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POLITICAL MAP 

OF 

EUROPE IN 191^ 



UC£ilj4. 



J:! AT cu?^ 



STAKES OF THE WAR 

Summary of the various Problems , 

Claims and Interests of the Nations 

at the Peace Table 



BY 
LOTHROP STODDARD, A.M., Ph.D. (Harv.) 

Author of "Present Day Europe: Its National States of Mind," 
"The French Revolution in San Domingo," etc. 

AND 

GLENN FRANK, B.A. (Northwestekn) 
Sometime Lecturer on Social-Economics 



ILLUSTRATED 
WITH MAPS 




NEW YORK 

THE CENTURY CO. 

1918 



V 



i^f^'^O 



Copyright, 1918, by 
The Century Co. 



Published, April, 1918) 



gia.A50l696 

SEP -5 !9I8 



^x-^ \ 



TO 
OUR MOTHERS 



FOREWORD 

I have read with much interest and instruction this book. 
It sets forth in a concise and readable form the relevant facts 
in respect to every country whose condition is likely to be 
the subject of consideration by the powers who shall make 
the treaty of peace for the great war and construct the ma- 
chinery for the maintenance of future peace. Alsace-Lor- 
raine, the Trentino, the country about Trieste, the Balkans, 
the Baltic provinces, the Ukraine, Constantinople, Armenia, 
Egypt, Arabia, Palestine, Persia, Africa, and the German 
colonies are all discussed in sententious paragraphs, with the 
statistics which one wishes to have, and which it is difficult 
to find elsewhere massed all together in one volume. The 
various plans for the disposition of these lands, with the 
probable attitude of the interested countries toward such 
plans, is also summarily set forth. The book is not an argu- 
mentative or contentious work. It takes no side. It is a 
book of ready reference. It is practical in its information 
because all the various countries likely to cause dispute be- 
tween the Powers are laid down upon a small chart, so to 
speak, where they may be compared. It is a book most valu- 
able to every one who expects to follow the course of inter- 
national politics and settlements in this war. Its publication 
could not be more opportune. The names of the authors are 
an earnest of its fairness and accuracy. 




New Haven, Connecticut 



PREFACE 

Yesterday the detailed facts of European and Asiatic poli- 
tics, race, trade, industry, and religion were of primary in- 
terest to the scholar and foreign trader. To-day they inject 
themselves into the discussions of every counting-room, throw 
their shadow across the deliberations of every labor council, 
and stand as stubborn factors in the personal fortune and 
future of every American. Foreign affairs have become the 
personal concern of the man in the street, no less than the 
professional concern of the scholar and the trader. Not that 
these facts have not always had profound influence upon 
American interests ; but it remained for the war to force upon 
us, as a people, a belated recognition of the fact that we are 
part and parcel of a world of interlaced interests in which 
no nation can play a lone hand. 

This book is an attempt to chart the facts involved in those 
problems of race and territory which the war has shoved into 
the foreground of our political and business thinking, which 
will demand solution at the peace-table, and with the impli- 
cations of which we shall hereafter be obliged to deal — facts 
which no business man can in safety overlook if he is to plan 
wisely for the future; facts which no labor leader can pru- 
dently ignore if he is to guard the gains of the past and 
guarantee the development of the future ; facts which no legis- 
lator can leave out of his thinking if he is to bring constructive 
statesmanship to bear upon American policy ; facts which the 
average American must know in order to read his daily paper 
with full appreciation of the related meanings of the news, 
filled as it to-day is with new names, new factors, new prob- 
lems forced upon his attention by necessity and self-interest. 

In writing this book we have tried to keep strictly to the 



viii PREFACE 

role of reporters of facts. We have studiously avoided the 
expression of personal opinions. It may be thought that we 
have indulged in opinion at the points where we have dealt 
with the various solutions proposed for the several problems ; 
but here again we have only set down some of the solutions 
that statesmen, publicists, and political schools have advanced. 
We have tried to report, with no admixture of our personal 
opinions, what ends those who have proposed a given solution 
think it will serve, and to record as well the objections that 
have been raised to such solution. We have included these 
statements of proposed solutions in this book of facts because 
the points of view and convictions which they represent are 
as truly facts for political engineering to reckon with at the 
peace-table as any matter of race or trade. But we have not 
in any instance placed our personal valuation upon a solution. 

The reader may get the impression that we have not taken 
into full account the practical force of the political idealism 
that has taken such concrete form in the recent state papers 
of the United States and of our associates in the war ; it may 
be thought that in listing the interests of Russia, let us say, 
we have overlooked the renunciation of many old interests that 
has been made by the present revolutionary leaders ; or, again, 
where we state that the possession of a certain territory by a 
given nation would cut off from the sea certain other nations, 
it may seem that we have left out of our reckoning the growing 
determination of statesmanship that the problem of access 
to the sea for all nations shall be constructively met at the 
peace conference by adequate international arrangements. 

In all such cases, however, it must be remembered that this 
book is not a propagandist document, but an attempt to list 
all of the concrete factors that must be dealt with by the new 
statesmanship or by the revolutionist philosophy in the at- 
tempt to work out a new order of economic and political 
relationships. 

Nor in discussing the interests that several nations have in 



PREFACE ix 

a given territory have we mixed our opinion with the analysis. 
We have tried accurately to tabulate the interests claimed by 
the several nations, as those claims have been expressed in 
the writings and pronouncements of their respective states- 
men, publicists, business men, and other leaders of opinion. 
If such an arrangement of facts enables the reader to see in 
turn through English, French, Russian, German, or Italian 
eyes, the method will be justified; for what a nation thinks 
its interests are may be as real a factor in political calcula- 
tion a& what its interests really are. 

We have not been lured into any ambitious attempt to 
guide American opinion. We have tried simply to bring to- 
gether the raw materials of fact from which an intelligent 
public opinion can draw its own conclusions. 

There are books beyond number that draw sweeping gen- 
eralizations regarding international politics and organization. 
The danger is that generalizations will determine the opinion 
of America before American opinion has acquired that saving 
balance of judgment which comes only with a knowledge of 
facts. A literature of generalization is indeed awakening the 
American mind to interest in world affairs, but we need a 
literature of fact before the public mind has been captured by 
the special pleader. 

We have been obliged to set definite limitations to the scope 
of these studies. We have not dealt with those problems 
which are essentially matters of international law with its 
cechnical considerations ; that field is well treated in many ex- 
isting volumes. We have not considered the problem of 
China; that problem, as such, may not come up for specific 
action by the conference that settles this war, although it 
doubtless holds important possibilities for the future. We 
have not treated the problem of straits and canals ; that prob- 
lem promises to fall largely in the field of international regu- 
lation and control, which has not lacked constructive treat- 
ment at many hands. 



X PREFACE 

We have taken as a basis for this volume those racial and 
territorial problems directly involved in the war at the time 
the book goes to press, and which are virtually certain to be 
treated at the peace-table. This delimitation of field has ex- 
cluded certain problems of race and territory which may be 
raised if still other nations are drawn into the war. Like- 
wise it has ruled out certain other problems of race and terri- 
tory, the treatment of which at the hands of the peace con- 
ference is highly problematic. 

With the international situation daily changing with un- 
precedented swiftness, it has been clearly out of the question 
to write a book that would record with scientific accuracy and 
completeness the statistics of race and industry of the immedi- 
ate war-governed situation. We have, therefore, used no sta- 
tistics later than those of December 31, 1913. Later statistics 
are difficult to obtain, and, when obtainable, are frequently 
juggled. But even though accurate statistics of the immedi- 
ate situation were in all instances obtainable, they would be 
less pertinent to the purpose of these studies than the pre-war 
statistics. The statistics of the present situation, especially 
the economic statistics, deal with an abnormal situation, 
whereas these problems must be settled upon the basis of the 
normal situation which peace involves. Therefore, choice 
would prompt, even though necessity did not dictate, the use 
of the statistics of 1913 in the analysis of the essential factors 
in each problem. 

May we repeat that we have sought to serve American opin- 
ion by the simple reporting of facts. In no small measure 
we have written this book from a sense of duty which recog- 
nizes that passionate devotion to ideals on the battle-field 
must be supplemented by realistic dealing with the facts of 
race and economics at the peace-table if sacrifice is to be re- 
warded with security. 

LoTHROP Stoddard, 
Boston, January, 1918, Glenn Frank. 



BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 

The bibliographies in this book do not pretend to complete- 
ness. Our aim has been to cite the noteworthy books on the 
various subjects dealt with which have been written in Eng- 
lish, French, German, and Italian, and which have been pub- 
lished within the last generation. In this way the reader who 
desires more detailed information on any particular subject 
is referred to recent and fairly general works. From the bib- 
liographical references in these works he can discover those 
older or more technical books which will enable him to go still 
deeper than the limitations of space and the synthetic pur- 
pose of this volume have permitted. 

In order to aid the reader in his prospective researches, we 
have endeavored wherever possible to subdivide our bibli- 
ographies into three sections: (1) historical, (2) economic, 
(3) general. 

The historical section contains not only technical historical 
works, but also books of a more popular character, describing 
contemporary conditions, etc. The economic section contains 
the leading official or non-official reference-publications in the 
particular field in question, together with books of a pre- 
dominantly economic content. The general section contains 
all books not falling clearly within the two preceding cate- 
gories, thus including both the lighter books of travel and 
works on special topics other than economic. 

Naturally, it has not been possible always to subdivide with 
absolute accuracy. Many books fall so on the line that their 
exact classification is a moot point. Again, in certain chap- 
ters, the total bibliography is so scanty that we have thought 



xii BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 

it better to place the entire list under the general category at 
the end of the chapter. 

Despite these imperfections, we believe that our classifica- 
tion will serve a useful purpose by enabling the reader to 
pick out books on particular matters with a minimum of time 
wasted in consulting volumes not germane to his special 
enquiry. 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER WESTERN EUROPE p^oe 

I Belgium 3 

II Alsace-Lorraine 23 



NORTHERN EUROPE 

III SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN 41 

IV Finland 51 

V Baltic Provinces 65 

EASTERN EUROPE 

VI Poland 77 

VII Lithuania 109 

VIII Czecho-Slovak Territories 119 

IX Ukraine Territories 135 

THE BALKANS 

X Italia Irredenta 147 

XI Yugo-Slav Territories 167 

XII Macedonia 193 

XIII Albania . 209 

XIV Greater Rumania 221 

XV Dobrudja 243 

THE NEAR EAST 

XVI Constantinople 253 

XVII Asia Minor 261 

XVIII Armenia 277 

XIX Syria 289 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

XX Mesopotamia 299 

XXI Arabia 309 

XXII Egypt 323 

XXIII Persia 337 

Appendix on the Colonial Problem 349 

LIST OF MAPS 

Political Map of Europe in 1914 Frontispiece 

Belgium-Luxemburg 2 

Alsace-Lorraine 22 

Schleswig-Holstein 40 

Finland 50 

The Baltic Provinces 64 

Ethnographical Map of Europe 74 

The Polish Problem 76 

Lithuania 108 

Czecho-Slovak 118 

Ukraine Territories , 134 

Italia Irredenta 146 

Economic Map of Europe 164 

Yugo-Slav Territories 166 

Greater Rumania 220 

The Near East 252 

Map of Africa ....,».,. ^ ^ .. . 348 



WESTERN EUROPE 
BELGIUM 



STAKES OF THE WAR 

CHAPTER I 
BELGIUM 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 

Belgium is a sort of geographical half-way house between 
the marshlands of the North Sea coast and the uplands of west- 
central Europe. The north and west parts are low plains. 
The southeastern half is hill-country. Here again geography 
has played a determining role in history. The geographical 
difference between the two sections of Belgian territory ac- 
counts for the racial difference between the two sections of 
Belgian population ; and this racial division is the outstanding 
problem of the internal history of Belgium. 

The low plains of the north and west fell easy prey to the 
Germanic barbarians when they swept southward at the fall 
of the Roman Empire. To-day the modern Flemings, the 
descendants of these invaders, form a solid block of popula- 
tion which is thoroughly Teutonic in blood, language, and 
basic culture. They are, in fact, blood-brothers of their 
northern neighbors, the Dutch. 

But the more defensible hills of the southeastern half of 
Belgium enabled the Latinized Celtic population to hold its 
ground against the Germanic invaders. There was not, there- 
fore, the racial displacement in the southeast that there was 
in the north and west of Belgium. The modem Walloons 
occupying this section of Belgium are descendants of the old 

3 



4 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Latinized Celtic folk, and therefore are a French-speaking 
people closely related to their kinsmen in France. 

Belgium's history has been singularly troubled. The nat- 
ural point of focus for several lines of political pressure, 
Belgium has for centuries been the cockpit wherein the great 
powers of Europe have fought for special advantage and 
supremacy. 

For more than two centuries previous to 1870, France 
aspired to control Belgium. During the Napoleonic era 
Belgium was actually in French hands. As a barrier to 
French aggression, the Vienna Congress of 1814 united Bel- 
gium and Holland into the Kingdom of the Netherlands. 
But this union was of short duration, because the French- 
speaking Walloons, whose racial self-consciousness had been 
intensified by the preceding generation of French rule, chafed 
under the rule of Dutchmen and Flemings which the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands involved. The Walloons, taking advan- 
tage of the religious cleavage between the Catholic Flemings 
and the Protestant Dutch, won sufficient Flemish support to 
launch the successful revolution of 1830, which resulted in 
the establishment of Belgium as an independent state. 

From 1830 until 1914 Belgium enjoyed unwonted immunity 
from foreign pressure. The old French menace had almost, 
if not entirely, ceased to be a factor in Belgium's political 
calculations, and fear of Germany did not become acute until 
the very eve of the present war. This long period of peace 
brought prosperity to Belgium and made her one of the com- 
manding industrial centers of the world. 

Her most vexing problem was the growing breach between 
the Walloons and the Flemings. During the generation after 
1830 there was a marked racial and cultural revival among the 
Flemings, giving momentum to a growing protest against the 
privileged position that the Walloon leaders of the revolu- 
tion of 1830 had accorded the French language and culture. 
The Walloons, jealous of their advantages, feared that the 



BELGIUM 5 

slightly more numerous Flemish element might ultimately 
secure political supremacy. In the years immediately pre- 
ceding the present war Flemish-Walloon antagonism was 
acute. Flemish extremists threatened secession to Holland, 
while "Walloon extremists hinted at union with France. 

Then came the German invasion of 1914, and differences of 
race and culture were temporarily adjourned in the face of a 
common disaster. Historically speaking, this German inva- 
sion is the last of a long series of attempts from various 
quarters to acquire, as a strategic right of way or actual 
dependency, this eminently desirable region, the control of 
which would go far toward making the possessor master of 
western Europe. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Balau, S. Soixante-dix Ans d'Histoire contemporaine de la Belgique 
1815-84. Brussels, 1890. 

Bavay, C. V. de. Histoire de la Revolution beige de 1830. Brussels, 
1873. 

Boulger, D. C. Belgium of the Belgians. London, 1911. 

Boulger, D. C. The History of Belgium. London, 1913. 

Charriaut, H. La Belgique moderne. Paris, 1910. 

Ensor, R. C. K. Belgium. London, 1915. 

Hanslik, E. Das Konigreich Belgien. Berlin, 1910. 

Hymans, L. Cinquante Ans de la Liberte. 4 vols. Brussels, 1880. 

Hymans, L. Histoire parlementaire de la Belgique. 6 vols. Brussels, 
1878-80. 

Hymans, L. La Belgique contemporaine. Mons, 1880. 

MacDonnell, J. de C. Belgium, Her Kings, Kingdom and People. Lon- 
don, 1914. 

Olschewsky, S. Leopold II, Roi des Beiges, sa Vie et son Regne, Brus- 
sels, 1905. 

Pirenne, H. Histoire de Belgique. Vols. 1-4. Brussels, 1900-1911. 

Quelle, O. Belgien. Braunschweig, 1916. 

Scudamore, C. Belgium and the Belgians. London, 1901. 

Siosteen, G. Das moderne Belgien. Berlin, 1909. 

Smythe, C. The Story of Belgium. London, 1900. 

Stokes, H. and Brangwyn, F. Belgium. London, 1915. 

Van der Essen, L. A Short History of Belgium. London, 1916. 



THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 



ECONOMIC SURVEY 

At the time of the German invasion of 1914, Belgium was 
one of the most flourishing economic areas in the world. 
Fertility of soil, extent of mineral resources, variety of manu- 
factures, and ample trade communications combine to produce 
a well-balanced prosperity and economic completeness. 

Nearly all the soil of Belgium is productive. Of its total 
area of 7,264,159 acres, 4,287,920 acres are under cultivation, 
and 1,286,870 acres are in forest, with only 469,300 acres 
fallow or uncultivated. In 1912 the yield from the cultivated 
area was as follows, estimated in long tons: Cereal crops 
(wheat, barley, oats, and rye), 1,535,859 tons; potatoes, 162,- 
653 tons ; sugar-beets, 85,126 tons ; tobacco, 9,867 tons. 

The average yearly value of Belgian forest products is 
about 21,500,000 francs. 

At the end of 1912 the live-stock possessions of Belgium 
stood as follows: Horses, 262,709; horned cattle, 1,830,747; 
pigs, 1,348,514. 

The most valuable mineral product of Belgium is coal. 
The extensive coal-deposits near Liege and Mons, in the 
southeastern part, have long been the basis of Belgium's 
industrial life, and the opening of a rich new coal-field in the 
province of Limburg in 1906 promised a fresh accession of 
industrial power. 

Southeastern Belgium also contains valuable iron deposits, 
although these are showing signs of exhaustion, and therefore 
Belgium's iron and steel industries depend somewhat upon 
the importation of iron ore from Luxemburg and French 
Lorraine. 

In 1912 the mineral output of Belgium stood as follows: 
Pig-iron, 2,301,290 tons; manufactured iron, 334,750 tons; 
steel ingots, 2,515,040 tons; steel rails, 1,903,270 tons; zinc, 
205,940 tons ; lead, 102,020 tons ; silver 279,965 kilograms. 



BELGIUM 1 

The total value of the pig-iron, manufactured iron, steel 
ingots, and steel rails produced in 1912 was 700,000,000 francs. 
Belgium possesses, in addition to these mineral resources, 
many valuable quarries of granite, marble, and slate. 

The possession of coal and iron, basic factors of modern 
industrial life, together with an industrious and intelligent 
working population, has enabled Belgium to erect an impos- 
ing industrial structure. The country is dotted with work- 
shops and factories which produce a wide variety of articles. 
Eastern Belgium is the center of the iron and steel trades, 
producing particularly railway materials, fire-arms, and ma- 
chinery. Western Belgium, especially Flanders, is the center 
of the textile industry, producing both cotton and woolen 
fabrics. Linens, laces, gloves, and other allied products fig- 
ure in its output. Other important industries are window 
glass, paper, oil-cloth, dyes and colors, as well as miscellaneous 
chemical products. 

With these adequate bases of resource and production 
Belgium has succeeded in building up an extensive commerce. 
Belgium holds sixth place in the commercial ranking of the 
nations. In 1912, Belgium's exports amounted to 3,951,- 
000,000 francs ; her imports, 4,958,000,000 francs. By virtue 
of location, Belgium is a natural trade-link between central 
Europe and the outer world. This means for Belgium an 
important transit-trade which in 1912 amounted to 2,437,000,- 
000 francs. This is due to the fact that her great port of Ant* 
werp, near the mouth of the Scheldt River, is accessible to 
the largest ocean-going steamers and connected with the rest 
of Europe by a network of railways and canals. Through 
her expanding merchant marine, which in 1912 totaled 181,- 
637 tons, Belgium reaped a further profit from her overseas 
trade. 



THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

The official publications of the Central Statistical Commission and 
of the various administrative departments of the Belgian Government, 
Agriculture, Industry and Labor, Interior, Railways, et cetera — are 
adequate sources. 

The following are handy compendiums of general statistical in- 
formation : 

Annuaire statistique de la Belgique et du Congo beige. 
Annual. Brussels. 

Statesman's Year Book. Annual. London. 
Billiard, R. La Belgique industrielle et commerciale de demain. Paris, 

1915. 
Bouche, B. Les Ouvriers agricoles en Belgique. Brussels, 1914. 
Cosoiu, M. N. Die belgische Handelspolitik der letzten 40 Jahre. 

Stuttgart, 1914. 
Deiss, E. Anvers et la Belgique maritime. Paris, 1899. 
Deschesne, L. L'expansion economique de la Belgique. Brussels, 1900. 
DujardinBaumetz, M. Histoire graphique de I'lndustrie houillere en 

Belgique. Paris, 1888. 
Ghislain, O. Geographic industrielle et commerciale de la Belgique. 

Brussels, 1903. 
Guillery, J. Les Soeiet^s commerciales en Belgique. 3 vols. Brussels, 

1883. 
Leener, G. de. La Politique des Transports en Belgique. Brussels,. 

1913. 
Lewinski, J. S. L'Evolution industrielle de la Belgique. Brussels, 

1911. 
Martel, H. Le Dgveloppement commercial de la Belgique. Annual. 

Brussels. 
Prost, E. La Belgique agricole, industrielle, et commerciale. Paris, 

1904. 
Rowntree, B. S. Land and Labor; Lessons from Belgium. London, 

1910. 



THE FACTS ABOUT BELGIUM 

Where Belgium is Located 

Belgium is located at the point where the marshlands of the 
North Sea coast merge into the uplands of west-central 



BELGIUM 9 

Europe. It is bounded by Holland on the north, the English 
Channel on the west, France on the south, and Germany on 
the east. 

Territorul Units Involved 

Belgium has an area of 11,373 square miles, about equaling 
the combined areas of Maryland and Delaware. 

(Luxemburg, dealt with in an annex to the Belgian prob- 
lems, has an area of 999 square miles.) 

Different Races in Belgium 

The Walloons (French-speaking element) number about 2,- 
833,000 and occupy the hilly southern half of Belgium. They 
are of all social classes. Before the war they enjoyed a 
slightly higher political and cultural status than the Flemings. 
They appear to have slightly less economic efficiency than the 
Flemings. 

The Flemings (Flemish-speaking element) number about 
3,220,000 and are found in the flat northern half of Belgium. 
They are of all social classes. As part of a Teutonist policy, 
the German government, since its occupation of Belgium, has 
seemed to favor the Flemings at the expense of the Walloons. 

Besides the figures above quoted, which represent those 
persons who speak only French or Flemish, there were in 1910 
(the census from which all these figures are drawn) 871,000 
persons speaking both French and Flemish. The majority of 
these should be classed as Flemish in blood. 

Who Controlled Belgium Before the War 
Belgium. 

Who Has Controlled or Occupied Belgium Since 
THE War Began 

Germany has occupied and controlled all of Belgium except 
a small tract in the extreme west on the sea-coast adjacent to 



10 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

the French frontier. This tract has been held by the rem- 
nant of the Belgian army, aided by Allied troops. 

Belgium's Interests 

The interest of Belgians in the restoration of Belgium as 
an independent state is so patent and vital that it needs no 
topical consideration. 

Germany's Interests in Belgium 

Political. German retention of Belgium would shift the 
political balance of power in western Europe to the decided 
favor of Germany. It would reduce France to a position of 
precarious dependence, turn Holland into a mere enclave 
of the German Empire, and menace England with subjection 
to German dominance. On the other hand, Germany would 
regard a restored Belgium, frankly hostile to Germany and 
allied with France and England, as shifting the balance of 
power in western Europe considerably against Germany, 

Economic. The great accession of economic strength that 
would accrue to Germany from the retention of Belgium is 
clear from a consideration of the economic resources of Bel- 
gium. The Belgian port of Antwerp would be invaluable 
to Germany as a part of her machinery of trade distribution. 

Strategic. German retention of Belgium would envelop 
France both to the north and east, making a German drive 
on Paris possible at any time. It would render Holland de- 
fenseless against Germany. It would menace England's sea- 
power through German control of Antwerp and render rea- 
sonably practicable a German invasion of England by virtue 
of a solid German foothold on the English Channel. On the 
other hand, a hostile Belgium, supported by France and Eng- 
land, would be in an advantageous position for an offensive 
against Germany's industrial heart, Westphalia and Rhine- 
land. Germany's principal arsenal, the Krupp works at 
Essen, lies within striking distance of the Belgian frontier. 



BELGIUM 11 

Racial. In the extreme east of Belgium, near the German 
border, is the small district of Verviers, inhabited by about 
30,000 German-speaking peasants. There are, of course, con- 
sideraWe colonies of Germans (business men and others) in 
the Belgian cities, notably Antwerp. Many Germans, how- 
ever, particularly those of the Pan-Germanist school of 
thought, assert that since the Flemish population of Belgium 
belongs to the Teutonic race, it might ultimately be assimilated 
by the German nationality. This is one of the arguments 
adduced in Germany for the annexation of Belgium to the 
German Empire. 

Cultural. The Teutonic cast of the language and culture 
of the Flemings and their close historic affiliations with Ger- 
many are emphasized by the Pan-Germans. 

Religious. The great majority of the population of Bel- 
gium is Roman Catholic. There are only 28,000 Protestants 
and 13,000 Jews in Belgium. Although the tendency of the 
Flemings to be devout Roman Catholics and of the Walloons 
to be free-thinking laicists undoubtedly is a factor in compli- 
cating the relations of these two nationalities within Belgium, 
religion has virtually no bearing upon the international aspect 
of the Belgian problem. 

France's Interests in Belgium 

Political. France regards a strong Belgium as essential 
to the preservation of the balance of power in western Eu- 
rope against the possibility of German aggression. Some 
Frenchmen think the solution lies in the neutralization of 
Belgium under adequate international guaranties. Others, 
skeptical of this arrangement, desire an independent Belgium 
in friendly alliance with France. 

Economic. France is partly dependent upon Belgian coal. 
There exists a close economic connection between the adjoining 
industrial areas of southern Belgium and northern France. 



12 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Belgium is an important market for French products. In 
1912, France exported to Belgium to the extent of 908,000,000 
francs, while Belgium exported to France to the extent of 
752,000,000 francs. Thus France was importing from Bel- 
gium more than from any other country except Germany. 

Strategic. A restored Belgium, adequately guaranteed 
against German aggression, would safeguard the rather inde- 
fensible northern frontier of France, and a friendly or allied 
Belgium would even enable France, by a quick thrust, to reach 
the vital industrial centers of Westphalia and Rhineland, as 
before suggested. 

Racial. The Walloon part of the Belgian population is 
French in blood and language. France has every concern, 
therefore, to see that the interests of this largest block of 
French-speaking people outside of France are safeguarded 
and furthered. 

Cultural. The culture of the Walloons is French, a fact 
which reinforces the racial interest and deepens French con- 
cern in Belgium. Should the Walloons ultimately succeed in 
assimilating the Flemings, thereby making Belgium a solidly 
French-speaking nation, it would obviously mean a marked 
gain for French cultural power. 

Religious. Virtually no religious interest figures in French 
calculations regarding Belgium. 

England's Interests in Belgium 

Political. English political thought regards a strong and 
independent Belgium as essential to England's position as a 
great power. England realizes that the possession of Bel- 
gium by any Continental great power would mean the holding 
of the key to the European situation. 

Economic. In 1912, England stood third in Belgian trade 
countries both as regards imports and exports, imports stand- 
ing 505,000,000 francs and exports 594,000,000 francs. The 
economic tie is close. 



BELGIUM 1^ 

Strategic. A German-controlled Belgium would menace 
England's sea-power by giving Germany naval bases on the 
English Channel. This is especially significant as a potential 
menace since the development of the submarine as a factor 
in naval warfare. It would also threaten England with direct 
military invasion. 

Racial. None. 

Cultural. None. 

Religious. None. 

Holland's Interests in Belgium 

Political. Mutual trade between Holland and Belgium is 
large. In 1912, Holland exported to Belgium to the extent of 
356,000,000 francs and imported from Belgium to the extent 
of 367,000,000 francs. 

Strategic. A German-controlled Belgium would leave Hol- 
land with an indefensible frontier against Germany. 

Racial. The Flemings are blood-brothers of the Dutch. 
There is virtually no racial difference between the two stocks. 

Cultural. Flemish and Dutch culture are essentially the 
same. The Flemish tongue is a dialect of the Dutch. The 
literary language of the two bodies is the same. This unity 
of blood and culture has led many, on both sides of the fron- 
tier, to regret the violent separation of 1830 and to dream 
of a political reunion of the Flemish part, at least, of Bel- 
gium with Holland. This aspiration is embodied in the 
"Great Netherland" school of political thought. 

Religious. The fact that the Flemings are predominantly 
Roman Catholic, while the Dutch royal house and most of the 
Dutch people are strong Protestants, is a formidable handicap 
to the spread of the Great Netherland idea. Religion is the 
principal factor which has kept apart these two stocks racially 
indistinguishable. 



14 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Solutions that Have Been Proposed and What They 

Mea.n 

1. Status Quo ante helium under Stronger International 

Guaranties. 

A guaranteed independence for Belgium naturally appeals 
to the greatest number as the essentially just and desirable 
solution. The continued security of Belgium as a small state 
would be the living symbol of a just and stable world order. 
But the independence of Belgium is important not only as a 
symbol of the recognized rights of small nations as a general 
principle, but for the maintenance of the liberties of Europe. 
The way in which, at each instance of aggression against Bel- 
gium, leagues of European states have spontaneously formed 
to resist the aggressors, as in the case of Spain, Prance, and 
Germany, proves that there is clear recognition, instinctive as 
well as reasoned, that Belgium in the hands of any one strong 
power would threaten Europe with subjection to the military 
despotism that nation could thereby create. 

The fact that Belgium has a maximum of desirability and 
a minimum of defensibility maJjes it a vulnerable point in the 
European fabric and a constant invitation to aggression. 

Two things are essential to the successful maintenance of 
an independent Belgium : the establishment of a new inter- 
national order that will conduce to greater international co- 
operation and world security instead of the traditional clutch- 
ing at distributive shares of desirable territory, and a con- 
structive solution of Belgium's internal racial strife between 
the Flemings and the Walloons. 

2. A Greater Belgium. 

The suggestion of such a solution would most probably 
come from the French-speaking Walloon school of thought, 
supported by their sympathizers in Prance, representing as 
they do the imperialistic sentiment in Belgium. This would 



BELGIUM 15 

probably imply the annexation to Belgium of the Grand 
Duchy of Luxemburg, Dutch Flanders, with a Belgian-Dutch 
co-ownership of the mouth of the Scheldt, and Dutch Lim- 
burg. These annexations have been urged in some quarters 
for years. 

This would mean, by the resulting extension of territory 
and population, an appreciable strengthening of Belgium. It 
would not, however, lift Belgium to the rank of a great power 
or lessen materially the necessity for international guar- 
anties. While extending the size of the Belgian state, it would 
intensify the internal race problem. The Flemings would 
object to such spoliation of Holland. The inhabitants of 
Dutch Flanders and Limburg would look with little enthu- 
siasm on such a change of allegiance. 

Since the war began some Belgians contend that a band 
of German territory to the east of the present Belgian fron- 
tier should be annexed in order to give Belgium a strategic 
frontier against renewed German attack. Some Belgians de- 
sire to extend their frontier even as far as the Rhine. This 
would still leave Belgium a small power, however, and would 
intensify Belgium's racial problem by bringing in a body of 
recalcitrant Germans. It would imply permanent hostility to 
Germany and probably close alliance with France. 

3. A German Annexed or Controlled Belgium. 

This would virtually mean a German hegemony of Europe. 
It would give Germany a strategic position on the English 
Channel from which she could bring a menacing pressure 
upon, if not invade, England. It would mean a German en- 
velopment of France on the north and east sides. It would 
mean an enormous accession of economic power to the German 
Empire by giving it the resources of Belgium and the port 
of Antwerp. 

4. A Division of Belgium along Racial Lines. 

This would imply the extinction of Belgium as a state, and 



16 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

its division between France and Holland, France taking the 
Walloon part and Holland the Fleming part. This would of 
course remove the standing racial friction. Division could be 
made along fairly clear lines, leaving very few conflicting ele- 
ments in eith-er part. A proposal for division would get its 
main support from the extreme elements among the Flemings, 
who dream of a Greater Netherland in which they would join 
their Dutch kinsmen, and from the extreme element among 
the Walloons who would prefer to join their French kinsmen 
rather than make further political and cultural concessions 
to the Flemings. Against these elements and points of view 
would, of course, be the national patriotism that has grown up 
during the century of Belgian independence and which has 
been vivified through the common defense during the present 
war. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Banning, E. La Belgique au Point de Vue militaire et ihternationale. 
Brussels, 1901. 

Bissing, W. von. Belgien unter deutache Verwaltung. Munich, 1915. 

Blanchard, R. La Flandre. Paris, 1906. 

Boubee, J. La Belgique loyale, heroique et malheureuse. Paris, 1916. 

Bramer, K. Nationalitat und Sprache im Konigreiche Belgien. Stutt- 
gart, 1887. 

Cumont, F. Comment la Belgique fut romanisee. Brussels, 1914. 

Davignon, H. La Belgique et I'AlIemagne. London, 1915. 

De Backer, L. La Langue flamande en France. Ghent, 1893. 

De Gourmont, R. La Belgique litteraire. Paris, 1916. 

Demarteau, D. Le Flamand, le Wallon. Li&ge, 1889. 

Denecke, T. ^^Igien und Nordfrankreich. Hamburg, 1915. 

Hamelius, L. Le Mouvement flamand. Brussels, 1894. 

Hampe, K. Belgiens Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, Leipzig, 1916. 

Kessler, O. Das deutsche Belgien. Berlin, 1915. 

Kurth, G. La Frontiere linguistique en Belgique et dans le Nord de la 
France. Brussels, 1898. 

Kurth, G. La Nationality beige. Brussels, 1913. 

Lambreeht, N. Preussische Wallonie. Essen, 1909. 

Langhammer, J. Belgiens "Vergangenheit und Zukunft. Warmsdorf, 
1916. 



BELGIUM 17 

Laveleye, E. de. Le Parti clerical en Belgique. Paris, 1874. 
Massart, J. Belgians xrnder the German Eagle. London, 1916. 
Waxweiler, E. Belgium, Neutral and Loyal. London, 1915. 
Wilmotte, M. La Belgique, morale et politique. Brussels, 1902. 
Woeste, C. Vingt Ans de Polemique. Brussels, 1894. 



LUXEMBURG: ANNEX TO THE BELGIAN PROBLEM 

Luxemburg is an independent, neutralized grand duchy, 
situated at the junction of Germany, France, and Belgium. 
Its area is 999 square miles; its population 260,000. Its in- 
habitants are mostly of Teutonic blood and speak a German 
patois, though the upper classes also speak French. The 
country is, in fact, a meeting-ground of German and French 
culture. 

Though small in area, Luxemburg is a valuable bit of terri- 
tory. Its hilly surface covers rich iron deposits much worked 
in recent years. The soil is generally fertile. 

Though politically independent of Germany, Luxemburg 
is within the German Zollverein, or customs-union, and most 
of its trade is with Germany. 

For centuries Luxemburg has been a bone of contention 
between France and Germany. During the Middle Ages it 
formed part of the Medieval German Empire (Holy Roman 
Empire), though the French made several attempts to conquer 
it, and actually held it for several years during the reign of 
Louis XIV in the latter part of the seventeenth century. 
Again conquered by the French in the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars, the Vienna Congress of 1814 assigned it 
to the King of Holland. It was not, however, made Dutch 
territory, but was left within the Germanic Confederation, 
the rights of the Dutch king thus being dynastic, not national. 
"When the Germanic Confederation was dissolved in 1866, 
Luxemburg was declared a neutralized principality under 
the Dutch crown. This arrangement lasted until 1890, when 
the male line of the Dutch royal house failed, the last Dutch 



18 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

king being succeeded by his daughter, the present Queen 
Wilhelmina. By the ancient Salic law of succession, which 
covered Luxemburg, a younger branch of the Dutch royal 
house succeeded to the Ducal throne, and Luxemburg thence- 
forth became an independent grand duchy under its own line 
of sovereigns. 

In August, 1914, Luxemburg was overrun by German troops 
and has since been in German hands. 

Solutions that Have Been Proposed and What They 

Mean 

1. Status Quo Ante Bellum. 

This would imply Luxemburg as an independent grand 
duchy under international guaranties. This arrangement vir- 
tually stands or falls with the independence of Belgium under 
international guaranties. The same factors govern both situ- 
ations. In such a world as Belgium can live in, Luxemburg 
may know security. 

2. Annexation of Luxemburg to Germany. 

This would mean less of a wrench to the feelings of the 
Luxemburgers than the annexation of Belgium would to the 
Belgians, since Luxemburg is already within the German cus- 
toms-union and is a part of the German economic system. 
Most of its trade is with Germany. Most of the inhabitants 
speak a dialect of German as their mother tongue. There is, 
however, a strong local patriotism, which has probably been 
heightened by the German military occupation since 1914. 

3. Annexation of Luxemburg to France. 

Strong cultural ties bind Luxemburg to France. Most edu- 
cated Luxemburgers speak French as their second language 
and look upon France as their natural protector against Ger- 
man annexation. The annexation of Luxemburg to France 



BELGIUM 19 

would hardly be feasible except in connection with a French 
annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, since otherwise Luxemburg 
would be a small salient extending into German territory. 

4. Annexation of Luxemhurg to Belgium. 

Were the inhabitants to face the proved impossibility of 
continued independence, the annexation of Luxemburg to Bel- 
gium would better reconcile them to the loss of national iden- 
tity than annexation either to Germany or to France. Such a 
solution would also remove the possibility of either France or 
Germany charging the other with imperialistic designs. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Calmes, A. Das Gildsystem des Grossherzogtums Luxemburg. Munich, 
1907. 

Coster, J. Geschichte der Festung Luxemburg. Luxemburg, 1869. 

Eltz, J. Aus Luxemburgs Vergangenlieit und Gegenwart. Trier, 1891. 

Eyschen, P. Das Staatsrecht des Grossherzogtums Luxemburg. Frei- 
burg, 1890. 

Grovig, N. Luxemburg, Land und Volk. Luxemburg, 1867. 

Passmore, T. H. In Further Ardenne. London, 1905. 

Perk, M. A. Lirxemburgiana. Bussum, 1892. 

Prat, C. F. Histoire d'Arlon et de la Province de Luxembourg. Arlon, 
1874. 

Pflips, H. Das luxemburger Land. Aachen, 1895. 

Renwick, G. The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg and its People. London, 
1913. 

Schotter, J. Geschichte des luxemburger Landes. Luxemburg, 1882. 

Werveke, N. van. Beitrage zur Geschichte des luxemburger Landes. 
Luxemburg, 1887. 



WESTERN EUROPE 
ALSACE-LORRAINE 




fH^Z ALSACe-LOItRAIIVE 



CHAPTER II 
ALSACE-LOREAINE 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 

As its hyphenated name suggests, Alsace-Lorraine is com- 
posed of two distinct regions\the geographical differences of 
which are pronounced. Alsace is a sharply defined area co*n- 
sisting of a long and rather narrow alluvial plain stretching 
north and south between the "V^sges Mountains and the River 
Rhine. Lorraine is a hilly plateau, bounded on the west by 
the river valley of the Moselle, and to the eastward sinking 
into the Alsatian pl^in. 

The history of these tVo^egioni has been as different as 
their geography. Indeed, their history has Ijeen to no small 
degree different, just because their geography nasS^^A* dif- 
ferent. True, they were both thoroijghly Latinized under the 
Roman Empire, but thereafter their development was di- 
vergent. 

Because the Alsatian plain was open and accessible, when 
the Roman Empire fell the incoming tide of Teutonic bar- 
barians from across the Rhine easily flooded the Alsace region 
and overwhelmed entirely the old Gallo-Roman population. 
From that time on Alsace has been thoroughly Teutonic in 
blood and speech. 

But the broken hill country of Lorraine acted as a check 
on the Teutonic tide. The Teutonic hordes were able to oc- 
cupy only the eastern portion of the Lorraine region, the 
western part remaining predominantly Latin in language 
and Gallo-Roman in blood. This racial division has per- 
sisted virtually unchanged to the present day. In 1910, the 
official census of the German Empire indicates 1,634,000 of the 

23 



24 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine spoke German and 204,000 
spoke French. These language statistics must of course not 
be taken as an accurate index of the French or German sym- 
pathies of the population. Nearly all of the French-speaking 
population was concentrated in western Lorraine. 

During the Middle Ages both Alsace and Lorraine were 
parts of the medieval German Empire (Holy Roman Empire). 
Both, however, were semi-independent. Alsace was divided 
into many small feudal principalities and free cities. The 
present German province of Lorraine was part of the power- 
ful Duchy of Lorraine, which included much territory to-day 
a part of France. Embedded in this Duchy of Lorraine, as 
independent enclaves, were three ecclesiastical states, the 
bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun. 

It was through the Duchy of Lorraine that French influ- 
ence first made itself felt. Alsace was cut off from inter- 
course with the French world to the west by the rugged moun- 
tain-chain of the Vosges and bound closely to the Teutonic 
world across the Rhine, thereby remaining for a long time 
entirely German in thought and feeling. But Lorraine early 
felt the influence of French culture. The capital of the 
Duchy of Lorraine was Nancy, a city lying well within the 
French language-zone. The court of the Lorraine dukes 
thereby became increasingly French in character, and exerted 
a distinctly French cultural influence even over the German- 
speaking parts of the duchy. 

At the close of the Middle Ages France began to follow up 
this cultural conquest by political control. The Kingdom of 
France had now grown strong. The medieval German Em- 
pire had fallen into anarchic feebleness. Taking advantage 
of this state of things, France annexed the three bishoprics 
of Metz, Toul, and Verdun in 1552 and, by the early part of 
the next century, reduced the Duchy of Lorraine to an in- 
creasing dependence, which ended in formal annexation to 
France in 1766. 



ALSACE-LORRAINE 25 

Long before 1766, however, France had acquired Alsace. 
The complete prostration of Germany during the Thirty 
Years' War (1618-1648) enabled France to possess much of 
Alsace, the remainder of the region being annexed during 
the latter part of the century; so that by 1700 all Alsace 
was a French province save a few small enclaves which 
retained their independence until the French Revolution 
(1789). 

Two factors reconciled Alsace-Lorraine to French rule and 
furthered the spread of French culture and French ideals: 
the gradual nature of the French conquest and the tactful 
policy of the French government, which made no attempt to 
uproot the German language and culture of the Teutonic 
inhabitants. But it was the French Revolution that really 
bound Alsace-Lorraine to France. From that time until 
1870 the vast majority of Alsace-Lorrainers felt themselves to 
be Frenchmen and expressed no desire for political union 
with their Teutonic kinsmen beyond the Rhine. When, by 
the Treaty of Frankfort, which concluded the Franco-Prus- 
sian War in 1871, Alsace-Lorraine was annexed to the new 
German Empire, the change was bitterly resented by the in- 
habitants of the two provinces. Fully 50,000 Alsace-Lor- 
rainers emigrated to France at that time rather than become 
German citizens. And this emigration has never quite 
ceased, although of late years it has dwindled to negligible 
proportions. 

Since 1871, Alsace-Lorraine has been subjected to a syste- 
matic process of Germanization. The results of this German- 
ization process have varied greatly, however, with the differ- 
ent sections and racial elements. 

The French-speaking population of western Lorraine has 
stubbornly resisted Germanization, and beyond doubt to-day 
desires reunion with France. In fact, so solidly French was 
this region that Germany probably would not have demanded 
its cession had it not contained the great fortress of Metz, 



26 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

which German military leaders considered vital to a strategic 
frontier. 

On the other hand, the German-speaking population of 
eastern Lorraine apparently is fairly well reconciled to its 
new political status. 

In Alsace the bulk of the population seems to take a middle 
ground. The Alsatian, resembling in many ways his near 
kinsman the German Swiss, is a strong individualist, with a 
keen love of personal liberty. Two generations within the 
German Empire have doubtless done much to stimulate the 
fundamental Teutonism of the Alsatian nature. In fact, had 
German rule been tactful and liberal, Alsace might to-day be 
a contented member of the German Empire. But the tactless, 
oppressive, and brutal German rule, which has striven to up- 
root the last vestige of French culture, has sorely irritated this 
highly individualistic and liberty-loving people. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Babelon, E. La Grande Question d'Occident. Le Rhin dans I'Histoire. 

2 vols. Paris, 1915. 
Du Prel, H. Die deutsche Verwaltung in Elsass, 1870-1879. Strass- 

burg, 1879. 
Grad, 0. L'Alsaee: Le Pays et ses Habitants. Paris, 1909. 
Jacob, K. Die Erwerbung des Elsass durch Frankreich in westfalischen 

Frieden. Berlin, 1902. 
Miillenheim Rechberg. Die Annexion des Elsass durch Frankreich. 

Strassburg, 1897. 
Petersen, L. Das Deutschtum in Elsass Lothringen. Munich, 1902. 
Putnam, R. Alsace and Lorraine, from Caesar to Kaiser. 58 B.C.-1871 

AD. New York, 1915. 
Witte, H. Zur Geschichte des Deutschtums im Elsass und im Voges- 

engebiet. Strassburg, 1897. 

ECONOMIC SURVEY 

Alsace-Lorraine is an area of high economic importance due 
to its fertile soil, extensive mineral deposits, and effectively 
developed industrial life. 



ALSACE-LORRAINE 27 

Alsace is agriculturally the more important of the two 
provinces. The alluvial plain of the Rhine Valley and the 
lower parts of the numerous river valleys opening into it 
from the Vosges Mountains are markedly fertile. Lorraine 
soil is less fertile, but by no means barren. 

The 1913 crop-statistics, stated in metric tons (2,204 lbs.), 
showed the following yield: Wheat, 238,048 tons; rye, 92,- 
889 tons; barley, 108,678 tons; potatoes, 1,266,463 tons; oats, 
209,963 tons; hay, 1,137,786 tons; tobacco, (dried) in 1912, 
4,878 tons; hops, 1,595 tons. 

In addition, 67,090 acres of vineyards yielded 3,934,442 
gallons of wine. 

At the beginning of 1913 the live-stock possessions of 
Alsace-Lorraine stood as follows : Horses, 136,536 ; horned 
cattle, 522,029 ; sheep, 45,519 ; goats, 70,978 ; pigs, 430,161. 

The mountain pastures of the Vosges conduce to the rais- 
ing of live stock. The famous Miinster cheese is one of the 
valuable dairy products of this region. 

The greatest mineral asset of Alsace-Lorraine is iron, pos- 
sessing, as it does, the largest deposit of iron ore in Europe. 
The iron beds of western Lorraine are reckoned to contain two 
billion tons, or five sevenths of the estimated total iron re- 
sources of the German Empire. The iron output of this 
region in 1913 was 21,000,000 metric tons. Because of the 
phosphoric quality of this iron, it yields fertilizer by-products 
sufficient to supply the entire German Empire and leave an 
export surplus. In 1902 valuable potash deposits were dis- 
covered in the Alsatian Vosges. 

Other mineral products, such as coal and salt, are found. 
The 1913 mineral-statistics stood as follows : Iron, 21,136,265 
tons; coal, 3,795,932 tons; salt, 76,672 tons. 

Besides these, there are valuable gypsum and limestone 
quarries; 38,509 persons were employed in the mines and 
quarries. 

The chief industry of the region is the textile works, found 



28 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

mainly in Alsace, centering at Miilhausen and Colmar and in 
the neighboring valleys of the Vosges. The cotton manufac- 
ture is the most important in the German Empire. The 
woollen industry is of smaller proportions. About 76,000 
persons were employed in these industries in 1913. 

The industry and commerce of Alsace-Lorraine are en- 
hanced by the fact of excellent facilities of communication. 
The region is a natural connecting-link between the north and 
south and the east and west. This is particularly true of 
Alsace. The River Rhine, the numerous canals, and good 
railways constitute a good transportation system. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

The principal reference books dealing with this region are: 

Statesman's Year-Book. Annual. London. 

Statistisches Jahrbuch fiir Elsass-Lothringen. Annual. Strassburg. 

Das Eeichsland Elsass-Lothringen, Landes-und Ortsbeschreibung. Her- 
ausgegeben vom Statistischen Bureau des Ministeriums fiir Elsass- 
Lothringen. Strassburg, 1898-1903. 

Nachrichten des Statistischen Landesamts ftir Elsass-Lothringen. An- 
nual. Strassburg. 
Other critical volumes are: 

Engerand, F. L'Allemagne et le Fer. Les Frontieres lorrainea et la 
Force allemande. Paris, 1916. 

Greger, A. Die Montanindustrie Elsass-Lothringens seit Beginn der 
deutschen Verwaltung. Munich, 1909. 

Herkner, H. Die oberelsassische Baumwollindustrie. Strassburg, 1887. 

Krzymowski, R. Die landwirtschaftlichen Wirtschaftssyateme in 
Elsass-Lothringen. Gebweiler, 1915. 

Levy, R. Histoire ^conomique de I'lndustrie cottonifere en Alsace. 
Paris, 1912. 

Thisse, E. Die Entwickelung der elsassischen Landwirthschaft in der 
zweiten Halfte des 19 Jahrhunderts. Berlin, 1911. 

Weill, G. Die Lage der Kanalschiffer in Elsass-Lothringen. Strass- 
burg, 1905. 



ALSACE-LORRAINE 29 

THE FACTS ABOUT ALSACE-LORRAINE 

Where Alsace-Lorraine is Located 

Alsace-Lorraine is the long and rather narrow border-land 
lying between France and Germany and stretching from 
Belgium to Switzerland. Since 1871, of course, it has been 
politically German. 

TEBRiTORiAii Units Involved 

Alsace has an area of 3,202 square miles. 

Lorraine has an area of 2,403 square miles. 

Alsace-Lorraine has, therefore, a total area of 5,605 square 
miles and is about as large as the combined areas of Rhode 
Island and Connecticut. 

Different Races in Alsace-Lorraine 

Note: Alsace-Lorraine is an exception to the tendency prevailing 
in Europe for the national preference of a population to coincide with 
its blood and speech. Therefore, while the language statistics of Alsace- 
Lorraine may be rightly taken as the basis for estimating the racial 
elements, the reader must not be misled into thinking that all persons 
here listed as German -speaking are German in their national prefer- 
ences or sympathies. This number includes native-born anti-German 
AIsace-Lorrainers, as well as such Alsace-Lorrainers as have German 
sympathies, and the Germans who have settled in such large numbers 
in Alsace-Lorraine since 1871. 

The 6^erman-speaking element numbers about 1,634,000 and 
is found throughout Alsace-Lorraine except in the western 
part of Lorraine, and even here there are large German gar- 
risons and a considerable German civilian population in the 
towns. Most of the German preponderance in the towns of 
western Lorraine represents German settlement since 1871. 
The Germans are found in all social classes. Virtually all of 
the official class is German. They are politically and economi- 
cally dominant. 



30 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

The French-speaking element numbers about 204,000 and is 
concentrated to a marked degree in western Lorraine, espe- 
cially in the country districts. The French are likewise found 
in all social classes. They are politically depressed, but their 
French culture exerts much influence throughout Alsace- 
Lorraine. 

Who Controlled Alsace-Lorraine Before the War 
Germany. 

Who Has Controlled or Occupied Alsace-Lorraine 
Since the War Began 

Germany has maintained her control of this region with 
the exception of a small area in the extreme south of Alsace, 
which has been under French military occupation since the 
autumn of 1914. 

Germany's Interests in Alsace-Lorraine 

Political. Nearly all Germans regard Alsace-Lorraine as 
an integral part of the historic German fatherland and in- 
sist that its loss would inflict an unhealable wound upon the 
body politic of Germany. 

Economic. Its economic and industrial value to the Ger- 
man Empire is regarded as critically important. The crux 
of Germany's economic interest is the iron deposits of Lor- 
raine, which represent about seventy-five per cent, of the 
iron output of the German Empire. This has been the basis 
of Germany's marked industrial development and has under- 
lain her ability to arm and to carry on the war. Germany 
realizes that the loss of this region would be not only an eco- 
nomic, but a military, blow as well. 

Strategic. Alsace-Lorraine makes an ideal frontier both 
defensive and offensive. In French hands it would consti- 
tute a threatening wedge driven deep into Germany. Both 



ALSACE-LORRAINE 31 

Germany and France regard the possession of this region by 
the other as a threatening advantage. 

Racial. The deliberate racial displacement that has gone 
on since 1871 has left the majority of the inhabitants of 
Alsace-Lorraine to-day Germanic in speech and blood. 

Cultural. The majority of the inhabitants are Germanic in 
original culture, although most of them are impregnated 
with French culture. 

Religious. Of the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, 1,428,343 
are Roman Catholics, 408,274 are Protestants, 3,868 are other 
Christians, and 30,483 are Jews. Religion, however, plays 
virtually no part in the problem. 

France's Interests in Alsace-Lorraine 

Political. Nearly all Frenchmen regard Alsace-Lorraine 
as an integral part of the historic French fatherland. In 
French opinion the return of this region to France is the 
only thing that will heal the wound inflicted by the muti- 
lation of 1871, when Germany wrested it away. 

Economic. The great economic resources of the region 
would obviously mean a vast accession of economic strength 
to France. It would tend to tip the economic balance be- 
tween Germany and France in favor of France. 

Strategic. Alsace-Lorraine in French hands would mean 
a wedge-like frontier driven into Germany, giving France un- 
doubted advantage both for defense and offense. 

Racial. The French majority in western Lorraine and the 
French element throughout all Alsace-Lorraine represent the 
racial interest of France in this region. 

Cultural. France asserts that virtually the entire popula- 
tion of Alsace-Lorraine, regardless of racial origin, is French 
in culture. 

Religious. Religion plays little part in the claims of 
France. 



32 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Solutions that Have Been Peoposed and What They 

Mean 

1. Status Quo Ante Bellum. 

This would mean, of course, the continuance of Alsace- 
Lorraine as a Reichsland in the German Empire. A Reichs- 
land corresponds in a general way to the territorial depend- 
encies of the United States. That is to say, its representation 
and powers are not those of a fully federalized unit in the 
empire, just as the representation and powers of Alaska in 
our House of Representatives differ from the representation 
and powers of Alabama. This solution is not likely to be 
tried. Local sentiment is against it, and the German govern- 
ment has given out intermittent hints that it intended turning 
Alsace-Lorraine into a federalized state of the empire. 

2. Federalization in the German Empire. 

In the event that Alsace-Lorraine should remain a part of 
the German Empire, the transfer of the territory from the 
status of a Reichsland to that of a federalized state of the em- 
pire, with the accompanying increase of representation and 
powers, will be a desirable, if not inevitable, move. But the 
value of federalization as a solution of the problem will vary 
according to whether Germany is liberalized or remains auto- 
cratic either in fact or form. 

a. Under an Autocratic Germany 

The undoubted resentment against the tactless administra- 
tion of Germany in her attempt to root out French culture 
and language might make the inhabitants willing to throw 
away all economic advantages of German control, if they 
could hope for nothing but a continuance of the same policy 
of complete Prussianization of spirit and culture involved in 
further dependence upon an autocratic Germany. 



ALSACE-LORRAINE 33 

b. Tinder a Liberalized Germany 

Should Germany become liberalized and grant full rights 
of language and culture to Alsace-Lorraine as a federalized 
state of the empire, the anti-German spirit might in time be 
tempered, and the argument of economic interest might have 
weight toward some ultimate solution that would not mean 
complete severance from the German Empire. 

In the event of such development, certain results may be 
predicated. If the Alsatians secure, in addition to the eco- 
nomic rights that they have, the political rights that they do 
not have, much of their standing grievance might be canceled. 
Were the Alsatians to become fairly well reconciled to such an 
arrangement, and were it to become evident that they were a 
real factor in a responsible Germany democratized in essence, 
if not in form, the revanche spirit in France might tend to 
die. For we do not go out to avenge satisfied peoples. The 
Alsatians in their intense individualism are anti-Prussian, 
and therefore their hearty approval of a solution, if freely 
given, would be good evidence of its justice. Such a solution 
would of course raise no inverse revanche spirit in Germany. 

3. Annexation to France. 

This solution would of course meet the approval of the 
French and French-feeling elements in Alsace-Lorraine ; it 
would satisfy the almost universal desire of Frenchmen for 
the return of territory and kinsmen which they regard as 
having been wrested from them by force untempered by jus- 
tice or right. Should this territory not revert to France 
either through arms or council, France would be left with the 
bitterness of a baulked ambition, which during the last forty 
years has been an abiding, even thoush quiesoent purpose, 
waiting only for the stress of war to whip it into an almost 
religious crusade. 

In such a mood of disappointment, and with such a sense 



34 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

of justice outraged, France might, just because human nature 
is what it is, subordinate all other policies to a new and in- 
tensified revanche; and in her sullen determination to im- 
prove the "next chance" to regain Alsace-Lorraine, she might 
not collaborate with a whole heart in the establishment of 
a stable world order. 

The obvious obstacles to this solution are the preponderant 
Germanic population and the completeness with which Ger- 
man finance and industrial administration have interlaced 
themselves in the life of the country. These factors have 
doubtless been accentuated during the war by extensive pur- 
chase of French-owned little farms, individual homes, and 
larger estates, and a settled policy of increasing the distinctly 
German ownership of the country. 

Of course the retrocession of this region to France would 
create an inverse revanche spirit in Germany that might poi- 
son international relations for generations to come. All sec- 
tions of German thought, even the Socialists, outside the most 
extreme types, regard Alsace-Lorraine as an integral part of 
the fatherland — at least the German-speaking part of the 
region. 

Against the handicap of a sullen and revengeful Germany 
that would be likely to result from a French annexation of 
Alsace-Lorraine should be placed the fact that, deprived of the 
vast iron resources of the region, Germany would not be in a 
position readily to rearm on an extensive scale. 

4. Division between France and Germany along Racial 
Lines. 

This would probably mean that western Lorraine would go 
to France, while eastern Lorraine and Alsace would remain 
with Germany. Were this to prove a feasible treatment, it 
would, of course, reduce to a minimum the present conflicts of 
language and culture. Although it would fall short of both 
French and German dreams, it might have the merits of a 



ALSACE-LORRAINE 35 

compromise solution. Both would have got something; the 
French the most French part, the Germans the most German 
part. 

If life were always logical, such a solution might in time 
be expected to mollify the revanche spirit both in France and 
in Germany. Such a division would also give the value of 
continuity of economic administration over the most indus- 
trial part of the region. One stubborn element would be that 
such a disposition would transfer the enormous iron resources 
of western Lorraine to France, a fact that would give Germany 
pause, since so much of her power of industry and arms de- 
pends upon this resource. 

5. Plebiscite. 

It has become almost an axiom of Allied statesmanship, 
certainly one of the most-used slogans of the war, that peo- 
ples shall have the right to determine their political alle- 
giance. At first glance it would seem that a plebiscite, or 
the taking of a referendum vote, that would give the inhabi- 
tants of Alsace-Lorraine a chance to say what they desire in 
the matter, would be the simplest and most just solution. 

The proposal for a plebiscite may be qualified by many 
plans of procedure. A separate vote might be taken in each 
of the divisions, one in Alsace and one in Lorraine, Separate 
votes might be taken in the sections where a racial majority is 
clear. Still other and smaller local units might be voted sepa- 
rately. The withdrawal of belligerent authority might be 
made precedent to the plebiscite, and the vote taken under 
neutral guaranty against undue pressure from keenly inter- 
ested nations. 

Certain practical difficulties, however, intervene. It would 
probably be difficult to get a reaUy free expression of the 
popular will. Indirectly, if not directly, pressure would in- 
evitably come from both Germany and France. The vote 
would probably show ** indecisive and patchy results," as 



36 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

some one has phrased it. And that would increase the diffi- 
culties of the final settlement, whichever way the result 
turned. It would dramatize the internal differences. Then, 
too, the problem of Alsace-Lorraine happens to be quite as 
much an international as a national problem. Recorded ex- 
perience indicates that plebiscites among subject peoples in- 
variably confirm the wishes of the controlling government. 

6. Alsace-Lorraine as an Independent Buffer State between 

France and Germany. 
However desirable this solution may, at first consideration, 
appear as a means of keeping France and Germany apart and 
thus eliminating the threat of future invasions, its practica- 
bility may be gravely doubted. Alsace-Lorraine is too small 
to stand alone as an independent political and economic unit 
unless there occur developments of international organization 
and control which the political realist must still regard as in 
the field of hope rather than of fact. 

7. Alliance with Belgium and Switzerland in a Solid Band 

of Small Neutral States across Europe under Interna- 
tional Guaranty. 
This suggestion is ingenious, but of doubtful feasibility. 
And yet it may be only one of a series of such arrangements 
which, impossible under the old regime, will become possible 
under some new international synthesis that may rise out of 
the otherwise sordid bargainings of a peace table. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Aaron, L. Alsace-Lorraine; la Carte au Liserg vert. Paris, 1911. 
Baldy, R. L'Alsace-Lorraine et TEmpire allemande. Paris, 1912. 
Driault, E. La France et la Guerre: Les Solutions frangaises. Paris, 

1916. 
Froelich, J. Les Pangermanistes en Alsace. Paris, 1915. 
Gerber, P. La Condition de I'Alsace-Lorraine dans I'Empire allemande. 

Lille, 1906. 
Griinberg, P. Zur elsJissischen Lage und Frage. Strassburg, 1909. 



ALSACE-LORRAINE 37 

Guyot, Y. La Provine Rhenane et la Westphalie. Paris, 1915. 
Henry, R. La Frontiere linguistique en Alsace-Lorraine. Paris, 1912. 
Hinzelin, E. L'Alsace sous le Joug. Paris, 1914. 
Jordan, D. S. Alsace-Lorraine; a Study in Conquest. Indianapolis, 

1916. 
Leroy, M. L'Alsace-Lorraine : Porte de France, Porte d'Allemagne. 

Paris, 1914. 
Lichtenberger, H. La Guerre europ^enne et la Question d'Alsace-Lor- 

raine. Paris, 1915. 
Marmottan, P. Notre Frontiere naturelle, le Rhin. Paris, 1915. 
Miilert, O. Die staatsrechtliche Stellung von Elsass-Lothringen 

Greifswald, 1904. 
Naumann, P. Deutsehland und Frankreich. Berlin, 1914. 
Novicow, J. L'Alsace-Lorraine, Obstacle a I'Expansion allemande. 

Paris, 1913. 
Perrier, E. France et Allemagne. Paris, 1915. 
Pfister, C. La Limite de la Langue frangaise et de la Langue allemande 

en Alsace-Lorraine. Paris, 1890. 
Reynard, L. Histoire G^nerale de I'lnfluence frangaise en Allemagne. 

Paris, 1915. 
Schalfejew, E. Die staatsrechtliche Stellung Elsass-Lothringens nach 

dem neuen Verfassungsgesetz. Berlin, 1913. 
This, G. Die deutsch-franzosische Sprachgrenze in Elsass und 

Lothringen. Strassburg, 1887-1888. 
Turmann, M. Le Rhin libre. Paris, 1917. 
Weill, G. L'Alsace frangaise de 1789 a 1870. Paris, 1916. 



NORTHERN EUROPE 
SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN 




A/?3 SCHLaSWiCi -HOLSTS^I^ 



CHAPTER III 
SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 

ScMeswig-Holstein has always been a disputed frontier 
region between the Germans and the Danes. Holstein was 
from the first predominantly German, having originated as a 
German Mark, or frontier colony, against Danish incursions 
into Germany. Schleswig, at the beginning of the Middle 
Ages, seems to have been predominantly Danish in race, al- 
though during the course of centuries it became increasingly 
Germanized. At the beginning of the fifteenth century 
Schleswig and Holstein were united politically under a single 
ruler. When his line died out, they passed by inheritance, 
in 1460, to the royal house of Denmark, with the proviso, 
however, that they should maintain their political existence 
apart from the Danish kingdom under a personal union with 
the Danish king as Duke of Schleswig-Holstein, and with the 
agreement that the duchies should never be separated. 

So things stood down to the middle of the nineteenth cen- 
tury, when it became clear that the old Danish royal house 
was about to die out. The question of the dynastic succes- 
sion to the duchies which ensued is a complicated problem of 
genealogy which need not concern this study, for the very 
good reason that it was used as a pretext by the really inter- 
ested parties, the Danish and German peoples. The nine- 
teenth century, the era of nationalities, had roused both peo- 
ples to a high pitch of national consciousness, and both were 
resolved to incorporate these disputed territories into their 
respective nations. The Danes wished to make Schleswig and 

41 ° 



42 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Holstein simple Danish provinces. The Germans, invoking 
the fact that Holstein formed part of that rather anomalous 
political entity, the Germanic Confederation, declared that, 
on the extinction of the old Danish royal house, the duchies 
would cease automatically to have any connection with Den- 
mark, and through Holstein would become part of the Ger- 
manic political body. When Danes proposed a division of 
the duchies under which Schleswig would go to Denmark and 
Holstein to the Germanic Confederation, the Germans harked 
back to the Indissoluble Union of 1460, and declared that 
Schleswig and Holstein could never be separated. Mean- 
while the German and Danish elements in the duchies them- 
selves came to blows, volunteers streamed in from both Den- 
mark and Germany, and there was begun a civil war, which 
was smothered only by the intervention of a concert of Euro- 
pean great powers in 1850. 

The question was, however, merely adjourned. The extinc- 
tion of the old Danish royal line in 1863 brought matters to a 
climax. At this point Bismarck, the Prussian statesman, 
strode forward as the champion of Germanism, got Austria 
to back him, and proceeded to expel the Danes from Schleswig- 
Holstein. Denmark, relying on the intervention of other 
European powers, particularly England, stood her ground. 
But no one came to her assistance, and in a brief campaign 
the Prussian and Austrian forces crushed the small Danish 
army and forced Denmark to yield all her rights to Schleswig- 
Holstein in 1864. For two years the duchies were jointly 
occupied by Prussia and Austria. Then, when the two Ger- 
manic powers fought their war of 1866, Prussia obtained 
Schleswig-Holstein as a part of the spoils of victory. The 
duchies were annexed to Prussia as ordinary Prussian prov- 
inces. Since 1871 they have, of course, formed part of the 
German Empire. 



SCHLESWIG-HOLSTBIN 43 



ECONOMIC SURVEY 

Schleswig-Holstein is predominantly an agricultural and 
stock-raising country. Woodland is rare, and no minerals 
exist save a little rock-salt. 

The shores of the peninsula are fertile, especially the North 
Sea coast, much of which has been reclaimed from the sea, 
after the manner of Holland, and has to be defended by an 
elaborate system of dikes. Vegetables are extensively grown. 
Much of the interior is unproductive heath and moor. 

Cattle-breeding and dairy farming are as important as 
agriculture. The Holstein milch-cows have a world-wide rep- 
utation, and dairy products form one of the principal items 
of export. The province also produces a good breed of horses. 

In the larger towns industries of various sorts are estab- 
lished. The Kiel Canal has given the province great com- 
mercial importance. The city of Kiel is a flourishing port, 
its prosperity being further enhanced by the presence of a 
large naval arsenal. 

THE FACTS ABOUT SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN 

Where Schleswig-Holstein is Located 

The long peninsula between the German mainland and the 
Danish province of Jutland is Schleswig-Holstein. 

Territorial Units Involved 

Schleswig and Holstein. 

The total area is 7340 square miles, about the size of New 
Jersey. The population is 1,620,000. The Danes number 
about 150,000, or eight per cent, of the total. 

Different Eaces in Schleswig-Holstein 

The Germans number 1,425,000, or eighty-nine per cent, of 
the population, and are found throughout. In Holstein the 



44 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

population is solidly German. In Schleswig the southern 
part is solidly German, and the towns in the northern part 
are also predominantly German (from fifty to sixty-five per 
cent.), while Flensburg, the chief city of North Schleswig, is 
overwhelmingly German (ninety-three per cent.)- The Ger- 
mans are of all social classes; the upper classes of Schleswig 
are almost entirely German, Of course all the officials are 
Germans. The German element in both Schleswig and Hol- 
stein is dominant in every way. 

The Danes number 150,000, or eight per cent, of the popu- 
lation. They are found in North Schleswig. They are 
mostly peasant farmers, although in the small towns of North 
Schleswig the Danish element also forms a large proportion of 
the population. They are a thrifty folk, economically pros- 
perous, but politically depressed. 

The Frisians number 45,000, or three per cent, of the popu- 
lation. They are found in Schleswig. These people, a 
branch of the Dutch Frisian stock, occupy a narrow strip of 
coast-land on the western (North Sea) shore of Schleswig, 
together with the adjacent islands off the coast. They are 
fishermen and small farmers, and are politically unimportant. 
They have no real national consciousness. The Frisians side 
politically with the Germans, and will probably ultimately 
be Germanized. 

Who Controlled Sohleswig-Holstein Before the War 
Germany. 

Who Has Controlled or Occupied Schleswig-Holstein 
Since the War Began 
Germany. 

A Special Note Regarding Conflicting National 
Interests in Schleswig-Holstein 

In considering this problem, we should carefully distinguish 
between Schleswig and Holstein. Holstein, a solidly German 



SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN 45 

land, is hardly ever claimed by even the most extreme Danish 
nationalists. To annex Holstein to Denmark would mean 
bringing the Danish frontier down to the north bank of the 
River Elbe, thus all but inclosing Germany's chief seaport, 
Hamburg, as an enclave in Danish territory. This would ap- 
pear intolerable to all Germans, and would expose Denmark 
to a certain German war of revenge. It would also mean 
bringing a solid block of nearly a million recalcitrant Ger- 
mans into Denmark's political life. As Denmark is a very 
small country, with fewer than three million inhabitants, this 
would make Danish domestic politics almost unworkable. 

Only less serious would be the problem involved in a Danish 
annexation of the whole of Schleswig. The population of 
Sehleswig, taken as a whole, is nearly three fourths German. 
Also, its southern border parallels the Kiel Canal, so that 
Schleswig in Danish hands would jeopardize the key to Ger- 
man sea-power. This state of aifairs would also appear to 
Germany an intolerable situation, which she would endeavor 
to upset as soon as the general European situation should 
enable her to make a successful spring at her Danish neighbor. 

For this reason most Danes limit their hopes to North 
Schleswig, the northern two fifths of the province, adjoining 
the Danish province of Jutland, where the Danish element in 
Schleswig is concentrated. Nevertheless, since many Danes 
still dream of annexing the whole of Schleswig, we shall con- 
sider this possibility in the following analysis. Holstein, 
however, will be left out of the discussion as beyond the 
bounds of practical politics. 

It is true that many Allied publicists, mostly English and 
French, have advocated giving both Schleswig and Holstein 
to Denmark in case of an Allied victory in the present war; 
but any such proposal would probably be negatived by Danes 
themselves as exposing them to certain German vengeance at 
some future day. 



46 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Germany's Interests in Schleswig-Holstein 

Political. Loss of Schleswig would deprive Germany of 
one of her important positions on both the Baltic and North 
Seas, and would undermine her sea-power. 

Economic. Schleswig is a fertile agricultural country with 
a very high-grade population, and as such is important to 
Germany. 

Strategic. Since the southern boundary of Schleswig 
parallels the Kiel Canal for a considerable distance, the an- 
nexation of Schleswig to Denmark would strike a deadly blow 
at German sea-power, one of whose chief assets is the ability 
to transfer the German navy from the Baltic to the North 
Sea through a wholly German waterway absolutely secure 
from hostile attack. 

Racial. Taking the province as a whole, the bulk of the 
population of Schleswig is German. 

Cultural. The German element in Schleswig is thoroughly 
Germanic in culture. 

Religious. None. 

Denmark's Interests in Schleswig-Holstein 

Political. Annexation of Schleswig to Denmark would 
give that small country a relatively large extension of area 
and population, and this, together with her partial control of 
the Kiel Canal, would considerably increase her importance 
in European politics. 

Economic. Schleswig is a fertile province with a very 
high-grade population. The economic life of Schleswig is 
virtually the same as that of Denmark ; therefore annexation 
of this region to Denmark would increase the agricultural and 
dairying importance of Denmark. 

Strategic. Since Denmark has no navy worthy of the 
name, Schleswig would be strategically rather a detriment 
than a benefit, because its long coast-lines could easily be 



SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN 47 

turned by landing-forces superior to the small Danish army. 

Racial. Annexation of the Danish element in North 
Sehleswig would be a solid racial gain to Denmark, 

Cultural. The Danish element in North Sehleswig is thor- 
oughly Danish in culture. 

Beligious. None. 

Solutions that Have Been Proposed and What They 

Mean 

1. Status Quo Ante Bellum. 

This would conserve Germany's commercial and naval ad- 
vantages involved in the retention of the Kiel Canal by Ger- 
many, but would leave untouched the problem of North 
Sehleswig, which is predominantly Danish and which is the 
source of Danish resentment against Germany. 

2. Annexation of North Sehleswig to Denmark and Re- 

tention of the Remainder by Germany. 
This would remove Danish-German irritation. Racial di- 
vision would be easy, because race-lines are sharply defined. 
This would be no real menace to Germany, since the entire 
course of the Kiel Canal would remain well within German 
territory and the slight accession of strength to Denmark 
could involve no threat to Germany, since Denmark would 
still be small. 

3. Annexation of all Sehleswig -Holstein to Denmark. 
This would place a large German population under Danish 

rule and create an almost certain irredentist movement in 
Germany. Germany would plan re-conquest. This would be 
intensified by the restrictions it would place on German com- 
mercial and naval advantages by the loss of the Kiel Canal 
and the fact that the Danish frontier would then run up to 
the north bank of the River Elbe, beyond Hamburg, leaving 
this greatest of German seaports a semi-isolated enclave in 
Danish territory. 



48 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

4. Neutralization of the Kiel Canal as a Corollary to Danish 
Annexation. 

This would temper the restrictions upon Germany's com- 
mercial and naval advantages, but would not touch the racial 
factor involved. 

BIBLIOGEAPHY 

Gasselin, L. La Question du Slesvig-Holstein. Paris, 1909. 

Jansen, C. and Samwer K. Schleswig-Holsteins Befreiung. Wiesbaden, 

1897. 
Jessen, F. de. La Question du Slesvig. Paris, 1906. 
Jorgensen, A. D. The Dano-Grerman Question. Copenhagen, 1900. 
Rosendal, G. Sonderjylland. Odens«, 1912. 
Sach, L. Das Herzogtura Schleswig-Holstein in seiner ethnographischen 

und nationalen Entwickelung. Halle, 1896. 



NORTHERN EUROPE 
FINLAND 




/)loj^.FH\H,f\NO 



CHAPTER lY 
FINLAND 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 

Finland is a vast region only recently emerged from the 
glacial period. It is studded with lakes and to a great extent 
covered with forest. The soil is not fertile, and the winters 
are long and cold. For this reason the relatively small popu- 
lation (3,200,000) is concentrated on or near the coast, the 
interior being very thinly inhabited. 

Finland's geographical position also explains its history, 
which up to a century ago was indissolubly bound up with 
that of Sweden. Before the age of roads and railways Fin- 
land was quite isolated overland, its neighbor Sweden, just 
across the narrow Gulf of Bothnia, being the sole link with 
the outer world. 

Finnish history begins with the Swedish invasion of the 
twelfth century. The native Finns, a people of Mongolian 
stock, were rude savages who accepted unmodified the civiliza- 
tion of their conquerors. For this reason Finland became 
not so much a dependency as an integral part of Sweden. 
The very physical type of the Finnish people was modified by 
the steady current of Swedish immigration, so that the orig- 
inally black-haired. Mongoloid Finns to-day show close affini- 
ties with the blond Scandinavian race. The chief outstand- 
ing difference between Finns and Swedes is language, the 
mass of the Finnish people having retained their old Asiatic 
tongue. 

So matters stood at the time of the Russian conquest of 
1809 which tore Finland from Sweden and linked its destinies 

51 



52 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

with the great Slav Empire. Finland's new status was not, 
however, that of a mere Russian province. So greatly was 
this eventuality dreaded that the Finns swore to iight to the 
death rather than pass under unrelieved Russian rule. To 
avoid a long and harassing struggle, Czar Alexander I recon- 
ciled the Finns by the grant of complete autonomy. Fin- 
land was, in fact, not annexed to Russia at all, but was de- 
clared a grand duchy governed, subject to its own constitu- 
tion, by the Czar of Russia as Grand Duke of Finland. This 
satisfied the Finns, and until the close of the nineteenth cen- 
tury Finland remained the most contented and prosperous of 
the Czar's dominions. 

In 1899, however, this happy era came to a violent end. In 
that year the Russian government determined upon the 
Russification of Finland, the solemn promises of several suc- 
cessive Czars were summarily revoked, and the country was 
treated virtually as a Russian province. This roused the 
Finns to desperation. A dogged folk, stubbornly attached to 
their ancient liberties, they resolved never to be Russianized. 
Since armed rebellion was impossible, passive resistance was 
employed, Russian arbitrary government being universally 
ignored. This roused the Russians to brutal severities, an- 
swered by sporadic Finnish terrorism. The situation was be- 
coming almost hopeless when the Russian Revolution of 1905 
enabled the Finns to extort from the tottering czardom a 
confirmation of their old liberties. A few years later, how- 
ever, when czardom had recovered most of its former power, 
it broke its word and again undertook the Russification of 
Finland. The situation promptly grew tense once more, and 
by 1914 things were in a bad way. 

One of the results of Russian tyranny has been to heal the 
breach which had opened between the Finnish and Swedish ele- 
ments of the population. In 1809 the Finns had felt them- 
selves virtually Swedes, but political separation from Sweden 
gradually roused the Finns to a sense of their peculiar race 



FINLAND 53 

identity. This dawning Finnish nationalism was strongly- 
resisted by the pure-blooded Swedish element in Finland, 
which, although numerically a small minority of only four- 
teen per cent., included most of the landed aristocracy and 
townsfolk, and which had always held political power. By 
the close of the nineteenth century, however, the Finns had 
gained the upper hand, and relations were decidedly tense 
when the Russian coup forced both parties to rally in defense 
of their common liberties. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Atlas de Finland. Maps and Text. 3 vols. Helsingfors, 1911. 
Brown, J. C. People of Finland in Archaic Times, London, 1892. 
Danielson, J. R. Finlands Vereinigung mit den russischen Reiche. 

Helsingfors, 1891. 
Mechelin, L. H. S. Finland in the Nineteenth Century. Helsingfors, 

1894. 
Phibbs, I. M. The Grand Duchy of Finland. London, 1903. 
Reade, A. Finland and the Finns. London, 1914. 
Renwick, G. Finland Today. London, 1911. 
Schybergson, M G. Geschichte Finlands. Gotha, 1896. 
Vuolle-Apiala, J. Die Entwickelung der Verfassung Finlands bis zum 

Regierungsantritt Nikolaus II. Heidelberg, 1912. 

ECONOMIC SURVEY 

Despite the industry of its people and the intelligent care 
bestowed on farming methods, Finnish agriculture has to 
struggle against serious handicaps. A rather infertile soil, 
long, cold winters, and frequent summer frosts combine to 
deprive the Finnish farmer of the full reward of his efforts. 
Nevertheless, the crop yield is considerable. In 1913 the 
principal crops, reckoned in bushels, were : Oats, 21,338,000 ; 
potatoes, 17,516,000 ; rye, 9,948,000 ; barley, 4,742,000 ; wheat, 
159,000. The flax and hemp production totaled 1097 tons. 

A large part of the country is devoted to hay and pasture, 
supporting considerable live stock. In 1913 there were: 
Horses, three years old, 297,183 ; horned cattle two years old, 



54 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

1,178,192. These cattle are mainly bred for dairy purposes, 
Finnish butter ranking second among Finland's exports. 

Finland is, however, a land of forests, and wood-products 
are therefore Finland's chief products. Both timber and 
wood-pulp are produced in enormous quantities, standing 
first among Finnish exports.- 

Finland's forests also furnished her first industries — wood 
industries and paper-mills. During the last generation, how- 
ever, Finland's industrial life has become much more varied, 
many ^mechanical works and textile mills having been intro- 
duced, stimulated by the cheapness of electric power derived 
from Finland's numberless lakes and waterfalls. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Frederiksen, N. C. Finland: Its Public and Private Economy. Lon- 
don, 1902. 
Lagus, H. Uber den Holzexport und die Walder Finl'ands. Heidelberg, 
1908. 
Statistik Arsbok for Finland, utg. af Statistika Centralbyrin. 

Annual. Helsingfors. 
Statesman's Year Book. Annual. London. 

THE FACTS ABOUT FINLAND 
Where Finland is Located 

The great block of territory lying opposite Sweden on the 
eastern shore of the Gulf of Bothnia, the northern arm of the 
Baltic Sea. Another arm of the Baltic, the Gulf of Finland, 
forms the country's southern border. It is connected with 
Russia by a narrow tongue of land between the Gulf of Fin- 
land and an immense lake, Lake Ladoga. Finland stretches 
northward almost to the Arctic Ocean, being separated there- 
from by a thin strip of Norwegian territory. Its eastern 
frontier is the watershed between the Baltic and Arctic river 
systems. Its area is 125,689 square miles, or about the size of 
New Mexico. 



FINLAND 55 

Different Races in Finland 

The Finns number 2,571,000 and are found throughout. 
They constitute an overwhelming majority and are found in 
all social classes save the old aristocracy and a portion of the 
middle class, which are Swedish in blood. They are politi- 
cally dominant. 

The Swedes number 339,000 and are found throughout. 
Only along the coast and in the towns do they form any large 
part of the population. The former political ascendancy 
is now at an end, but the Swedish aristocracy still retains 
much social prestige. 

The Russians number about 7000 and are found throughout. 
They are almost exclusively officials, there being virtually no 
civilian Russian population. The number here quoted does 
not include the large Russian garrisons quartered in various 
parts of Finland. 

Who Controlled Finland Before the War 
Russia. 

Who Has Controlled or Occupied Finland 
Since the War Began 

Russia maintained control of Finland until the Russian 
Revolution of March, 1917. Since this revolution Finland 
has freed itself from all effective Russian control. The 
country has been much disturbed by factional struggles be- 
tween the radical and conservative elements of its population. 

Russia's Interests in Finland^ 

Political. Although the more democratic elements in Rus- 
sia would be willing to accord Finland local self-government, 

1 The Bolshevik rggime has affected to disregard nationality as com- 
monly defined, and has renounced many of the orthodox national claims 



56 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

nearly all Russians believe that Russian control of Finland 
is necessary to the safety of Russia itself. The Finnish fron- 
tier is only a few miles north of Petrograd, and an inde- 
pendent Finland would make Russia's capital a frontier 
town, while its sea approach (the Gulf of Finland) would be 
flanked by a foreign power. Also, an independent Finland 
would flank the railroads to Russia's arctic ports — Archangel 
and the new harbor on the Murman coast. Russian im- 
perialists have further reason for wishing to keep control of 
Finland. They dream of breaking a path to the Atlantic 
Ocean by seizing northern Norway and Sweden, which can be 
done only through Finland. This is the main reason why 
Russian imperialists demand the Russification of Finland: 
it is a necessary first step in their designs on Scandinavia 
and the open sea. 

Economic. The natural resources of Finland, although not 
great, are made the most of by the country's thrifty, intelli- 
gent people. 

Strategic. Russian possession of Finland not only defends 
Petrograd and northwest Russia, as suggested above, but also 
gives Russia a potential stranglehold on Sweden through the 
Finnish archipelago of the Aland Islands, which lie only a 
few miles off the Swedish coast. This gives the Russian fleet 
a base within a short distance of the Swedish capital, Stock- 

of Russia, substituting therefor class interests and a yet incompletely 
defined proletarian internationalism. 

If this Bolshevik philosophy should attain general acceptance, it 
would obviously mean a new world order in which "national interests" 
as here tabulated would be superseded by an entirely new category of 
interests. This being not a book of prophecy but a record of facts 
read in the light of the existing world order, we have been obliged to 
view Russia's interests from the same angle as those of other nations. 
Unless the Bolshevik regime continues to dominate Russian policy the 
interests here listed will most likely be the interests to be reckoned 
with at the settlement. This observation applies throughout this book 
wherever Russia's interests are listed. 



FINLAND 57 

holm, and lays the very heart of Sweden open to the threat 
of Russian invasion. 

Racial. Virtually none. 

Cultural. None. 

Religious. Virtually none. 

Sweden's Interests in Finland 

Political. Sweden has never got over the loss of Finland to 
Russia in 1809, Finland having been always regarded as an 
integral part of Sweden rather than as a dependency. The 
rise of Finnish racial self-consciousness since 1809, to be 
sure, makes many Swedes doubt whether the old intimate 
connection between Sweden and Finland could ever be re- 
stored. For this reason Sweden might be fully reconciled by 
the establishment of a Finland under merely nominal Russian 
suzerainty. But all Swedes feel that a Russified Finland 
would be a deadly threat to their national life, since it would 
put Sweden virtually at Russia's mercy. 

Economic. The trade relations between Sweden and Fin- 
land are very close. 

Strategic. Finland in the hands of an aggressive Russia 
would threaten Sweden by land in the extreme north, where 
Sweden possesses some of the richest iron deposits in the 
world. Also, the Aland Islands threaten Stockholm itself 
with a Russian bombardment and landing on very short 
notice. 

Racial. The fate of the large Swedish element in Finland 
is naturally an object of keen solicitude to Sweden. 

Cultural. The culture of Finland is wholly Swedish, even 
the most anti-Swedish of the Finns being indebted to Sweden 
for their civilization. , 

Religious. Lutheran Protestantism, professed by the en- 
tire population of Finland, is an offshoot of the Swedish 
church. 



58 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Norway's Interests in Finland 

Political. Like Sweden, Norway is menaced by a Finland 
controlled by an imperialistic Russia. Northern Norway is 
a narrow fringe of territory entirely backed by Finland. In 
places the Finnish frontier reaches to within a few miles of 
the head waters of the Norwegian fjords. Owing to the Gulf 
Stream, these fjords are always free from ice, thus offering 
Russia the temptation of possible naval stations on the open 
Atlantic Ocean. 

Economic. Slight. 

Strategic. A Russified Finland places northern Norway at 
Russia's mercy. 

Racial. The Norwegians are so closely allied racially to 
the Swedes that many Norwegians take a Scandinavian inter- 
est in the fate of the Swedish element in Finland. 

Cultural. The same is true regarding culture as just stated 
in the matter of racial claims. 

Religious. Norway, Sweden, and Finland are all Lutheran 
countries in closest religious communion. 

Solutions that Have Been Proposed and What They 

Mean 

1. Status Quo Ante Bellum. 

This would mean Finland as an autonomous unit under Rus- 
sia. Such a solution presupposes a liberal Russia. Imperial- 
istic Pan-Slavist leaders in Russia who broke promises to 
Finland at the close of the nineteenth century made the de 
jure autonomous status of Finland a farce. Such leaders 
would do the same again. Even some of the Russian liberals 
think the same. It might be workable under a liberal Russia. 
It would satisfy all Finland except the Swedish minority. 
It would satisfy a liberal Russia that had no designs of con- 
quest in Scandinavia, because it would fully protect the land 



FINLAND 59 

and sea approaches to Petrograd. A contented autonomous 
Finland under a liberal Russia neither could nor would de- 
sire to strike a blow at Russia. It would satisfy Norway and 
all except a few imperialists in Sweden, because Scandinavia 
would thereby be assured against Russian intervention by 
this autonomous buffer state. It would satisfy the world at 
large because fears of Russia's obtaining naval bases on the 
Atlantic (Norwegian fjords) and domination of the Baltic 
would be allayed. 

2. Russification of Fiyiland under Imperial Russia. 

This would pave the way for a Russian conquest of Sweden 
and Norway which would give Russia ample warm-water out- 
lets on the Atlantic and also insure her domination of the 
Baltic, to say nothing of adding the considerable resources 
of the Scandinavian peninsula to the Russian Empire. It 
would involve a drastic crushing of stubborn Finns and 
Swedes, which would be accomplished only by the most ruth- 
less measures. They have shown they would resist to the 
death. 

3. Independent Finland. 

This might work, but the Finnish and Swedish elements 
would probably conflict. It would be a temptation for both 
Swedish and Russian intervention or conquest. If the Finns 
oppressed the Swedes of the southwestern coast and towns, 
Sweden would resent it. The Finnish frontier, so near 
Petrograd, would be an incitement to Russia to reconquer the 
territory. The smallness and relative poverty of an inde- 
pendent Finland would make its economic existence pre- 
carious. 

4. Autonomous Finland under Sweden. 

This would probably mean the appointment of the King 
of Sweden as Grand Duke of Finland, as the Russian czars 
were from 1809-99, or the installation of a cadet branch of 



60 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

the Swedish royal family as grand dukes under the suzerainty 
of the Swedish crown. 

This solution would probably work. It would assure the 
Finns the right of management of their own affairs. Finnish 
economic life is as related to Sweden as to Russia, so no serious 
economic disturbance would be involved. Russia would have 
little to fear, for, even with Finland as autonomous, it would 
still be too small alone to menace Russia. And, too, Sweden 
would be so contented with the righting of what she regards 
as an historic vsrrong that she would be little tempted to join 
a league of greater powers against Russia. The world at 
large would be satisfied because, in the event of imperialistic 
designs on the part of Russia, Sweden would be in a better 
position to hold her own until other nations could come to 
her assistance. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Bornhak, C. Russland und Finland. Munich, 1909. 

Buch, M. Finland und seine Nationalitatenfrage. Stuttgart, 1883. 

Chalhoub, M. La Finlande. Paris, 1910. 

Coussange, J. de. La Scandinavie et la Nationalisme scandinave. 

Paris, 1914. 
DeSars, A. La Finlande au Point de Vue du Droit Internationale. 

Paris, 1901. 
Despagnet, F. La Question finlandaise au point de vue juridique. 

Paris, 1901. 
DeWindt, H. Finland as it is. London, 1901. 
Dobson, G. The Finnish Revolution in Preparation. St. Petersburg, 

1911. 
Elenef, F. Lea Pretensions des Sep^ratistes finlandais Paris, 1895. 
Erich, R. Das Staatsrecht des Grossfurstentums Finland. Tubingen, 

1912. 
Ericson, C. Some Swedish Reflections in these Momentous Times. 

London, 1916. 
Fisher, J. R, Finland and the Tzars. London, 1901. 
Getz, B. Das staatsrechtliche Verhaltniss Zwischen Finland und Russ- 

land. Leipzig, 1900. 
Gray, H. Finland, a Little Land that is True to Itself. New York, 

1914. 



FINLAND 61 

Habermann, W. Finnland und die oflFentliche Meinung Europas. Mun- 
ich, 1910. 

Henry, R. La Question de Finlande au point de vue juridique Paris, 
1910. 

International Conference on the Finnish Question. Proceedings. 

London, 1910. 

"Juani Aho" (pseud.) Pour ma Finlande. Lausanne, 1903. 

Leclcrcq, J. La Finlande aux mille Lacs. Paris, 1914. 

Michoud, M. La Question finlandaise. Paris, 1901. 

Osten-Sacken, Baron von der. The Legal Position of the Grand Duchy 
of Finland in the Russian Empire. London, 1912. 

Puaiix, R. La Finlande, sa Crise actuelle. Paris, 1899. 

Sergejevski, N. D. Finland; The Question of Autonomy and Funda- 
mental Laws. London, 1911. 

Stolypin, P. A. Finland's status vs. Russia. London, 1906. 

Travers, R. Letters from Finland London, 1911. 

Vlugt, W. van der. Le Conflict finlandaise envisagg au point de vue 
juridique. Paris, 1900. 

Vlugt, W. van der. Pour la Finlande. Paris, 1900. 

Young, E. Finland: The Land of a Thousand Lakes. London, 1912. 



NOETHERN EUROPE 
THE BALTIC PROVINCES 




N9S THE. BALTIC P/iOVINC£:> 



CHAPTER V 
THE BALTIC PROVINCES 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 

The three Baltic provinces, Courland, Livonia, and 
Esthonia, form a belt of low-lying country on the east coast 
of the Baltic Sea extending from the German frontier to the 
Gulf of Finland. This extensive region, with an area of 35,- 
614 square miles (about the size of Indiana) possesses a cer- 
tain geographical unity, especially on its eastern side, where 
it is marked off from the great Russian plains beyond by 
large lakes and a long belt of rough hill country. 

Thus protected from the east and facing the Baltic Sea, it is 
not surprising to find that the influences shaping Baltic 
Province history have mostly come from the west. This his- 
tory really begins with their conquest during the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries by the Teutonic Knights of the Sword. 
The Knights, a German crusading order, undertook the task 
primarily to Christianize the natives, fierce Lettish and Fin- 
nish or Esth tribes fanatically devoted to their native heathen- 
ism. The result of this conquest was the establishment of an 
ecclesiastical state governed by the Teutonic Order, which im- 
posed upon the original inhabitants not only Christianity, but 
Germanic civilization as well. For this reason the Germans, 
though never more than ten per cent, of the population, set 
upon the Baltic Provinces a cultural stamp which no subse- 
quent changes have been able to efface. Both the powerful 
Baltic Province nobility, owning nearly all the land, and the 
upper classes in the towns are to-day of German blood and 
intensely aware of their Germanism. 

65 



66 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

The medieval prosperity of the Baltic Provinces received 
a rude shock from the great Russian invasion of 1558 under 
Czar Ivan the Terrible, who anticipated by nearly two cen- 
turies Peter the Great's longing to break a path for Russia to 
the Baltic Sea. The Knights, it is true, ultimately ejected 
the Russians, while the general disorganization into which 
Russia sank after Ivan's death long averted the danger of 
Russian conquest. Nevertheless, the devastations of Ivan's 
half-savage hordes had dealt the country a blow from which 
it did not recover, and the weakened land fell a prey to the 
rival ambitions of Denmark, Sweden, and Poland. After a 
confused struggle the great Swedish monarch Gustavus 
Adolphus brought the whole region under his sway early in 
the seventeenth century, and it remained Swedish for a hun- 
dred years until the collapse of Sweden in the struggle against 
Peter the Great brought the Baltic Provinces under Russian 
control in 1721. 

This Russian conquest did not, however, cause any imme- 
diate changes in the internal life of the country. The real 
rulers of the Baltic Provinces were still the landowning Ger- 
man barons, the descendants of the Teutonic Knights, a mas- 
terful breed whose ancient privileges the Swedish kings had 
been always careful to respect. Peter determined to follow 
the Swedish precedent, and the Baltic Provinces therefore 
continued to enjoy essentially complete home rule. Not until 
the latter half of the nineteenth century was this state of 
affairs altered. Then, however, the Pan-Slavist ideas which 
dominated the Russian thought of that time led the Russian 
government to attempt the Russification of the Baltic Prov- 
inces. Gradually the old liberties were swept away, Russian 
arbitrary rule was introduced, and efforts were made to root 
out German culture and convert the inhabitants from 
Lutheran Protestantism to Russian Orthodoxy. Especially 
Russia strove to set the Lettish and Esth peasantry against 
the German upper classes. These efforts were largely sue- 



THE BALTIC PROVINCES 67 

cessful. Despite their Germanic culture and Lutheran faith, 
the peasants of the Baltic Provinces had retained their old 
languages and customs, and here, as elsewhere, the nineteenth 
century awakened these dormant nationalities to self-con- 
sciousness. The result was a bitter struggle for predominance 
between the different race elements. In this struggle the 
German minority, despite extraordinary vigor, steadily lost 
ground. In 1914 the Baltic Province Germans had lost most 
of their former political supremacy, although they still domi- 
nated the economic and social life of the country. 

ECONOMIC SURVEY 

The Baltic Provinces are predominantly an agricultural 
country. To be sure, a severe climate and a cold soil which, 
generally low lying, inclines to be marshy, are undoubted 
handicaps to agriculture. But the intelligence and aptitude 
of the peasantry overcome these natural difficulties sufficiently 
to produce large crops of the more northern cereals, especially 
rye, oats, and barley. Considerable flax is also grown. A 
good deal of the country is under forest. 

The large amount of meadow-land makes possible the ex- 
tensive raising of live stock. On some of the larger estates 
the breeds are very fine. The dairy products of the Baltic 
Provinces form one of the chief items of export. Valuable 
fisheries exist off the coast, a considerable proportion of the 
population being devoted to seafaring pursuits. 

The industrial life of the Baltic Provinces is centered at 
Riga, a great port which serves as the commercial outlet for 
much of western Russia. Libau and Reval are also port towns 
of importance. Within the last half-century industrial life 
in the modem sense has been begun in the Baltic Provinces. 
Numerous textile and flax spinning-mills, tanneries, breweries, 
sugar refineries, distilleries, woodworking establishments, and 
miscellaneous industrial establishments exist. 



68 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

THE FACTS ABOUT THE BALTIC PROVINCES 

Where the Baltic Provinces Are Located 

The Baltic Provinces are the broad band of territory on the 
eastern shore of the Baltic Sea. An arm of the Baltic — the 
Gulf of Finland — forms the northern boundary of the Baltic 
Provinces. To the east lies Russia proper, from which it is 
separated by the large lakes Peipus and Pskov and by a long 
chain of rough hills. To the south the Baltic Provinces 
shade imperceptibly into the Lithuanian provinces of Russia. 
At its extreme southwestern tip the coast-line of the Province 
of Courland just touches the extreme tip of the German 
province of East Prussia. 

Territorial Units Involved 

Courland has an area of 10,435 square miles and a popula- 
tion of about 783,000. 

Livonia has an area of 17,574 square miles and a popula- 
tion of about 1,493,000. 

Esthonia has an area of 7605 square miles and a popula- 
tion of 492,000. 

The total area of the Baltic Provinces is 35,614 square miles, 
about the size of Indiana. The population is 2,768,000. 

Different Races in the Baltic Provinces 

The Letts are found in Courland and Livonia. They form 
the bulk of the population in Courland and in the southern 
part of Livonia. They are mostly peasants and town work- 
men, although a middle class is developing. They are of 
fairly high intelligence and growing economic prosperity, 
and are rapidly gaining in political power. 

The Esths are found in Esthonia and Livonia. They form 
the bulk of the population in Esthonia and northern Livonia. 
They are mostly peasants, sailors, and fishermen, not quite so 



THE BALTIC PKOVINCES 69 

quick intellectually as the Letts, but steadier, more energetic, 
and economically more prosperous. They are more devout 
Protestants than the Letts and not so anti-German. They 
are gaining ground against the Letts along the racial boundary 
in mid-Livonia. 

The Germans are scattered throughout all the provinces. 
The genuine Baltic Province Germans (that is the old medie- 
val stock) number about 200,000. They are the social elite 
of the country, including both the landowning nobility and 
the almost equally aristocratic burgher families of the towns. 
They form about eight per cent, of the population. Besides 
these, there are about 50,000 Germans recently from Germany. 
The 45,000 Jews of the Baltic Provinces, mostly of a fairly 
good type, speak German, not Yiddish. They generally side 
with the Germans. There are also about 300,000 Letts and 
Esths who speak German and act like Germans, but who are 
not technically considered Germans in the strict racial hier- 
archy that prevails. The majority of this class sides with 
the Germans. This German block thus numbers from about 
500,000 to 600,000. Politically it has lost much of its former 
predominance, but economically and culturally it still domi- 
nates the country. The old-stock Baltic Province Germans 
are a strong and masterful type. 

The Russians are found in all the provinces. They are 
mostly officials, although they form a certain civilian element 
in the large towns. There are also a few colonies of Russian 
peasants near the Russian border. Their total number is 
about 130,000. 

Who Controlled the Baltic Provinces Before the War 
Russia. 

Who Has Controlled or Occupied the Baltic Provinces 
Since the War Began 

Courland has been mostly under German control since the 



70 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

autumn of 1915. Livonia and Esthonia have been under 
Russian control, with possibility of German military conquest. 

Russia's Interests in the Baltic Provinces^ 

Political. The Baltic Provinces are Russia's "window on 
the Baltic" through which alone Russia can communicate 
freely by sea with the outer world. By their ports alone can 
Russian sea-power exist. Their loss would "blind" Russia, 
shutting her back into the purely continental position which 
she occupied before Peter the Great acquired them 200 years 
ago. All Russians therefore consider the retention of the 
Baltic Provinces as vital to Russia's future as a great power. 

Economic. It is as a transit area that the chief economic 
value of the Baltic Provinces to Russia* resides. The great 
Dvina River, which falls into the Baltic at Riga, in Livonia, 
drains a large part of western Russia, and a number of rail- 
road trunk-lines carry to Riga and other Baltic Province ports 
the produce of interior Russia for export to the outer world. 
Riga is a great sea-port with 558,000 inhabitants, being in 
fact the sixth largest city of the whole Russian Empire. The 
loss of Riga and the other Baltic Province ports would deal a 
staggering blow to Russia's economic life. 

Strategic. Russia's naval bases in the Baltic Province 
harbors are the foundations of her sea-power. Without them 
the Russian navy could not exist. The loss of the Baltic 
Provinces would bottle up Petrograd and menace it with 
capture, the frontier of Esthonia being only about seventy 
miles west of the city. In fact, the loss of the Baltic Provinces 
would lay all northwest Russia open to attack. 

Racial. The number of Russians in the Baltic Provinces is 
small, being about 130,000. 

Cultural. Russia's cultural interest is very slight. The 
culture of the Baltic Provinces is fundamentally German. 
The attempted Russification of the Baltic Provinces has had 
very superficial cultural results. 

1 See foot-note on page 55. 



THE BALTIC PROVINCES 71 

Religious. The religion of the Baltic Provinces is Lutheran 
Protestantism. Russian attempts to convert the population 
to Orthodoxy have signally failed. 

Germany's Interests in the Baltic Provinces 

Political. German annexation or control of the Baltic 
Provinces would give Germany a powerful hold upon Russia, 
would insure her absolute mastery of the Baltic by eliminat- 
ing the fleet of the only other Baltic naval power, and would 
open up a great field for German emigration and economic 
exploitation. The area of the Baltic Provinces is one sixth 
that of the German Empire. 

Economic. Although the present economic condition of the 
Baltic Provinces is by no means backward, the possibilities for 
intensive exploitation such as Germany could give are very 
great. 

Strategic. The acquisition of the Baltic Provinces would 
enable Germany to hold northwest Russia virtually at her 
mercy. Russia would no longer ijossess a defensible frontier 
in this quarter, and Petrograd would lie exposed to German 
attack. The German navy would absolutely dominate the 
Baltic. 

Racial. The German nobility and townsfolk of the Bal- 
tic Provinces are of such a strong, high type that their in- 
corporation into Germany would be a great gain for Teu- 
tonism. 

Cultural. The culture of the Baltic Provinces is fundamen- 
tally German. Even the most anti-German Letts and Esths 
are indebted to Germany for their civilization. With no 
native culture or upper classes of their own, the Lettish and 
Esth peasantry could not long resist a strong current of 
German immigration. They would ultimately be completely 
Germanized, and the Baltic Provinces would then become 
thoroughly German. 

Religious. The Lutheran Protestantism of the Baltic 



72 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Provinces, historically a mere offshoot of German Lutheran- 
ism, is another close bond with Germany, 

Solutions that Have Been Proposed and What They 

Mean 

1. Status Quo Ante Bellum. 

This would leave the Baltic Provinces in the Russian Em- 
pire without local autonomy. This situation would prevail 
under an imperial autocratic Russia, and even under a certain 
type of Russian Liberals. It would satisfy the Russians, but 
not the inhabitants. 

2. Autonomous Provinces Under Liberal Russia. 

This would safeguard Russia strategically and economi- 
cally, leaving to Russia her outlets to the sea. It would rea- 
sonably satisfy the aspirations for local self-government. 
The only question raised is this: Would the different races 
dispute and make the area dangerous to the future peace of 
the world? 

3. Independent Baltic Province State. 

The objection raised to this is that it would be too small and 
possess too few resources. 

4. Union of Baltic Provinces with the Lithumiians and a 

Let to -Lithuanian State. 
This is discussed in the chapter on Lithuania. 

5. German Control or Anmexation of the Baltic Provinces. 
This would satisfy Germany and the Germanized upper 

class minority of the Provinces. It would mean for the^time 
being at least the dissatisfaction of the Letts and Esths. 
However, this might be only temporary, because both the 
Esths and the Letts are culturally and religiously so much 
affiliated with the Teutonic world that under German rule. 



THE BALTIC PROVINCES 73 

and with the extension of German immigration and economic 
penetration, the chances are they would soon be Germanized. 
The great objector would be Russia, who could not be recon- 
ciled to the strategic loss. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Bielenstein, A. F. G. Die Grenzen, des lettischen Volksstammes und 

der lettischen Spraelie. St. Petersburg, 1892. 
Bigelow, P. The Borderland of Czar and Kaiser. London, 1895 
Friederichsen, M. Die Grenzmarken des europHisohen Russlands. 

Hamburg, 1915. 
Hollman, H. Kurlands Agrarverhiiltnigse. Riga, 1893. 
Schieniann, T. Russland, Polen und Livland bis ins 17. Jahrhundert. 

(2 vols..) Berlin, 1886-87. 
Seraphim, H. Geschichte Liv-Est- und Kurlands. Reval, 1897. 



ETHNOGRAF 
MAP 
OF 
EUROPI 




ETHNOGRAPHIC 

MAP 

OF 

EUROPE 



EASTERN EUROPE 
POLAND 




t\l0 () THB POLfiH PKOBUEtA 



CHAPTER VI 
POLAND 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 

The tragedy of Poland is rooted in its geography. Save 
on the south it has never known the protecting and preserv- 
ing advantage of natural frontiers. Consequently its politi- 
cal boundaries have shifted and reshifted with successive con- 
quests and partitions. And every shift has meant a new act 
in the Polish tragedy. The problem of Poland is strangely 
tangled and difficult to present clearly. 

The Polish race centers in the inland plains which are 
drained by the Vistula River and lie between Russia and 
Germany. This region includes the so-called Polish Gov- 
ernments of Russia, the western part of the Austrian province 
of Galicia, and portions of the Prussian provinces of Posen, 
West Prussia, and Silesia. This area is about 70,000 square 
miles in extent, or about the size of Missouri. Within this 
region the Poles are in the majority. The region is something 
of a huge oblong, the southern base of which rests upon the 
Carpathian Mountains, Poland's only natural frontier. On 
the south, therefore, the line between Polish and non-Polish 
peoples is clear, but to the east, north, and west this Polish 
nucleus shades off imperceptibly into regions inhabited partly 
by Poles and partly by other races. In nearly all this mixed 
zone, which covers almost 300,000 square miles, the Polish 
and non-Polish elements are mixed in hopeless confusion. 
How this Polish "dispersion" occurred and what the present 
situation is can be explained only by a glance at Polish 
history. 

77 



78 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

The origin of Poland is bound up with the Slav migrations 
of the sixth century a. d. At that time countless Slav swarms 
burst out of the Russian plains and deluged central Europe 
from the Baltic to the Balkans. The northern end of this 
Slav wave penetrated Germany as far west as the River Elbe, 
driving out the original Teutonic inhabitants and turning all 
of eastern Germany into a solidly Slav country. But these 
Slavs were rude barbarians, divided into many small tribes, 
and showing even then that tendency toward political an- 
archy which has been the bane of the Slav race. 

There was naturally a Teutonic reaction against this Slav 
conquest of German territory. It came in the tenth century, 
and the mass of petty Slav tribes were struck full and fair 
by the German Drang nach Osten — the March to the East. 
The Germans, now strong in their newly assimilated Roman 
civilization, quite outmatched the unorganized and barbarous 
Slavs. They made rapid eastward progress, expelling or ab- 
sorbing the Slavs as they came. 

It was the ancestors of the modem Poles who checked this 
German March to the East. There arose in the region to-day 
the Prussian province of Posen a dynasty of able chieftains, 
the Piasts, who welded the Slav tribes into a state which 
blocked the German advance. This first Kingdom of Poland 
was composed not only of Posen, but much of the eastern 
German plain-country, including the present Prussian prov- 
inces of Silesia and Pomerania. For two centuries Poland 
was strong, the Germans were checked, and the Polish tribes 
to the east and the south, Russian Poland and Galicia, were 
incorporated into the Piast kingdom, thus uniting the whole 
Polish race as it then existed within the bounds of one state. 

But in the twelfth century the Piast dynasty lost its vigor, 
and Poland broke up into several principalities and in the 
thirteenth century the terrible Tatar invasion, which pros- 
trated Russia, reached into Poland and left the land desolate 
and depopulated. 



POLAND 79 

The Poles had become so weak that the heathen Lithuanians 
and the Old Prussians to the north threatened to overrun the 
country. These peoples were neither Slav nor Teuton, but 
a separate branch of the Aryan race which had dwelt through- 
out recorded history about the southeastern corner of the 
Baltic Sea. In fear the Poles called in the Teutonic Knights, 
a German crusading order pledged to the subjugation and 
conversion of the Lithuanian pagans. Establishing them- 
selves on the lower Vistula, in the country of the Old Prus- 
sians, or the western branch of the Lithuanian race, the Teu- 
tonic Knights began a ferocious struggle with the redoubtable 
heathen. So unbending were these stubborn folk that the 
war ended in their absolute annihilation. The Old Prussians 
were wiped from the face of the earth, and their land, the 
present German provinces of East and "West Prussia, was re- 
settled by Germans brought in by the Teutonic Knights. 

This resettlement by Germans was anything but agreeable 
to Poland. The Poles had hoped to obtain the mouth of the 
Vistula and that access to the sea so essential to the prosper- 
ity of Poland. Instead, Poland saw arising a neighbor which 
threatened to become even more dangerous than the Old 
Prussians had been; for the Teutonic Knights built up a 
formidable military state which aspired to conquer both 
Lithuania and Poland. 

Under the pressure of this common peril Poles and 
Lithuanians laid aside their ancient enmity and drew to- 
gether against the common foe. In 1386 the Lithuanian 
prince, Jagiello, abjured paganism, married the daughter of 
the Polish king, and united Poland and Lithuania against the 
Germans. A terrible struggle ensued, ending in the defeat 
of the Teutonic Knights, whose aggressive power was broken 
in the memorable battle of Tannenberg in 1410. In 1466 a 
peace was signed by which the Teutonic Knights ceded West 
Prussia to Poland and as vassals of the Polish crown retained 
East Prussia. By acquiring "West Prussia, Poland obtained 



80 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

her coveted access to the sea and in the succeeding centuries 
of Polish rule West Prussia was partly Polonized, although 
the towns, especially the port of Danzig, at the mouth of the 
Vistula, remained racially German. 

The Jagiellon dynasty produced a succession of able kings 
under whom the new state of Poland-Lithuania became a 
really great power. Although the old Polish provinces of 
Pomerania and Silesia were not recovered, being hopelessly 
lost to Germanism, the union with Lithuania had brought 
Poland an immense extension of territory to the east. The 
Lithuanian homeland on the northeast of Poland was a small 
country, but just before the union with Poland the Lithu- 
anians had waged successful wars against Russia, which was 
then broken and devastated by the Tatar invasions, and had 
annexed an immense tract of Russian territory extending be- 
yond the Dnieper River and reaching almost to the Black 
Sea. The common task of holding and exploiting these im- 
mense regions drew the Poles and the Lithuanians together. 
The Russian inhabitants, being Greek Orthodox Christians, 
hated the rule of the Roman Catholic Poles and Lithuanians. 
The Poles and Lithuanians united in the repression of their 
Russian subjects, who sank to the status of serfs, exploited by 
an aristocratic caste of Polish-Lithuanian landlords. 

The decline of the Kingdom of Poland-Lithuania began with 
the extinction of the Jagiellon dynasty in 1572, at which time 
the crown became elective with the Polish nobility, the domi- 
nating element in the country, as the electors. The kings be- 
came mere shadows. The nobles split into factions whose end- 
less broils plunged the country into anarchy. And before 
long Poland 's growing weakness attracted the greed of foreign 
powers, who ravaged the country and fought over the spoils. 
The year 1772 saw the beginning of the end, that being the 
time when Poland's three strong neighbors, Russia, Prussia, 
and Austria, agreed upon the First Partition of Poland. Two 
other partitions followed in 1793 and in 1795, by which time 



POLAND 81 

Poland was entirely divided up and had ceased to exist as a 
state. After some reshuffling of Polish territory during the 
Napoleonic Wars, the Vienna Congress of 1814 drew the lines 
of division as they were to stand down to 1914. In this last 
settlement Russia obtained far and away the lion's share of 
Poland, while Prussia and Austria got comparatively small 
portions. 

But the political extinction of Poland did not solve the 
Polish problem. The hopelessly anarchic Polish state died, 
but the Polish people lived, with common ties that were to 
survive foreign domination, as Talleyrand observed upon his 
return from the Congress of Vienna. The very depths of 
their misfortunes roused them to a fresh racial consciousness. 
The old Poland had been divided into oppressing aristocrats 
and oppressed peasants, but under foreign domination all 
classes drew together under the pressure of a common suffer- 
ing and the inspiration of a common dream — the dream of a 
new and regenerated Poland. 

Accordingly the nineteenth century witnessed a national 
revival in all the sundered branches of the Polish race. Rus- 
sia and Prussia failed in their attempts to denationalize the 
Poles under their rule, because of the resistance of a rising 
sense of racial rights. Austria never really attempted to de- 
nationalize the Poles in her territory, but granted them local 
autonomy and marked freedom in the development of their 
national life and institutions. The Austrian Poles have not 
escaped economic handicaps, but the political autonomy they 
have enjoyed has resulted in Austrian Poland, or Galicia, 
becoming the cultural center of Polish nationalism. 

The regions of Polish settlement to-day fall roughly into 
three parallel zones running north and south. In the west- 
ern zone, embracing the eastern provinces of the German Em- 
pire, the Polish element is mostly the lower classes, peasants 
and town workmen, while the aristocracy and the middle 
classes are mostly German. In the middle zone, embracing 



82 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Russian Poland and western Galieia, the Poles form the bulk 
of all social classes, the only considerable non-Polish element 
being the Jews. In the eastern zone, embracing eastern 
Galieia, the Ukraine, White Russia, and Lithuania, the land- 
owning aristocracy and upper-class townsfolk are largely 
Poles, while the peasants are Russians of various sorts or 
Lithuanians. 

ECONOMIC SURVEY 

This survey will deal only with the regions where a Polish 
population predominates: that is, the Polish Governments of 
Russia, the German provinces of Posen, West Prussia, and 
Upper Silesia, and the western part of the Austrian province 
of Galieia. The economic survey of the eastern zone of 
Polish settlement will be found in the chapters on Lithuania 
and the Ukraine. 

This area, which may be called Poland proper, possesses 
in the broad sense of the term a certain natural economic 
unity. The land is mostly a broad plain, and there are no 
hilly regions save in the extreme south. Climatic conditions 
are remarkably uniform. There are no wide variations in 
the character of the soil and quantity of rainfall. Most of 
Poland lies within the same drainage system, the basin of the 
River Vistula and its affluents. 

These facts mean an inherent similarity of economic con- 
ditions at least as regards agriculture and trade. These 
natural tendencies toward economic unity have been largely 
nullified, however, by historical developments and by the 
presence of non-Polish racial elements in different parts of 
the country. The political division of Poland between Rus- 
sia, Prussia, and Austria more than a century ago, and the 
intersection of Poland since that time by political frontiers 
and high tariff walls, have produced such diverse economic 
developments that separate treatment will be necessary. 



POLAND 83 



RussixVN Poland 



Despite long winters, wet springs, and much marsh area, 
the soil of Russian Poland is fairly fertile, and nearly half 
its surface is under cultivation. Northern cereals and fodder 
crops are the principal agricultural products. The main 
cereal staples are rye, oats, wheat, and barley. Beets are 
largely grown for sugar, and potatoes are extensively culti- 
vated both for food and for distilling. A good deal of to- 
bacco is raised, though of inferior quality. The large hay 
crop, together with other fodder products, nourishes large 
numbers of cattle, horses, and sheep. Bee-keeping is widely 
followed, especially in the southeast. A considerable portion 
of the country is under forest. 

The most notable feature of the modern economic history 
of Russian Poland has been the development of its mineral 
wealth and the growth of its industrial life. Half a century 
ago Russian Poland was an almost purely agricultural coun- 
try; but the hilly southeast, near the German and Austrian 
frontiers, contains extensive coal-fields and rich iron deposits, 
and the last quarter of the nineteenth century saw an inten- 
sive development of these mineral resources, which placed 
Russian Poland high in the list of coal- and iron-producing 
regions of Europe. This exploitation of mineral wealth has 
been largely accomplished by foreign capital and direction. 
Quick to see the economic significance of the region for capi- 
talists, modern industry was shortly introduced, so that to- 
day southeast Russian Poland contains industrial centers of 
first-rank importance. Lodz is the great textile center, 
Czenstochowa and Dombrowa, just across the Silesian fron- 
tier, are the chief mining and metallurgical areas, while War- 
saw, the capital, is the seat of a variety of factory industries, 
especially leather, machinery, and sugar-refining. 



84 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 



Prussian Poland 

In the provinces of Posen and West Prussia agricultural 
conditions are somewhat like those in Russian Poland. On 
the whole the soil is not so fertile, much of it being light and 
sandy; but certain districts, like the reclaimed marsh-lands 
of Posen and the Valley of the Vistula, in West Prussia, are 
markedly fertile. As in Russian Poland, the chief cereal 
crop is rye. Oats, wheat, barley, potatoes, and sugar-beets 
as well are extensively cultivated. There is considerable 
stock-raising, cattle, sheep, and goats being the principal 
kinds. In West Prussia especially considerable areas are 
under forest. Except salt, there are no important mineral 
resources. Industry is not greatly developed save at the city 
of Dantzig, and in this the Poles have virtually no part, the 
city being almost purely German. 

In the province of Silesia the Polish element is mainly con- 
centrated in the southern part, in the region known as Upper 
Silesia. This region is the geographical prolongation of the 
hilly southeastern part of Russian Poland, previously de- 
scribed. Upper Silesia is likewise rich in coal and iron. 
An industrial development corresponding to that of Russian 
Poland has taken place on an even more intense scale, so that 
to-day the extreme southern portion of Silesia is a veritable 
nexus of coal and iron mines, factories and metallurgical 
works, producing a great variety of iron and steel wares. 

Austrian Poland 

Austrian Poland, the western part of the province of 
Galicia, is agriculturally the most backward of any part of 
the Polish race-zone. This is due not so much to its soil, 
which is on the whole as fertile as the average in either Rus- 
sian or Prussian Poland, but to bad social conditions. The 
land is largely divided into great estates, which are indiffer- 



POLAND 85 

ently cultivated. Much of western Galicia is hilly or moun- 
tainous. The Cracow district is rich in a variety of miner- 
als, especially coal and zinc, while the salt-mines of Wielicka 
are among the most famous in the world. Industry is still 
backward, the principal branch being distilling. The rich 
petroleum-fields of eastern Galicia are in the Ukrainian rather 
than in the Polish race-zone. 

THE FACTS ABOUT POLAND 
Where Poland Is Located 

Considering Poland in the widest sense as comprising all 
regions that have an appreciable Polish element, it may be 
placed as the whole vast region between the Baltic Provinces 
on the north, Hungary on the south, central Russia on the 
east, and central Germany on the west. 

Territorial Units Involved 

Russian Poland comprises, firstly, the "Polish Govern- 
ments" of Russia; or the governments of Kalisz, Kielce, 
Lomza, Lublin, Piotrkow, Plock, Radom, Suwalki, and War- 
saw. It has an area of 43,804 square miles and a population 
of 11,500,000, of which seventy-four per cent., or 8,470,000, 
are Polish. These figures are from the census of 1907, which 
was an official estimate on the basis of the census of 1897. 

The Eastern Zone of Polish Settlement is, in the broad 
sense, also a part of Russian Poland, and includes Lithuania 
(provinces of Kovno, Grodno, Vilna) with an area of 46,505 
square miles; White Russia (provinces of Minsk, Mohilev, 
Vitebsk) with an area of 70,707 square miles; and the Ukraine 
(provinces of Podolia, Volhynia, Kieff) with an area of 61,- 
599 square miles. Total area 198,901 square miles. Popula- 
tion, 26,000,000; Poles, 1,800,000, or seven per cent. 

Prussian Poland. Posen: Area, 11,190 square miles. 



86 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Population, 1,887,000. Poles, 1,167,000 (62 per cent). West 
Prussia: area, 9,854 square miles. Population, 1,563,000. 
Poles, 555,000 (35 per cent.). East Prussia: area, 14,282 
square miles. Population, 1,986,000. Poles, 311,000 (15 
per cent.). Silesia: area, 15,566 square miles. Population, 
4,668,000. Poles, 1,305,000 (28 per cent.). Total, area, 50,- 
892 square miles. Population, 10,114,000. Poles, 3,338,000 
(33 per cent.). These figures are from the census of 1900. 

Austrian Poland. Galicia: Area, 30,321 square miles. 
Population, 7,315,000. Poles, 3,292,000 (45 per cent.). 
Austrian Silesia: area, 1,988 square miles. Population, 691,- 
000. Poles, 233,000 (34 per cent.). Total, area, 32,309 
square miles. Population, 8,006,000. Poles, 3,525,000 (41 
per cent.). These figures are from the census of 1900. 

Different Races in Poland 
Russian Poland ^ 

(a) In the Polish Governments of Russia. 

The Poles number about 8,470,000, or seventy-four per cent, 
of the population. They are found throughout the territory. 
They are of all social classes; but whereas in the rural dis- 
tricts, except the government of Suwalki, they form almost the 
whole population, in the great cities the Poles average only 
sixty per cent, of the population, and in the small towns only 
from thirty to forty per cent. (Warsaw, fifty-eight per cent. 
Poles ; Lodz, fifty-two per cent. ; Lublin, thirty-eight per cent. ; 
most of the balance Jews.) The Poles tend to gravitate to- 

1 Great changes in population have taken place in EusBiftn PolaJid 
since the beginning ot the war, especially owing to the systematic 
evacuation of the civilian population ordered by the Russian Govern- 
ment at the time of the retreat of the Russian armies before the Austro- 
German invasion in the Summer of 1915, But here, as elsewhere in 
this book, we have used pre-war statistics for the reason stated in the 
preface. 



POLAND 87 

ward the two ends of the social scale. At society's top is a 
solid Polish aristocracy; at its bottom, a solidly Polish peas- 
antry and a predominantly Polish urban proletariate. The 
middle and artisan classes are largely Jewish and German, 
though a Polish middle class is fast developing. The Poles 
are politically oppressed, the official class being almost exclu- 
sively Russian. The Poles of this region are still economi- 
cally backward as compared with the Jews and Germans. 

The Jews number 1,756,000, or thirteen per cent, of the 
population. They are found throughout, especially in the 
towns. The Jewish element is almost exclusively urban, such 
Jews as are found in the country being engaged in non-agri- 
cultural pursuits — small traders, peddlers, usurers, etc. The 
Jews control business, the poorer classes of the race being 
artisans, factory operatives, etc. In the smaller towns the 
Jews form a good half of the entire population ; some towns, 
such as Lublin, being overwhelmingly Jewish. The Jews are 
politically oppressed by both Russians and Poles, though the 
Russian government sometimes uses them as political counter- 
weights against the Poles. Of late years Polish anti-Semitism 
has been growing, the Poles believing that the Jews are ene- 
mies of Polish nationalism. The economic boycotts proclaimed 
by the Poles against the Jews have hit the latter hard, and 
the Poles' growing economic efficiency threatens the Jews' 
former business monopoly. 

The Germans number 587,000, or five per cent, of the popu- 
lation, and are found throughout in the cities. Even more 
than the Jews, the Germans concentrate in the cities. As the 
Jews dominate trade, so the Germans tend to control industry. 
Some of the great manufacturing centers are almost entirely 
in German hands. Lodz, the textile center, is twenty-four per 
cent. German. 

The Russians number 193,000, or 1.5 per cent, of the popu- 
lation. They are found throughout the region, especially in 
"Warsaw, the capital. They are almost exclusively officials. 



88 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

There are few civilians except at Warsaw, where the Russian 
element forms seven per cent, of the population. This does 
not include the large Russian garrisons quartered in various 
parts of the country before 1915. 

The Lithuanians number 320,000, or 2.7 per cent, of the 
population. They are concentrated in the northern part of 
the Suwalki government, which is racially part of Lithuania. 
Here they form virtually the entire population except a few 
Polish landlords and some Jews and Germans in the towns. 

The Biithenians (also known as Ukrainians and Little Rus- 
sians) number 358,000, or three per cent, of the population. 
They are concentrated in the eastern part of the Lublin gov- 
ernment. This district is racially a border-land between 
Poles and Ruthenians. The Ruthenians are a rural popula- 
tion, peasants and agricultural laborers. 

(b) In the Eastern Zone of Polish Settlement 
This vast region, comprising Lithuania, White Russia, and a 
large part of the Ukraine, was under Polish rule for about four 
centuries, from 1386 to 1772. During that period the aristoc- 
racy and town upper classes were Polonized, and despite the 
strongest denationalizing efforts of the Russian government 
since 1772, these classes remain largely Polish to-day. The 
Polish element at present numbers about 1,800,000, or seven 
per cent, of the entire population. It is composed almost ex- 
clusively of the landed gentry and upper-class townsfolk. It 
is strongest in Lithuania, where it forms over fifteen per cent, 
of the population; weakest in the Ukraine provinces, where 
it is barely four per cent. Some of the large Lithuanian 
cities are virtually Polish colonies (Vilna, forty-four per 
cent. Poles; Kovno, forty per cent. Poles). In Minsk, the 
chief city of White Russia, the Polish element is twenty-five 
per cent. In Kieff, the capital of the Ukraine, the Poles num- 
ber eleven per cent. 

The Polish element is everywhere politically depressed. 



POLAND 89 

The Russian government has long adopted toward it measures 
far harsher even than those in force in Poland proper. This 
Polish element of the Eastern Zone is economically somewhat 
stronger than its kinsmen of the Polish Governments, being 
more of an elite, with stimulating traditions of dominance and 
executive power. Its future is, however, menaced by both 
the hostility of the Russian government and the growing 
nationalisms of Lithuanians and Ukrainians. Only the White 
Russians remain racially inert and acquiescent in the historic 
hegemony of the Polish element. 

Prussian Poland 

(a) In Posen. 

The Poles number 1,167,000, or sixty-two per cent, of the 
population, and are found throughout the region. They 
are of all social classes except officials, and include a numer- 
ous landed aristocracy and town middle class. The latter is 
mostly a recent development. The Poles of Posen have 
learned the lesson of German economic efficiency and are now 
fully the equals of their German neighbors in economic abil- 
ity, although lack of capital and the disfavor of the German 
government and the German financial world still debar them 
from absolute equality with the Germans in commercial and 
industrial lines. 

In Posen, as in other parts of Poland, the Poles are a rural 
rather than an urban people. The percentage of Poles is 
therefore highest in the country districts, there averaging 
about seventy per cent., although there are German peasant 
colonies scattered all over the province. On the other hand, 
many of the towns are predominantly German. The provin- 
cial capital, Posen city, has fifty-nine per cent. Poles. The 
Poles are politically depressed. 

The Germans number 694,000, or thirty-seven per cent, of 
the population. They are found throughout the region, espe- 
cially in the towns, The Germans of Posen are the special 



90 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

care of the Prussian government, which aids them in every 
way against the Polish majority. They are of course politi- 
cally dominant, all the officials being Germans. Owing to 
the close relations between the German government and Ger- 
man finance, business, etc., the Germans manage to maintain a 
slight economic superiority over the Poles, despite the latter 's 
high economic ability. The Germans are of all social classes, 
though they form a rather higher percentage of the upper 
and middle classes than do the Poles. 

The Jews number 26,000, or one per cent, of the population. 
They are found in the towns. The Jewish element of Posen, 
once large and influential, has now declined almost to extinc- 
tion. In the bitter racial struggle between Poles and Ger- 
mans, a struggle largely economic, the Jews have been nipped 
between the two sides and have been literally squeezed out of 
Posen 's economic life. Furthermore, the Poles, in particu- 
lar, are strongly anti-Semitic, and their economic boycotts 
have dealt the Jews blows from which they have never re- 
covered. The same is true of the other Polish provinces of 
Prussia. Everywhere the Jewish element is on the decline. 

(b) In West Prussia. 

The Poles number 555,000, or thirty-five per cent, of the 
population, and are found mostly in the central part of 
this region. Unlike Posen, which is an ancient seat of the 
Polish race, West Prussia represents Polish colonization in 
the later medieval period (1466 to 1772). This colon- 
ization was mostly from Posen, up the west bank of the 
River Vistula, which cuts entirely across the province. East 
of the Vistula the population remained mainly German. 
Furthermore, the towns all over the province remained Ger- 
man, the Poles settling mainly in the country. The Poles of 
West Prussia are therefore mostly peasants and workmen, the 
upper and middle classes being mainly German. 

On the Baltic sea-coast, just west of the port of Dantzig, 



POLAND 91 

solidly German, is a population of fisher-folk, the Kassubs, 
who, although counted as Poles, are really descended from the 
old Pomeranian Slavs, a people related to the Poles, but of a 
different type. 

The Poles of West Prussia are politically depressed and are 
not nearly so strong economically as their kinsmen in Posen. 

The Germans number 1,000,000, or sixty-five per cent, of 
the population, and are found throughout the region. The 
German element, besides constituting the great majority of 
the urban population throughout, is also settled in two solid 
peasant blocks in the eastern and western parts of the prov- 
ince. Between these two masses stretches the wedge of Polish 
peasants, just touching the Baltic through the Kassubs. The 
German element in West Prussia is dominant in every way. 
It is, of course, aided by the Prussian government. The 
great seaport of Dantzig is almost solidly German. The sec- 
ond largest city. Thorn, on the border of Russian Poland, has 
a population seventy per cent. German, thirty per cent. Polish. 

(c) In East Prussia. 

The Poles number 311,000, or fifteen per cent, of the popu- 
lation, and are located in the extreme south. Although of 
Polish blood and speech, it is doubtful whether these people 
should be classed politically as Poles. Known as the Mazurs, 
they inhabit the strip of territory between the Mazurian 
Lakes and the southern frontier of East Prussia. They have 
been under German rule since the fourteenth century, have 
much German culture, and are Lutheran Protestants. In 
eastern Europe religion plays such an important part in de- 
termining nationality that these people are separated from 
the strongly Roman Catholic Poles by a wide gulf of creed and 
culture. The Mazurs are almost all peasants. 

The Germans number 1,665,000, or eighty-five per cent, of 
the population, and are found throughout. They constitute 
the great majority of the population of all classes. There are 



92 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

many even in the Mazurian district. They are dominant in 
every way. The exposed position of these Germans makes 
their race consciousness particularly intense. 

(d) In Silesia. 

The Poles number 1,305,000, or twenty-eight per cent, of 
the population. They are located in the southeastern part 
of the province. The Polish element in Silesia has been 
politically separated from Poland since the thirteenth 
century, and a half a century ago it had almost no race con- 
sciousness (they are known as Wasserpolacken), but the 
Polish national revival has reawakened its dormant Polonism 
and it now feels itself Polish. They are mostly peasants and 
workmen in the coal-fields. They are politically depressed 
and economically weak. 

The Germans number 3,336,000, or seventy-two per cent, of 
the population. They are found throughout the region. 
They constitute the entire population except in the southeast, 
and even here they are preponderant in the industrial towns. 
(Gleiwitz, eighty per cent. Germans ; Konigshiitte, on the fron- 
tier of Russian Poland, sixty-two per cent. Germans.) They 
are dominant in every way. 

Austrian Poland 

(a) In Galicia. 

The Poles number 3,292,000, or forty-five per cent, of the 
population, and are found throughout the region. Galicia 
is divided into two sharply contrasted race-zones. West- 
ern Galicia is an ancient seat of the Polish race, and 
here the Poles form the great bulk of the population of all 
ranks except the business class, which is mainly Jewish. In 
Eastern Galicia, on the other hand, the bulk of the population 
is Ruthenian (Ukrainian). Nevertheless, even here the towns 
are largely Polish or Jewish. In fact, conditions in eastern 



POLAND 93 

Galieia closely resemble those already described in the Eastern 
Zone of Polish Settlement in Russia. The historical back- 
ground is much the same. Eastern Galieia was conquered 
and held by Poland from the fourteenth century down to 
1772, and during that time the aristocracy and town upper 
classes were Polonized. Thus to-day Lemberg, the capital of 
eastern Galieia, has fifty-two per cent. Poles. 

In Galieia alone of all the disunited fragments of Poland 
are the Poles politically dominant, the Austrian Government 
favoring them and allowing them full local self-government. 
Virtually all the officials are therefore Poles, though of recent 
years the rising nationalism of the Ruthenians has compelled 
the Poles to grant them some share in the governance of east- 
ern Galieia. Economically, however, the Galician Poles are 
decidedly weak. The Polish middle class is relatively small, 
trade being controlled by the Jews and industry by the Ger- 
mans. The ruling Polish aristocracy, though politically 
clever, is economically inefficient. 

The Ruthenians (Ukrainians) number 3,072,000, or forty- 
two per cent, of the population, and are found throughout 
eastern Galieia. They are overwhelmingly peasants. Very 
few of them are found in the towns. Lemberg, their chief 
city, has only ten per cent. Ruthenians. For centuries they 
have been terribly exploited by both Poles and Jews, and 
even to-day most of the Ruthenians are miserably poor. But 
their recent nationalistic revival has given them new energy 
and produced an intellectual class, and now they are assert- 
ing themselves. (See Chapter on Ukraine Territories.) 

The Jews number 770,000, or thirteen per cent, of the popu- 
lation, and are found throughout, especially in the towns. 
As in Russian Poland, the Jews form a great part of the urban 
population, actually predominating in some of the small 
towns. They control business, and the poorer classes of the 
race are artisans, factory operatives, etc. Throughout the 



94 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

country-side they are also found as small traders, peddlers, 
usurers, etc. They are politically depressed, and are hated 
by both Poles and Ukrainians. 

(b) In Austrian Silesia. 

In the extreme east of this small province, adjoining Gralicia, 
is a district whose peasantry are Poles, numbering 233,000, 
or thirty-three per cent, of the population. They are politi- 
cally and economically dominated by the Germans. 

Who Controlled Poland Before the War 

Russian Poland, Russia; Prussian Poland, Germany; Aus- 
trian Poland, Austria. 

Who Has Controlled or Occupied Poland Since the 
War Began 

Russian Poland. All the Polish Governments of Russia 
have been in Austro-German military occupation since the 
autumn of 1915. The same is true of Lithuania. The bulk 
of White Russia and the Ukraine remained under Russian 
control until the beginning of 1918, when a German advance 
was imminent. 

Prussian Poland. Germany. 

Austrian Poland. The Russians conquered the eastern part 
of Galicia in the autumn of 1914, lost most of it in 1915, and 
were entirely expelled from the province in the summer of 
1917. Thus Austrian Poland is entirely in Austrian hands 
once more. 

Polish Interests 

The first interest which suggests itself is that of the Poles 
themselves. The ardent desire of the Polish people for a 
recreated Polish state is too obvious to need topical analysis. 
The natural desire of the Poles is that the frontiers of the 



POLAND 95 

new Poland should coincide with the boundaries of the Polish 
race. This, however, as has already been shown by the analy- 
sis of the racial composition of the territories involved, is an 
extremely complicated matter, vitally affecting the interests 
of the three existing states (Russia, Germany, and Austria- 
Hungary) now possessed of these territories. The analysis 
below will therefore refer to the effect upon each of these 
powers of the loss of their respective share of Polish territory 
to a possible Polish state. "We can thus best gage the oppo- 
sition likely to be exerted against the formation of a new 
Poland. 

Russia 's Interests in Poland ^ 

In considering Russia's interests we must make a sharp 
distinction between the Polish Governments — Russian Poland 
proper, and the immense Eastern Zone of Polish Settlement 
(Lithuania, White Russia, and the Ukraine). In this latter 
area the Poles are only a small upper class, while White Rus- 
sia and the Ukraine are inhabited by populations which, 
though differing considerably from the Great Russians of 
Petrograd and Moscow, are yet regarded by the Great Rus- 
sians as full members of the Russian family. To abandon 
these blood-relatives to Polish rule would be so abhorrent to 
the Great Russians and so detested by most of the natives 
themselves that the incorporation of White Russia and the 
Ukraine into a new Poland would be unthinkable except as 
the result of a complete break-up of Russia and its reduction 
to absolute impotence. 

Lithuania is on the border-line. The Polish minority is 
here much larger than in either White Russia or the Ukraine. 
Polish cultural influence is also very strong, and a certain ele- 
ment of the Lithuanians (who, not being Slavs, are related 
neither to Poles nor Russians) would welcome a resumption 
of the old historic connection between Poland and Lithuania. 

1 See foot-note on page 55. 



96 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

But the growing nationalism of the Lithuanians makes it un- 
likely that the majority would welcome the change. Lithu- 
anian nationalists desire neither Russian nor Polish govern- 
ance, but self-rule. (See chapter on Lithuania.) The de- 
termining factor would probably be Russia, And Russia 
regards possession of Lithuania as necessary to her continued 
retention of the Baltic Provinces, considered as absolutely 
vital to the continued existence of Russia as a great power. 
(See chapter on the Baltic Provinces.) 

We may therefore rule out of our analysis all consideration 
of the Eastern Zone 's incorporation into a Polish state. This 
will narrow our discussion to the Polish Governments, or Rus- 
sian Poland in the restricted sense. 

Political. It is possession of Russian Poland more than 
anything else which gives Russia her standing as a European 
great power. The latent threat behind this huge salient, 
thrust far in between Germany and Austria toward the heart 
of central Europe, enables Russian diplomacy to make its 
voice heard in all European questions. A Russia shut away 
from central Europe by the wall of a Polish state would come 
to be regarded as a quasi- Asiatic power, with no major inter- 
est in European affairs. 

Economic. Behind the shelter of the high Russian tariff 
wall Poland has developed into the greatest single industrial 
region of the Russian Empire. The Polish "Black Country" 
about Lodz, with its coal, iron, textiles, etc., outclasses even 
the industrial areas of the Donetz and Moscow. Its loss 
would upset Russia's whole economic life. 

Strategic. Possession of Russian Poland gives Russia a 
magnificent salient thrust deeply between Germany and Aus- 
tria-Hungary from which Russia can strike at either country 
on interior lines. In the present war, to be sure, this advan- 
tage was negatived by the great inferiority of the Russian 
railroads to those of Germany and Austria-Hungary. But in 



POLAND 97 

1914, Russia had already begun the construction of a vast 
strategic railway system, and had the war been postponed 
till 1917, it is very unlikely that Russia could have been 
driven out of her Polish salient, to say nothing of possible 
successful Russian invasions of Germany and Austria-Hun- 
gary, The loss of this Polish salient would, therefore, make a 
Russian invasion of either Germany or Austria a very diffi- 
cult undertaking. 

Racial. The Russian element in Poland is purely official 
and therefore artificial. But the retention of Poland gives 
Russia control over the main body of the second largest sub- 
division of the Slav race and puts her in close touch with the 
Austrian Slavs. This in many ways furthers her Pan-Slavist 
aspirations. 

Cultural. Slight. The cultural gulf between Poles, with 
their civilization drawn from the Roman West, and Russians, 
with their civilization drawn from the Byzantine East, is very 
profound. 

Religious. None. The Roman Catholic Poles hate and 
fear the Russian Orthodox Church, which has persecuted them 
in attempts to make them abjure their faith and enter the 
Orthodox fold. 

Germany's Interests in Poland 

Political. To a far greater degree than either Russia or 
Austria, Germany considers the retention of her share of 
Poland as vital to her very existence. The loss of her Eastern 
provinces would leave Germany so weakened and mutilated 
that she would almost cease to be a first-class power. One 
fourth of the whole German Empire would be gone. 

Economic. Germany's eastern provinces contain some of 
the most valuable economic assets of the empire. Besides a 
generally high level of agricultural development throughout 
the area, the Polish southeast of Silesia covers one of the chief 



98 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

German coal-fields and is a great industrial center, while 
Dantzig, the great seaport of West Prussia, controls the whole 
Vistula River trade. 

Strategic. How vital the strategic value of this area ap- 
pears to Germans can be judged from the reason why Ger- 
many's present eastern frontier happened to be drawn. At 
the Vienna Congress of 1814 Russia strongly desired to obtain 
all of Poland. Prussia, however, asserted that this would 
leave her with an impossible eastern frontier, for Posen in 
foreign hands would drive a wedge of alien territory to within 
seventy-five miles of Berlin, while the loss of West Prussia 
would absolutely isolate the old German province of East 
Prussia, the cradle of the Prussian kingdom. The result 
would be that Berlin would lie open to invasion, East Prussia 
would be hopelessly lost, and Silesia and Pomerania would 
be both uncovered by the piercing flanks of the Posen salient. 
In other words, Prussia would lie at the mercy of her eastern 
neighbor. These arguments appeared conclusive to the Euro- 
pean statesmen of the Vienna Congress. Accordingly, the 
present Russo-German frontier was laid down as the absolute 
minimum required for Prussia's strategic safety. Germans 
therefore assert that it is still the absolute strategic minimum, 
which cannot be further pared down without vital peril to 
Germany's existence. 

Racial. Throughout most of the disputed area Germans 
and Poles are mixed up in inextricable confusion. Even in 
the most Polish of these regions, Posen, there are numerous 
German agricultural districts scattered over the province, 
while the cities are largely German. West Prussia is over- 
whelmingly German except for the central band of Polish 
peasants cutting across the province to the sea, and even here 
the towns are mainly German. Again in southeastern Silesia, 
while the country-side is mostly Polish, the towns are as 
strongly German. Lastly, there is East Prussia, a solid Ger- 
man block which would be isolated and lost if the Polish strip 



POLAND 99 

in West Prussia were cut out of the present German Empire. 
In fact, in all four provinces except Posen the German ele- 
ment decisively outnumbers the Polish. The total population 
figures for the four eastern provinces are : Germans, 6,685,000; 
Poles, 3,338,000. The Germans thus outnumber the Poles 
two to one. 

Cultural. From the German point of view these provinces 
are all German culture-lands, redeemed after centuries of 
bitter struggle from Slavism. In all the provinces save Posen 
the Germans are incontestably superior culturally, setting the 
whole tone of civilization ; and even in Posen the German ele- 
ment is culturally more important than its relative numerical 
strength would indicate. To give up these regions would be 
for Germany to lose the fruits of her Drang nach Osten, the 
labor of a thousand years. Germanism would thereby be 
thrown back behind the Oder, and Berlin itself would be 
perilously near Germanism's eastern frontier. 

Religious. In Eastern Europe religion plays a great part 
in determining nationality. Accordingly, in the eastern 
provinces of the German Empire religious differences broadly 
coincide with race lines, most Germans being Lutheran 
Protestants while most Poles are Roman Catholics. How- 
ever, there are certain exceptions to the rule. The Mazurs 
of East Prussia are Protestants, and so are a considerable 
number of the Silesian Poles, while a large minority of the 
Silesian Germans are Roman Catholics. The effect of re- 
ligion on nationality is, however, clearly apparent. Where 
religion coincides with nationality it greatly intensifies racial 
self-consciousness ; where there is cross-division, religion blurs 
and weakens the national sense. For example, the Protestant 
Mazurs, though Polish in blood and speech, have so little race 
feeling that they would probably prefer to remain in the 
German Empire rather than enter a Polish state. On the 
other hand, the Catholic Germans are rarely so anti-Polish 
as their Protestant kinsmen. Most of the cases of Poloniza- 



100 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

tion among the Germans come from the Roman Catholic ele- 
ment. 

Austria-Hungary's Interests in Poland 

Political. Austria's interest in her share of Poland is 
much less than that of either Russia or Germany. Galicia, 
while a large and populous province, is a distinctly outlying 
part of Austria, the loss of which would involve no vital 
weakening or mutilation of the empire. The Hapsburg 
dynasty might, it is true, deeply regret the loss of an emi- 
nently loyal province, both Poles and Ruthenians having 
shown themselves sincere supporters of the reigning house. 
But the chief racial element in Austria, the Germans, would 
probably regard the incorporation of Galicia into a Polish 
state with veiled satisfaction, since this would so diminish 
the Slav representation in the Austrian parliament that the 
Germans would thenceforth hold the parliamentary balance 
of power. 

Economic. In comparison with its size and population, 
Galicia is a poor country. Industry is very undeveloped, ag- 
riculture is backward, while the oil-iields of East Galicia and 
the salt-mines of Wielicka are its only important mineral as- 
sets. The loss of Galicia would therefore cause no profound 
disturbance to Austrian economic life. 

Strategic. Galicia is the glacis of the Austro-Hungarian 
fortress, covering both the Hungarian plain and the Moravian 
Gap (the eastern key to Vienna) from direct assault. The 
loss of this broad outwork would therefore seriously diminish 
Austria-Hungary's defensive power. But, on the other hand, 
the relations between Austria and the Polish race have been 
so traditionally friendly, and there are so slight possibilities 
of future friction, that Austria would not run the same risk 
of a hostile Poland as would Russia and Germany, against 
both of whom the Poles have old scores and with whom exist 
many probable grounds of future enmity. 



POLAND 101 

Racial. None. 
Cultural. None. 
Religious. None. 

Solutions that Have Been Proposed and What They 

Mean 

1. Status Quo Ante Bellum. 

Never since the partition of Poland, over a century ago, 
has the Polish race acquiesced in the splitting up of its na- 
tional state and subjection to alien masters. And the last 
generation has witnessed an unprecedented revival of Polish 
national consciousness and an increasing demand for the es- 
tablishment of a national Polish state. The present vs^ar has 
still further quickened Polish national consciousness, while 
the promises made by all three partitioning powers, in the 
endeavor to gain Polish support in the war, has further awak- 
ened Polish hopes and has established definite claims which 
Poles will press insistently for fulfilment. Such being the 
facts, it is evident that the status quo of 1914, which would 
be an absolute denial of all these Polish aspirations, hopes, 
and claims, would so ulcerate Polish feelings as to leave the 
Polish race in an uncompromising and rebellious mood, which 
would endanger the peace of Europe for generations to come. 

From the point of view of the powers that would, under 
this arrangement, possess Poland, — Eussia, Germany, and 
Austria-Hungary, — the latent threat of a restless Poland 
would have to be set over against the various advantages 
analyzed in the national interests section. 

2. New Partition of Poland. 

Any new partition would probably follow the lines of pres- 
ent military possession. This would involve cession by Rus- 
sia of her Polish governments and possibly more eastern terri- 
tory, such as Lithuania, to the Central Powers. This would 
bring to the Central Powers a great accession of economic 



102 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

strength, as specified above, and an excellent strategic fron- 
tier against future Russian aggression. But it would bring 
into the political bodies of the Central Powers many millions 
of recalcitrant and unassimilable Poles, Jews, and other racial 
elements. This would seriously disturb both the internal and 
international political problem of the Central Powers. 

3. Autonomous Poland under Russia. 

This must be predicated upon a liberal Russia. An im- 
perial Russia would not permit autonomy and would attempt 
to Russify it. The fact that such autonomy would be a long 
step toward a definite Polish entity would probably persuade 
the Poles to accept it. A liberal Russia would probably agree, 
because a satisfied Poland would not be a menace. Austria- 
Hungary could acquiesce in this because her Polish possession 
— Galicia — is not a vital part of her empire. The stubborn 
factor would be Germany, who would regard the loss of all or 
any considerable part of her Polish possessions as an irrepar- 
able loss and would plan to regain it at the earliest moment. 

4. Autonomous Poland under Austria-Hungary. 

The feasibility of this would depend upon whether Austria- 
Hungary comes out of the war more dependent upon and 
dominated by Germany or less so. Were Austria-Hungary a 
really independent empire, its Catholic and relatively non- 
national character might make its suzerainty bearable, if not 
wholly agreeable, to Poland. But this is a rather slender 
hope. 

5. Autonomous Poland under Germany. 

This would mean the placing of Poland 's economic life upon 
a well organized basis of development, but there is such racial 
antipathy between the Poles and Germans that, even under a 
liberalized Germany, the relations would be tense and menac- 
ing. 



POLAND 103 

6. Independent Poland. 

This would satisfy Polisli aspirations and would be the 
ideal solution. Would it work? If it included all predomi- 
nantly Polish territory, it would incur the lasting enmity of 
Germany and lay the grounds for later reconquest. Austria- 
Hungary would probably give little trouble. Russia might 
object regarding the eastern part, where there are many 
Russians. A limited Polish state not including the present 
German possessions would leave the state sealed up from ac- 
cess to the sea, with a difficult economic position. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Poland 

(As A WHOLE) 

Historical. 

Brandes, G. Poland. London, 1903. 

Cleinow, G. Die Zukunft Polens. Leipzig, 1908. 

Dmowski, R. La Question polonaise. Paris, 1909. 

Harley, J. H. Poland: Past and Present. London, 1917. 

Hill, N. Poland and the Polish Question. London, 1915. 

Leblond, M. A. La Pologne vivante. Paris, 1910. 

Lewinski-Corwin, E. H. The Political History of Poland. New 

York, 1917. 
Morfill, W. R. Poland. London, 1893. 
Orvis, J. S. A Brief History of Poland. Boston, 1916. 
Phillips, W. A. Poland. London, 1916. 
Winter. N. O. Poland of Today and Yesterday. Boston, 1913. 

Economic, 

Reyman, E. J. Die Weichsel als Wasserstrasse. Warsaw, 1912. 
Romer, H. Geographisch-statistisches Atlas von Polen. Cracow, 
1916. 

General. 

Dzieduszycki, J. Der Patriotismug in Polen. Cracow, 1884. 

Feldman, W. Deutschland, Polen und die russische Gefahr. Ber- 
lin, 1915. 

Gibbons, H. A. The Reconstruction of Poland and the Near East. 
New York, 1917. 



104 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Gizbert-Studnicki, W. R. Die Umgestaltung Mitteleuropas durch 

den gegenwartigen Krieg. Vienna, 1915. 
Guttry, A. von. Die Polen und der Weltkrieg. Munich, 1915. 
Lipkowski, J. de. The Polish Question and the Slavs of Central 
Europe. Paris, 1915. 
Missalek, E. Das Konigreich Polen. Leipzig, 1915. 
Retinger, J. H. La Pologne et I'Equilibre europeen. Paris, 1916. 
Zdziechowski, M. Die Grundprobleme Polens. Vienna, 1907. 

A. Russian Poland 
Economic. 

Statesman's Handbook for Russia. Petrograd. Annual. 
Bielschowski, F. Die Textileindustrie des lodzer Rayons. Ihre 

Werden und ihre Bedeutimg. Leipzig, 1912. 
Mavor, J. An Economic History of Russia. New York, 1916. 
Oeneral 

Friedrichsen, M. Die Grenzmarken des europaischen Russlands. 

Hamburg, 1915. 

B. Pbussian Poland 
Historical. 

Knotel, H. Gesehichte Oberschlesiens. Kattowitz, 1906. 

Krische, P. Die Provinz Posen: Ihre Gesehichte und Kultur. 
Stassfurt, 1907. 

Lohmeyer, K. Gesehichte von Ost- und Westpreussen. Gotha, 
1908. 

Meyer, C. Gesehichte der Provinz Posen. Gotha, 1891. 

Morgenbesser, M. Gesehichte von Schlesien. Berlin, 1892. 

Schmidt, E. Gesehichte des Deutschtums im Lande Posen unter 
polnischer Herrschaft. Bromberg, 1904. 

Stade, P. Das Deutschtum gegeniiber den Polen in Ost- und West- 
preussen. Berlin, 1908. 

Vallentin, H. Westpreussen seit den ersten Jahrzehnten dieses 
Jahrhunderts. Tubingen, 1893. 

Economic 

Statistisches Jahrbuch fiir den preussischen Staat. Berlin. An- 
nual. 

Belgard, M. Parzellierung und innere Kolonization in den sechs 
ostlichen Provinzen Preussens, 1875 bis 1906. Leipzig, 1907. 

Grtihn, A. Das deutsche Kapital und der Polonismus. Berlin, 
1895. 



POLAND 105 

Jackowski, T. von. Der Bauernbesitz in der Provinz Posen im 19. 

Jahrhundert. Leipzig, 1913. 
Michel, E. Bahrzahlung und Kreditverkehr im Handel und 

Gewerbe in der Provinz Posen. Stuttgart, 1915. 
Wegener, L. Der wirtschaftlieher Kampf der Deutschen mit dem 
Polen um die Provinz Posen. Posen, 1903. 

General. 

Bernhard, L. Preussische Stadte im Gebiete des polnischen Na- 
tionalitatenkampfes. Leipzig, 1909. 

Bernhard, L. Das polnische Gemeinwesen im preussischen Staat. 
Leipzig, 1910. 

Boguslawski, A. von. Fiinfundachtzig Jahre preussischer Regier- 
ungspolitik in Posen und Westpreussen von 1815 bis 1900. 
Berlin, 1901. 

Delbruck, H. Die Polenfrage. Berlin, 1894. 

Massur, H. Die Polen-Not im deutschen Osten. Berlin, 1903 

Mitscherlich, W. Die Ausbreitung der Polen in Preussen. Leip- 
zig, 1913. 

Puttkammer, Baron K. Die Misserfolge in der Polenpolitik. Ber- 
lin, 1913. 

Reismann-Grone, D. Die slavische Gefahr in der Ostmark. Mun- 
ich, 1899. 

Stumpfe, E. Polenfrage und Ansiedelungskommission. Berlin, 
1902. 

Tetzner, F. Die 81awen in Deutschland. Braunschweig, 1902. 

Weber, P. Die Polen in Oberschlesien. Berlin, 1914. 

Wiehdorff, H. V. Masuren. Berlin, 1915. 

C. Austrian Poland 
Economic. 

Oesterreiehische Statistik, herausgegeben vom K.K. Statistischen 
Zentralkommission. Vienna. Annual. 

General. 

Auerbach, B. Les Races et les Nationalites en Autriohe-Hongrie. 

Paris, 1898. 
Bienaime, G. La Diete de Galicie, ses tendances autonomes. Paris, 

1910, 
Gayda, V. Modern Austria: Her Racial and Social Problems. 

London, 1915. 
Guttry, A. von. Galizien. Munich, 1916. 
Szujski, J. Die Polen und Ruthenen in Galizien. Vienna, 1882. 



EASTERN EUROPE 
LITHUANIA 




GREAT RUSSIA NS 



WHITE RUSSIANS 



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LITHUANIANS 



■PROVINCIAL FRONTIERS 
■»•■»- + + + +• ^INTERNATIONAL FRONTIERS 



A/9y LITHUAN//\ 



CHAPTER VII 
LITHUANIA 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 

The Lithuanians represent the main body of a distinct 
branch of the Aryan race, dwelling from time almost beyond 
historic memory about the southeastern corner of the Baltic 
Sea. Other branches of this race-stock are the Letts of the 
Baltic Provinces and the former Borussians, or old Prussians, 
who are now extinct. 

The eastern Baltic lands were originally regions of swamp 
and forest where the Lithuanian peoples lived in primitive 
tribal anarchy. Their lack of political cohesion was offset, 
however, by a warlike disposition and a strongly developed 
religion maintained by a powerful priesthood akin to the 
Druids of the primitive Celts. This religious cult aroused 
a sense of common race solidarity among the Lithuanian peo- 
ples and enabled them to withstand the pressure of the much 
more numerous Slavs, who in the early centuries of the Chris- 
tian era flooded the wide regions to east and south, territory 
now represented by Russia and Poland. The race conscious- 
ness of the Lithuanians was intensified when the Slavs ac- 
cepted Christianity while the Lithuanians clung to their 
native paganism with a tenacity unexampled among Euro- 
pean peoples. 

It was this very paganism, however, which presently drew 
down upon the Lithuanian stocks a new enemy, the Germans. 
The persistence of this pagan area in the midst of the Chris- 
tian world aroused increasing concern throughout Christen- 
dom, and at the end of the twelfth century two German 

109 



110 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

crusading orders undertook the conversion and subjugation 
of these formidable heathen. One order, the Teutonic 
Knights, attacked the Old Prussians, and after a century of 
ferocious conflict entirely exterminated them, the Old Prus- 
sians preferring death to baptism. Their country, the pres- 
ent provinces of East and West Prussia, were resettled by 
Germans. The other crusading order, the Knights of the 
Sword, landed in the Baltic Provinces, and eventually sub- 
dued them. Here the resistance, though fierce, was not so 
implacable as in Prussia. For this reason the native popu- 
lation, the modern Letts, was not exterminated, but was re- 
duced to serfdom, the German conquerors becoming the aristo- 
cratic owners of the land, as indicated in the chapter on the 
Baltic Provinces. 

Although neither Prussia nor the Baltic Provinces were 
fully subdued until a much later date, their conquest was so 
well advanced by the middle of the thirteenth century that 
the Teutonic orders were then able to begin a joint assault 
upon the heart of the Lithuanian race — Lithuania proper, or 
the land lying between and to the east of both Prussia and 
the Baltic Provinces. This German attack did not, however, 
succeed. Warned by the fate of their Prussian and Lettish 
kinsmen, the Lithuanians drew together and submitted to the 
rule of a dynasty of native princes which had for some time 
been slowly gathering the various Lithuanian tribes beneath 
its sway. Indeed, these Lithuanian princes now made con- 
quests of their own. Russia had by this time fallen into 
anarchy under the shock of Tatar invasions, and the Lithu- 
anians accordingly subjugated most of western Russia, their 
conquests extending southward almost to the Black Sea. Yet, 
despite this accession of strength, the Teutonic menace still 
threatened. For this reason the Lithuanian princes made an 
alliance with their old enemies, the Poles, against the common 
Teutonic foe, and in 1386 this alliance became a dynastic 
union through the marriage of the Lithuanian Prince Jagiello 



LITHUANIA 111 

to the daughter of the Polish king. Henceforth Poland and 
Lithuania were united in a common state. The Lithuanians 
finally abjured their paganism for Roman Catholicism, and 
the two peoples together beat down the German peril at the 
great battle of Tannenberg, in 1410. 

As time passed, Lithuania was largely Polonized. The 
aristocracy and townsfolk became Polish in language and 
feeling. The peasants, although retaining their old Lithu- 
anian speech and customs, sank into abject serfdom and 
exerted no influence on the national life. When Lithuania 
fell to Russia during the partitions of Poland at the end of 
the eighteenth century^, Lithuanian race consciousness had ap- 
parently ceased to exist. 

But here, as elsewhere, the nineteenth century saw a re- 
awakening of race feeling, and a Lithuanian nationalist move- 
ment presently sprang into being. The Russian government 
favored the movement, since it was directed primarily against 
the Polish upper classes. At the present time the bulk of the 
Lithuanian population is certainly aware of its peculiar racial 
identity, and the more advanced wing of Lithuanian national- 
ism dreams of an independent Lithuania, freed from both 
Polish and Russian domination. But the aristocracy and 
townsfolk are still predominantly Polish, and insist upon 
Lithuania's inclusion in any future Polish state. Much of 
the history of Lithuania is involved in the chapter on Poland. 

ECONOMIC SURVEY 

Lithuania is a poor country. Low-lying and badly drained, 
much of its surface is marsh, wet meadow-land, and tangled 
forest. 

A severe climate and a frost-bound soil complete the list of 
handicaps to cultivation. The best part of the country is the 
province of Kovno, lying nearest the Baltic. Here the land 
is higher and better drained and the climate is milder, being 
tempered by the nearness of the sea. Kovno, therefore, pro- 



112 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

duces fairly good crops of northern cereals, especially rye, 
oats, and barley, while potatoes are extensively grown for 
food, fodder, and distilling. Flax cultivation completes the 
list of its noteworthy agricultural products. Agriculture in 
the other provinces of Lithuania is similar in character, but 
in a much less prosperous condition. 

The raising of live stock is carried on throughout the 
country. 

Forest products are also an important item in Lithuania's 
economic life. 

Industry in the modern sense is confined mainly to the 
larger towns. Grodno has several large woolen mills, while 
numerous distilleries, tanneries, woodworking establishments, 
and kindred industries exist in various parts of the country. 

THE FACTS ABOUT LITHUANIA 

Where Lithuania is Located 

Lithuania is bounded by East Prussia and Poland on the 
west, the Baltic Provinces on the north, Russia proper on the 
east, and White Russia on the south. 

The Territorial Units Involved 

Russian provinces of Kovno, Vilna, and Grodno; also parts 
of the Russian provinces of Vitebsk and Minsk; and the north- 
ern part of the Polish Government of Suwalki. 

The area of Lithuania proper — that is, the Russian prov- 
inces of Kovno, Vilna, and Grodno — is 46,595 square miles, 
or about the size of New York State. Its population in 1912 
was 6,980,000. Of these about 3,000,000 are Lithuanians. 
In adjoining provinces are about 500,000 Lithuanians. 

Different Races in Lithuania ^ 

The Lithuanians are found throughout the region. They 
are mostly peasants and town proletariat, although an intel- 
1 See foot-note on page 86. 



LITHUANIA 113 

lectual and middle class is developing. They are good agri- 
culturists, but economically exploited by Poles and Jews, and 
politically depressed by Poles and Russians. 

The Poles are found throughout the region. They are 
mostly upper-class landowners or townsfolk. The bulk of 
these Lithuanian Poles are of Lithuanian blood, but they have 
been Polonized for centuries, and to-day feel themselves true 
Poles. Culturally dominant and economically powerful, they 
are politically depressed by the Russians. 

The Great Russians are found throughout the region. They 
are politically dominant, although few in numbers. Among 
them are some landowners and townsfolk, but they were 
mostly officials and garrison troops until 1915. 

The White Russians are found in the eastern part of the 
region. They are poverty-stricken peasants, with almost no 
race consciousness or separate culture. 

The Jews are found throughout the region. As in Poland, 
the Jews are very numerous, especially in the towns. They 
control the retail business of the region. 

The Germans are found mostly in the towns. They are 
very prominent in industrial life, the wholesale trades, and 
kindred lines. 

Who Controlled Lithuania Before the War 
Russia. 

Who Has Controlled or Occupied Lithuania Since the 

War Began 

Since the autumn of 1915 Germany has occupied the region. 

Lithuanian and Polish Interests in This Region 

The interests of Lithuanians and Poles are too self-evident 
to require topical analysis. The Lithuanians dream of an 
independent or autonomous Lithuania. The Poles desire to 



114 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

incorporate Lithuania into their proposed revived Polish 
state. 

Russia's Interests in Lithuania^ 

Political. The retention of Lithuania within the Russian 
Empire appeals to most Russians as vital to Russia's con- 
tinued existence as a European great power. 

Economic. Although nowhere of great fertility, the large 
area of Lithuania presents in the aggregate considerable agri- 
cultural resources. Cereals are widely grown, and the ex- 
tensive forest areas yield considerable revenue. In the cities, 
especially Vilna, there is some manufacturing. 

Strategic. The retention of Lithuania is considered vital 
to Russia's defense system on her western side. The loss of 
Lithuania would undermine Russia's hold on the Baltic Prov- 
inces, would virtually sever Russia from her Polish provinces, 
and would uncover the heart of Russia — Muscovy — to in- 
vasion. 

Racial. The numerous White Russian element is claimed 
by the Great Russians as an integral part of their race. 

Cultural. The culture of both Lithuanians and White Rus- 
sians is predominantly Polish. The cultural claim of Russia 
is therefore slight. 

Religious. Most of the inhabitants of Lithuania are Roman 
Catholics. The religious claim of Russia is therefore slight. 

Germany's Interests in Lithuania 

Political. The severance of Lithuania from Russia and its 
erection into a separate state, either independent or under 
German influence, would immensely strengthen Germany's 
eastern position. It would shatter Russia's whole standing 
in eastern Europe, and open up possibilities of German domi- 
nation over this entire region, made up of Lithuania, the 
Baltic Provinces, and Poland. 

1 See foot-note on page 55. 



LITHUANIA 115 

Economic. Germans already play a leading part in indus- 
try. Also, many landed estates are in German hands. 

Strategic. It is through Lithuania that Russia touches 
East Prussia. A Lithuanian state would remove all direct 
Russian pressure upon eastern Germany, and might lay open 
the Baltic Provinces, Poland, and Russia proper to German 
invasion. 

Racial. The racial interest is very slight. 

Cultural. Cultural claims do not enter. 

Beligious. Religious interests are not a factor. 

Solutions that Have Been Proposed and What They 

Mean 

1. Status Quo Ante Bellum. 

This would leave Lithuania an undifferentiated part of 
Russia. It would disappoint the aspirations of both the Lithu- 
anian majority and the Polish minority. It would best please 
the Russians, even liberal Russians. Lithuania is so much a 
geographical part of Russia that even liberals would probably 
not view its severance with the relative equanimity that they 
would the severance of Poland. 

2. Independent Lithuania. 

This would satisfy the aspirations of Lithuanian national- 
ists. Its feasibility is questionable on the grounds that it is 
too small, has too little variety of economic resources, and has 
too many refractory elements to maintain itself successfully. 

3. Independent Lithuania Augmented by the Lettish Part 

of the Baltic Provinces. 
This would reunite the whole Letto-Lithuanian race, and 
would therefore seem the racially desirable solution. But 
even so, the state would be very small, and would arouse Rus- 
sian hostility through possession of Riga and the lower Dvina 
River, one of Russia's chief economic outlets. It is not cer- 
tain that the Lithuanians and the Letts would get on together. 



116 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Racially of the same stock, they have divergent histories. 
The Lithuanians are Roman Catholics with Polish culture. 
The Letts are Protestants with German culture. 

With the further inclusion in this state of the northern 
part of the Baltic Provinces, it would be subject to the same 
weaknesses as the above, plus the presence of the Esths of 
these provinces, who are of an entirely different race and of 
refractory inclinations. 

4. Incorporation of Lithuania within a Polish State. 

This would follow the old historic lines of the Polish-Lithu- 
anian state as it existed from the later Middle Ages down to 
the extinction of the Polish state at the close of the eighteenth 
century. This would satisfy the Polish minority in Lithu- 
ania, but would disappoint the Lithiianian majority. 

5. Autonomous Lithuania under Eussia. 

Under a liberal Russia the Lithuanians would probably be 
satisfied with such an arrangement. The chief difficulty 
would be the internal friction between the Lithuanian ma- 
jority and the Polish minority. 

6. Autonomous Lithuania under Germany. 

This implies, from the geographical position of Lithuania, 
a German hegemony over Poland. The Polish minority 
would probably be discontented. The Lithuanian majority 
might be satisfied, as there does not seem to exist the same 
racial antagonism against Germany as between the Poles and 
the Germans. The chief objector would be Russia, because of 
the strategic threat from Germany it would make. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Brye, J. de. Etude historique sur la Lithuanie. Paris, 1894. 
Friederichsea, M. Die Grenzmarken des europaischen Russlands. 

Hamburg, 1915. 
Schiemann, T. Russland, Polen und Llvland bis ins 17. Jahrhundert. 

(2 vols.) Berlin 1886-87. 
Zweck, A. Litauen; eine Landes- und Volkskunde. Stuttgart, 1898. 



EASTERN EUROPE 
CZECHO-SLOVAK TERRITORIES 




00 



CHAPTER VIII 
CZECHO-SLOVAK TEREITOEIES 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 

The home of the Czecho-Slovaks is a long band of territory 
stretching due east and west across east-central Europe. Its 
physical character varies greatly, its three historic divisions 
(Bohemia, Moravia, and the Tatra, or western Carpathians) 
denoting distinctly diverse geographical regions. 

Bohemia, the westernmost of these regions, is by far the 
most important. It is a great plateau in Europe 's very heart, 
ringed about with mountains. Bohemia's dominant position, 
overlooking as it does the flat lands of Germany to the north 
and the Danube Valley to the south, has given it the signifi- 
cant title of the Citadel of Europe. 

East of Bohemia, and separated from it by a chain of rough 
hills, lies Moravia. Moravia is a transition land of hill and 
plateau broken by wide river-valleys draining south to the 
Danube. Its northern border is formed by projecting spurs 
of the Bohemian and Carpathian mountain-systems, reaching 
out toward each other, but just failing to meet. The result 
is a stretch of fairly low country between — the famous Mo- 
ravian Gap — through which unnumbered tribes and peoples 
have poured from the boundless Russian plains into central 
Europe. 

East of Moravia, again, rises the Tatra, or Western Car- 
pathians. The Tatra is a mass of rugged mountains, steep 
to the north, but opening out on the south into river valleys 
draining the wide Hungarian plain. 

The history of these lands begins with the Slavic invasion 

119 



120 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

of the sixth century, a. d. At that epoch the ancestors of the 
modern Czechs and Slovaks poured through the Moravian 
Gap, expelled the Teutonic tribes who then peopled the region, 
and settled down as masters. These Slavs were rude bar- 
barians, but they prospered greatly in their new homes, and 
when they had acquired the rudiments of civilization they 
built up powerful states in both Bohemia and Moravia. Only 
the eastern branch of the race, the Slovaks, side-tracked in 
the remote and infertile Tatra, fell behind and never made 
the political and cultural progress of their Czech kinsmen to 
the west. 

In the early Middle Ages the Kingdom of Bohemia, which 
had absorbed Moravia, was one of the leading states of Eu- 
rope ; but in the thirteenth century the old dynasty of native 
Slav kings died out, and the throne fell to foreign monarchs 
who favored that German infiltration which had already been 
long at work. When the Czechs occupied Bohemia in the 
sixth century they tarried in the fertile central plain, leaving 
the mountain rim in the hands of the dispossessed Teutons. 
Now little by little the Germans began to descend from the 
mountains toward the plain once more, while German mer- 
chants and artisans, favored by the crown, settled all over 
Bohemia and Moravia in the towns, gradually giving them a 
Teutonic complexion. The terrible Hussite Wars of the fif- 
teenth century, although purely religious in form, were in fact 
largely a Czech nationalistic revolt against encroaching Ger- 
manism, and their effect was to check the progress of Ger- 
manism for a full century. 

The struggle was renewed in the Thirty Years' War (1618- 
1648), but this time the Czechs lost. Their Hapsburg sov- 
ereigns, who represented Germanism, took a terrible venge- 
ance upon the rebellious Czechs. Bohemia and Moravia were 
half depopulated, while the old Czech nobility was entirely 
rooted out, their estates being given to foreigners, mostly 
Austrian Germans. Thus deprived of their natural leaders, 



CZECHO-SLOVAK TERRITORIES 121 

the oppressed Czech peasantry sank into a political and cul- 
tural stupor which looked like death. Outwardly the land 
was entirely German, the Czech language being spoken only 
by peasants. 

However, the nineteenth century, that awakener of dor- 
mant nationalities, roused the Czechs from their long slum- 
ber. A vigorous nationalist revival began, and the increasing 
economic prosperity which Bohemia then enjoyed permitted 
the rapid growth of a Czech middle and educated class, which 
furnished able leaders to the national revival. Step by step, 
despite stubborn opposition, the Czechs drove the German 
minority from their privileged positions, and by the begin- 
ning of the twentieth century the Czechs were in full political 
control of those parts of Bohemia and Moravia in which they 
constituted a numerical majority; in other words, most of 
the country. 

The long struggle had, however, aroused great bitterness on 
both sides. The German minority, infuriated by Czech suc- 
cesses and alarmed for its future, openly preached secession 
from Austria to the German Empire, while the Czech na- 
tionalists demanded the erection of Bohemia and Moravia 
into a fully autonomous unit wherein they, as the numerical 
majority, might Slavize the unprotected Germans. When 
Austria refused their demands, many of the Czech nationalists 
fixed their hopes on Russia. Bohemia and Moravia were thus 
full of race-hatred, secessionism, and general unrest when the 
European War broke out in 1914. 

Of the Slovaks there is little to be said. They have always 
been a population of backward peasants, and since the early 
Middle Ages they have been under the political domination 
of the Magyars, or Hungarians. Originally identical with 
the Czechs, long centuries of contrasted environment and his- 
tory have differentiated them considerably from their western 
kinsmen. The Czech nationalists wish to incorporate the 
Slovaks in their projected Czecho-Slovak state. 



122 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Benes, E. Detruisez I'Autriche-Hongrie : Le Martyre des Tchgco-Slo- 

vaques h travers I'Histoire. Paris, 1916. 
Bourlier; J. Les Tcheques et la Boheme contemporaine. Paris, 1897. 
Bretholz, B. Gesehichte Mahrens. Briinn, 1893. 
Capek, T. The Slovaks. New York, 1906. 
Capek, T. Bohemia under Hapsburg Misrule. London, 1915. 
Denis, E. La Boheme depuis la Montagne-Blanche. Paris, 1903. 
Liitzow, Count. Bohemia: An Historical Sketch. London, 1896. 
Monroe, W. S. Bohemia and the Czechs. Boston, 1910. 
Sasinek, F. V. Die Slovaken. Eine ethnographische Skizze. Prague, 

1875. 
Schmidt-Beauchez, L. La Lutte de la Boheme contre le Pangermanisme. 

Paris, 1898. 
Seton-Watson, E. W. Racial Problems in Hungary: A History of the 

Slovaks. London, 1909. 
Skene, A. von. Entstehen und Entwickelung der slavisch-nationalen 

Bewegung in Bohmen und Mahren im 19. Jahrhundert. Vienna, 

1893. 
Tobolka, Z. W. Das Bohmisehe Volk. Prague, 1916. 
Tiirk, K. Bohmen, Mahren und Schlesien. Munich, 1898. 

ECONOMIC SURVEY 

The lands of the Czecho-Slovaks are, in the aggregate, fer- 
tile, well endowed with mineral wealth, and possessed of a 
rapidly expanding industrial life. 

This is notably true of Bohemia, which is in every respect 
a highly favored region. To begin with, the combination of 
a good climate and a laborious peasantry has brought agri- 
culture to a high prosperity. The central plain is generally 
cultivable, certain areas ranking among the most fertile in 
Europe, Large crops of cereals and potatoes are raised, and 
of recent years the cultivation of sugar beets has greatly ex- 
tended. Flax and fruit are also grown with success. Bo- 
hemia's most notable agricultural specialty is hops, those of 
the Saaz district being acknowledged to be the finest in the 
world. The mountainous rim of Bohemia is clothed with 



CZECHO-SLOVAK TERRITORIES 123 

fine and well-tended forests, the yield of which is valuable. 
Bohemian live stock is distinctly specialized, goose-raising and 
bee-keeping being the principal branches. Bohemian honey 
enjoys a wide-spread reputation. 

Bohemia 's mountain rim is stocked with almost every useful 
metal and mineral except salt. The most important mineral 
products are coal and lignite. Some of the richest lignite- 
fields in Europe are found in the northeast, while valuable 
coal-fields occur in the northwest. In the north, near the 
Saxon frontier, are good iron-mines. Other valuable metals 
are silver, lead, tin, antimony, graphite, kaolin, and radium, 
while copper, sulphur, cobalt, alum, nickel, arsenic, and cer- 
tain sorts of precious stones are found in paying quantities. 
Bohemia is unusually rich in mineral springs. Several of 
these, notably Carlsbad, Franzensbad, and Marienbad, have 
valuable medicinal qualities which have a world-wide repu- 
tation. 

Well provided with coal, iron, and water-power, Bohemia 
has naturally developed a varied industrial life. Some of 
her industries are of long standing, Bohemian glass and porce- 
lains having been famous since the Middle Ages. During the 
last half -century, however, the staple industries of the mod- 
ern world have developed so greatly as to place Bohemia first 
industrially among Austrian provinces. These great staple 
industries, textiles, cloth-making, and iron and steel works of 
every description, are centered in northern Bohemia in close 
juxtaposition to the water-power sources and the coal- and 
iron-fields. The rise of beet-sugar growing has dotted the 
Bohemian plain with sugar refineries, while the output of the 
great breweries of Budweis and Pilsen goes all over the world. 
Other industrial specialties are chemicals, leather, paper, pen- 
cils, and musical instruments. 

Moravia is in many respects the economic counterpart of 
Bohemia, although not quite so well favored by nature. In 
northern Moravia a relatively severe climate and less fertile 



124 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

soil check the development of agriculture, but southern Mo- 
ravia possesses much fertile land, producing heavy cereal 
crops. The mountainous north is covered with valuable for- 
ests. Sheep-raising and horse-breeding are Moravia's chief 
live-stock occupations. 

As in Bohemia, the mountains contain a varied wealth of 
minerals and metals, notably coal, iron, and silver. 

As in Bohemia, again, the presence of coal and iron makes 
possible an important industrial life which has acquired great 
importance during the last hundred years. The principal 
manufactures are textiles, woolens, linens, iron, and steel 
products, and some specialties, such as leather and brandy. 

Austrian Silesia, although very small, is a flourishing area 
both agriculturally and industrially, with considerable min- 
eral wealth. It is in most respects a microcosm of Moravia, 
of which, economically, it forms a part. 

The only really ill-favored portion of the Czecho-Slovak 
area is the Slovak country of the western Carpathians. This 
mountainous district has neither mineral wealth nor fertile 
soil, while the Slovaks themselves, a backward, depressed peo- 
ple, show little aptitude for modern industrial life. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Oesterreiehische Statistik, herausgegeben vom K.K. Statistischen Zen- 
tralkommission. Vienna. Annual 

Statistische Riickblicke aus Oesterreich, K.K. Statistische Zentralkom- 
naission. Vienna, 1913. 

Salz, A. Gesehichte der bohmischen Industrie in der Neuzeit. Mun- 
ich, 1913. 

THE FACTS ABOUT THE CZECHO-SLOVAK 
TERRITORIES 

Where the Czecho-Slovak Territories Are Located 

A long band of plateau or mountain country lying along 
and within the northern frontier of Austria and the northern 
frontier of Hungary, This area is bounded on the north by 



CZECHO-SLOVAK TERRITORIES 125 

Germany and Poland, while to the south it sinks into the 
Danubian plains of Austria and Hungary. This country of 
the Czeeho-Slovaks divides into three distinct geographical 
regions: (1) the plateau of Bohemia, entirely surrounded 
by mountains; (2) east of Bohemia, the plateau of Moravia; 
(3) east of Moravia, a tangled mass of mountains known as 
the Tatra, or Western Carpathians. This last is the Slovak 
country, Bohemia and Moravia being the habitats of the 
Czechs. 

Territorial. Units Involved 

Bohemia has an area of 20,065 square miles, 

Moravia has an area of 8584 square miles. 

Austrian Silesia has an area of 1988 square miles. 

Tatra, or Western Carpathians, has an area of about 20,000 
square miles. 

The combined area of these regions is about 50,000 square 
miles, or a little larger than New York State. 

Different Races in the Czecho-Slovak Territories 

The Czechs number 6,435,000. They are found in Bohemia, 
Moravia, and Austrian Silesia. 

The Czechs in Bohemia are concentrated in the plains, 
where they form the great majority of the population outside 
of a few towns. Formerly politically depressed, they have 
been politically dominant for nearly a generation. Always 
good agriculturists, they are developing industrially, and a 
business class is fast appearing. In Moravia all the above is 
true to a less degree. In Austrian Silesia the Czechs are a 
minority of the population, and have little political or eco- 
nomic power. 

The Slovaks, numbering 1,967,000, are found in the Tatra, 
or Carpathian, uplands of northern Hungary, 

The Slovaks are peasants, politically depressed, economi- 
cally weak, and culturally backward. 



126 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

The Germans number 3,300,000. They occupy solidly the 
mountainous rim of Bohemia and form a large part of the 
town population of Bohemia and Moravia. They are the 
majority in Austrian Silesia. There is a sprinkling of Ger- 
man villages in the Tatra. 

In the mountainous rim of Bohemia the entire population 
is German. In Bohemia and Moravia a large part of the town 
population is German, particularly the upper classes. They 
are economically dominant in both Bohemia and Moravia, 
and of course in Austrian Silesia. In the Hungarian Tatra 
they are few in numbers and of slight importance. 

The Magyars are found in the Tatra region. They are land- 
lords and officials, numerically few, but politically dominant. 

The Austrian aristocracy is a racially mixed group, found 
in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia. They are great nobles 
and landowners, holders of rich clerical benefices, etc. Their 
former political power has been much undermined by the more 
democratic trend of recent Austrian political life ; but they are 
still politically, economically, and socially powerful. They 
support the Hapsburg dynasty rather than any particular 
racial element of the empire, thus being supra-national. 

Who Controlled Czecho-Slovak Territories Before 

THE War 
Austria-Hungary. 

Who Has Controlled or Occupied Czecho-Slovak 
Territories Since the War Began 

Austria-Hungary. 

Austria-Hungary's Interests in Czecho-Slovak 
Territories ^ 

Political. Austria- Hungary naturally desires the reten- 
tion of these regions as one of the chief parts of Austria and 

1 The foregoing analysis postulates as "Austro-Hungarian" the point 



CZECHO-SLOVAK TERRITORIES 127 

of an important part of Hungary. The loss of these regions 
would so mutilate Austria and cut her off from the main body 
of the Germanic world that her continued existence would be 
impossible. 

Economic. Bohemia, Moravia, and Austrian Silesia, be- 
sides great agricultural wealth, possess important mineral de- 
posits, and also are the greatest single industrial region of the 
empire. 

Strategic. An Austria without Bohemia and Moravia 
would have no defensible frontier on the north. Vienna would 
be almost a frontier city and would lie entirely open to attack. 
Hungary, also, by the loss of the Tatra region, would have her 
Carpathian rampart breached, and in its stead an indefensible 
frontier in the Hungarian plain dangerously near Budapest. 

Racial. The large German minorities of Bohemia and 
Moravia (in Bohemia thirty-five per cent.) and the isolated 
German block in Austrian Silesia would be lost. The Magyar 
gentry of the Slovak Tatra would be engulfed. 

Cultural. Bohemia and Moravia are largely Germanic in 
culture as a result of centuries of Germanic predominance. 
Even the purest-blooded Czechs are strongly impregnated with 
Germanic culture. But were this area cut out of Austria, it 
might be culturally lost entirely to Germanism, and instead 

of view of the ruling classes in the empire, together with that of the 
two leading raees, Germans and Magyars. As to the sentiments of the 
population of the particular territories involved, there would seem to 
be three shades of opinion : ( 1 ) Independence. This is the wish of a 
large minority of Czechs and of some Slovaks. The idea is that Bo- 
hemia, Moravia, Silesia, and the Slovak Carpathians be erected into an 
independent state. This state, from its small size and exposed situa- 
tion, would probably be under the influence of its natural protector, 
Russia. (2) Autonomy under the Hapshurg crown. The idea is that 
these lands be formed into an autonomous unit of a federated Austria- 
Hungary. Before the war this was the point of view of most Czechs 
and nearly all the Slovaks. (3) Status quo. This is the desire of a 
few Czechs, most of the German minority, and most of the nobility and 
the official class. 



128 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

an irreconcilable Slav culture-area injected into the midst of 
the Germanic world. 

Religious. The Czechs are nearly all Roman Catholics, 
while many of the Slovaks are Protestants. But religion 
plays little part in the problem. 

Germany's Interests in Czecho-Slovak Territories 

Political. A Czecho-Slovak state would disrupt Germany's 
chief ally, Austria-Hungary, and would erect upon Germany's 
southern frontier a naturally hostile Slav state in close touch 
with Russia. It would also erect a barrier between Germany 
and the friendly Magyars (Hungary), 

Economic. A Czecho-Slovak state would cut Germany's 
shortest trade-route to the Mediterranean and the Near East, 
to-day favored by special economic agreements between Ger- 
many and Austria-Hungary. 

Strategic. Such a state would transform Germany's 
southern frontier from a friendly line requiring no guarding 
into an inevitably hostile border requiring heavy defense. 

Racial. Large German-speaking minorities would be lost, 
and a Slav wedge would be driven between Germany and the 
Austrian Germans of the Danube Valley, 

Cultural. A large area to-day largely Germanic in culture 
would be lost. 

Religious. Practically none. 

Russia's Interests in Czecho-Slovak Territories 

Political. The existence of a Czecho-Slovak state would 
mean the existence of a friendly, and probably dependent, 
Slav nation driven like a wedge into the Germanic world and 
separating Germany from its natural allies against Slavism — 
the Magyars, It would tend to make Russia dominant in cen- 
tral Europe. It would also give Russia a powerful hold on 
Hungary. 



CZECHO-SLOVAK TERRITORIES 129 

Economic. Russia being so economically backward, her 
economic interests here are slight. 

Strategic. The mountain fortress of Bohemia has often 
been termed the Citadel of Europe, while through the famous 
Moravian Gap Russian armies could pour freely upon Vienna 
or Budapest. Also, Russian armies could enter Hungary 
further to the eastward over the Slovak Carpathians. 

Racial. The full Slavization of these regions would en- 
trench Slavism firmly in the heart of central Europe, and this 
would normally redound to the great advantage of Russia, the 
natural head of the Slav world. It would also enable Russia 
better to further the interests of the Yugo-Slavs (Serbs, 
Croats, etc.). 

Cultural. The closer connection with the advanced and 
progressive Czechs would probably have enriching effects upon 
Russian cultural life. 

Religious. The Czechs being Roman Catholics and the 
Slovaks Protestants, the religious interests of Orthodox Rus- 
sia are not involved. 

Solutions that Have Been Proposed and What They 

Mean 

1. Status Quo Ante Bellum. 

In the present Austria-Hungary, allied to Germany, the 
Czechs of Bohemia, Moravia, and Austrian Silesia would be 
integral parts of the Austrian monarchy, with a considerable 
measure of local self-government and with representation in 
the Austrian Reichsrat. During the last ten years most politi- 
cal discrimination against the Czechs in favor of the Germans 
has been done away with, although the Czech demands for 
extensive local autonomy have been refused. 

The principal outstanding grievance of the Czechs in recent 
years, outside of extremists who wish for a virtually inde- 
pendent Czecho-Slovak state, has been not so much the matter 
of local autonomy as the fact that the foreign policy of the 



130 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Austro-Hungarian government has effected a close alliance 
with Germany, which has meant a hostile attitude towards the 
rest of the Slav world, particularly the South Slavs and 
Kussia. 

So long as Austria-Hungary remains in close alliance with 
Germany a majority of the Czechs will probably remain dis- 
contented despite further concessions of local self-government. 
The Czechs regard themselves as the advance guard of the 
Slavic world and resent having their activities contribute to 
German rather than Slavic progress. 

If, however, the peace conference results in a constructive 
settlement, giving a greater sense of security to all parts of 
Europe, the sense of "standing on guard" for their racial 
interests, which both the Czechs and the Germans have, would 
tend to be allayed. With such a lessening of the Czecho- 
German antagonism, the problem of the Czechs in Austria 
might be solved by an increasingly liberal attitude that the 
Austrian government might be inclined to adopt in a meas- 
urably "secure" situation in which it was not threatened by 
the Czech and other minorities which it has hitherto feared 
as the tools of larger imperialisms. Attitude of mind here 
counts for more than formal constitutional changes. 

The Slovaks in Hungary have not received the political ad- 
vantages that their Czech kinsmen have in Austria in recent 
years. They are still greatly oppressed by the Magyars, and 
enjoy virtually no local self-government. The Magyars show 
no signs of granting such concessions. So long as a Magyar- 
ruled Hungary remains, therefore, the Slovaks will remain 
discontented over their hard lot under the iron-handed rule 
of Magyar landlords. 

2. Independent Czecho -Slovak State. 

This would satisfy Czech nationalists, but such a state could 
survive only by grace of the constant support of Russia. 
Germany would regard it as a menacing political tool of 



CZECHO-SLOVAK TERRITORIES 131 

Slavic imperialism, cutting into the German Empire, separat- 
ing large sections of German population, and constituting an 
economic barrier to trade routes of the German Empire to the 
Adriatic, Mediterranean, and the Near East. 

Russia could reach her Czecho-Slovak proteges only through 
Poland, thus implying Rusian possession of Poland or the alli- 
ance of a Polish state with Russia. 

It would be an inland state, with a difficult economic situa- 
tion. All trade connections would be through Germany or 
German parts of Austria. Germany could put pressure on 
its economic outlets. 

In such a liberalized, pacifized Europe as would follow a 
constructive settlement, the Magyars would be obliged to give 
the Slovaks political rights and local self-government, because 
all nations would put pressure on the Magyars to set their 
house in order so as to remove an explosive situation that 
might upset the peace of Europe. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Auerbaeh, B. Les Races ct les Nationalites en Autriche-Hongrie. 
Paris, 1898. 

Gayda, V, Moaern Austria: Its Racial and Social Problems Lon- 
don, 1915. 

Kaial, K. Die Unterdriickung der Slovaken. Prague, 1!!03. 

Kramgf, K. Anmerkungen zur bohmisehen Politik. Vienna, in06. 

Schlesinger, H. Das Deutsch-bohmische SpraehgebeJt. Vienna, 1894. 

Zemmrioh, J Sprachgrenze und Deutschtum in Bolimen. Braunsch- 
weig, 1902. 



EASTEEN EUROPE 
UKRAINE TERRITORIES 



CHAPTER IX 
UKRAINE TERRITORIES 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 

The Ukrainians (also known as Little Russians and Ruthe- 
nians) occupy a vast belt of plain country stretching from 
Poland eastward across south Russia to the middle reaches 
of the River Don. They were settled in their present homes 
by the early centuries of the Christian era, although their 
primitive tribal system prevented the formation of any strong 
state until the rise of the Kingdom of Kieff, on the River 
Dnieper in the ninth century, a, d. During the next two cen- 
turies the Kingdom of Kieff was a powerful state. It was, 
in fact, the center of Russian life. The modern Great Rus- 
sians (the people generally spoken of as Russians to-day) are 
really the descendants of colonists from the original Ukrain- 
ian center who migrated to the great forest regions of north 
Russia and there mingled their blood with Finnish tribes, 
becoming thereby a different stock. 

The Great Russians owe their civilization and religion to 
Kieff, which received both from Byzantine Constantinople and 
distributed them throughout the Russian world. 

The center of Russian life would probably have continued 
to be Kieff instead of Moscow and Petrograd had it not been 
for the terrible Tatar invasion of the thirteenth century, which 
destroyed Kieff and turned all south Russia into a desert. 
Only the western portion of Ukrainia, near Poland, escaped 
the Tatar hordes, and this broken remnant soon fell under 
Polish rule. For the Ukrainians this was a great misfortune. 
The Poles, although fellow-Slavs, had taken their religion and 

135 



136 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

civilization from the Roman West, and they now attempted 
to force Roman Catholicism and Polish culture upon the 
Ukrainians with their Greek Orthodox faith and eastern Euro- 
pean civilization. The Ukrainians resisted doggedly, dis- 
playing that race-tenacity which is their most marked charac- 
teristic; but they were degraded to the level of wretched 
serfs, persecuted and exploited by their Polish masters. 

The Ukrainians, however, presently made a bid for free- 
dom. Taking advantage of a gradual waning of the Tatar 
scourge, Ukrainian colonists pushed out into the south Rus- 
sian plains, striving to regain the lost lands of their ances- 
tors. These hardy pioneers, called Cossacks, soon founded a 
strong military republic. But Poland, fearing that this would 
become the center of an Ukrainian national revival, attempted 
to subdue the Cossacks, and a bloody struggle raged through- 
out the first half of the seventeenth century. Feeling them- 
selves too weak to maintain their independence against Poland, 
the Cossacks sought the protection of the rising czardom of 
Moscow, but their Great Russian kinsmen played them false, 
for the Czar soon made a treaty with Poland partitioning the 
Ukraine, and thereafter the Czar tried to make his Ukrainians 
into Great Russians as ruthlessly as the Polish kings had tried 
to make theirs into Poles. When Poland fell at the end of 
the eighteenth century, Russia acquired nearly all the Ukraine, 
only a small portion (eastern Galicia) falling to Austria. 

The nineteenth century, the era of nationalities, saw a 
revival of Ukrainian race consciousness. This movement made 
most rapid progress in eastern Galicia, for the Austrian Gov- 
ernment, having no reason to fear it, placed no obstacles in its 
way. By the beginning of the twentieth century the Ukrain- 
ian revival had made great headway despite Russia's best 
efforts to beat it down. The advanced wing of the Ukrain- 
ian nationalists dream of an independent Ukrainia. The 
more moderate parties would be content with local autonomy 
and full cultural rights under Russian or Austrian suzerainty. 



UKRAINE TERRITORIES 137 

The Ukrainians of Bukowina and northeastern Hungary 
represent streams of colonization which settled these regions 
during the Middle Ages. They are both somewhat out of 
touch with the main current of Ukrainian national feeling, 
and their race consciousness is as yet imperfectly awakened. 

ECONOMIC SURVEY 

The long belt of territory occupied by the Ukrainian race- 
stock covers many varieties of soil, natural resources, and 
economic activity. 

The comparatively small portion under Austrian rule (east- 
ern Galicia and northern Bukowina) is not of special economic 
importance. The climate is severe, and agriculture is back- 
ward because of unfavorable social conditions, much of the 
land being owned by absentee landlords. The chief import- 
ance of the region arises from the existence of rich oil-wells 
at the foot of the Carpathian Mountains. Industry in the 
modern sense is virtually non-existent. 

The economic, as well as the ethnic, center of the Ukrainian 
race is found farther east, in southern Russia. Most of this 
vast territory forms part of the famous Russian Black Earth 
zone and is therefore very fertile. All cereals grow well, and 
enormous crops of cereals, sugar beets, tobacco, and .vegetables 
are raised. This region has, in fact, been sometimes termed 
the granary of Russia. Only in the extreme northwestern 
corner of the Ukrainian race-area (provinces of Volhynia, 
southern Minsk, and Chernigov) does the black earth fail to 
appear. This region is therefore relatively infertile, much 
of it being swamp and forest. 

The industrial life of the Ukraine centers in the Donetz 
region, in the extreme east. Here rich coal-fields and iron- 
mines are found in close juxtaposition. This has naturally 
favored the growth of industrial life in its modern sense. 
Accordingly, the Donetz region is a rapidly expanding indus- 
trial center, with a variety of iron and steel works, manufac- 



138 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

tories of agricultural machinery, etc. Elsewhere industrial 
plants are mainly sugar-mills, distilleries, tanneries, and 
similar workers-up of raw materials. 

THE FACTS ABOUT THE UKEAINE TERRITORIES 

Where Ukraine Territories Are Located 

The Ukraine is the great belt of territory stretching from 
Poland in the west right across southern Russia to the middle 
Don River on the east, and bounded by the Black Sea on the 
south. 

Territorial Units Involved 

Eastern Galicia, Northeastern Hungary, Bukowina, and 
Southern Russia are the units that make up the Ukraine ter- 
ritory. 

Its area is 300,000 square miles. 25,000 square miles 
of this lies in Austria-Hungary, and 275,000 square miles in 
Russia, or about the size of Texas and Louisiana combined. 
The Ukrainian population in this area is 30,000,000. 

Different Races in the Ukraine Territories 

The Ukrainians are found throughout the region. Almost 
everywhere they are peasants and urban workingmen, de- 
pressed by centuries of racial and religious persecution and 
economic exploitation. Of late, especially in Galicia, they 
have evolved the beginnings of an intellectual and middle 
class, taking advantage of every possible opportunity in a 
way which shows the race possessed of good latent capacity. 
This they also show by their tenacious hold upon their racial 
and cultural identity despite unexampled hostile pressure. 

The Great Russians are found in southern Russia. In most 
districts they compose the upper classes, and throughout they 
are the officials. Many of these upper-class Great Russians 



UKRAINE TERRITORIES 139 

are Russified Ukrainians. There are also numerous colonies 
of Great Russian peasants planted in the southern Russian 
plains, and a considerable infiltration of Great Russian work- 
men into the new industrial centers of southern Russia, espe- 
cially the Donetz coal and iron area. 

The Poles are found in eastern Galicia. They are the land- 
owning nobility, townsfolk, and most of the officials. 

The Jews are found in eastern Galicia, Bukowina, and adja- 
cent provinces of Russia. They are traders, usurers and arti- 
sans, especially in the towns. They are economically very 
keen, politically depressed, socially persecuted. 

The Magyars are found in northeastern Hungary. They 
are the landowning gentry and officials and are politically 
dominant. 

Other elements are found mostly in southern Russia. The 
colonization of the southern Russian steppes north of the 
Black Sea since the overthrow of Tatar domination in the late 
eighteenth century, while mainly done by Ukrainians, has 
brought in many racial elements, so that to-day the extreme 
south of Russia is studded with agricultural colonies of Great 
Russians, Germans, Rumanians, Serbs, Bulgarians, etc. Also, 
along the Black Sea coast and in the Crimean Peninsula are 
considerable remnants of the Tatar population. 

Who Controlled Ukraine Territories Before the War 

Eastern Galicia, Bukowina, and northeastern Hungary were 
under Austro-Hungarian control. Southern Russia was under 
Russian control. 

Who Has Controlled or Occupied Ukraine Territories 
Since the War Began 

Eastern Galicia and Bukowina have been fiercely contested 
battle-grounds, alternately occupied by Austro-Hungarians 
and Russians, according to the fortunes of war. In the 



140 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

autumn of 1917 they were entirely reconquered by the Austro- 
Hungarians. 

Northeastern Hungary has remained in Austro-Hungarian 
control except for a few Cossack raids in early 1915. 

Southern Russia, up to the beginning of 1918, remained en- 
tirely under Russian control except for a few border raids of 
Austro-Hungarian troops, although an Austro-German inva- 
sion appeared imminent. 

Russia 's Interests in the Ukraine Territories ^ 

Political. Russia has hitherto considered the retention of 
her present Ukrainian territories as vital to her national life. 
The creation of an independent Ukrainia would shear away all 
southern Russia from the present Russian Empire and would 
exclude the Great Russians from the Black Sea. The richest 
provinces of Russia would be lost. In fact, many Russians 
consider it necessary to annex eastern Galicia and Bukowina, 
contending that so long as any portion of the Ukrainian race 
is outside the Russian frontiers it will inevitably develop into 
a center of Ukrainian nationalism, which will threaten to dis- 
rupt the Russian Empire. 

Economic. Russia's Ukrainian provinces are the richest 
part of European Russia. Within them lies most of Russia's 
famous Black Earth belt, which is the great wheat-growing 
region of the Empire, while the chief Russian coal- and iron- 
fields (the Donetz basin) fall mainly within the Ukrainian 
race-area. 

Strategic. The creation of an independent Ukrainia would 
draw a frontier right across central Russia to the River Don 
and would exclude Russia from the Black Sea. In fact, it 
would have upon Russia the same disastrous effects that the 
success of the Confederacy would have had upon the United 
States. 

Racial. Most Great Russians deny that the Ukrainians are 

I See foot-note on page 55. 



UKRAINE TERRITORIES 141 

a separate people and assert that they must be indissolubly 
connected with the Russian state. 

Cultural. Most Great Russians deny that the Ukrainians 
have a separate language and culture. 

Religious. Both Great Russians and Ukrainians belong to 
the Greek Orthodox Church. 

Austria-Hungary's Interests in Ukraine Territories 

Political. The creation of an Ukrainia, with its attendant 
disruption of Russia, would be an immense advantage to 
Austria-Hungary. Her eastern neighbor, instead of the pres- 
ent huge Russian Empire, would then be a moderate-sized 
state, probably friendly to Austria through fear of Great 
Russian attempts to reconquer Ukrainia. Of course Austria 
would probably have to surrender eastern Galicia and Buko- 
wina to the new Ukrainia, but this sacrifice would probably be 
made cheerfully in view of the immense attendant political ad- 
vantages to be gained. 

Economic. An independent Ukrainia, probably hostile to 
Russia, would open a vast field for Austrian trade and capital. 

Strategic. An Ukrainia would make a perfect buffer-state, 
absolutely safeguarding Austria-Hungary's eastern frontier. 

Racial. Even after the surrender of Eastern Galicia and 
Bukowina, the Ukrainian inhabited districts of northeastern 
Hungary would remain under Austro-Hungarian jurisdiction. 
But these districts are relatively small, and the range of the 
Carpathian Mountains intervening between them and the main 
body of the Ukrainian race makes such a natural frontier that 
serious trouble would probably be avoided. 

Cultural. Slight. 

Religious. Slight. 

Germany's Interests in Ukraine Territories 

Germany, like Austria-Hungary, would benefit greatly from 
the establishment of an independent Ukrainia and the eonse- 



142 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

quent disruption of the present Eussian Empire. Such an 
Ukrainia would probably look to Germany as a protector 
against Great Russian encroachments. Ukrainia would thus 
offer a rich field for German trade and economic penetration. 

Some Solutions that May Be Proposed and What They 

Mean 

1. Status Quo Ante Bellum. 

This would imply placing a great majority of the Ukrainians 
under Russia ; East Galicia and Bukowina under Austria, and 
the Ukrainian districts south of the Carpathians under Hun- 
gary. This would involve disappointment to the Ukrainian 
nationalist aspirations. 

As regards the parts going to Russia, the degree of bitter- 
ness of the Ukrainians would depend upon whether Russia is 
autocratic or liberal, although, owing to the peculiar geo- 
graphical location of Ukrainia, it is doubtful whether even a 
liberal Russia would grant the degree of autonomy which 
most Ukrainians demand as it would cut Russia off from the 
Black Sea. 

As regards the parts going to Austria-Hungary, the Ukrai- 
nians in these territories would probably follow the attitude 
of the main body of the race in Russia while, being so few in 
numbers, they probably would not take a divergent attitude. 

2. Independent Ukrainia. 

This would certainly include both Russian and Austrian 
Ukrainians but probably not the small Ukrainian population 
south of the Carpathians which is under Hungary, as this 
would form a geographically unnatural extension of frontier. 
These people have a very imperfect race consciousness. 

Such a solution would satisfy Ukrainian nationalist aspira- 
tions. It would be especially pleasing to Austria-Hungary 
and Germany, so they would back it up. Practically, it would 



UKRAINE TERRITORIES 143 

be a buffer state and would break up the economic area of 
Russia. It would offer a good outlet for German capital. It 
would restore the Medieval trade route between the Black 
Sea and the Baltic via the Dnieper (which made the glory of 
Kieff'). This trade route would be used by Germany and 
Austria-Hungary It would make Russia the implacable 
enemy of the new State. 

3. Autonomous Ukrainia under Russia. 

This solution is unlikely. Russia would not want to re- 
lease her direct hold on the valuable economic resources of 
this area, nor lose direct access to the Black Sea. 

4. Autonomous Ukrainia under Austria-Hungary. 

This would probably be ruled by a cadet branch of the Haps- 
burg House. It would probably satisfy most Ukrainians. 
The Ukrainians have long looked to the Hapsburgs as their 
possible liberators from the Great Russians. Since Russia 
would be the irreconcilable enemy of an independent Ukrai- 
nian State this would bind it to Austria-Hungary. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Donzow, D. Die Ukrainische Staatsidee und der Krieg gegen Russland. 
Berlin, 1915. 

Fedortchouk, Y. Memorandum on the Ukrainian Question in its Na- 
tional Aspect. London, 1914. 

Guttry, A. von. Galizien. Munich, 1916. 

Hrushevski, M. Geschichte des ukrainischen Volkes. Leipzig, 1906. 

Hrushevski, M. The Historical Evolution of the Ukrainian Problem. 
London, 1915. 

Lewicky, E. Die Ukraine: Der Lebensnerv Russlands. Berlin, 1914. 

Lozinsky, M. Die russische Propaganda and ihre polnischen Gonner in 
Galizien. Berlin, 1915. 

Nolde, Baron B. E. L'Ukraine sous le Protectorat russe. Paris, 1915. 

Puluj, J. Ukraina und ihre internationale politische Bedeutung. Vi- 
enna, 1915. 

Eudnitzky, S. The Ukraine and the Ukrainians. New York, 1915. 



144 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Sands, B. The Ukraine. London, 1914. 

Sands, B. The Russians in Galicia. New York, 1915. 

Sembratovitch, R. Le Tsarisme et I'Ukraine. Paris, 1907. 

Slepowron, E. von. Polen in Ost und West. Berne, 1916. 

Steflfen, G. F. Russia, Poland and the Ukraine. Jersey City, 1915. 

Szujski,. J. Die Polen und Ruthenen in Galizien. Vienna, 1882. 

Ukrainia's Claim to Freedom. (Series of Articlea) Jersey City, 1915. 



THE BALKANS 
ITALIA IREEDENTA 



CHAPTER X 
ITALIA IKREDENTA 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 

Beyond Italy 's northeastern frontier, in Austrian territory, 
lie several areas inhabited by Italian-speaking populations 
that are claimed by most Italians as kinsmen who have been 
lost out of the main body of Italian life, but must be brought 
back into the Italian state. 

These areas, which ar^ geographically separate from one 
another, are: Trentino, Kiistenland, and Dalmatia. Their 
historical pasts are so unlike as to require separate treatment. 

Trentino 

The main chain of the Alps runs like a giant arch from the 
Franco-Italian Riviera to the head of the Adriatic and in- 
closes within its span the Lombardo-Venetian plains of north- 
em Italy, but here and there it throws spurs southward into 
these plains, the most prominent of these being known as 
southern Tyrol. Southern Tyrol forms a mountainous tri- 
angle the southern apex of which reaches far into the Italian 
plain, almost to the city of Verona. The northern part of 
this triangle is inhabited by Germans who flowed over the 
historic Brenner Pass and Teutonized the region at the fall of 
the Roman Empire. But the Latin element maintained itself 
in the southern apex, which is the Trentino district, and as a 
result it is to-day inhabited by a virtually solid Italian popu- 
lation. It is this Italian-speaking district which is claimed by 
Italians on racial and cultural grounds, though many Italians 
make a further claim to the whole of southern Tyrol up to the 

147 



148 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

main chain of the Alps at the Brenner Pass, which would con- 
stitute for Italy an ideal strategic frontier in this sector. 
Trentino, the chief city of which is Trent, has had little 
political connection with Italy since Roman times. During 
the Middle Ages, it was a bishopric of the Holy Roman Em- 
pire, or the medieval German Empire, and enjoyed a position 
of semi-independence. The Congress of Vienna (1814) 
awarded it to Austria, which has held it ever since. 

KiJSTENLAND 

This peninsula, jutting into the Adriatic just east of the 
Italian frontier, is a jumble of mountains rising sharply out 
of the sea. After the fall of the Roman Empire the moun- 
tainous interior was occupied by Slav tribes (Slovenes and 
Croats). The old Latin population was confined to the nar- 
row coast-line and port towns. During the Middle Ages 
Istria was divided between Austria and the Republic of 
Venice. Austria secured the major part, including the chief 
Istrian city, Trieste, which has been Austrian since 1382. 
The Congress of Vienna assigned the whole to Austria in 
1814. The Italian element has long been losing ground before 
the Slavs, who to-day number some sixty-six per cent, of the 
total population as against an Italian thirty-three per cent. 
Even Trieste, owing to its development as a great world port, 
has lost the exclusively Italian character it once had, the lower 
classes having become increasingly Slav, while the business 
element is now largely Austro-German. The population of 
Trieste in 1900 was 229,000. Of this number 170,000, or 
seventy- four per cent., were Italians ; 43,000, or nineteen per 
cent., were Slovene; 11,000, or five per cent., were Germans. 
The fact that Trieste is the natural outlet to the Mediterranean 
for both Austria and Germany gives Istria great economic and 
political importance. 



ITALIA IRREDENTA 149 

Dalmatia 

The east coast of the Adriatic is a nigged mountain wall 
with a fringe of rocky islands. Before modern metaled roads 
and railways this mountain wall almost entirely cut off the 
Balkan hinterland from its natural sea-frontage on the Adri- 
atic. This narrow line of coast territory is Dalmatia. Thus 
cut off from the back-country, it has led a historical life apart. 
Dalmatia was entirely Latin under the Roman Empire, but 
it was invaded by Serbo-Croat Slavs in the ninth century, and 
the Latin element was thereafter confined to the islands and 
port towns. But in the early Middle Ages most of Dalmatia 
fell under the sway of the Venetian Republic, which spread 
a veneer of Italian ci^lture over the Dalmatian Slavs, even 
though it failed to extend to them the Italian language. The 
Vienna Congress assigned Dalmatia to Austria in 1814. Dur- 
ing the last half-century the Dalmatian Slavs have awakened 
to such aggressive political and cultural life that Italianism 
has been almost destroyed. The Italian population during 
this period declined from ten per cent, to three per cent. 
Only in the towns of Zara and Spalato and on a few islands 
is the population to-day predominantly Italian. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Battisti, C. II Trentino. Novara, 1915. 

Caprin, G. Trieste. Bergamo, 1906. 

Cassi, G 11 Mare Adriatico, sua Funzione attraversi il Tempo. Milan, 

1915. 
Hartmann, L. M. Hundert Jalire italieniache Geschichte. Munich, 

1916. 
Loiaeau, C. L'fiquilibre Adriatique: Italic et la Question d'Orient. 

Paris, 1901. 
Low, S. Italy and the War. London, 1916. 
Mantegazza, V. L'Altra Sponda. Italia e Austria nell'Adriatlco. 

Milan, 1905. 
Revelli, P. L'Adriatico e il dominio del Mediterraneo Orientale. Rome, 

1916. 



150 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Tamaro, G. Italiani e Slavi nelP Adriatico. Rome, 1915. 
Vellay, C. La Question de I'Adriatique. Paris, 1915. 

ECONOMIC SURVEY 

Trentino 

Trentino is a mountainous district with little fertile land. 
The chief agricultural occupations are wine-growing and 
fruit-raising. The mountain slopes afford a certain amount 
of good summer pasturage for herds of milch-cows. The dis- 
trict is poor in minerals. The only important industry is 
silk-spinning, which is carried on in the towns, especially 
Trent and Rovereto. 

KiJSTENLAND 

Economically, as well as geographically, Kiistenland di- 
vides into three separate areas: Gorz-Gradisca, Istria, and 
the City of Trieste. 

Gorz-Gradisca is a region of hills covered with vineyards, 
while its numerous valleys, notably that of the River Isonzo, 
are dotted with fruit orchards and mulberry plantations sup- 
porting the silkworms the product of which supplies the 
numerous silk-spinning establishments of the towns. 

The Istrian peninsula is a region of varied agricultural 
products. Its mountainous interior is largely covered with 
forests, which occupy about one-third of its entire surface. 
The cultivated land of the interior is given over to cereal 
crops, wheat, maize, oats, and rye. The narrow coast littorals, 
warmed and sheltered by the overhanging mountains, are de- 
voted to wine-growing, olive-groves, and fruit- raising. All 
these products are of high quality. Many of the Istrian wines 
are famous, while Istrian olive-oil has been prized since ancient 
times. The best known fruit products are figs and melons. 
Cattle-raising is also an important occupation of the inland, 
while the coast population is further employed in fishing and 



ITALIA IRREDENTA 151 

the gathering of sea salt. No large towns or industries exist. 
Trieste is a highly specialized urban district set in the 
solidly rural Istrian area. It owes its character not to its 
immediate surroundings, but to its functions as chief seaport 
of Austria and the natural outlet for central Europe's trade 
with the Mediterranean and Near East. It is, in fact, a 
typical world-port, with extensive docks, great shipyards, ma- 
chine-shops, and other manufacturing plants of a metropoli- 
tan center. 

Dalmatia 

The ancient fertility of Dalmatia has greatly decreased in 
modem times, probably owing to the destruction of the mag- 
nificent forests which once clothed its steep mountains. How- 
ever, where the thin soil of the hill-slopes still remains, olive- 
groves, vineyards, and fruit orchards produce valuable crops. 
One important local specialty is the Dalmatian cherry, from 
which is distilled the celebrated maraschino cordial. The 
fisheries, including sponge and coral-beds, are valuable, and 
employ a considerable part of the population. There is some 
house-industry in the towns, but of merely local importance. 

THE FACTS ABOUT TRENTINO 

Where Trentino Is Located 

Trentino is the southern apex of the triangle of southern 
Tyrol territory which projects into the Po Valley between 
Lombardy and Venetia. 

Different Races in Trentino 

The Italians are found throughout Trentino, and consti- 
tute virtually the entire population of all classes save officials. 
They are politically depressed. 

The Austrian Germans are mainly found as officials and 



152 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

garrison troops, being only a small part of the population. 
They are politically dominant. 

Who Controlled Trentino Before the War 
Austria. 

Who Has Controlled or Occupied Trentino Since the 
War Began 

Austria has maintained control of Trentino except for a 
few frontier posts occupied by Italian troops. 

Austria's Interests in Trentino 

Political. Trentino has been politically associated with 
Austria for centuries, and there is therefore the force of 
tradition binding Austrian interests to this territory. 

Economic. Trentino is a mountainous country. A little 
wine, fruit, and silk comprise the list of its valuable products. 

Strategic. Its strategic value to Austria lies in the fact 
that this mountain barricade projecting into the Italian plains 
enables Austria to threaten the whole Po Valley. It also 
has high defensive value, for its powerful fortifications render 
an Italian invasion of Austria northward over the Brenner 
Pass virtually impossible. 

Racial. Claims of race are slight. 

Cultural. Virtually none. 

Religious. Both Austria and Italy are Roman Catholic 
countries. The religious interest is negligible. 

Italy's Interests in Trentino 

Political. Italy claims Trentino as "naturally" Italian in 
every respect, and therefore rightly belonging to the main 
body of the Italian state. 

Economic. The interests of trade and natural resources 
are slight. 



ITALIA IRREDENTA 153 

Strategic. The possession of Trentino would enable Italy 
to guard against an Austrian surprise attack upon the Po 
Valley. It would also enable Italy to throw her whole weight 
against Austria farther to the east (Trieste, etc.) instead of, 
as now, having to keep heavy reserves about Trentino to guard 
against an Austrian counter-stroke, which might cut off Italy's 
eastern armies and doom them to destruction. 

Racial. The population of Trentino is thoroughly Italian. 

Cultural. The culture of Trentino is thoroughly Italian. 

Religious. The religious interest is negligible. 

THE FACTS ABOUT KUSTENLAND 

Where Kustenland Is Located 

Kiistenland is located in the valley of the Isonzo and in the 
adjacent Istrian peninsula, lying next to Italy's eastern 
frontier. 

Territorial Units Involved 

Isonzo and Istria, politically united, make up the Austrian 
province of Kiistenland. 

Its area is 3078 square miles, or about that of the combined 
areas of Rhode Island and Delaware. Its population numbers 
922,000. 

Different Races in Kiistenland 

The Italians constitute thirty-three per cent, of the popu- 
lation throughout the territory. They constitute the majority 
in the towns and along the coast. Formerly dominant in 
every respect, during the last half-century their former 
political and cultural supremacy has been undermined by the 
Yugo-Slavs, while their former economic preponderance has 
been impaired by the Austro-Germans. 

The Yugo-Slavs — that is, the Slovenes and Croats — eon- 



154 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

stitute sixty-six per cent, of the population and are found 
throughout the territory. They are in the majority in the 
mountainous interior, which begins just back from the coast. 
They are mostly peasants, although they are fast drifting into 
the towns and there swelling the urban working classes. A 
political, economic, and cultural aggressiveness is lifting them 
out of their former depressed condition. 

The Austro-Germans constitute only one per cent, of the 
population. They are found throughout the territory in the 
towns. Besides the officials, who control the political situa- 
tion, there is a rapidly growing Austro-German commercial 
upper class in the towns, especially Trieste, where they are 
fast coming to dominate commercial life. 

Who Controlled Kustenland Before the War 
Austria. 

Who Has Controlled or Occupied Kustenland Since 
THE War Began 

Austria has maintained her control of this region except for 
the lower Isonzo Valley, which was in Italian hands from the 
summer of 1915 to the autumn of 1917, when it again passed 
under Austrian control through the big Teutonic drive. 

Austria-Hungary's Interests in Kustenland 

Political. Austria considers the political control of Kiisten- 
land as vitally necessary to her future. Its loss would cut 
off Austria from direct access to the sea. Her sole remaining 
outlet would then be through the Hungarian port of Fiume, 
and even this outlet would lie wholly at Italy's mercy. Aus- 
tria-Hungary would cease to be a naval power and would lose 
all influence in the Adriatic, Albania, and related regions. 

Economic. The internal economic value of Kiistenland is 
slight, but its value as Austria's only commercial sea-gate to 



ITALIA IRREDENTA 155 

the outer world is regarded as vital. That specific sea-gate 
is the city of Trieste, a world-port with 229,000 inhabitants 
in 1900 and a great increase since. Deprived of Trieste, 
Austria's export trade would have to pass through foreign 
territory, and would thus be by the grace of foreign powers. 

Strategic. The strategic value of Kiistenland to both Aus- 
tria and Hungary is incalculable. Were Kiistenland in 
Italian possession, Austria-Hungary would cease to exist as 
a naval power. Even its sea-borne commerce would lie en- 
tirely at Italy's mercy, for Hungary's port of Fiume would 
be only a few miles east of the new Italian frontier and would 
be absolutely bottled up between the Istrian peninsula, tipped 
by the great war-port of Pola, and the Quarnerno Islands, 
which inevitably would go to Italy along with Kiistenland. 
The loss of Kiistenland would also deprive Austria-Hungary 
of its present fine strategic frontier against Italy, and would 
open the way to possible Italian invasions of the great 
Danubian hinterlands which lie beyond the protecting belt of 
coastal mountains. 

Racial. The official classes of Kiistenland are mostly Aus- 
trian Germans. There is also a sprinkling of Austro-German 
population throughout the towns, especially Trieste, where 
the Germanic element numbers over five per cent, of the 
inhabitants. 

Cultural. The Germanic element, owing to its being exclu- 
sively upper class and representing official life, exerts a cul- 
tural influence disproportionate to its numbers. It has suc- 
ceeded in impressing a distinctly Austrian character on the 
towns of this region, particularly Trieste. 

Religious. All the races of Kiistenland being Roman 
Catholic, there is no clash of religious interests. 

Italy's Interests in Kitstenland 

Political. Italy feels that the Isonzo Valley and the 
Istrian peninsula, with its dependent island-chain of the 



156 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Qiiarnerno, are her " natural " limits, boundaries traced by 
nature, and necessary to assure her a good frontier and that 
Adriatic supremacy which she claims is her just due. In 
Italian eyes Austria is an interloper upon the Adriatic sea- 
board, and Italians contend that Austria must be expelled 
before Italy can take her place as a Mediterranean great 
power, with her exposed eastern flank secure. Possession of 
the Austrian Kiistenland, with its corollary, Austria's disap- 
pearance from the Adriatic, would also enable Italy to assert 
preponderance on the Adriatic's eastern, or Balkan, shore, 
particularly in Albania. 

Economic. Possession of Kiistenland would enable Italy 
to dictate the terms on which Austria-Hungary's export trade 
should reach the sea. This would help Italy in many foreign 
markets where she and Austria are to-day trade rivals, par- 
ticularly in the Balkans and the Near East. 

Strategic. Possession of Kiistenland would make Italy 
mistress of the Adriatic and would eliminate the fleet of her 
chief naval competitor, Austria-Hungary. It would give 
Italy a fine natural frontier against Austria-Hungary, elimi- 
nating the chance of an Austrian invasion of Venetia and 
giving Italy an opportunity for powerful counter-strokes 
from this secure strategic base. 

Racial. The population of Kiistenland is one third Italian 
in race. 

Cultural. Italy claims that the culture of Kiistenland is 
fundamentally Italian. She denies that the Yugo-Slavs of 
this region have any native culture of their own, and asserts 
that under Italian rule they would quickly become Italianized, 
thus turning Kiistenland into a thoroughly Italian country. 

Religious. The religious interest is not an important 
factor. 



ITALIA IRREDENTA 157 



Yugo-Slav Interests in Eustenland 

Detailed topical discussion of Yugo-Slav interests in 
Kiistenland can be found in the Yugo-Slav chapter. 



THE FACTS ABOUT DALMATIA 
Where Dalmatia Is Located 

Dalmatia is made up of the long and narrow east coast of 
the Adriatic, including its island fringe from the Istrian 
peninsula down to Montenegro. The narrowness of the region 
can be appreciated by its 210 miles of length, as contrasted 
with its width, which is only 35 miles at the widest point. 
In many places only a few miles of territory intervene be- 
tween the sea and the crest of the overhanging mountains. 

Its area is 4956 square miles, or about the size of Con- 
necticut. Its population is 660,000. 

Different Races in Dalmatia 

The Italians constitute only three per cent, of the popula- 
tion. Except on some of the outlying islands, the Italian 
element is found only in the towns, and even here they con- 
stitute solely the upper class except at Zara and Spalato. 
They are rapidly declining in numbers and influence before 
the Slavs. 

The Yugo-Slavs (Croats) constitute ninety-seven per cent, 
of the population. By reason of this overwhelming majority, 
they are rapidly increasing in power in every way. 

The Austrian Germans are very few in numbers. They are 
almost entirely officials and soldiers. 

Who Controlled Dalmatu. Before the War 
Austria. 



158 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Who Has Controlled or Occupied Dalmatl^ Since the 
War Began 
Austria. 

Austria-Hungary's Interests in Dalmatia 

Political. Austria regards the political control of Dal- 
matia as essential to her position in the Adriatic and considers 
it the natural pendant to her provinces of Bosnia and Herzego- 
vina, just back of the coastal mountains which form Dalma- 
tia's land frontier. Possession of Dalmatia also enables 
Austria to hold the whip-hand over Montenegro and to main- 
tain her influence in near-by Albania. 

Economic. Although there are a few fertile districts, the 
intrinsic economic value of Dalmatia is not great. Further- 
more, until costly railroad lines are built over or through the 
rugged eastern mountain-wall, Dalmatia cannot serve as an 
economic outlet for its Bosnian and Serb hinterlands. 

Strategic. Dalmatia 's chief value to Austria is regarded 
as strategic. It contains many fine naval bases. Cattaro, at 
its extreme southern end, is one of the most impregnable naval 
fortresses in the world. 

Racial. None. 

Cultural. None. 

Religious. None. 

Italy's Interests in Dalmatia 

Political. Italian imperialists claim Dalmatia as naturally 
Italian. Other Italians concede that this is not the case. 
But nearly all Italians assert the great importance of Dalma- 
tia for Italy. Possession of Dalmatia would rivet Italy's 
cherished claim to Adriatic supremacy and give Italy a valu- 
able foothold in the Balkans. 

Economic. Dalmatia would offer a good base for railroad 
lines into the Balkans. If these were built under Italian 



ITALIA IRREDENTA 159 

auspices, it would be an important step toward Italy's pro- 
jected economic penetration of the Balkan peninsula. It 
would tap the large adjacent hinterlands and divert much 
trade to Italian hands. 

Strategic. Dalmatia's naval bases, especially Cattaro, in 
Italian hands, would virtually preclude a hostile fleet from 
passing up or down the Adriatic. 

Racial. The Italian element of Dalmatia numbers only 
about three per cent, of the total population. It is rapidly 
dwindling before the Slavs. Half a century ago it numbered 
nearly ten per cent. To-day it dominates only in the towns 
of Zara and Spalato and on a few islands. 

Cultural. Italian imperialists claim that the culture of 
Dalmatia is entirely Italian, that the Dalmatian Slavs have no 
native culture of their own, and that, once under Italian rule, 
these Slavs would ultimately become Italians. 

Religious. None. 

Yugo-Slav Interests in Dalmatia 

The interests of the Yugo-Slavs in Dalmatia are discussed 
in the Yugo-Slav chapter. 

Solutions that Have Been Proposed and What They 

Mean 

The Territory Considered as a Whole 

1. Status Quo Ante Bellum. 

This would leave all of Italy's irredentist aspirations un- 
satisfied, and make impossible the realization of a Yugo-Slav 
state. It would leave Austria in a strategic position for 
domination of the Balkans and the Adriatic and assure Aus- 
tria an economic outlet to the Mediterranean and the Near 
East. 

2. Annexation of Trentino, EUstenland and Dalmatia to 

Italy. 



160 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

This would fulfil completely the dream of the irredentists 
of Italy, uniting all the Italian populations of the Adriatic 
region in the Italian state. It would protect Italy from in- 
vasion from the north and northeast by giving her a highly 
defensible frontier. Possession of the Dalmatian mountain- 
chain would protect Italy against attack by a possible Yugo- 
slav state. It would mean her absolute mastery of the Adri- 
atic and her probable control of Albania. Through her pos- 
session of Trieste and her dominance of the Adriatic, she 
would control the natural trade-route of Austria-Hungary 
and Germany to the Mediterranean and the Near East. 

Owing to the large Slav majorities in Kiistenland and Dal- 
matia, however, this would throw more Slavs under Italian 
rule than there now are Italians under Austrian rule, thus 
creating an inverse irredentism. 

The one thing that could tone down, if not eliminate, the 
economic stricture upon Austro-Hungarian and German com- 
merce in its outlet to the Adriatic would be some genuine guar- 
anty that freedom of access to the sea would be assured. 
This presupposes a development of really workable machinery 
for international control. 

Trentino Considered Alone 

1. Status Quo Ante Bellum. 

This would leave northern Italy open to Austrian invasion 
in the future and leave the irredentist dreams of Italy regard- 
ing this region unsatisfied. 

2. Annexation of Trentino to Italy, and the Part of South- 

ern Tyrol Between Trentino and Bremier Pass to 

Austria. 

This would be equitable on racial grounds. Italy would 

get the Italian-speaking part of southern Tyrol ; that is, the 

Trentino. Austria would retain the German-speaking part 



ITALIA IRREDENTA 161 

to the northward. Austria would still hold the superior po- 
sition, but Italy's frontier would be improved from the point 
of view of defensibility. 

3. Annexation of Southern Tyrol to the Brenner Pass to 
Italy. 

This would give Italy an ideal strategic frontier; but it 
would violate the racial principle in favor of Italy as much 
as the status quo favored Austria, since an intensely self- 
conscious, German-speaking population would be brought un- 
der Italian rule. 

KUSTENLAND CONSIDERED AlONE 

1. Status Quo Ante Bellum. 

This would leave Kiistenland in Austrian hands. It would 
assure Austria an economic outlet to the sea at Trieste and 
give Austria a strategic frontier against Italy. It would 
leave Italian aspirations unsatisfied. No racial question is 
involved for Austria. 

2. Annexation of Kiistenland to Italy. 

This would satisfy Italy's aspirations for the thirty-three 
per cent. Italian part of the population. It would deprive 
Austria of a sea outlet and disappoint South Slav hopes. 

3. Division along Racial Lines between Italy and a Yugo- 

slav State. 

This would be racially just and not difficult to effect, as 

race lines are fairly distinct. It would result, however, in 

almost impossible frontiers. The economic problem would 

be difficult, since Trieste would have no Italian hinterland. 

4. Inclusion of Kiistenland in a Yugo-Slav State. 

This would satisfy the Yugo-Slavs, disappoint the Italians, 



162 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

and bottle up Austria. It would throw the important sea- 
port of Trieste into the hands of a small state. 

Dalmatia Considered Alone 

1. Status Quo Ante Bellum. 

This would leave Dalmatia in Austrian hands. It would 
disappoint Italy and the Yugo-Slavs. It would assure Aus- 
tria an upper hand in the Adriatic through control of the 
best war ports and harbors, Cattaro in particular. 

2. Annexation of Dalmatia to Italy. 

This would satisfy Italy, disappoint the Yugo-Slavs, and 
bottle up Austria. 

3. Annexation of Dalmatia to a Yugo-Slav State. 

This would assure a Yugo-Slav state its natural coast front- 
age, but would disappoint Italy and make possible a naval 
rivalry between Italy and the Yugo-Slavs in the Adriatic in 
the event that the Yugo-Slavs should develop sea-power. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

(Auerbach, B. Les Races et les Nationalites en Autriche-Hongrie. 
Paris, 1898. 

Bainville, J. La Guerre et I'ltalie. Paris, 1916. 

Baisini, J. II Trentino dinanzi all' Europa. Milan, 1915. 

Bauron. P. Les Rives illyriennes. Paris, 1888. 

Chlumeeky, Freiherr L. von Oesterreich-Ungtarn und Italien. Das 
westbalkanische Problem und Italiens Kampf um die Vorherrschaft 
in der Adria. Leipzig, 1907. 

Clare, C. L. The Brenner Pass. London, 1912. 

Corradini, E. II Nazionalismo italiano. Milan, 1914. 

DeLucchi, G. Trentino e Tirolo. Rome, 1915. 

Faure, G. La Route des Dolomites, Tyrol et Cadore. Grenoble, 1915. 

Galanti, A. I Tedeschi sul versante meridionale delle Alpi. Rome, 
1885. 

Gayda, V., Modern Austria: Its Racial and Social Problems. Lon- 
don, 1915. 



ITALIA IRREDENTA 163 

Gonzaga, C. V. A, La questione delle lingue in Austria. Rome, 1900. 

Jackson, T. G. Dalmatia, the Quarnerno and Istria. Oxford, 1887. 

Maugain, G. L'Opinion italienne et I'lntervention de I'ltalie dans la 
Guerre actuelle. Paris, 1916. 

Munroe R. Rambles and Studies in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Dal- 
matia. London 1900. 

Neumann- Spallart. Oesterreichs maritime Entwickelung und die 
Hebung von Triest. Stuttgart, 1882. 

Rausch, K. Oesterreich-Ungarn in und nach dem Kriege. Vienna, 
1916. 



THE BALKANS 
YUGO-SLAV TEREITORIES 



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Mt /f-rvco-ii,/\v'T£iutiWaiea 



CHAPTEE XI 
YUGO-SLAV TERRITORIES 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 

The ancestors of the Yugo-Slavs, or South Slav peoples, 
reached their present seats during the great migration period 
of the sixth and seventh centuries a. d. At that time count- 
less swarms of Slavonic barbarians flooded southeastern Eu- 
rope. They were then a relatively homogeneous type, but 
the mountainous character of the country in which they set- 
tled marked them off into separate population groups, which 
at once began a slow process of differentiation that in some 
cases went to a marked extent. The Bulgarians in the ex- 
treme eastern part of the Balkan Peninsula, for instance, 
broke away entirely from the parent stock and became a sepa- 
rate type, while at the northern extremity of the South Slav 
area the Slovenes fell under German influence and followed 
a distinct line of development, although not so divergent as 
in the case of the Bulgarians. 

The main body of the South Slavs, however, never split up 
irremediably. Settled in the western Balkans and adjacent 
regions to the north, they maintained a fundamental unity of 
language and customs. They would probably have remained 
consciously one people but for the fact that the tribes settled 
on the Balkan shore of the Adriatic (Dalmatia) and the 
region just to the north (Croatia-Slavonia) accepted Christi- 
anity from Rome and civilization from western Europe, 
whereas the Yugo-Slavs of the Balkan interior (Serbia) took 
their Christianity and civilization from Byzantine Constanti- 
nople. The result was that the former people, the modern 

167 



168 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Croats, became Eoman Catholic, with a western European 
point of view, while the latter, the modern Serbs, became 
Orthodox Greek Christians, with an eastern European point 
of view. Different alphabets, literatures, historic connections, 
and economic ties united in tending to widen the breach be- 
tween the two main branches of the Yugo-Slav race. 

The Croats were the first to develop politically, building up 
a regular state in the early Middle Ages. But this state had 
a brief existence. It soon fell under the control of the Mag- 
yars of Hungary. The Dalmatian Croats, separated from 
their northern brethren, and their Serb kinsmen to the east 
by a range of almost impassable mountains, were too much 
scattered along their narrow strip of coast-land ever to attain 
political unity. Consequently most of them fell under the 
rule of the Venetian Republic. In the fourteenth century 
the Serbs developed a really powerful empire, which, under 
their Emperor Stephen Dushan, dominated the whole Balkan 
peninsula. But Dushan 's empire fell to pieces after his 
death, and the whole Serb branch of the Yugo-Slav race soon 
sank under the iron rule of the Turks. The Croats saved 
themselves from a similar fate by putting themselves under 
the Hapsburg rulers of Austria. 

The Turkish conquest of the Serbs dealt another blow to 
the race unity of the Yugo-Slavs. Despite degrading perse- 
cutions, the population in Serbia proper remained true to its 
Orthodox faith ; but in the intermediate region between Serbia 
and Croatia (the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina) a 
large part of the population turned Mohammedan and became 
such fanatical followers of Islam that they lost all sense of 
race solidarity with their Serb or Croat relatives. It was the 
Bosnian Mohammedans who upheld Turkish power against 
Austrian pressure into the Balkans during the decline of the 
Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century. 

Austria's progress in the Balkans was greatly furthered by 
the acquisition of Dalmatia, awarded her by the Vienna Con- 



YUGO-SLAV TERRITORIES 169 

gress of 1814. Indeed, the Austrian statesman Metternich 
appears to have considered the idea of uniting the whole 
Yugo-Slav race under the Hapsburg crown. But the Ortho- 
dox Serbs of the Balkans had no desire to become subjects of 
the Catholic emperors at Vienna. They had long looked to 
Orthodox Slav Russia to deliver them from the Turkish yoke. 
Their drooping spirits were constantly revived by the spec- 
tacle of a Serb islet of freedom standing secure above the 
Moslem flood, the small principality of Montenegro, which the 
Turks had never been able to subdue. All this, together with 
increasing Turkish weakness, accounts for the Serbian na- 
tional rising in 1804. After many vicissitudes, and thanks 
largely to Russian aid, this national rising ended in the estab- 
lishment of an autonomous Serbia in 1830 and in the formal 
independence of Turkey in 1879. During the nineteenth cen- 
tury the Serbian state slowly grew in power and prosperity, 
although its progress was impeded by the turbulence of its 
internal political life. 

As Serbia became more powerful she began to aspire to 
unite all the Serbs in a single national state. As things then 
stood, more than half the Serbs remained under Turkish rule 
in Old Serbia and Novibazar to the south and in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina to the west. Toward the close of the nineteenth 
century this Pan-Serb idea became merged in the larger con- 
cept of Yugo-Slav unity. The nineteenth century, the era of 
nationalities, had aroused all the South Slav peoples to a quick- 
ened race consciousness, and had made them remember their 
ancient race unity, which had long been obscured by differ- 
ences of religion and civilization and by divergent historical 
development. Thus certain elements among both Serbs and 
Croats came to dream of a Yugo-Slavia which should unite 
all the South Slav peoples into a single national state. Even 
the Slovenes, hitherto politically quiescent and half -German- 
ized, began to stir slightly at the call of Yugo-Slav propa- 
ganda. 



170 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

All this naturally alarmed Austria-Hungary, whose integ- 
rity would be threatened by any such development. Since 
Serbia was the obvious champion of the Yugo-Slav idea, Aus- 
trian policy became directed against any further accession of 
Serbian strength. In 1908, Austria dealt Serbia a crushing 
blow by formally annexing the provinces of Bosnia and Herze- 
govina. These provinces had, it is true, been under Austrian 
military occupation since 1878, but Serbia herself had hoped 
eventually to annex these nominal dependencies of the Turk- 
ish Empire. 

Henceforth the Yugo-Slav question became involved in the 
general tangle of European politics which preceded the Great 
War. Backed up by Russia, Serbia made no concealment of 
her dream of effecting Yugo-Slav unity, while Austria-Hun- 
gary, backed by Germany and convinced that the success of 
Serbia's Yugo-Slav program meant the disruption of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, resolved to avert this deadly peril 
by crushing Serbia at the first favorable moment. The Ser- 
bian victories in the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 greatly in- 
creased Serbian power and made Austria more implacable. 
The result was that the assassination of the Austrian Arch- 
duke Francis Ferdinand at Sarajevo, Bosnia, in June, 1914, 
precipitated a general explosion. 

ECONOMIC SURVEY 

The lands inhabited wholly or partly by the Yugo-Slav race 
present such diverse features of soil, climate, and natural re- 
sources that the several units of territory require separate 
treatment. 

Serbia 

The area here discussed includes only those territories con- 
stituting the Kingdom of Serbia as it existed prior to the 
Balkan Wars of 1912-13. The territories acquired by Serbia 



YUGO-SLAV TERRITORIES 171 

in those years are treated in the chapter on Macedonia. 
These Macedonian territories, with the exception of the region 
known as Old Serbia, lying immediately to the south of the 
Kingdom of Serbia, as it existed before 1912, are Bulgarian 
rather than Yugo-Slav in population. They do not, there- 
fore, fall technically within the scope of this chapter, devoted 
to the Yugo-Slav racial area. 

Serbia proper is a land of hills and mountains, among 
which numerous rivers, notably the Morava, wind their ways. 
These fertile river valleys are industriously tilled by a race 
of hardy yeoman farmers, although their agricultural meth- 
ods are somewhat primitive. About two fifths of the country 
is under cultivation, the total agricultural yield reaching con- 
siderable proportions. Corn is the great cereal staple, serv- 
ing both as food for the people and as feed for the numerous 
domestic animals. Other important crops are wheat, barley, 
oats, rye, and tobacco. Fruit grows well, especially the plum, 
from which is distilled a brandy known as slivovitza, which is 
the national drink. 

For the world at large, however, Serbian agriculture is less 
important than Serbian live stock. In proportion to its size, 
Serbia has more live stock than any other country in Europe. 
Numerous herds of pigs fatten in the extensive beech and oak 
forests, while the barer hill-slopes afford pasturage for great 
flocks of sheep and goats. Live animals and meat products 
are the most important of Serbia's exporte. At the end of 
1910 Serbia possessed : Sheep, 3,808,815 ; pigs, 863,544 ; goats, 
627,427 ; horned cattle, 957,918 ; horses, 152,617. 

The forests of Serbia play an important part in the eco- 
nomic life of the country. They occupy nearly a third of the 
total area. They serve as a feeding-ground for swine, and are 
the sources of valuable timber products. 

Serbia also has considerable mineral resources. Her cop- 
per-mines rank among the richest in Europe. Valuable coal- 
fields exist. There are a few gold deposits of some value. In 



172 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

1911 the output of these mineral products was: Copper ore, 
7,023 metric tons; coal, 235,058 metric tons; gold, 422 kilo- 
grams. 

With better communications and more capital, Serbia's min^ 
eral output might be still further increased. 

Industry is distinctly backward. The Serb does not take 
kindly to factory life. Such industries as do exist are car- 
ried on by foreign workmen. The principal industries in the 
modern sense are meat-packing, flour-milling, distilling, and 
tanning. There are certain old local industries, such as car- 
pet-weaving, sandal-making, and leather working, but these 
are not carried on by modern methods, being still in the 
house-industry stage. 

Montenegro 

Montenegro is a decidedly poor country. The western por- 
tion is a sterile mass of limestone crags, forming part of the 
famous "karst" region, which stretches along most of the 
east coast of the Adriatic Sea. Here nothing grows except 
brushwood and stunted scrub. 

At certain places in eastern Montenegro are fertile valleys 
and small plains which bear good crops, mainly of com, bar- 
ley, buckwheat, and tobacco. 

The eastern portion of Montenegro, though mountainous, 
is largely under forest. The woods are of good quality, but 
valueless, owing to lack of roads. 

Considerable live stock is reared, largely sheep and goats. 

Industry is virtually non-existent. Montenegro 's whole life 
is very primitive and backward. 

Bosnia-Herzegovina 

North of Montenegro and west of Serbia lie the twin prov- 
inces of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This country is very much 
richer than Montenegro and is probably better than Serbia 



YUGO-SLAV TERRITOEIES 173 

from an economic point of view. Bosnia-Herzegovina is pre- 
dominantly hill country, but the percentage of valley and 
arable plateau is greater than in Serbia, while the sterile karst 
region is confined to the mountains bordering the Adriatic 
coast. 

When Turkish rule over Bosnia-Herzegovina ended by the 
Austrian occupation of 1878 the country was in a deplorably 
backward condition ; but the Austrian administration has set 
itself intelligently to the material development of the prov- 
inces, and to-day Bosnia-Herzegovina has reached a relatively 
high degree of prosperity. The chief thing which holds the 
country back is the extreme conservatism of the inhabitants, 
who dread innovations and cling to antiquated methods. 

Even as it is, Bosnia-Herzegovina's fertile soil yields excel- 
lent and abundant agricultural products. The chief crops are 
corn, wheat, barley, oats, rye, millet, buckwheat, potatoes, 
flax, hemp, and tobacco. Fruit is extensively raised, espe- 
cially the plum, from which, as in Serbia, slivovitza brandy 
is distilled. Wine of good quality is also produced. 

Like Serbia, again, Bosnia-Herzegovina is an important 
stock-raising area. In 1910 there were in the country: 
Sheep, 2,499,422; goats, 1,393,068; horned cattle, 1,308,930; 
swine, 527,271; horses, 221,981. 

The mineral wealth of Bosnia-Herzegovina is considerable ; 
its exploitation, entirely negligible in 1878, has been greatly 
developed under Austrian rule. The principal mineral prod- 
ucts are coal, iron, copper, chromium, quicksilver, and man- 
ganese. In 1912 statistics for certain minerals were: Coal, 
852,920 tons; iron ore, 159,420 tons; manganese, 4,650 tons. 

Since 1878 much capital has flowed into the country, and 
industrial life in the modern sense has taken definite root. 
There are to-day important iron and steel manufactures and 
various factories for chemicals, matches, sugar, and sundry 
minor products. 



174 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Ceoatia-Slavonia 

This land falls into four rather sharply contrasted geo- 
graphical zones. In the extreme west is a narrow strip of 
coast-land fronting the Adriatic Sea. This sheltered coast 
strip enjoys a warm climate and its output is of typical Medi- 
terranean products; citrus fruits, olive-oil, and wine. 

Back of this narrow coast strip rise rugged mountains, 
mostly of the bare and sterile limestone karst type. Farther 
east and north is a wider belt of mountain and hill country, 
clothed in forest, and broken here and there by fertile val- 
leys. In the extreme east the land sinks into flat plain, 
largely fertile agricultural country, but with considerable 
areas of swamp and fen. 

With the exception of the Adriatic coast-line, the economic 
life is similar to that of Serbia. Agriculture and stock-rais- 
ing are the two principal occupations of the people. As in 
Serbia, herds of swine fatten in the beech forests, while the 
abundant plum-crops are distilled into slivovitza. 

Croatia-Slavonia is poor in minerals. Her industrial life 
is centered at Fiume, on the Adriatic. This city is Hungary's 
one outlet to the sea. Accordingly, the Hungarian Govern- 
ment has done much for its development. Fiume is to-day, 
therefore, a flourishing commercial and industrial center, with 
shipyards, iron works, and other industrial appurtenances of 
a modern port town. Another subsidiary industrial center is 
Agram, the local capital. 

Sttria, Carinthia, and Carniola 

These three Austrian provinces, lying to the north of 
Croatia-Slavonia, are the northern border-lands of the Yugo- 
slav race, the Slav element of their population being Slovenes. 
Styria and Carinthia fall mostly outside of the Yugo-Slav 
zone, the Slovenes occupying only the extreme southerly por- 
tions of the provinces, while the rest of the area is occupied 



YUGO-SLAV TERRITORIES 175 

by Germans. Carniola, however, is almost solidly Slovene in 
population. 

These provinces form a mountainous block with compara- 
tively little agricultural land, most of the country being under 
forest. The mineral wealth of Styria and Carinthia is con- 
siderable, though it falls mostly outside the Slovene zone. 
Carniola is much less favored in respect to mineral wealth. 

Dalmatia and Kustenland 

These provinces are considered in the chapter on Italia 
Irredenta. 

THE FACTS ABOUT YUGO-SLAV TERRITORIES 

Wheke Yugo-Slav Teeritories are Located 

The territory of the Yugo-Slavs is an irregular block of 
territory in southeastern Europe, bounded on the north by 
the rivers Drave and Danube, on the west by Italy and the 
Adriatic Sea, on the south by Albania and Greece, and on 
the east by Bulgaria. 

Territorial Units 

Serbia, as before 1912, had an area of 18,650 square miles, 
or about the size of New Hampshire and Vermont combined. 
Its population was 2,911,000 and almost solidly Yugo-Slav. 

Old Serbia, Novi-Bazar, and Serbian Macedonia, Serb an- 
nexations in 1912-13, have an area of 15,241 square miles, or 
about the size of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecti- 
cut combined. Its population is about 1,600,000, mostly 
Yugo-Slav, excepting Macedonia. 

Bosnia-Herzegovina has an area of 19,768 square miles, or 
about the size of New Hampshire, Vermont, and Rhode Island 
combined. Its population is about 1,898,000, solidly Yugo- 



176 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Slav, although the 626,000 Mohammedans, despite their blood, 
do not feel themselves Yugo-Slavs. 

Montenegro, with territorial acquisitions of 1912-13, has 
an area of 5603 square miles, or about the size of Massachu- 
setts and Rhode Island combined. Its population is about 
516,000, solidly Yugo-Slav, except a few Albanian districts. 

Croatia- Slav onia has an area of 16,421 square miles, or 
about the size of Massachusetts and New Hampshire com- 
bined. Its population is about 2,186,000, almost solidly Yugo- 
Slav. 

Dalmatia has an area of 4956 square miles, or about the size 
of Connecticut. Its population is about 660,000, ninety-seven 
per cent, of which is Yugo-Slav. 

8erJ)o-Croat districts in southern Hungary, especially the 
Banat of Temesvar. This region has an area of 3000 square 
miles, approximately. Its population is approximately 500,- 
000, about sixty per cent, of which is Yugo-Slav. 

Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, and EUstenland. Their area 
is about 19,574 square miles, or about the size of New Hamp- 
shire, Vermont, and Rhode Island combined. The population 
is 3,311,000, fifty-five per cent, of which is Yugo-Slav. 

The total area of these territories is 105,000 square miles, or 
about equaling the combined area of the Middle Atlantic 
States, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. Its popu- 
lation totals 14,000,000. The Yugo-Slavs number 10,000,000, 
or seventy-one per cent, of the total population. 

Different Races in Serbia (as before 1912) 

Fully ninety-seven per cent, of the population is Serbian in 
blood. The only foreign elements worth mentioning are the 
small Rumanian population of the extreme northeastern dis- 
tricts bordering the Danube (see chapter on Greater Rumania) 
and a scattering of Gypsies and Turks. 



YUGO-SLAV TERRITORIES 177 

Different Races in Old Serbia, Novi-Bazar, and Serbian 
Macedonia (Serb annexatious in 1912-13) 

The Serbs are found mostly in Old Serbia and Novi-Bazar, 
where they form the bulk of the population. There are a 
few in Macedonia. Previous to 1912 they were a poverty- 
stricken peasantry, oppressed by their Turkish masters and 
terrorized by the Albanians. From 1912-13 the Serbs be- 
came the masters and retaliated upon their former oppressors 
and upon the Bulgarians of Macedonia. Since 1915 the Serbs 
are again oppressed, this time by the Bulgarians and Austro- 
Germans. 

The Bulgarians form the bulk of the population in Mace- 
donia. They are mostly peasants. Previous to 1912 they 
were oppressed by the Turks, from 1912 to 1915, oppressed 
by the Serbs, since 1915 they have been the masters of Mace- 
donia. 

The Albanians are found mostly in Old Serbia. For many 
years prior to 1912 the Turkish government had encouraged 
the immigration of Albanians to terrorize and supplant the 
Serbian population. In 1912, Old Serbia was dotted with 
Albanian colonies. From 1912-15 Serb proscriptions greatly 
reduced their numbers. 

The Turks are found throughout. They were landed pro- 
prietors, townsfolk, officials, and garrison troops previous to 
1912, and were politically dominant until then. Thereafter 
many were killed or emigrated. 

The Greeks are found mostly in the towns. They are 
traders, shopkeepers, etc. In 1912 much of the business life 
of the country was in their hands. Since 1912 many have 
emigrated. 

Different Races in Bosnia-Herzegovina 

The Serbs number about 856,000 and are found through- 
out. They are mostly peasants and are politically depressed. 



178 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

The Croats number about 451,000 and are found through- 
out. They are mostly peasants, but there is among them a 
larger middle class than among their Serb kinsmen. They 
are better off politically and slightly more prosperous eco- 
nomically. 

The Mohammedans number 626,000 and are found through- 
out. They compose all social classes. The landed gentry of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina is, however, nearly all Mohammedan. 
Politically favored by the Austrian government, they are 
prosperous and contented. 

DiFFEEENT EaCES IN MONTENEGRO 

Except for a few Albanian districts, the population is 
solidly Serbian. 

Different Eaces in Croatia-Slavonia 

Except for a very small Magyar population, mostly at the 
port of Fiume, the population is solidly Yugo-Slav. Of these, 
seventy-five per cent, are Croats, twenty-five per cent, are 
Serbs. 

Different Eaces in Dalmatia 

Except for a small Italian population (three per cent.) in 
a few towns and islands, the population is solidly Croat. 

Different Eaces in the Serb Districts op Southern Hun- 
gary, Especially in the Banat op Temesvar 

The Serb population is found in solid blocks, interspersed 
with other blocks of Germans, Rumanians, and Magyars. 
(See the chapter on Greater Eumania.) 



YUGOSLAV TERRITORIES 179 

Different Races in Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, 
and kustenland 

The Slovenes are found in Carniola, where they form the 
bulk of the population. From this center they overflow into 
southern Carinthia and Styria and northern Kiistenland. 
They are mostly peasants, culturally backward, although of 
late years with a dawning race consciousness. They are much 
under German cultural influence, economically fairly pros- 
perous, and politically contented. 

The Croats are found in southern Kiistenland. They are 
peasants, culturally and economically backward. 

The Germans form the bulk of the population in Styria 
and Carinthia. They form a considerable minority in Carni- 
ola. There are a few in Kiistenland. They are of all social 
classes, especially the aristocracy and townsfolk, which classes 
are nearly all German, except in Kiistenland, where only the 
officials and the business community of Trieste are German. 
They are politically dominant. 

The Italians are found in Kiistenland, along the coasts and 
in the towns. They are of all social classes and are politically 
depressed. 

"Who Controlled Yugo-Slav Territories Before the War 

Serbia, Old Serbia, Novi-Bazar, and Serbian Macedonia 
were under Serbian control. Montenegro was under Monte- 
negrin control. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia-Slavonia, Dal- 
matia, southern Hungary, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, and 
Kiistenland were under Austro-Hungarian control. 

Who Has Controlled or Occupied Yugo-Slav Territories 
Since the War Began 

Since the autumn of 1915 all the Yugo-Slav territories have 
been in the hands of the Austro-Germans and Bulgarians. 



180 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Serbia's Interests in Yugo-Slav Territories 

Political. Although, as already explained in the historical 
background, Croats and Slovenes by no means see things eye 
to eye with Serbs on many points, nevertheless, Serbia is pre- 
eminently the representative and champion of Yugo-Slav 
unity. The Serbs dream of a united Yugoslavia, either di- 
rectly under Serb dominance or as a federation in which 
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes shall form autonomous members 
of a larger political whole. 

Such a state would be almost a first-class power. Stretch- 
ing from the Danube Valley to Greece and from the Adriatic 
to Bulgaria, the new Yugoslavia would dominate the Bal- 
kans, control the southern Danubian area, and rival Italy on 
the Adriatic Sea. 

Economic. The present Serbia is almost wholly an agri- 
cultural and stock-raising country of moderate economic 
value; but the wide areas claimed for Yugoslavia in Austria- 
Hungary contain lands of much higher agricultural richness, 
some mineral wealth, and, above all, control of one of the 
main trade-routes between central Europe and the Near East, 
the trade-route down the Adriatic from the ports of Trieste 
and Piume. 

Strategic. The strategic value of Serbia is high. The 
natural line of military advance from central Europe to the 
Balkans and Near East (and vice versa) runs via the Morava 
and Vardar valleys; that is, through the heart of Serbia. 
Could Serbia now obtain the Yugo-Slav lands of Austria- 
Hungary, her strategic situation would be vastly bettered, 
while her new Adriatic frontage would give her a secure base 
for the creation and upbuilding of sea-power. 

Racial. Both the Croats and Slovenes are of the same race- 
stock as the Serbs. 

Cultural. Despite the fact that the Croats and Slovenes 
took their civilization from the Koman West instead of from 



YUGOSLAV TERRITORIES 181 

the Byzantine East, as did the Serbs, the languages, customs, 
and basic ideas of all three peoples are closely akin. 

Religion. Religion is the great stumbling-block to Yugo- 
slav unity. Religion plays a leading part in the formation 
of nationality in eastern Europe. Accordingly, the Roman 
Catholic Croats and Slovenes tend through their religion to 
draw apart from their Orthodox Serb brethren, while the 
Mohammedans of Bosnia-Herzegovina, despite their pure 
Yugo-Slav blood, regard their Serb and Croat kinsmen with 
fear and hatred, experiencing no sentiment of race identity. 

Austria-Hungary's Interests in Yugo-Slav Territories 

Political. For Austria-Hungary, retention of her Yugo- 
Slav provinces is vital to her continued existence. Their loss 
would shear away a large part of the empire, and would en- 
tirely exclude her from the sea. On the other hand, annex- 
ation of, or lasting control over, Serbia, would ensure her 
domination over the Balkans and would open the road to the 
Near East. 

Economic. Austria-Hungary's one sea trade-route is down 
the Adriatic via the ports of Trieste and Fiume. This route 
is jeopardized by Yugo-Slav aspirations. On the other hand, 
possession of Serbia would assure Austria-Hungary the Bal- 
kan markets, and would give her a favored position for the 
economic penetration of the whole Near East. 

Strategic. The loss of her Yugo-Slav provinces would 
annihilate Austria-Hungary's sea-power, and would draw a 
hostile frontier athwart the middle Danube Valley perilously 
close to Vienna and Budapest. On the other hand, annex- 
ation of Serbia and Montenegro would make Austria-Hun- 
gary absolutely secure to south and east, from any possible 
attack. 

Racial. Annexation of Serbia and Montenegro would bring 
the whole Yugo-Slav race inside the Austro-Hungarian fron- 



182 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

tiers, thus in a certain inverse sense solving the problem of 
Yugo-Slav unity. 

Cultural. Slight. 

Religious. Slight. 

Germany's Interests in YuGO-SjiAv Territory 

Germany's political, economic, and strategic interests are, 
in their broader aspects, virtually the same as those of Aus- 
tria-Hungary. 

Eussia's Interests in Tugo-Slav Territories^ 

Political. Russia has long considered itself the protector 
of its Yugo-Slav "little brothers." Russia's aims at Balkan 
hegemony and leadership of the Slav world are bound up 
with the continued independence of Serbia and the prospects 
of Yugoslavia. The destruction of the present Austro-Hun- 
garian Empire, implied in the creation of a united Yugo- 
slavia, would eliminate Russia's old rival in the Near East. 

Economic. The economic interest is slight. There are no 
natural trade-routes Between Russia and the western Balkans. 
Russia and Serbia are both primarily agricultural states and 
feel no need of each other's produce. Russia's manufactured 
goods cannot compete in the Serbian market against those of 
other nations. 

Strategic. A friendly Serbia, necessarily dependent upon 
Russia, and still more a friendly Yugoslavia, would give 
Russia an invaluable ally in southeastern Europe, and would 
insure Russian hegemony over that whole area. 

Racial. Most Russians regard the Yugo-Slavs as their 
blood-brethren. 

Cultural. The fundamental ideas and customs of both 
Russians and Yugo-Slavs have much in common. Their lan- 
guages are also somewhat similar. 

1 See foot-note on page 55. 



YUGO-SLAV TERRITORIES 183 

Religious. The Serbs, like the Russians, are Orthodox, this 
constituting a powerful bond of sympathy between them. On 
the other hand, the Roman Catholicism of the Croats and 
Slovenes tends to estrange them from the Russians. As to 
the Mohammedan Yugo-Slavs of Bosnia-Herzegovina, there 
is of course no religious bond with Russia. 

Italy's Interests in Yugo-Slav Territory 

Italy's interests are discussed in the chapter on Italia irre- 
denta. 

Bulgaria's Interests in Yugo-Slav Territory 

Bulgaria's interests are discussed in the chapter on Mace- 
donia. 

Rumania's Interests in Yugo-Slav Territory 

Rumania's interests are discussed in the chapter on Greater 
Rumania. 

Solutions that Have Been Proposed and What They 

Mean 

1. Status Quo Ante Bellum. 

This would imply leaving Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bos- 
nia-Herzegovina, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, Kiistenland, and 
the Serbo-Croat districts in southern Hungary (especially the 
Banat of Temesvar) as parts of the Austro-Hungarian Em- 
pire. 

It would imply leaving Serbia, as appearing on maps prior 
to 1912, Old Serbia, Novibazar, and Serbian Macedonia as 
parts of Serbia. 

It would imply the existence of Montenegro as an inde- 
pendent state closely allied with Serbia. 

This arrangement would disappoint Yugo-Slav aspirations 



184 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

and would leave the Serbs discontented and revengeful. The 
Croats of Croatia-Slavonia who are under Magyar rule, as 
that rule appears as a phase of the control arising from the 
connection with Hungary, would be almost as much discon- 
tented. The Croats of the Austrian provinces (Dalmatia and 
Istria) would probably be less discontented, since their local 
political life has not been so greatly suppressed as has their 
kinsmen's under Magyar rule. The Slovenes of Istria, Ca- 
rinthia, Carniola, and Kiistenland would probably not object 
greatly, since their race consciousness is still but imperfectly 
awakened. 

Austria-Hungary would probably not be satisfied with a 
return to the status quo, because she would regard it as 
leaving unsolved the problem of the Yugo-Slav movement on 
the south, which she regards as a menace to the integrity of 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 

2. United Yugo-Slav State. 

This would imply the union of all the above mentioned 
territories into a single political unit. This would satisfy 
Yugo-Slav aspirations and result in the formation of a large 
state ranking almost as a first-class power. Such a state 
would stand in a good way to dominate the Balkans and play 
a major role in the whole eastern European situation. In 
extent of territory, population, and economic resources such a 
state would be well fitted to maintain itself. 

The difficulties that such a Yugo-Slav state would encoun- 
ter may be listed as follows: Austria-Hungary would prob- 
ably interpose an implacable hostility to the new state unless 
adequate and really workable international arrangements off- 
set the fact that the formation of the new state would cut 
Austria-Hungary off from the sea, mutilate her territory, and 
deprive her of defensible frontiers. In such enmity Austria- 
Hungary would be backed by Germany, v/ho would thereby 
be deprived of her natural sea outlet to the south and balked 



YUGO-SLAV TERRITORIES 185 

in her political and commercial ambitions in the Balkans and 
in the Near East ; Italy would probably be jealous of the new 
state, as it would run athwart her irredentist aspirations and 
be a potential rival in the Adriatic ; Bulgaria would doubtless 
hold a bitter enmity for the retention by the new state of 
Serbia's present share of Macedonia, which is mainly in- 
habited by Bulgarians. Even if this region were given to 
Bulgaria, Bulgarians would still be jealous of the Yugo-Slav 
state, because Bulgaria's former primacy in the Balkans 
would pass to the stronger Yugo-Slav state. Minor difficul- 
ties would also grow out of Albanian hostility. 

3. Annexation of Yugo-Slav Territories or Their Control 

hy Austria-Hungary. 

While this would defeat the aspiration for an independent 
Yugo-Slav state, it would bring the Yugo-Slav elements into 
a unity ; and that unity might afford some degree of satisfac- 
tion if Austria-Hungary should make the Yugo-Slav terri- 
tories, when unified, a third grand division of the empire, just 
as Austria and Hungary are parts. A possible corollary to 
this arrangement would be the cession to Bulgaria of Serbian 
Macedonia. This would not greatly effect Yugo-Slav unity, 
since there are but few Serbs in Serbian Macedonia. 

In such a Yugoslavia, as part of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, the Groats would probably become the leaders, since 
they are the western European element of Yugoslavia and 
would therefore better correlate with the general leadership 
of the western European empire of Austria-Hungary. 

4. Possible Division of Yugo-Slav Territories hetween Aiis- 

tria-Eungary, Italy, and a Limited Yugo-Slav State. 

Such an arrangement would be but temporary at best, as 

it would leave balked ambitions and growing aspirations on 

all hands. The possible divisions may be stated, however, as 

follows: Kiistenland and Dalmatia might go to Italy; the 



186 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

districts of southern Hungary (especially the Banat of 
Temesvar) might go to Rumania; Serbia might go to Austria- 
Hungary either by annexation or as a protectorate or be di- 
vided between Austria and Bulgaria; Serbian Macedonia 
might go to Bulgaria ; and Montenegro be annexed to Austria 
or sustain an autonomous relation. There are several possi- 
bilities of moves on the board here ; any one of the above men- 
tioned parts might be treated as suggested and the remainder 
or parts of the remainder of the Yugo-Slav territories be re- 
verted to the status quo or given to a limited Yugo-Slav state. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Serbia 
Historical. 

A Diplomatist. Nationalism and War in the Near East. Oxford, 
1915. 

Berard, V. La Serbie. Paris, 1916. 

Church, L. F. The Story of Serbia. London, 1914. 

Coquelle, P. Le Royaume de Serbie. Paris, 1894. 

Crawfurd, H. The Balkan Cockpit. London, 1915, 

Denis, E. La Grande Serbie. Paris, 1915. 

Durham, M. E. Through the Lands of the Serb. London, 1904. 

Georgevitch, W. Die serbisehe Frage. Stuttgart, 1909. 

Gopcevie, S. Serbien und die Serben. Leipzig, 1888. 

Gubernatis, Comte A.de La Serbie at les Serbes. Paris, 1898. 

Kanitz, F. Das Konigreich Serbien und das Serbenvolk von der 
Romerzeit bis zur Gegenwart. (3 vols.) Leipzig, 1909. 

Lazarovich-Hrebelianovich, Prince. The Servian People. London, 
1911. 

Louis-Jaray, G. Chez les Serbes. Paris, 1906. 

Mallat, J. La Serbie contemporaine. (2 vols.) Paris, 1902. 

Mijatovic, C. Servia of the Servians. London, 1908. 

Miller, W. The Balkans. London, 1896. 

Murray, W. S. The Making of the Balkan States. London, 1912. 

Petrovic, V. M. Serbia: Her History and Her Customs. London, 
1915. 

Reed, H. L. Serbia: A Sketch. Boston, 1917. 

Schurman, J. G. The Balkan Wars, 1912-13 Princeton, 1915. 

Sloane, W. M. The Balkans: A Laboratory of History. New- 
York, 1914. 



YUGO-SLAV TERRITORIES 187 

stead, A. Serbia and the Serbians. London, 1911. 

Temper ley, H. W. V. A History of Serbia. London, 1917. 

Tuma, A. Serbien. Hannover, 1894. 

Woods, H. C. The Danger Zone of Europe. London, 1911. 
Uconomic. 

Statesman's Year Book. London. Annual. 

Janitchijewitch, Z. Die Entwickelimg der serbischen Handels- 
politik. Wiirzburg, 1911. 

Kessler, O. Serbien: Wirtschaftliche Verhaltnisse und deren 
Entwiekelung. Berlin, 1910. 

Krikner, J. Industrie und Industriepolitik Serbiens. Halle a/S. 
1913. 

Millet, R. La Serbie 6conomique et commerciale. Paris, 1889. 

Nestorovic, I. Z. Der Aussenhandel Serbiens. Leipzig, 1913. 

Yovanovic, L. R. L' Agriculture en Serbie. Paris, 1900. 
General. 

Chotch, P. G. Du Nationalisme serbe. Dijon, 1916. 

Cvijic, J. Questions balkaniques. Paris, 1916. 

Hogge, J. La Serbie de nos jours. Brussels, 1900. 

Lanux, P. de. La Yugoslavie. Paris, 1916. 

Lazard, E. La Serbie de nos jours. Paris, 1901. 

Muzet, A. Aux Pays balkaniques. Paris, 1912. 

Racic, V. Le Royaume de Serbie. Paris, 1901. 

Velimirovic, N. Serbia in Light and Darkness. London, 1916. 

Vivian, H. Servia, the Poor Man's Paradise. London, 1897. 

MONTENEGBO 

Historical. 

Coquelle, P. Histoire du Montenegro et de la Bosnie. Paris, 1895. 

Gopcevic, S. Montenegro und die Montenegriner. Leipzig, 1877. 

Mantegazza, V. Al Montenegro. Florence, 1896. 

Martini, A. II Montenegro. Turin, 1897. 

Maton, E. Histoire du Montenegro ou Tsernagore. Paris, 1881. 

Miller, W. The Balkans. London, 1896. 

Murray, W. S. The Making of the Balkan States. London, 1912. 

Schwartz, A. Serbien und Montenegro. Laibach, 1909. 

Stevenson, F. S. A History of Montenegro. London, 1912. 

Trevor, R. Montenegro: A Land of Warriors. London, 1913. 

Wyon, R. and Prance G. The Land of the Black Moimtain. Lon- 
don, 1908. 
General. 

Achleiner, A. Reisen im slavischen Siiden. Berlin, 1913. 



188 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Hassert C. Reise durch Montenegro. Vienna, 1893. 

Muzet, A. Aux Pays balkaniques. Paris, 1912. 

Yiarte, C. Les Bords de I'Adriatique et le Montenegro. Paris, 
1900. 

Austbia-Htjngaet 
Historical. 

Aelschker, H. Geschichte Kiirntens. Klagenfurt, 1885. 
Auerbaeh, B. Les Races et les Nationalites en Autriche-Hongrie. 

Paris, 1898. 
Bauron, P. Les Rives illyriennes. Paris, 1888. 
Cassi, G. II Mare Adriatico, sua Funzione attraversi il Tempo. 

Milan, 1915. 
Gayda, V. Modern Austria: Its Racial and Social Problems. 

London, 1915. 
Jackson, T. G. Dalmatia, the Quarnerno and Istria. Oxford, 

1887. 
Loiseau, C. L'f)qiiilibre adriatique: Italic et la Question d'Ori- 

ent. Paris, 1901. 
Mayer, F. M. Geschichte der Steiermark. Graz, 1898. 
Seton- Watson, R. W. The Southern Slav Question and the Haps- 

burg Monarchy. London, 1911. 
Seton-Watson, R. W. Absolutism in Croatia. London, 1912. 
General. 

Gonnard, R. Entre Drave et Save. Paris, 1912. 

Oransz, M. Auf dem Rade durch Kroatien und Bosnien. Vienna, 

1903. 
Revelli, P. L'Adriatico e il dominio del Mediterraneo Orientale. 

Rome, 1916. 
Tamaro. Italiani e Slavi nell' Adriatico. Rome, 1915. 
Vellay, C. La Question de TAdriatique. Paris, 1915. 
Weisbach, A. Die Serbokroaten der adriatischen Kiistenlander. 

Berlin, 1884. 
Zahn, J. von Styriaca. Graz, 1896. 

Bosnia- Herzegovina 
Historical. 

Aaboth, T. An Official Tour through Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

(transl.) London, 1890. 
Coquelle, P. Histoire du Montenegro et de la Bosnie. Paris, 

1896. 
Cvijic, J. L' Annexion de la Bosnie et la Question Serbe. Paris, 1909. 



YUGO-SLAV TERRITORIES 189 

Fournier, D. A. Wie wir zu Bosnien kamen. Vienna, 1909. 

Klaie, V. Gesehichte Bosniens. Leipzig, 1884. 

Nikasinovic, B. Bosnien und die Herzegowina unter der Ver- 

waltung der Oesterreich-ungarischen MonarcMe. Berlin, 

1901. 
Schmolle, L. Die neuen Reichslande Oesterreich-Ungarns. 

Vienna, 1909. 
Spalajkovie J. La Bosnia et I'Herzegovine. Paris, 1897. 

Economic. 

Ballif, P. Wasserbauten in Bosnien und der Hercegovina. 

Vienna, 1896. 
Ballif, P. Das Strassenwesen in Bosnien und der Hercegovina. 

Vienna, 1903. 
Griinberg, K. Die Agrarverfassung und das Grundentlastungs- 

problem in Bosnien und der Herzegowina. Leipzig, 1911. 
Wirtsehaftlicher Fiihrer durch Bosnien-Hercegovina. Herausge- 

geben vom oesterreichisehen Interessentenverband. Vienna, 

1913. 

General. 

Baernreither, J. M. Bosnische Eindriicke. Vienna, 1908. 

Bordeaux, A. La Bosnie populaire. Paris, 1904. 

Capus, G. A travers la Bosnie et I'Herzegovine. Paris, 1896. 

Holbach, M. Bosnia and Herzegovina; some Wayside Wander- 
ings. London, 1910. 

Munroe, R. Rambles and Studies in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Dal- 
matia. London, 1900. 

Preindlsberger-Mrazovic. M. Bosnisclies Skizzenbuch. Dresden, 
1909. 

Schliiter, O. Beitrage zur Landeskunde Bosniens under der Herze- 
govina. Vienna, 1907. 



THE BALKANS 
MACEDONIA 



See Map of Yugo-Slav Territories on page 166. 



CHAPTER XII 
MACEDONIA 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 

Macedonia is the ethnic cross-roads where all the races of 
the Balkan peninsula meet. It is the topographic heart of 
the Balkans. The various mountain-chains which wall it in 
on every side, save its ^gean sea-front on the south, give it 
a certain geographic unity. These mountain-chains, though 
high and rugged, are not impassable, and the River Vardar, 
which runs the entire length of Macedonia from north to 
south, is the main line of communication between central Eu- 
rope and the East. For these reasons Macedonia has been 
overrun by invaders from all directions, who have fought end- 
lessly over the possession of this coveted area. 

The earliest inhabitants of Macedonia were Thracians, an- 
cestors of the modern Albanians. The superb fighting ability 
of the Thracians was shown by the world-empire forged by 
their renowned monarchs, Philip and Alexander the Great. 
At that time Macedonia became Greek in culture, while long 
before Alexander's day Hellenic colonies had converted the 
-<:Egean coast-country into a racially Greek territory. 

During the days t)f the Roman Empire the inhabitants of 
the interior were Latinized, and the stock seems to have been 
substantially modified by strong infusions of Italian blood. 
The great Slav invasions of the Balkans in the sixth and sev- 
enth centuries a. d. wrought a profound change in the racial 
complexion of Macedonia, turning it into the predominantly 
Slav land that it has ever since remained. The seaboard alone 

193 



194 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

remained Greek. The Latinized inhabitants of the hinterland 
were driven into the Pindus Mountains to the southwest, 
where to-day their descendants, the modern Kutzo-Vlaehs, are 
found. The rest of the country became Slav of the Bulgarian 
rather than of the Serbian branch of the South Slav race. 
During the Middle Ages the Byzantine emperors of Constan- 
tinople waged a series of ferocious wars with the Bulgarians 
for possession of Macedonia, while in the fourteenth century 
the land fell under the transitory rule of the Serbian Emperor 
Stephen Dushan. Then Macedonia, like the rest of the Bal- 
kan peninsula, was overrun by the conquering Turk. 

The five centuries of Turkish rule which followed produced 
further racial changes. Large numbers of Turks settled in 
Macedonia, and many of the native population embraced 
Islam and were assimilated by the conquerors. At the begin- 
ning of the eighteenth century Macedonia was at least half 
Turkish and Mohammedan. The tide soon began running 
the other way, however. The decline of the Turkish Empire, 
which set in about that time, permitted the oppressed Chris- 
tian elements to take heart once more. The disastrous wars 
then waged by the Ottoman Empire and the growing internal 
conflicts of rival factions drained the Turkish population of 
its vigor, since it was the Turks who always did the fighting, 
the Christian serfs paying taxes in lieu of military service. 
The national and cultural revivals of the Christian Balkan 
races during the nineteenth century further increased the 
self-assurance and efficiency of the Macedonian Christians, 
while the Turkish element, ignorant, apathetic, and drained 
by excessive conscription, fell steadily behind, till at the be- 
ginning of the twentieth century it numbered barely a fourth 
of the total population. 

By then it was clear that the days of Turkish rule in Mace- 
donia were numbered. Who should succeed to the Turk's 
inheritance? The most likely claimant was Bulgaria. As 
far back as 1877, Russia, after her victory over Turkey in 



MACEDONIA 195 

that year, had endeavored to solve the Macedonian problem by- 
assigning the country to the new Bulgarian state created by 
the Peace of San Stephano. That solution, to be sure, was 
nullified the next year by the Berlin Congress of 1878, which 
tore up the San Stephano treaty and handed Macedonia back 
to Turkish rule. But the Macedonian Bulgars never forgot 
the San Stephano episode and worked ceaselessly for union 
with the Bulgarian homeland, which was at that time rising 
into the first rank among the Christian Balkan States. 

There were other claimants, however, for the Macedonian 
prize. Greece and Serbia both desired to possess themselves 
of large portions of the country. The Greeks claimed south- 
ern and the Serbs northern Macedonia. All the varied racial 
elements of Macedonia had become keenly self-conscious, with 
the result that these elements, covertly supported by their 
respective fatherlands, became involved in a complicated 
struggle between themselves and against their Turkish mas- 
ters. These struggles resulted in Macedonia falling into de< 
plorable anarchy, being overrun by Bulgarian, Greek, and 
Serbian guerilla bands, and oppressed by Turkish troops and 
Albanian irregulars, who were employed by the Ottoman gov- 
ernment to terrorize the Christian elements. By the begin- 
ning of the twentieth century conditions in Macedonia had 
become so bad that the European great powers insisted upon 
some measure of administrative reform. It was these de- 
mands, backed by threats of European intervention, which 
prompted the Young Turks to venture their successful revo- 
lution which resulted in the overthrow of Sultan Abdul- 
Hamid in 1908. 

Moved by Young Turk promises of general political re- 
generation, the Western powers stayed their hand. But the 
Young Turks proved incapable of solving the Macedonian 
problem, and the Christian Balkan States presently deter- 
mined to take matters into their own hands. The result was 
the Balkan War of 1912, by which the Turks were driven 



196 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

from Macedonia. The Balkan allies quarreled over the spoils^ 
and precipitated the second Balkan War in 1913, which ended 
in the virtual exclusion of Bulgaria from any share in ]\Iace- 
donia and the division of Macedonian territory between Serbia 
and Greece by the Treaty of Bukharest. Bulgaria remained 
sullenly unreconciled, and the present war gave her an op- 
portunity of upsetting the Bukharest settlement. By her al- 
liance with the Central Powers she revenged herself upon Ser- 
bia and gained possession of Serbian Macedonia in the autumn 
of 1915, while in the spring of 1916 the eastern portion of 
Greek Macedonia was occupied by Bulgarian troops. 

The Macedonian problem thus remains unsettled. Its solu- 
tion depends primarily upon the outcome of the present war. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

A Diglomatist, Nationalism and War in the Near East. Oxford, 

1915. 
Avril, Baron A. d' En Maeedoine. Paris, 1897. 

Azembouja. G.de Le Conflit des Races en Maeedoine. Paris, 1904. 
Berard V La MacMoine. Paris, 1897. 
Brailsford, H. N. Macedonia: Its Races and Their Future. London, 

1906. 
Engelhardt, E. La Question macedonienne : fitat actuel, Solution. 

Paris, 1906. 
Gopcevie, S. Makedonien, und Alt-Serbien. Vienna, 1889. 
Mantegazza V. Macedonia. Milan, 1903. 
Routier, G. La Question macedonienne. Paris, 1903. 
Sloane, W. M. The Balkans: A Laboratory of History, New York, 

1914. 

ECONOMIC SURVEY 

As might be expected from the chronic disturbances which 
have long afflicted it, Macedonia's economic life is stunted 
and backward. This is the more serious since even by nature 
Macedonia is not specially well endowed. Much of the coun- 
try is rugged mountain or sterile plateau which could never 
be agriculturally valuable. 



MACEDONIA 197 

There are certain favored regions, The alluvial delta of 
the Vardar near Saloniki is capable of yielding heavy cereal 
crops, but neglect and insecurity of tenure have thrown much 
of it out of cultivation and turned once fertile fields into 
fever-stricken marsh-land. The only large district which has 
been kept to anything like its potential capacity is the coastal 
plain of Kavalla, in the extreme east of Macedonia, This 
region has long been noted for its cigarette tobacco. Else- 
where agriculture has been steadily going backward, the 
harassed peasantry abandoning their fields for the compara- 
tive safety of the towns or abandoning the country altogether 
by emigration to other lands. 

The fine forests which clothed the Macedonian mountains 
in ancient times have been mostly destroyed by centuries of 
reckless deforestation, and new growths have been prevented 
by the flocks of sheep and goats which generations of Turkish 
and Kutzo-Vlach shepherds have led to pasture over the 
denuded areas. The result has been that the soil of the 
steeper slopes has been entirely washed away, so that to-day 
the mountain-ranges stand stripped to their rocky skeletons, 
pouring down spring floods of melted snow which ruin the 
tilled fields in the plains below. Only dn the Pindus and 
Olympus mountains of the extreme south do substantial for- 
ests remain. 

Save for the Kavalla tobacco region, the great economic 
asset of Macedonia is the city of Saloniki, the natural com- 
mercial outlet for the whole country and the potential termi- 
nus of a short-line trade-route from central Europe to the 
Near East. It is to-day the center of whatever industrial 
and commercial life exists in Macedonia, such activities being 
virtually absent in the rest of the country. 



198 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

THE FACTS ABOUT MACEDONIA 

Where Macedonia is Located 

Macedonia is an irregularly shaped block of territory situ- 
ated in the west central part of the Balkan Peninsula. Since 
the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, as the result of which Macedonia 
was taken from Turkey and divided between Serbia, Greece, 
and Bulgaria, the region does not clearly appear on political 
maps; but on maps of the Balkans previous to 1912 Mace- 
donia does so appear. The Turkish vilayets of Saloniki, 
Monastir, and Kossovo, taken together, cover virtually the 
geographical limits of the Macedonian area. 

The Territorial Units that Make up the Country 

Serhian Macedonia has an area of 15,241 square miles. 

Oreek Macedonia has an area of 14,006 square miles. 

Bulgarian Macedonia has an area of 7227 square miles. 

Macedonia has, therefore, a total area of 36,474 square 
miles, or about the area of Indiana. Its population in 1912 
was estimated about 2,000,000. 

Different Races in Macedonia 

No exact statistics of the various racial elements which 
make up Macedonia's population are, or ever have been, avail- 
able. Even before the Balkan Wars Macedonia's ethnic 
make-up was largely a matter of conjecture. Turkish statis- 
tics were proverbially loose, while the unofficial ''statistics" 
offered by representatives of the Christian races were mere 
propagandist special pleading. And since the Balkan Wars 
the difficulty has enormously increased. The massacres, de- 
portations, and migrations which took place during the years 
1912-14 resulted in wholesale shifts of population, while the 
analogous events during the course of the present war have 



MACEDONIA 199 

produced further important changes. In the racial analysis 
which follows, therefore, only the broader generalizations will 
be offered. 

Bulgarians. While differing somewhat in physicial type, 
language, and culture from the inhabitants of Bulgaria, the 
great majority of the Macedonian Slavs undoubtedly con- 
sider themselves Bulgarians. These Bulgar-feeling Slavs are 
found throughout Macedonia except in the extreme south, 
where the mountain region of the Olympus, the Chalcydic 
peninsula, and the ^gean coast generally are predomi- 
nantly Greek, while in the extreme north (the region known 
as Old Serbia) the Slav population feels itself Serbian rather 
than Bulgarian. The Macedonian Bulgars are a thoroughly 
rural population, the great majority being peasants or agri- 
cultural laborers. Politically depressed and economically ex- 
ploited by the Turks, they suffered even more severely at the 
hands of the Serbians and Greeks during and after the Sec- 
ond Balkan War of 1913. Vast numbers were expelled or 
emigrated from Serbian and Greek Macedonia between the 
years 1913 and 1915. Since the Teuton-Bulgar conquest of 
Serbian Macedonia in the autumn of 1915, however, the Bul- 
garians are dominant in that region, while the military occu- 
pation of the Drama-Kavalla region of Greek Macedonia by 
Bulgarian troops in the spring of 1916 has made the Bul- 
garians politically dominant there also. It is probable that 
many of the Bulgarian exiles have now returned to these 
regions, though exact data are wanting. In 1912 the Bul- 
garian element was supposed to number nearly 1,000,000, or 
about one-half the total population of Macedonia. 

Serbians. The Serbian element is virtually confined to the 
region known as Old Serbia in the extreme north of Mace- 
donia, adjoining the frontier of the Kingdom of Serbia as 
this existed previous to 1912. There is a thin sprinkling of 
villages in central Macedonia, the inhabitants of which con- 
sider themselves Serbians rather than Bulgarians. Previous 



200 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

to 1912 the Serb element, which, like its Bulgarian kinsmen, 
was almost entirely rural, was politically depressed by the 
Turks and terrorized by the Albanians, who were systemati- 
cally colonized in Old Serbia by the Turkish government. 
After 1912 the Serb population, now annexed to the Kingdom 
of Serbia, became the dominant race throughout northern and 
central Macedonia. The Serbs then revenged themselves on 
their Albanian and Bulgarian enemies, many of whom emi- 
grated or were expelled. The Serbian government was en- 
couraging a wholesale immigration of Serbs from Serbia 
proper and Austria-Hungary to build up the Serbian element 
in its new Macedonian territories, and the Serb population 
of those regions seems to have increased considerably between 
1913 and 1915. Since the Teuton-Bulgar conquest of Serbian 
Macedonia in the autumn of 1915, however, the Bulgarians 
have become the dominant race, and from what little news is 
available the Serbian element appears to have been greatly 
reduced once more. In 1912 the Serbs of Macedonia probably 
numbered about 150,000. 

Greeks. The Greek element in Macedonia is mainly found 
in the south. Two large blocks of Greek population exist: 
one in the extreme south, centering in the hill country about 
Mount Olympus and spreading northward along the Bistritza 
River to its entry into the Gulf of Saloniki; the other occu- 
pying the Chalcydic peninsula on the opposite, or eastern, 
side of the gulf. These two blocks are connected by a narrow 
ribbon of Greek population which follows the coast. Besides 
these main nucleii, there are scattered islets of Greek popu- 
lation found throughout south and south-central Macedonia. 
This is especially true of the towns. The Greek takes to town 
life better than to agriculture. Therefore in many parts of 
Macedonia almost purely Greek towns are found surrounded 
by a solidly Slav or Turkish country-side. As might be in- 
ferred, the Greeks form a large proportion of the commercial 
middle class. Since Greece acquired south and south-central 



MACEDONIA 201 

Macedonia in 1913 the Greeks have been the dominant race. 
Wholesale emigration or expulsion of Bulgarians and Turks 
has been partly counterbalanced by a large immigration of 
Greel^, principally refugees from Turkey and Bulgaria. For 
this reason the Hellenic element in Greek Macedonia is much 
larger to-day than it was in 1912. In 1912 the Macedonian 
Greeks numbered about 250,000. 

Kutzo-Vlachs. Closely associated with the Greeks are the 
Kutzo-Vlachs, who are mostly concentrated in the Pindus 
Mountain district of southwestern Macedonia, near the Al- 
banian frontier. The Kutzo-Vlachs are the descendants of 
the Romanized inhabitants of Macedonia who were driven to 
the mountains by the Slav invasions of the seventh century 
A. D. In physical type, language, and fundamental culture 
they closely resemble the Rumanians, who take a lively inter- 
est in them and who have used them as a basis for Rumanian 
imperialistic claims to Macedonia. At the close of the nine- 
teenth century, backed by Rumanian support, the Kutzo- 
Vlachs developed a nationalistic movement; but this proved 
fictitious, and has now nearly died away. The Kutzo-Vlachs 
have long been under Greek influence. Many of them are 
Hellenized, and they will undoubtedly be ultimately absorbed 
into the Greek race. In 1912 they numbered about 50,000 in 
Macedonia. 

Albanians. For generations a current of Albanian immi- 
gration had been setting into northern Macedonia. These 
masterful brigand highlanders found a congenial field in the 
disturbed conditions which there prevailed, and the Turkish 
government welcomed their presence as useful terrorizers of 
the restive Christian population, since most of the Albanians 
were Mohammedans. In 1912, Old Serbia had become fully 
as much Albanian as Serb in population, while a sprinkling 
of Albanian colonies was found throughout central Macedonia 
as well. When this region fell under Serb control at the end 
of 1912 the Serbs paid off old scores, and the Albanian ele- 



202 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

merit was greatly reduced by expulsion or death. In 1912 
the Albanian element in Macedonia numbered about 75,000, 
mostly in Old Serbia. 

Jews. The Jewish element in Macedonia is mostly concen- 
trated in the city of Saloniki. They are the descendants of 
refugees from Spain who came to Macedonia at the beginning 
of the seventeenth century. They prospered greatly, and in 
1912 a great part of the commercial life of Macedonia was in 
their hands, half the population of Saloniki being Jews. They 
were favored by the Turkish government, and some of them 
had adopted Mohammedanism, though they formed a sepa- 
rate religious community, and were known as Deunmes, or 
Crypto-Jews. Since the Greek possession of Saloniki in 1912 
the position of the Saloniki Jews has changed for the worse. 
No love is lost between these two essentially commercial peo- 
ples, while the pro-Turkish sentiments of the Jews made them 
suspect to the Greek government. Since 1912 many of them 
have emigrated to Turkey. In 1912 the Jews of Macedonia 
numbered about 75,000, mostly in Saloniki. 

Turks. In this category are included all the Mohammedan 
elements of Macedonia except the Albanians, although, as a 
matter of fact, comparatively few of the Macedonian Moslems 
are of pure Asia Minor Turkish stock. Most of them are the 
descendants of Christian converts to Islam after the Turkish 
conquest of Macedonia five centuries ago or of Mohammedan 
immigrants from various regions. Before 1912 the Turks 
were found in all social classes except the commercial middle 
class, commercial aptitude not being displayed by any section 
of the Mohammedan population. Before 1912 they were, of 
course, the dominant race and thus constituted most of the 
official class. There were also many great landowners, while 
along the central Vardar Valley and in the tobacco districts 
of Kavalla and Drama to the extreme east were considerable 
blocks of Turkish peasantry. In many of the mountainous 
districts there was a population of Mohammedan shepherds, 



MACEDONIA 203 

the descendants of Turkoman "Yuruks" from tlie Asia Minor 
plateau. The Balkan Wars of 1912-13 bore very hard on 
the Mohammedans of Macedonia. All the Christian conquer- 
ors, whatever their intestine quarrels, united in oppressing the 
Turks. Most of the Turkish landed gentry fled or were dis- 
possessed, and the Turkish peasantry emigrated wholesale. 
The Turkish element has thus been greatly reduced. In 1912 
the Turks of Macedonia numbered about 500,000, one quarter 
of the total population. 

Who Controlled Macedonia Before the War 

Serbia the north, Greece the south, and Bulgaria a com- 
paratively small portion in the extreme east. 

Who Has Controlled or Occupied Macedonia. Since 
THE War Began 

In the autumn of 1915 the Teuton-Bulgar conquest of Serbia 
put Serbian Macedonia under Teuton-Bulgar military con- 
trol. In the spring of 1916 Bulgarian troops occupied the 
Kavalla- Drama region of Greek Macedonia. Meanwhile, ever 
since the fall of Serbia, an Anglo-French army had occupied 
the city of Saloniki, and this Allied army, greatly reinforced, 
subsequently extended its control over all the rest of Greek 
Macedonia, and in the autumn of 1916 began an offensive 
against the Teuton-Bulgar army which resulted in the occu- 
pation of a small portion of Serbian Macedonia in the ex- 
treme southwest, including the city of Monastir. 

Solutions that Have Been Proposed and What They 

Mean 

1. Status Quo Ante Bellum. 

This would mean virtually the continuing division of Mace- 
donia between Serbia and Greece, Bulgaria 's share as awarded 
her under the Bukharest settlement of 1913 being relatively 



204 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

negligible. It would also imply continued Greek possession 
of Saloniki, the great economic prize of the area. 

The status quo has been from the first highly unstable. 
It has satisfied none of the possessing powers. 

Greece feels that the hinterland of Saloniki is insuffi- 
cient both strategically and economically and regrets the 
possession by Bulgaria of the Greek-inhabited ^gean coastal 
strip in the extreme northeast, which blocks her land ad- 
vance toward the Greek populations of Thrace and Constan- 
tinople. 

Serbia regards Saloniki as the necessary economic outlet 
to her Macedonian territory and begrudges Greece her pos- 
session of it. 

As for Bulgaria, she is wholly unreconciled to the division 
of 1913, and considers it a vital matter to annex the Bul- 
garian-speaking populations of Serbian and Greek Macedonia, 
as well as to annex the ^gean coastal region of Serres- 
Drama-Kavalla, which is the natural economic outlet of Bul- 
garia proper to the ^gean Sea. 

With such a nexus of conflicting interests, Macedonia, under 
its present territorial division, must remain a very unstable 
political area. 

2. Possible New Partition of Macedonia. 

No considerable party in any one of the possessing nations 
seriously aspires to the possession of the whole of Macedonia; 
but parties in all these nations do aspire to the undivided pos- 
session of so much of Macedonia that the remaining shares 
would be relatively negligible. 

Serbian imperialists desire possession of Saloniki, with, 
the entire Vardar Valley. 

Bulgarian imperialists desire all Macedonia except the ex- 
treme south near Greece and the extreme north near Serbia 
as those nations existed prior to 1912. 

Greek imperialists desire possession of most of Bulgaria's 



MACEDONIA 205 

present share of Macedonia, as well as a favorable rectification 
of the Greco-Serbian frontier at Serbia's expense. 

The realization of any one of these aspirations, considering 
the high strategic and economic value of this Macedonian 
area, would go far toward giving the particular nation the 
hegemony of the Balkans, and therefore would be contested 
bitterly by the other nations concerned. 

3. Austro-German Controlled Macedonia as Part of an 

Austro-German Controlled Balkan. 

The outward form of this solution would probably be a 
partition of Macedonia between Austria-Hungary and Bul- 
garia. Austria-Hungary would probably annex the Mace- 
donian district of Old Serbia, together with Serbia proper, 
and Bulgaria take the rest of Macedonia. 

This would imply the annihilation of Serbia a^id the reduc- 
tion of Greece to political insignificance, 

4. Macedonia as a Federal Reserve of a Balkan Confeder- 

ation. 

Since Macedonia has been the rock on which all attempts 
at Balkan confederation have split, this might seem to be a 
rational compromise of rival Balkan imperialisms, giving 
them a needed bond of commercial and economic interest and 
removing the fear of the Balkan dominance that goes in- 
evitably to the nation possessing Macedonia. 

But the difficulty is that these rivalries are so deep-seated 
and envenomed by the events of recent years that the Balkan 
nations are deaf to reason. This difficulty would seem to 
make the proposal a counsel of perfection. 

5. Internationalization of Macedonia. 

This solution, or at least international control, was actually 
attempted by the European Concert of Powers between 1903 
and 1908. Although that attempt failed, it may be that the 



206 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

inability of the Balkans to settle this problem peaceably may 
force the world to undertake the settlement through some ex- 
tension of the principle of international control which may 
result from the union of necessity and statesmanship at the 
peace conference. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Abbott, G. F. The Tale of a Tour in Macedonia. London, 1903. 
Amadori-Virgili, G. La Questione rumeliota e la Politica italiana. 

Bitonto, 1908. 
Balcanicus. La Bulgarie: Ses Ambitions, Sa Trahison. Paris, 1915. 
Berard, V. Pro-Macedonia. Paris, 1904. 

Brancoff, M. La Macedoine et sa Population chretienne. Paris, 1903. 
Draganov, P. D. La Macedoine et les R^formes. Paris, 1906. 
Exintaris, G. Les Rgformes en Macedoine. Paris, 1913. 
Focief, O. Les Rgformes en Macgdoine. Paris, 1907. 
Gandolphe, M. La Crise mac^donienne. Paris, 1904. 
Kazazes, N. La Macedoine et les Roumains. Paris, 1907. 
Nieolaides, C. La MacMoine. Paris, 1899. 
Voinov, I. F. La Question macgdonienne et les Egformes. Paris, 

1905. 



THE BALKANS 
ALBANIA 



See Map of Yugo-Slav Territories on page 166 



CHAPTER XIII 
ALBANIA 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 

Albania is a land of rugged mountains, with a race as wild 
as its crags. The Albanians are an ancient race which has 
dwelt among its bleak hills tU ough the centuries. They are 
typical highlanders, divided into many tribes and clans, ex- 
hausting their savage energy in relentless blood-feuds. De- 
spite these local broils and a total lack of any real civiliza- 
tion, the Albanians do possess, however, an instinctive racial 
self-consciousness which makes them cling fiercely to their 
ancient customs, and enables them to combine against a foreign 
intruder in hours of external peril. These qualities, together 
with the poverty and inaccessibility of the country, have 
hitherto preserved Albania from foreign conquest. No nation 
has ever yet really tamed these indomitable mountaineers. 

The Albanians are in every sense a strong race. They are 
not merely tremendous fighters, but they also possess keen 
intelligence and some excellent moral qualities. The innate 
capacity of the race is shown by the number of really able men 
that Albania has given to the Turkish Empire, as well as by 
the noted persons of Albanian extraction in Greece, Italy, 
and throughout the Levant. To name only three instances: 
Mehemet Ali of Egypt, Ali Pasha of Janina, and the Italian 
statesman Francesco Crispi were all Albanians. 

The great question is whether this race, which does so well 
abroad, will ever amount to anything at home. The total 
breakdown of the Albanian "State" set up by the European 
powers after the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 and the country's 

209 



210 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

quick relapse into the customary tribal anarchy are not hope- 
ful omens for the future. If the Albanians cannot set their 
house in order themselves, some one else ultimately will. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Brailsford, H. N. Macedonia: Its Races and Their Future. London, 

1906. 
Galanti, A. L'Albania. Rome, 1901. 
Gopcevic, S. Das Fiirstentum Albanien. Berlin, 1914. 
Ojetti, U. L'Albania. Turin, 1902. 
Peacock, W. Albania: The Foundling State of Europe. London, 

1914. 
Pears, Sir E. Turkey and Its People. London, 1911. 
Pernice, A. Origine ed Evoluzione storica delle Nazioni balcaniche. 

Milan, 1915. 
Puaux, R. La malheureuse Epire. Paris, 1914. 
Woods, H. C. The Danger Zone of Europe. London, 1911. 

ECONOMIC SURVEY 

The anarchical political conditions prevailing throughout 
Albania have stunted its economic life. Nevertheless, Albania 
possesses sufficient potential natural wealth to make it a pros- 
perous country under normal modern conditions. 

To begin with, although Albania is a mountainous country, 
there are many valleys and small plains with an exceedingly 
fertile soil. Even as it is, with a maximum of political inse- 
curity and the most primitive methods of husbandry, these 
favored districts produce enough cereal crops to furnish a 
considerable surplus for foreign export. The cereals grown 
are corn, barley, oats, and rye. The lower hills also produce 
excellent olive-oil. In southern Albania considerable tobacco 
of fair quality is grown, though mainly for local consump- 
tion. The hill-slopes also furnish excellent pasture for flocks 
of sheep and goats, which form the principal wealth of the 
wild highland tribes. In the lowlands horned cattle are pas- 
tured. The magnificent forests which clothe the Albanian 



ALBANIA 211 

mountains, though sadly diminished in many places by reck- 
less cutting, are still a considerable asset to the country. The 
principal hindrance to their commercial exploitation is the 
almost total lack of roads and bridges, while of course no rail- 
roads exist. 

This lack of communications and the anarchic political con- 
ditions unite in preventing the opening up of Albania's 
mineral wealth, which is considerable, although mostly unex- 
plored. Coal and iron are probably abundant, while copper, 
lead, silver, and antimony are believed to exist. Gold- and 
silver-mines were worked in northern Albania in ancient times, 
while in southern Albania, near Avlona, there is a remarkable 
deposit of mineral pitch. However, all these workings are 
to-day abandoned. 

Industry in the modern sense is of course non-existent, 

THE FACTS ABOUT ALBANIA 

Where Albania Is Located 

Albania proper, a separate political entity since 1913, is a 
band of rugged mountain-land, bounded by the Adriatic on 
the west, Montenegro on the north, Serbia and Macedonia on 
the east, and Greece on the south. This is the immemorial seat 
of the Albanian race. But beyond the present frontiers of 
the Albanian state as traced in 1913 there stretches eastward 
into Serbia and Macedonia a wide fringe of Albanian popu- 
lation, constituting an Albania irredenta, which is the objec- 
tive of Albanian nationalist aspirations. 

Territorial Units Involved 

Albania proper has an area of about 11,000 square miles, or 
a trifle larger than the combined areas of Massachusetts and 
Rhode Island. Its population is about 800,000. 

Old Serbia, Macedonia, and Epirus have Albanian elements 
in the population, and thus figure in the problem. 



212 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Different Races in Albania 

The Albanians are found in Albania, Old Serbia, Macedonia, 
and Epirus. In Albania proper they constitute the entire 
population except in the extreme south. In Old Serbia, up to 
the Balkan "Wars of 1912-13, they formed a considerable 
population, especially semi-military colonists, favored by the 
Turks and tyrannizing over the Serb and other Christian 
elements. In Macedonia they held a similar status, although 
not so numerous or influential. In Epirus they are mostly 
wild hillmen, although some are landed gentry. Since the 
Balkan Wars the Albanians outside Albania proper have all 
suffered at the hands of their new Serbian or Greek masters. 

The Greeks are found in Epirus. Southern Epirus was an- 
nexed to Greece in 1913. Northern Epirus was assigned to 
Albania, but was forcibly occupied by Greece in 1914. 
Throughout Epirus the towns are mainly Greek in blood. In 
the south the bulk of the rural population is also Greek. In 
the north the population is about half and half. The Greeks 
are economically and culturally far superior to the Albanians. 

The Serbs are found in Old Serbia and Macedonia. They 
were politically and economically depressed before the Balkan 
Wars of 1912 and 1913. They were politically dominant 
thereafter until 1915. They have again been depressed since 
the Teuton-Bulgar conquest in 1915. They are mostly 
peasants. 

Who Conteolled Albania Before the War 

Albania was under Albanian rule, which was very anarchic. 
Old Serbia was under Serbian rule. 

Macedonia was under Serbian rule. Only the extreme 
northern part of Macedonia enters into the Albanian problem. 
Epirus was under Greek control. 



ALBANIA 213 

Who Has Controlled or Occupied Albania Since 
THE War Began 

Albania has remained partly under Albanian rule, which 
has been still more anarchic. It has been partly under Aus- 
trian control in the hinterland, and has remained partly 
Italian on the coast, especially about Avlona. 

Old Serbia has been under Austro-German control. 

Macedonia has been under Austro-German and Bulgarian 
control. 

Epirus has been partly under Greek and partly under 
Italian control. 

Italy's Interests in Albania 

Political. Italy desires to control all Albania. Such con- 
trol would give Italy the mastery of the Adriatic and would 
offer a fine base for that predominant political influence in the 
Balkans to which Italian imperialists aspire. 

Economic. Albania's chief economic value to Italy would 
be as a base for an economic penetration of the Balkans, which 
might make the peninsula an important field for Italian trade 
and investment of capital. 

Strategic. Italian control of Avlona would give Italy an 
ideal naval base with which to close the Adriatic and thus 
insure her mastery of that sea. 

Racial. None. 

Cultural. Many Italians claim that what culture the Al- 
banians possess is mainly of Italian origin, and that the Al- 
banians are peculiarly receptive to Italian culture. 

Religious. The Italian government has tried to get the 
Catholic tribes of northern Albania to look upon Italy aa 
their protector, but hitherto without success. 



214 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Serbia's Interests in Albania 

Political. Serbia wants to annex northern Albania in order 
to get a sea-outlet for Old Serbia and Macedonia. Further- 
more, Serbia thinks that her control of this region would stop 
the aid which the free Albanians are always giving to the 
Albanian colonies under Serb rule in Old Serbia and Mace- 
donia, and thus strengthen the political status of Serbia in 
this region. 

Economic. The harbors of northern Albania would be 
valuable outlets for Serbian trade. 

Strategic. Possession of northern Albania would give 
Serbia an Adriatic foothold and consolidate her exposed 
strategic position in Macedonia. 

Racial. There are a few Serbs in northern Albania. 

Cultural. None. 

Religious. Since the inhabitants of northern Albania are 
either Mohammedans or Roman Catholics, Orthodox Serbia 
has no religious interest here. 

Greece's Interests in Albania 

Political. Greece wants to annex southern Albania in order 
to "redeem" the partly Greek population of this region, con- 
solidate her position in the western Balkans, and prevent an 
Italian occupation. 

Economic. Southern Albania would have some slight eco- 
nomic value for Greece. 

Strategic. Southern Albania would give Greece a good 
strategic frontier. 

Racial. Part of the population of southern Albania is 
Greek, and this element ardently desires annexation to Greece. 

Cultural. Greece claims that what culture the southern 
Albanians possess is Greek, and that, once annexed to Greece, 
the whole region would become genuinely Greek in a short 
time. 



ALBANIA 215 

Beligious. Besides the Greek element, many of the south- 
em Albanians are Greek Orthodox Christians in faith. 

Austria-Hungary's Interests in Albania 

Political. Austria's political interest in Albania is largely 
negative. Although she would undoubtedly like Avlona as a 
naval base, Austria does not care to go to the expense of 
conquering the whole country. But she does intend to keep 
every other nation out. In fact, the present condition of 
anarchy and savagery rather plays into her hands. Such an 
Albania serves as an effective barrier both to Italian pene- 
tration of the Balkans and to Serb access to the sea. 

Economic. What little Albanian trade exists is mostly in 
Austrian hands through the Austrian Lloyd Steamship serv- 
ice, which touches at the various Albanian port-towns. 

Strategic. Avlona would make an ideal base for Austrian 
naval control of the Adriatic. 

Racial. None. 

Cultural. None. 

Beligious. The Catholic tribes of northern Albania have 
long regarded Austria as their protector. 

Solutions that Have Been Proposed and What They 

Mean 

1. Status Quo Ante Bellum. 

Before the war Albania was independent under a guaranty 
of the great powers made in 1913. It was to be financed inter- 
nationally and policed by an international gendarmerie. It 
was an experiment in international control. When the war 
broke, the contingents of the gendarmerie went home. The 
viability of an independent Albania depends upon whether 
the long or short view is taken. The age-long tribal anarchy 
of Albania has made disorder so natural to the people that 
it would take much time, money, and energy before the coun- 



216 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

try could be got under way for economic development and 
civilized existence. All that can be said about the political 
and economic capacity of the Albanians is that where they 
have been in civilized environment in Greece and Italy for a 
long time they have shown real capability. Therefore there 
is a good chance that, under adequate international guaranty, 
they would in time prove equal to the opportunity. 

2. Division of Albania Between Serbia (or Yugoslavia) and 

Greece. 

This would probably mean giving the northern part to 
Serbia and the southern part to Greece. As regards giving 
the northern part to Serbia it may be said that there is such 
deep race-hatred between the Serbs and the Albanians, in- 
tensified by religious differences, that it is difficult to imagine 
the Albanians reconciled to Serbian rule. 

They are, however, so small in numbers as compared with 
the Serbs, especially in a united Yugoslavia, and the north- 
ern districts would be such a highway between Serbia and 
the outer world, that the problem might solve itself by the 
swamping and annihilating of the Albanians by the Yugo- 
slavs. 

As regards giving the southern part to Greece, it may be 
said that the Albanians have no such hatred for the Greeks 
as they have for the Serbs. The southern Albanians have 
certain cultural affiliations with Greece, and some are Greek 
Orthodox in faith. All over southern Albania there is a 
certain native Greek element. At first Greek rule would 
probably be considerably opposed by the Albanian-feeling 
element, but ultimately Greek absorption would be likely. 

3. Annexation of Albania to Italy. 

There is not so much antipathy between Albanians and 
Italians as between Albanians and Serbs, but more than be- 
tween Albanians and Greeks. Along the coast there are a 



ALBANIA 217 

certain immber of Albanians who are friendly to the Italians. 
The old Albanian colonies in southern Italy are another link 
between the two races. 

Italy might, in the long run, reconcile Albanians to Italian 
rule, but it would require great tact and involve much trouble, 

4. Albania Under Control of the Central Powers. 

This, of course, would be only in the event of a Teutonic 
victory, and a permanent domination of the Balkans by the 
Central Powers. The Catholic tribes of northern Albania 
have long regarded Austria as their protector; but this friend- 
ship would quickly vanish if Austria attempted to establish a 
strong political control of the country. What degree of an- 
tipathy the Albanians would have for Austria is hard to say, 
as they have never been in direct political contact. It prob- 
ably would be considerable. Control would cause Austria 
much trouble. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Bianconi, F. La Question albanaise. Paris, 1913. 

Degrand, A. Souvenirs de la Haute Albanie. Paris, 1901. 

Durham, M. E. High Albania. London, 1906. 

Durham, M. E. The Struggle for Scutari. London, 1914. 

Georgevitch, V. Les Albanais et les Grandea Puissances. Paris, 1913 

Ippen, T. A. Skutari und die nordalbanische Kiistenebene. Serajevo 

1907. 
Jackh, E. Im tiirkischen Kriegslager durch Albanien. Heilbronn 

1911. 
Liebert, E. Aus dem nordalbanischen Hochgebirge. Serajevo, 1909 
Lorecchio, A. La Questione albanese; Scritti vari. Catanzaro, 1898 
Louis-Jaray, G. L'Albanie inconnue. Paris, 1913. 
Newbigin, M. I. Geographical Aspects of Balkan Problems. London 

1915. 
Polyvios, P. J. L'Albanie et la Reunion d'Ambassadeurs k. Londrea 

Paris, 1914. 
Siebertz, P. Albanien und die Albanesen. Vienna, 1910. 
Steinmetz, K. Eine Reise durch die Hochlandergaue Oberalbaniens 

Vienna, 1904. 



218 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Steinmetz, K. Von der Adria zum Schwartzen Drin. Serajevo, 1&08. 
Tomic, J. N. Les Albanais en Vieille-Serbie et dans le Sandjak de 

Novibazar. Paris, 1913. 
Wace, A. J. B. and Thompson, M. S. The Nomads of the Balkans. 

London. 1914. 



THE BALKANS 
GREATER RUMANIA 




** + ■<■+ + + INTERNAtlONAL FRONTIERS 



TURHO-TARTAR 



-PROVINCIAL FRONTIERS 



N9I2- GREATER RQUMANIA 



CHAPTER XIV 
GREATER RUMANIA 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 

The regions inhabited wholly or partly by Rumanians form 
a huge flattened ellipse in the southeastern corner of Europe. 
The geographic center of this area is the mountain mass of 
Transylvania. About this lofty core the Rumanian race 
spreads far out over the adjacent plains to the east, south, 
and west. 

The Rumanians are a racial and cultural puzzle. They 
look like Southern Italians, and speak a language more akin 
to the ancient Latin than any other living tongue. Yet they 
are separated by hundreds of miles of territory, which is in- 
habited by utterly alien stocks, from the nearest outpost of 
the modern Latin world, the Italian population at the head 
of the Adriatic Sea. 

The Rumanians themselves explain their Latin character- 
istics by claiming to be the descendants of Roman colonists 
planted by the Emperor Trajan after his conquest of these 
regions (the ancient Dacia) in the second century a. d. There 
is probably a basis of truth in this picturesque legend, for 
when barbarian hordes forced Rome to abandon Dacia at the 
end of the third century a. d., a part of its Romanized in- 
habitants probably took refuge in the fastnesses of the Car- 
pathian Mountains and there kept alive the Latin language 
and traditions. 

Certain it is that in the early Middle Ages the ancestors of 
the modern Rumanians emerged from Transylvania into those 
wide plains north of the Danube which now make up the 

221 



222 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

present Kingdom of Rumania. They were probably pushed 
thither by pressure from the west. By that time the great 
plains of Hungary had been settled by the Magyars, and a 
branch of this warlike race, the so-called Szeklers, had broken 
into Transylvania, subjecting the less warlike Rumanians to 
their sway. 

The Rumanian colonies in the Danubian plains gradually 
crystallized into two states, Wallachia in the south, Moldavia 
in the north, the latter including the present Russian province 
of Bessarabia. The Turkish conquest of the Balkan Penin- 
sula in the fifteenth century hit the Rumanian principalities 
hard, but despite repeated devastations they managed to re- 
tain semi-independence as autonomous vassals of the Ottoman. 
Empire. During the decline of Turkish power in the eight- 
eenth century and early nineteenth century the principalities 
suffered greatly from Russian invasions, since they were the 
natural highroad across which Russian armies marched to the 
invasion of the Balkans. Indeed, some Russian statesmen 
hoped to incorporate the Rumanian principalities into the 
Russian Empire, and the annexation of Bessarabia to Russia 
at the beginning of the nineteenth century was a first step to 
this end. But the nineteenth century, the era of nationali- 
ties, had awakened the Rumanians to full race consciousness, 
and the inhabitants of Wallachia and Moldavia then aspired 
to throw off Turkish suzerainty, checkmate Russian encroach- 
ments, and establish themselves as a sovereign people. In 
1859, despite Russian opposition, Moldavia and "Wallachia 
merged themselves into a single state under the name of Ru- 
mania. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877 gave Rumania the 
chance to throw off Turkish suzerainty and declare itself an 
independent state. This war was, however, the occasion of a 
sad blow to Rumanian hopes. Twenty years earlier, after 
the Western powers had beaten Russia in the Crimean War, 
they had given Moldavia the southern portion of that prov- 
ince of Bessarabia which Russia had seized in 1812. But 



GREATER RUMANIA 223 

after the War of 1877, Russia, despite the valuable assistance 
rendered her by Rumania against the Turks, forced her small 
ally to retrocede southern Bessarabia, giving Rumania in ex- 
change the previously Turkish province of Dobrudja, a sterile 
peninsula between the Danube and the Black Sea, inhabited 
mostly by Tatars. This has ever since been a sore point with 
Rumanians, who aspire to annex the whole of Bessarabia, a 
land predominantly Rumanian in race. 

However, Rumania made the best of a bad bargain, and by 
the beginning of the twentieth century she had so increased 
in power and prosperity that patriotic Rumanians could 
dream of drawing the various outlying branches of their race 
within the political frontiers of the Rumanian kingdom. Be- 
sides the Rumanian populations of Transylvania and Bes- 
sarabia, already noted, the Rumanian race had expanded 
greatly to the westward beyond Transylvania into the Hun- 
garian plains. The Turkish conquest of Hungary in the six- 
teenth century had been a bad blow to the Magyars, and when 
the Austrians drove the Turks out of Hungary in the eight- 
eenth century they found the land half depopulated. Into 
this depopulated region Rumanians poured in great numbers, 
so that to-day the Rumanians stretch far out into the Ru- 
manian plain, reaching in some places almost to the River 
Theiss. About this same period a subsidiary stream of Ru- 
manian emigration had made its way northward from Tran- 
sylvania into Bukowina, the Austrian province just beyond 
the northern slope of the Carpathian Mountains. 

Thus, as the modern Kingdom of Rumania grew in power 
and population, its patriots eyed with increasing impatience 
the sight of millions of their blood-brothers under Russian and 
Austro-Hungarian rule, and dreamed of uniting their whole 
race within the bounds of a Greater Rumania. 

Until the outbreak of the European "War, however, these 
hopes had scant prospects of realization. Rumania's unre- 
deemed provinces belonged to two great powers, Austria-Hun- 



224 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

gary and Russia, Against both of these Rumania alone was 
powerless, while the fact that the provinces in question were 
not solidly Rumanian, but very mixed in population, added to 
the practical difficulties of annexation to Rumania. 

In fact, Rumania's sole extension of territory before 1914 
followed not the line of race unity, but the path of strategic 
interest. After the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, it will be re- 
membered, Rumania had received the Dobrudja in exchange 
for southern Bessarabia. At the moment this was bitterly 
resented, but, as time passed, Rumania discovered that the 
Dobrudja possessed a special value of its own. It gave Ru- 
mania a direct frontage on the Black Sea, and its chief har- 
bor, Constanza, grew to be Rumania's commercial gateway to 
the outer world. But Rumania feared that the Bulgarian 
frontier which inclosed Dobrudja on the south ran so close 
to Constanza that it would be dangerously menaced in time 
of war. Accordingly, when Bulgaria engaged Greece and 
Serbia in the Second Balkan War of 1913, Rumania invaded 
Bulgaria and compelled that country to cede a wide strip of 
territory to the south of Dobrudja, including the fortress of 
Silistria on the Danube. The population of this strip was 
Bulgarian or Tatar, with virtually no Rumanian element. 
This accession of territory strategically safeguarded Con- 
stanza, but it raised up against Rumania an implacable spirit 
of Bulgarian revenge. 

So matters stood when in the autumn of 1916 Rumania en- 
tered the European War on the Allied side to obtain the Aus- 
tro-Hungarian lands inhabited by Rumanians. Rumania's 
defeat and conquest at the hands of Teutonic and Bulgarian 
armies speedily followed this decision. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Auerbach, B. Les Races et les Nationalites en Autriche-Hongrie. 

Paris, 1898. 
Bellessort, A. La Roumaine contemporaine. Paris, 1905. 
Benger, G. Rumauia in 1900. London, 1901. 



GREATER RUMANIA 225 

Bielz, E. A. Siebenbiirgen. Hermannstadt, 1902. 

Brilliant, O. Rumania. New York, 1915. 

Dame, F. Historie de la Roumaine contemporaine. Paris, 1900. 

DeMartonne, E. La Valachie. Paris, 1902. 

Eliade, P. Historie de I'Esprit public en Roumanie au 19 e Siecle. 
Paris, 1905. 

Fischer, T. Rumanien xmd die siideuropaischen Halbinseln. Leipzig, 
1909. 

Gubernatis, Comte A de La Roumanie et les Roumains. Florence, 
1898. 

Jorga, N. Geschicbte des rumanischen Volkes. Gotha, 1905. 

Jorga, N. Histoire des Roumains de Transylvania et de Hongrie. 
Bucharest, 1915. 

Mavrodin, C. D. La Roumanie contemporaine. Paris, 1915. 

Miller, W. The Balkans. London, 1896. 

Pointe, H. Le La Roumanie moderne. Paris, 1910. 

Samuelson, J. Rumania, Past and Present. London, 1882. 

Schwicker, J. H. Die Deutschen in Ungarn and Siebenbiirgen. 
Vienna, 1881. 

Slavici, I. Die Rumanen in Ungarn, Siebenbiirgen und der Bukowina. 
Vienna, 1881. 

Stourdza, A. A. La Roumanie moderne comme Facteur de la Civilis- 
ation en Orient, Paris, 1902. 

Stourdza, A. A. La Terre et La Race roumaines depuis leurs Origines 
jusqu'a nos jours. Paris, 1904. 

Stoiudza, A. A. La Roumanie et les Roumains, Paris, 1910. 

Teutsch, F. Geschichte der siebenbiirger Sachsen. (2 vols.) Her- 
mannstadt, 1899. 

Xenopol, A. D. Histoire des Roumains. (2 vols.) Paris, 1896. 



ECONOMIC SURVEY 

The greatest treasure of Rumania is its soil. The rich loam 
which covers her broad alluvial plains is akin to the famous 
Russian "black earth." In fact, the Rumanian humus is 
even richer than the Russian, containing a greater proportion 
of nitrogenous elements. Hence Rumania is, and long has 
been, one of the chief granaries of Europe, being in fact one 
of the leading cereal-growing areas of the world. Rumania's 



226 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

ehief agricultural staples are wheat and corn, thougli other 
cereals are extensively produced. 

In 1914 the chief agricultural crops were as follows : Corn, 
98,000,000 bushels; wheat, 44,100,000 bushels; barley, 18,781,- 
000 bushels; oats, 12,859,000 bushels; rye, 1,739,000 bushels. 

Besides these staple cereals, Rumania also raises large crops 
of beans, potatoes, sugar-beets, tobacco, and many minor gar- 
den products. On the higher plains near the Carpathian 
Mountains are great numbers of thriving fruit orchards, while 
the Carpathian foot-hills themselves are terraced with vine- 
yards, producing much good wine. 

Rumania is also a considerable stock-raising country. In 
1900, Rumania possessed 864,324 horses, 2,569,526 horned cat- 
tle, 5,655,444 sheep, 232,515 goats, and 1,709,205 swine. 

Half a century ago reckless deforestation had largely 
stripped the Rumanian side of the Carpathians. Since then, 
however, governmental foresight has restored Rumania's for- 
ests to something of their former magnificence. The woods 
of these Rumanian forests are of high quality, being mostly 
oak, beech, and pine. 

Rumania's ehief mineral asset is petroleum. The whole 
southern slope of the Carpathian Mountains is underlaid with 
an immense oil-field, which follows the curve of the range 
uninterruptedly from one end of the country to the other. In 
1914 the petroleum output of Rumania was 1,783,957 metric 
tons, this making Rumania one of the chief oil-producing 
countries in the world. The same area also includes rich, 
coal deposits, while iron, copper, lead, nickel, mercury, sul- 
phur, arsenic, and other metals were also found in paying 
quantities. The gold-mines of the Rumanian Carpathians, 
once profitable, have to-day been abandoned. 

Despite the presence of coal, iron, and abundant water- 
power, Rumania has proved unable to develop any important 
industries. By the aid of foreign capital and direction a cer- 
tain part of her raw products have been worked up ; but aside 



GEEATER RUMANIA 227 

from these oil and sugar refineries, lumber works, and flour 
mills, few factories exist. The Rumanian does not take kindly 
to industrial life, and Rumanian factory labor is not of high 
quality. 

The regions of Austria-Hungary which Rumania claims as 
territory, with unredeemed Rumanians, are quite similar to 
the Kingdom of Rumania, economically. Transylvania is the 
most valuable, and possesses the greatest variety of natural 
resources. It is mountainous, like the Carpathian frontier 
districts of Rumania, but contains many exceedingly rich 
valleys and some open country of great fertility. Its mineral 
wealth is great. Very little oil occurs, but its gold-mines are 
the richest in Europe. 

The Banat of Temesvar is a microcosm of Rumania. Its 
eastern portion, adjoining Rumania, is mountainous and con- 
tains much mineral wealth. Its western portion is fertile 
plain-country producing rich cereal crops. 

The Eastern Alfold is all plain-country, devoted to cereal 
growing and stock-raising. 

Southern Bukowina is economically closely akin to the ad- 
jacent regions of Rumania (Moldavia). It is fertile and 
grows good cereal crops. 

The Russian province of Bessarabia is predominantly an 
agricultural country, its soil being a prolongation of the 
famous Russian "black earth" zone. The principal cereal 
crops are wheat and corn, though other cereals — flax, fruit, 
and tobacco — are also grown. The middle portion of Bes- 
sarabia contains a range of hiUs covered with forests. The 
southern portion of Bessarabia, near the Black Sea, tends to 
become steppe country, but of a high grade, affording excel- 
lent grazing-ground for large herds of live stock of all kinds. 
Few mineral products are found. Industry is virtually non- 
existent. 



228 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

BIBLIOGKAPHY 

Annuaire statistique de la Roumanie. Bucharest, Annual. 

Statesman's Handbook for Russia. Petrograd. Annual. 

Statesman's Year Book. London. Annual. 

Arion, C. C. La Situation 6conomique et sociale du Paj'san en Rou- 
manie. Paris, 1895. 

Baicoianu, C. Histoire de la Politique douaniere de la Roumanie de 
1870 a 1903. Bucharest, 1904. 

Braesko, C. C. Le Paysan roumain et la Question paysanne en Rou- 
manie. Paris, 1906. 

Colescu, L. Population de la Roumanie. Resume demographique. 
Bucharest, 1903. 

Colescu, L. Introduction h I'Enqugte industrielle. Bucharest, 1904. 

Colescu, L. Progres 6conomique de la Roumanie realis6 sous le 
Rfegne de S. Majeste le Roi Carol 1. Bucharest, 1907. 

Colescu, L. Statistique agricole de la Roumanie. Bucharest, 1913. 

Creanga, G. D. Grundbesitzverteilung und Bauernfrage in Rumanien. 
Munich, 1907. 

Grothe, H. Zur Landeskunde von Rumanien; kulturgeschichtliches 
und wirtschaftliches. Halle, 1907. 

Jonescu, C. Die geschichtliche Entwickelung und der gegenwartiger 
Zustand der rumanischen Landwirtschaft, Bonn, 1901. 

Jonescu, D. B. Die Agrarvervassung Rumilniens, ihre Geschichte und 
ihre Reform. Munich, 1909. 

Martonne, E. de La Valachie: Essai de Monographic g^ographique. 
Paris, 1902. 

Mrazec, L. L'Industrie du Petrole en Roumanie. Bucharest, 1910. 

Serban, M. Rumilniens Agrarverhaltnisse. Berlin, 1915. 

Stamatiu, A. J. Le Commerce exterieure de la Roumanie. Paris, 
1914. 

THE FACTS ABOUT GREATER RUMANIA 

Where Greater Rumania Is Located 

The regions inhabited wholly or partly by Rumanians form 
a huge flattened eUipse in the southeast comer of Europe. 
The base of this ellipse rests solidly on the north bank of the 
lower Danube River from the Black Sea westward to a point 
almost opposite the Serbian capital, Belgrade. In fact, just 



GREATER RUMANIA 229 

before reaching this point, the line of Rumanian settlement 
crosses to the south bank of the Danube, the northeast corner 
of Serbia being partly Rumanian in race. From the point 
opposite Belgrade the western limit of Rumanian population 
runs in a wavering line northward across the Hungarian 
plains, trending gradually eastward until it reaches the head 
waters of the river Theiss, whence it runs due east across the 
Carpathian Mountains and includes the southern part of the 
Austrian province of Bukowina. From this point the line of 
Rumanian settlement crosses into Russian territory, bending 
sharply southward, and following the west bank of the River 
Dniester till it reaches the Black Sea once more, not very 
far from its starting-point. 

The area of Rumanian settlement thus includes not only the 
present Kingdom of Rumania, but large portions of Austria- 
Hungary and Russia and a small district of Serbia as well. 

Of course, this area is not solidly Rumanian in population, 
many non-Rumanian racial elements also dwelling therein. 
The line above described represents the extreme geographical 
limits of Rumanian settlement and indicates the extreme fron- 
tiers which Rumanian nationalists claim for their proposed 
* * Greater Rumania. ' ' 

Territoriali Units Involved 

The Kingdom of Rumania, or Rumania proper, including 
the Dobrudja, has an area of 53,489 square miles and a popu- 
lation of 7,508,000. The Rumanians number 6,240,000, or 
eighty-three per cent. 

Eastern Hungary, including Transylvania and the Banat 
of Temesvar, has an area of 40,000 square miles and a popu- 
lation 'of 6,000,000. The Rumanians number 2,800,000, or 
forty-seven per cent. 

Buhowina has an area of 4033 square miles and a population 
of 784,000. The Rumanians number 273,000, or thirty-five 
per cent. 



230 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Bessarabia has an area of 17,143 square miles and a popu- 
lation of 2,657,000. The Rumanians number 1,100,000, or 
forty-five per cent. 

Northeastern Serbia has an area of 2000 square miles. The 
Rumanians number 40,000 or thirty per cent. 

The total area of this region is a little over 100,000 square 
miles, or the size of the Middle Atlantic States (New York, 
New Jersey, and Pennsylvania). The Ruman element in its 
population is about 14,000,000. 

Different Races est the Kingdom of RuMAf^iA 

The Rumanians number 6,240,000, or eighty -three per cent, 
of the population. They are found throughout except in 
southern Dobrudja. The striking feature of Rumanian so- 
ciety is its lack of a native middle class. The average Ru- 
manian has little aptitude for commercial life, and is of an 
easy-going, prodigal nature which makes him economically 
one of the most inefficient of European races. Accordingly, 
we find the native Rumanians concentrated at the two ends 
of the social scale : at the top an extremely wealthy landown- 
ing aristocracy; at the bottom a mass of peasants and town 
proletarians, for the most part extremely poor and unedu- 
cated. The economic life of Rumania is in the hands of 
foreigners or Jews. The Rumanians are politically dominant; 
at least the upper class is. The peasants have very little to 
say. 

The Jews number 375,000, or five per cent, of the popula- 
tion. They are found throughout. The Rumanian Jews are 
not regarded as citizens, and are subject to many legal dis- 
abilities, especially the prohibition against owning land. 
These disabilities are imposed because of the economic weak- 
ness of the native Rumanians. Both peasants and nobles are 
so thriftless that, but for these restrictions, it is feared the 
Jews would soon own nearly the whole country. The Jews 
Control Rumania's retail trade, the liquor traffic, etc. Al- 



GREATER RUMANIA 231 

though the great Ghettos are in the cities, the Jews are also 
numerous in the country districts, where they are peddlers, 
usurers, and overseers of estates of the nobles, who are mostly 
absentee landlords. 

The Bulgarians number 143,000, or two per cent, of the 
population. They are found mostly in the Dobrudja. The 
Bulgarians are mostly in that part of Dobrudja (Silistria 
region) which Rumania forced Bulgaria to cede to her by the 
Treaty of Bukharest (1913). There are, however, certain 
Bulgarian communities scattered along the north bank of the 
Danube in Rumania proper. The Bulgars are politically 
depressed. 

The Austro-Germans number 140,000, or two per cent, of 
the population. They are found mostly in the cities and in- 
dustrial centers. Rumania's recent economic development 
is largely due to German and Austrian capital. Accordingly, 
the oil-fields, manufacturing, and other major aspects of 
Rumanian economic life are managed and controlled by 
Austro-Germans. 

The Turco-Tatars number 215,000, or three per cent, of the 
population. They are located in the Dobrudja, where, outside 
the towns, they form the bulk of the population. They are 
a semi-nomad population, self-contained and taking no inter- 
est in politics. They are Mohammedans. 

The Szeklers (Magyars) number 145,000, or two per cent, 
of the population. They are found in northern Rumania 
(Moldavia). This people of Magyar (Hungarian) stock is 
scattered in compact village communities through a large 
part of northern Rumania. Despite attempts to Rumanize 
them, they have retained their language and racial identity. 
They are thriftier and more prosperous than their Rumanian 
peasant neighbors. 

The Greeks and Armenians number 50,000, or a little less 
than one per cent, of the population. They are found mostly 
in the towns. The Greeks and Armenians supplement the 



232 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Jews in controlling the minor aspects of Rumanian economic 
life (retail business, peddling, usury, etc.). They are very 
unpopular, but the Greeks are protected from persecution 
owing to the fact that most of them are Hellenic subjects. 

The Gypsies number 150,000, or two per cent, of the popu- 
lation. They are found throughout. The Gypsies, in Ru 
mania as elsewhere, pick up a precarious living by fortune- 
telling, horse-trading, and promiscuous roguery. In Rumania, 
however, owing to the superstitious, music-loving, easy-going 
character of the natives, they fare unusually well. 

The Serbians number 40,000, or about half of one per cent, 
of the population. They are found in western Rumania 
(Wallaehia). On the north bank of the Danube, opposite 
Serbia, are a sprinkling of Serbian peasant communities. 

Different Races in Eastern Hungary 

The Rumanian area of settlement in eastern Hungary covers 
three distinct geographical regions: 

Transylvania, the mountainous country lying immediately 
to the west of the Kingdom of Rumania and half inclosed by it. 

The Banat of Temesvar, a rectangular block of territory 
inclosed between the rivers Danube, Theiss, and Maros. 

The eastern edge of the great Hungarian plain, Alfold, 
lying west of Transylvania. 

In this entire region the Rumanian elements numbered in 
1900, 2,800,000. Of this Rumanian population, 1,397,000 
were found in Transylvania (fifty-seven per cent, of the total 
population of Transylvania) ; 578,000 in the Banat (forty 
per cent.) ; and about 600,000 in the eastern Alfold (from 
forty to fifty per cent.) 

The Rumanians of Hungary nowhere form the entire popu- 
lation of any district. Everywhere the upper classes, whether 
landlords or townsfolk, are of non-Rumanian race stocks, gen- 
erally Magyars or Germans. In Transylvania and the Banat 



GREATER RUMANIA 233 

the Rumanian districts are inextricably interlaced with other 
districts where most of the inhabitants are non-Rumanian. 
Everywhere, however, the Rumanians occupy the lowest grades 
in the social scale, landless agricultural laborers, town prole- 
tariate, mountain shepherds, etc. They are nearly all poor, 
ignorant, and in a generally backward social condition. 

Different Races in Bukowina 

This small Austrian province is a racial medley, the towns 
being mainly Jewish and German. The Rumanian element is 
found in the southern part of the province. It numbers 273,- 
000, or thirty-five per cent, of the total population, and is 
mainly peasant, but more prosperous than the Rumanians of 
Hungary. 

Different Races in Bessarabia 

The Rumanian element in this Russian province numbers a 
trifle over 1,100,000 (forty-five per cent.). It is mostly peas- 
ant and fairly prosperous. Bessarabia is, however, dotted 
with agricultural colonies of Russians, Germans, Bulgarians, 
Serbians, and Greeks, while the marshy Black Sea coast is 
thinly settled by Cossacks and Tatars. Thus, though the Ru- 
manians form by far the largest single race element in the 
population, Bessarabia presents a picture of bewildering racial 
complexity. 

Different Races in Northeastern Serbia 

In the districts just south of the Danube, and opposite 
Rumania, is a rather thick sprinkling of Rumanian agricul- 
tural communities the population of which totals about 40,000, 
or about thirty per cent, of the population of said districts. 

Who Controlled Greater Rumania Before the War 
The Kingdom of Rumania was under Rumanian control. 



234 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Transylvania, the Banat, and the eastern Alfold were con- 
trolled by Hungary. 

Bukowina was under Austrian control. 
Bessarabia was under Russian control. 
Northeastern Serbia was under Serbian control. 

Who Has Contkolled or Occupied Greater Rumania 
Since the War Began 

The Kingdom of Rumania has been mostly occupied by 
Austro-German and Bulgarian armies since the autumn of 
1916, after Rumania's entry into the war on the Allies' side. 

Eastern Hungary has remained under Hungarian control 
except for a transient Rumanian military occupation of part 
of Transylvania in the early autumn of 1916. 

Bukowina has been alternately occupied by Austro-Ger- 
mans and Russians, according to the fortunes of war. 

Northeastern Serbia was overrun by the Austro-Germans 
during their conquest of Serbia in the autumn of 1915. 

Rumania's Interest in Greater Rumania 

Political. The amalgamation of all regions of Rumanian 
settlement into a single Rumanian national state would create 
a Greater Rumania, which would be almost a great power. 
Such a Greater Rumania could probably dominate the Bal- 
kans, and would certainly play a major role in the politics of 
the Near East. 

Economic. All the territories coveted by Rumanian na- 
tionalists (eastern Hungary, Bukowina, Bessarabia, and 
Transylvania) would augment the economic power of Ru- 
mania, although it would add no distinctive or vitally neces- 
sary resources. 

Strategic. The territory which has most strategic value 
for Rumania is Transylvania, the mountains of which domi- 
nate the Rumanian plains. With this natural fortress in its 



GREATER RUMANIA 235 

possession, and eastern Hungary and Bessarabia as twin glacis 
to west and east, Rumania, already well protected by the 
Danube River on the south, would be in excellent strategic 
posture for both defense and offense. 

Racial. All the lands coveted by Rumanian nationalists 
have large Rumanian populations whose "redemption" by in- 
corporation into a Greater Rumania is ardently desired in 
order thus to attain the political unity of the Rumanian race. 

Cultural. The culture of the "unredeemed" Rumanians of 
Austria-Hungary and Russia is virtually the same as that of 
the Kingdom of Rumania. 

Beligious. Nearly all Rumanians belong to the Greek 
Orthodox Church. 

AUSTRU-HUNGARY 'S INTERESTS IN GREATER RuMANIA 

Political. The area of Rumanian settlement in Austria- 
Hungary is one sixth of the total area of the dual monarchy. 
The loss of eastern Hungary and the Bukowina would, there- 
fore, greatly diminish Austria-Hungary's area and popula- 
tion, and would consequently weaken her political power in 
the world. 

Economic. Eastern Hungary and the Bukowina are rich 
agricultural regions, while Transylvania has some mineral re- 
sources, as already pointed out. Their loss would obviously 
weaken Austro-Hungarian economic power. 

Strategic. The loss of eastern Hungary would leave Hun- 
gary with no good frontier on that side. As things now are, 
the mountain bastion of Transylvania solidly anchors the de- 
fense-line of the Carpathian Mountains, thus effectively shield- 
ing Hungary from north and east. "Were Transylvania lost, 
together with the Banat of Temesvar, the Hungarian frontier 
would run through the open Alfold, and the Hungarian plains 
would lie completely open to invasion. Bukowina, while of 
comparatively minor importance, is nevertheless a valuable 
outwork, covering the eastern passes of the Carpathians. 



236 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Racial. The two leading races of Austria-Hungary (Ger- 
mans and Magyars) are largely represented in the population 
of the territories coveted by Greater Rumania, In the Banat 
of Temesvar there are 362,000 Germans and 170,000 Magyars ; 
in Transylvania, 240,000 Germans and 815,000 Magyars. In 
the Alfold districts claimed by Rumanian nationalists the 
Magyars average over forty per cent, of the population, or 
about 500,000. In Bukowina the upper classes are largely 
German. Hungary has also an interest in the fate of the 
Magyar (Szekler) communities in northern Rumania. 

Cultural. The cultural interests of Germans and Magyars 
in these regions are very great. The upper classes are every- 
where Magyars and Germans, and the whole tone of civiliza- 
tion is predominantly Magyar or German. The Rumanians, 
belonging almost wholly to the lower social strata, have little 
influence in the cultural life of eastern Hungary. 

Religious. Both Magyars and Germans are partly Roman 
Catholic, partly Protestant. None of them, however, belong 
to the Orthodox Church, the church of nearly all Rumanians. 
Thus religious differences widen the ethnic cleavage between 
these hostile elements. 

Russia's Interests in Greater Rumania^ 

Political. Russia's most obvious interest is, of course, the 
retention of her province of Bessarabia, which is not only a 
valuable part of the Russian Empire, but is also the necessary 
territorial base for those plans of Balkan domination cherished 
by Russian imperialists. Some of these even dream of an- 
nexing the Kingdom of Rumania as the best land connection 
with a Russian-owned Constantinople and the straits. Rus- 
sian imperialists also desire Bukowina as the pendant to their 
projected annexation of the Austrian province of Galicia, 
lying just to the west. 

1 See foot-note on page 55. 



GREATER RUMANIA 237 

Economic. Bessarabia is a rich agricultural province, 
which Russia naturally desires to retain. 

Strategic. The wide River Pruth, which forms the western 
boundary of Bessarabia, gives Russia a good strategic frontier. 

Racial. Many Russian imperialists claim Bukowina owing 
to the Ruthenian or Little Russian (Ukrainian) element in its 
population. 

Cultural. Virtually none. 

Religious. Most of the Rumanians, like the Russians, be- 
long to the Orthodox Church. 

Bulgaria's Interests in Greater Rumania 

Bulgaria's interests are confined to the Dobrudja and are 
discussed in the chapter on the Dobrudja. 

Serbia's Interests in Greater Rumania 

Serbia disputes Rumania's claim to the Banat of Temesvar, 
asserting that this Hungarian region should belong to her, ow- 
ing to the presence of 252,000 Serbs in its population. 

Solutions that Have Been Proposed and What They 

Mean 

1. Status Quo Ante Bellum. 

This implies an independent Rumania with unredeemed 
sections under the following controls: Austria-Hungary: 
Transylvania, Banat, eastern Alf old, and Bukowina. Russia : 
Bessarabia. Serbia : northeast Serbia. 

Rumania would own Dobrudja, thus violating irredentist as- 
pirations of Bulgaria. There are virtually no Rumanians 
there. 

This would mean for Rumania, the non-fulfillment of irre- 
dentist aspirations. It would leave the Rumanians a dis- 
affected and disturbing factor in southeastern European 
polities. 



238 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

This would mean for Bulgaria disappointment in not 
getting southern Dobrudja, which she lost to Rumania in 
1913, and it would leave a Bulgarian-Rumanian fer- 
ment. 

It would mean for Russia and Austria-Hungary satisfaction 
except to the imperialistic elements. 

2. Greater Bumama. 

This implies adding to the Kingdom of Rumania, Transyl- 
vania, the Banat of Temesvar, eastern Alfold, southern Buko- 
wina, and Bessarabia. It excludes from consideration north- 
eastern Serbia and the Kutzo-Vlachs of Macedonia, as neither 
is seriously claimed by the bulk of Rumanian irredentists. 
Only a few extreme imperialists desire their inclusion in 
Greater Rumania. 

This would mean for Rumania the creation of a Greater Ru- 
mania, which would include virtually the entire Rumanian 
race, making Rumania almost a great power in extent of 
population, territory, and natural resources. It would assure 
to all branches of the race full opportunities for development 
of their cultural life, at present thwarted in Austro-Hungarian 
and Russian parts. 

It would make Austria-Hungary the irreconcilable enemy 
to the new status of southeastern Europe. The loss of her 
provinces (Transylvania, eastern Alfold, southern Bukowina) 
would be regarded by Austria-Hungary as unbearable mutila- 
tions. 

It would disturb the economic life of Austria-Hungary by 
the loss of the natural resources of these provinces. Austria- 
Hungary's new frontier would be strategically indefensible. 
It would mean the placing of large German and Magyar popu- 
lations of these regions (almost the entire upper classes) under 
the rule of Rumanians, who are regarded by them as inferior 
in every respect. 

Russia would be dissatisfied because she would lose in Bes- 



GREATER RUMANIA 239 

sarabia a valuable frontier, and her new frontier would run 
dangerously near Odessa, her chief seaport ; but Russia would 
not be so irreconcilable as Austria-Hungary, as Bessarabia is, 
after all, an outlying province, and there are few Great Rus- 
sians in its population. 

Serbia would be dissatisfied because she would not get the 
Banat of Temesvar, and the Serbs of that region would be 
put under Rumanian rule. 

Bulgaria would be dissatisfied if southern Dobrudja is kept 
by Rumania, and there would be bitter feeling on account of 
the loss of Silistria, one of Bulgaria's chief towns. 

The practical difficulty is the political and economic in- 
competence of the Rumanians. They have not been able to 
assimilate their alien minorities in an unrestricted atmos- 
phere and have used the iron heel of authority to keep these 
minorities from business advantages, etc. 

3. Extinction and Partition of the Rumanian State. 

This might imply giving all of the territories to the Central 
Powers; Rumania proper (Wallachia and Moldavia) going to 
Austria-Hungary, and the Dobrudja to Bulgaria. Or it 
might imply a division of the territories between the Central 
Powers and Russia, with Wallachia going to Austria-Hun- 
gary, Moldavia to Russia, and the Dobrudja to Bulgaria. 

This would mean leaving the Rumanian race irreconcilably 
discontented and planning a recoup. It would measurably 
satisfy the imperialistic aspirations of Austria-Hungary and 
Bulgaria. It would also satisfy Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, 
and Russia as a compromise solution, each realizing the major 
part of their dreams. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Auerbach, B. Les Eaces et les Nationalites en Autriche-Hongrie. 

Paris, 1898. 
Bertha, A. de Magyars et Roiimams devant Fhistoire. Paris, 1899. 



240 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Brote, E. Die rumanische Frage in Siebenbiirgen und Ungarn, Vienna, 
1895. 

Dungem, O. Von. Rumanien. Gotha, 1916. 

Gayda, V. Modern Austria: Her Racial and Social Problems. Lon- 
don, 1915. 

Hunfalvy, P. Die Rumanen und ihre Anspriiche. Vienna, 1883. 

Joneseu, T. The Policy of National Instinct. London, 1916. 

Kirke, D. Domestic Life in Rumania. London, 1916. 

Lazare, B. Die Juden in Rumanien. Berlin, 1902. 

Netzhammer, R. Aus Rumanien. Einsiedeln, 1909. 

Sincerus, E. Les Juifs en Roumanie. London, 1901. 

Sirianu, R. La Question de Transylvanie et I'Unitg politique rou- 
maine. Paris, 1916. 

Stratilesco, T. From Carpathian to Pindus. London, 1906. 

Tabb€, P. La vivante Roumanie. Paris, 1913. 



THE BALKANS 
THE DOBRUDJA 



See Map of Greater Rumania on page 220. 



CHAPTER XV 
THE DOBRUDJA 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 

The Dobrudja is a long tongue of territory, or geographical 
projection of the Bulgarian uplands, thrusting northward be- 
tween the Black Sea on the east and the Danube River on the 
west. It is this ridge of hill and plateau which forces the 
Danube to make its great bend after passing Silistria, and 
thereafter to flow due north till it washes around the end of 
the Dobrudja hills and bursts a way to the Black Sea. 

Until recent years this barren peninsula of mountain, 
swamp, and sterile plateau had little importance. Its 
modern history really dates from its acquisition by Rumania 
in 1878. Previous to that time it had belonged to Turkey 
and had vegetated in poverty-stricken obscurity, its inhabi- 
tants being mostly Turks and nomad Tatars pasturing their 
flocks on its bare downs. A few Bulgarian peasants tilled 
the infrequent patches of more fertile soil. As a result of 
the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, however, Russia compelled 
Turkey to cede the Dobrudja. Russia thereupon gave it to 
Rumania, taking in exchange the Rumanian province of Bes- 
sarabia. This exchange, forced upon Rumania at the point of 
the bayonet, was regarded by Rumania as a robbery, for Bes- 
sarabia was a fertile land peopled mostly by Rumanians, 
whereas Dobrudja was little better than a desert and con- 
tained no Rumanian population. However, Rumania was 
forced to make the best of it, and in course of time she dis- 
covered that her bargain was not so bad as she had at first 
supposed. The great economic development of Rumania 
which occurred after 1878 made necessary a short-line eom- 

243 



244 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

mereial outlet to the Black Sea, and such an outlet offered 
itself in Constanza, the Dobrudja's chief harbor. When Con- 
stanza was connected by rail with the Rumanian capital, 
Bukharest, it quickly became a flourishing port, Rumania's 
chief commercial outlet to the Black Sea and thence to the 
outer world. 

Rumania was, however, still dissatisfied with the situation, 
because Constanza was fairly close to the Bulgarian frontier, 
and thereby exposed to capture in time of war. Rumania 
remedied this strategic defect by her intervention against Bul- 
garia in the Second Balkan War of 1913, when she forced 
Bulgaria to cede her the Danube fortress of Silistria, together 
with a strip of territory extending southeast to the port of 
Baltchik, on the Black Sea. This ceded strip had an area of 
nearly 3000 square miles, and pushed the Rumanian frontier 
so far southward as to preclude any Bulgarian surprise at- 
tack on Constanza. In fact, by the new frontier Rumania 
menaced Bulgaria's chief Black Sea port, Varna, more seri- 
ously than Bulgaria had formerly menaced Constanza. 

This naturally infuriated Bulgaria. The population of the 
ceded strip was Bulgar or Turko-Tatar, with virtually no 
Rumanians. Silistria was an important Bulgarian city, while 
the threat to Varna and the possibility of a Rumanian thrust 
into the heart of Bulgaria itself made Bulgaria determined to 
upset the 1913 settlement and get back her lost territory with 
interest. Bulgaria's chance came in the autumn of 1916, 
when Rumania's intervention in the European War on the 
Entente side enabled Bulgaria, the ally of Germany, to over- 
run the whole Dobrudja, which at this writing is still in Bul- 
garian hands. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

A Diplomatist. Nationalism and War in the Near East. Oxford, 

1915. 
Brilliant, 0. Roumania. New York, 1915. 
Fox, F. Bulgaria. London, 1915. 



THE DOBRUDJA 245 

Ishirkoff, A. Bulgarien: Land und Leute. Leipzig, 1917. 
Schurman, J. G. The Balkan Wars, 1912-13. Princeton, 1915. 
Sloane, W. M. The Balkans : A Laboratory of History, New York, 

1914. 
Weiss, J. Die Dobrudseha in Altertum; historische Landschaftskunde. 

Sarajevo, 1911. 

ECONOMIC SURVEY 

Intrinsically the economic value of Dobrudja is not great. 
The backbone of this peninsula-shaped tract consists of bare 
hills and barren, wind-swept downs over which the Turco- 
Tatar shepherds drive their flocks of sheep and goats. The 
northern portion of the region, near the mouth of the Danube 
River, is marshy. It is of slight agricultural value, but serves 
as a feeding-ground for herds of swine, which roam freely 
in a semi-savage state. Only in certain sheltered spots are 
there patches of comparatively fertile soil. 

The main economic asset of Dobrudja is the port of Con- 
stanza, Rumania's chief economic outlet and her only real 
seaport. It is the center of whatever commercial and indus- 
trial life exists. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Annuaire Statistique de la Rumanie. Bucharest. Annual. 

Ministere de I'lndustrie et du Commerce de la Rumanie. Progres de 

la Dobrudja depuis I'Annexion jusqu'aujourd'hui. Bucharest, 

1909. 
Danesco, G. Dobrogea: Etude de Geographic physique et Ethnog- 

raphie. Bucharest, 1903. 
Facian, J. La Dobrudja economique et soeiale. Paris, 1886. 
Zeciu, Z. Die Landwirtsehaft in der Dobrudseha. Leipzig, 1909. 

THE FACTS ABOUT THE DOBRUDJA 

Where the Dobrudja Is Located 

The Dobrudja is the long and relatively narrow tongue of 
land intervening between the Danube and the Black Sea, 



246 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

after the Danube's sharp northward bend just beyond Silis- 
tria. 

Different Races in the Dobrudja 

The Turco-Tatars, who form the bulk of the population, 
are mostly herdsmen and shepherds. In the more cultivable 
areas they are peasants. Politically they are of little weight. 

The Bulgars are found throughout the region save in the 
extreme north. They are settled especially in the towns, 
although some of them are peasants. They were politically 
dominant in the southern part until 1913 ; then oppressed by 
the Rumanians until 1916; again dominant since 1916. 

The Rumanians are found in the northern part, mostly in 
the towns, especially Constanza, which is the chief port. They 
were politically dominant in the northern part from 1878 to 
1916 ; they were dominant in the southern part acquired from 
Bulgaria from 1913 until 1916; since then they have been 
oppressed by the Bulgars. 

Who Controlled the Dobrudja Before the "War 
Rumania. 

Who Has Controlled or Occupied the Dobrudja 
Since the War Began 

Rumania maintained control until the autunm of 1916. 
After Rumania's entry into the war on the Allied side, the 
Dobrudja was quickly overrun by Bulgarian and Teutonic 
forces. It is now under Bulgarian military occupation. 

Rumania's Interests in the Dobrudja 

Political. Rumania claims the whole Dobrudja, including 
the Silistrian region, as necessary to her position as a Black 
Sea power and as a guaranteed sea connection with the outer 
world. 

Economic. The Dobrudja's geographical position gives 



THE DOBRUDJA 247 

Rumania a short line of communication with the Black Sea, 
and its port of Constanza has been connected by a railway 
trunk-line with Bukharest and the Wallachian plain, the heart 
of Rumania. 

Strategic. Rumania claims that the whole Dobrudja, in- 
cluding Silistria, is necessary to protect her port of Constanza 
and the trunk-line railroad to Bukharest. 

Racial. The Rumanian element is virtually confined to the 
towns, especially Constanza. It represents immigration since 
Rumania's acquisition of northern Dobrudja in 1878. 

Cultural. Except for the above-mentioned minority, Ru- 
mania has no cultural claims. 

Religious. None except in the small Rumanian minority. 

Bulgaria's Interests in the Dobrudja 

Political. Bulgaria claims first and foremost the return of 
southern Dobrudja and Silistria, which she had to cede to 
Rumania in 1913. She further claims the whole Dobrudja 
as being geographically part of Bulgaria and as having always 
been historically part of Bulgaria down to 1878. 

Economic. The Silistrian district has some slight economic 
value for Bulgaria. 

Strategic. The acquisition of Silistria is claimed by Bul- 
garia as necessary to protect her from Rumanian invasion. 
Possession of the whole Dobrudja would give Bulgaria the 
south bank of the Danube down to its mouth on the Black 
Sea. This would give Bulgaria a fine strategic frontier 
against Rumania. 

Racial. The Silistrian region is mostly Bulgar in race. 
There are Bulgarians throughout the Dobrudja, though in the 
northern part they form only a small minority of the popula- 
tion, which everywhere, outside the towns, is predominantly 
Turco-Tatar. 

Cultural. Except for the Bulgarian element, none. 

Religious. None except for the Bulgarian element. 



248 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

N 

Solutions that Have Been Proposed and What They 

Mean 

1. Status Quo Ante Bellum. 

This implies Rumanian possession of the Dobrudja as 
gained by the Peace of Bukharest in 1913. 

This would leave a satisfied Rumania and a dissatisfied 
Bulgaria. 

2. Division of the Dobrudja Between Rumania and Bul- 

garia. 
This would naturally follow the lines that existed before 
1913. Such a compromise might satisfy the moderates in 
both Bulgaria and Rumania. Both Rumania's port of Con- 
stanza and Bulgaria's port of Varna would be reasonably, 
although not entirely, safeguarded against sudden assault by 
either party. The imperialists in both Rumania and Bul- 
garia would be dissatisfied. 

3. Annexation of the Dohrudja to Bulgaria. 

This would satisfy Bulgaria's claims to the Dobrudja, as a 
geographical part of Bulgaria, as a historical part of Bul- 
garia up to 1878, and as affording Bulgaria a fine strategic 
frontier along her entire northern border, the Danube. It 
would leave a suppressed ambition in Rumania, since Ru- 
mania would thereby lose her only seaport and her short-line 
railway outlet to the Black Sea, although she would still have 
her longer water outlet via the Danube. 

Rumania would cease to be a naval or maritime power, as 
she would have no coast-line. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Balkanicus. The Aspirations of Bulgaria. London, 1915. 
Bibesco, G. Historie d'une Frontiere. La Roumanie sur la Rive 
dToite du Danube. Paris, 1883. 



THE DOBRUDJA 249 

Guechoff, J. E. L' Alliance balkanique. Paris, 1913. 

Newbigin, M. J. Geographical Aspects of Balkan Problems. London, 

1915. 
Pittard, M. Dans la Dobrudja. Geneva, 1902. 
Schwartz, B Aus der Dobnidseha. Leipzig, 1888. 
Stambler, B. Les Roumains et les Bulgares: Le Trait6 de Bucharest. 

Paris, 1914. 



THE NEAR EAST 
CONSTANTINOPLE 



CHAPTER XVI 
CONSTANTINOPLE 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 

Constantinople is the most significant city on earth. 
Strategically it is the world's most important capital. Situ- 
ated at the key-point of the salt-water river joining two seas 
and sundering two continents, it serves at one and the same 
time as toll-gate between the Black Sea and Mediterranean 
and as bridge between Europe and Asia. Its name must 
therefore be eternally writ large on the palimpsest of history. 

Constantinople was first settled by Greek colonists in the 
seventh century b. c, who stamped upon it that Hellenic im- 
press which it has always retained. For the first thousand 
years of its existence it was known as Byzantium. Although 
always a place of more than local note, its world significance 
dates from the year a. d. 330, when the Emperor Constantine 
declared it the capital of the Roman Empire and gave it his 
name. The subsequent fall of Rome and submergence of west- 
em Europe beneath barbarian onslaughts left ''the City of 
Constantine" the unquestioned center of the civilized world, 
and here the successors of Caesar, known to history as the 
Eastern Roman, or Byzantine, emperors, held sway down to 
the Turkish conquest in 1453. 

Since 1453 the Ottoman sultans have sat on the throne of 
the Byzantine Caesars, and Constantinople, renamed Stam- 
boul by the Turks, has been both the capital of the Ottoman 
Empire and the temporal center of the Mohammedan world, 
thus occupying in Islam a position analogous to that which it 
obtained in Christendom during the Middle Ages. 

253 



254 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

The decay of Ottoman power which began in the seven- 
teenth century, and the possibility of the expulsion of the 
Turks from European soil, made Constantinople the center of 
that "Eastern Question" which has vexed European chan- 
celleries for generations, Constantinople has been the great 
prize aimed at by every European great power seeking the 
reversion of the sultan's heritage. Kussia has been the most 
insistent claimant, but France and Austria have at times 
dreamed of possession, with England interposing a standing 
veto to all such schemes, unable herself to take the city, yet 
determined that none other should grasp the coveted prize. 
Of late years two minor powers, Greece and Bulgaria, have 
also laid claims to Constantinople, while Germany, giving 
friendship as the password, was covertly admitted within the 
city walls by Sultan Abdul-Hamid at the beginning of the 
present century, and now stands the veiled, though virtual, 
master. 

German hegemony and Turkish title-deeds are, however, 
both disputed by the Entente powers. When Turkey joined 
the Teutonic empires at the beginning of the present war, the 
Entente Allies announced as a part of their war aims the ex- 
pulsion of the Turk from Constantinople and the break-up 
of the Ottoman Empire. At that time Constantinople was 
promised to Russia, but since the Eussian Revolution of March, 
1917, the Russian people have renounced all claim to its pos- 
session. Constantinople's future status is therefore to-day 
quite uncertain, being absolutely dependent upon the course 
of the war and the fiat of the peace conference which will ef- 
fectuate the coming world order. 

ECONOMIC SURVEY 

The direct economic importance of Constantinople is to- 
day not great. From her once proud position as the chief em- 
porium between East and West, receiving from the uttermost 



CONSTANTINOPLE . 255 

Orient the rich products destined for distribution throughout 
the European West, she has now sunken to a petty seat of 
local trade. The endless procession of steamers bearing the 
produce of the Danube Valley and the Russian plains to the 
Mediterranean and the outer world do not break bulk, but 
pass her by. 

Nevertheless, as the toll-gate which can stop this mighty 
commerce at will, her economic importance is very great, while 
certain recent developments presage a revival of her ancient 
function as the nodal point in a main-trade artery running 
east and west. The construction of the Bagdad Railway means 
the speedy opening of a short-line between central Europe and 
the Persian Gulf. Once the Bagdad Railway becomes com- 
mercially profitable, Constantinople will be the junction for 
two of the world's commercial trunk-lines, the overland route 
between Europe and the East and the sea route between the 
Mediterranean and Black seas. Her position will then be 
fully comparable to that enjoyed under the Byzantine Empire. 

THE FACTS ABOUT CONSTANTINOPLE 

The larger world-politics aspect of the Constantinople 
problem overshadows so completely the local interests of the 
population that it is hardly pertinent to treat the problem 
under the same outline that is applied to the other problems 
of this volume. It will, however, be valuable to set down the 
essential features of the several nations' interests in Con- 
stantinople in order to measure the conflicting desires that 
any attempt at solution must face. 

Turkey's Interests in Constantinople 

For centuries Constantinople has been the capital of Tur- 
key and the center of Turkish national life. The population 
of Constantinople and its environs is largely Turkish. The 
loss of Constantinople and the Straits would involve the loss 



256 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

not only of European Turkey, but also a strip of territory on 
the Asia Minor side of the Straits that the possessing power 
would need for defensive reasons. This would mean a foreign 
sphere even in the homeland of the Turks. 

Islam's Interests in Constantinople 

The position of the sultans of Turkey since the early six- 
teenth century as guardians of the holy places, Mecca and 
Medina, their position as Khalifas, or temporal heads, of 
Islam, and the present position of Turkey as the one powerful 
Mohammedan state, give Mohammedans everywhere a lively 
interest in the fortunes of the Ottoman Empire and a disincli- 
nation to acquiesce in seeing that empire reduced, as it would 
be by the loss of Constantinople. 

Greece's Interests in Constantinople 

Constantinople is the goal of the Greek imperialist, who 
dreams of a New Byzantine Empire and espouses the Greek 
great idea discussed elsewhere in this volume. 

Bulgaria's Interests in Constantinople 

History has shown that the presence of a powerful state in 
control of Constantinople has always meant danger to Bul- 
garia. The fact that most of Bulgaria's natural commercial 
outlets are by way of the Black Sea means that the possessor 
of Constantinople can at will close Bulgaria's outlets. Bul- 
garian imperialists dream of possessing Constantinople as the 
capital of a Bulgarian Empire. 

The Balkan Peoples' Interests in Constantinople 

In view of the possibility, however remote, of a Balkan 
federation, the Balkan peoples as a whole have a lively inter- 
est in Constantinople, which would be the obvious capital for 
such a confederation. 



CONSTANTINOPLE 257 

Russia's Interests in Constantinople 

Russia has a permanent economic interest in Constantinople, 
since the richest portion of the empire, southern Russia, looks 
to the Black Sea. The Russian imperialist wants Constan- 
tinople, and a peace conference must not take too seriously 
the revolutionist's disavowal of a claim to Constantinople, for 
that claim is bound to reassert itself until the problem of 
Russia's outlet to the sea is met by some solution as effective 
or better than Russia 's possession of Constantinople would be. 

Germany's and Austria-Hungary's Interests in 
Constantinople 

Germany and Austria-Hungary see in Constantinople a 
bridge over which they may extend their political and eco- 
nomic imperialism over the Near East. 

England's Interests in Constantinople 

England does not aspire to possess Constantinople, but 
clearly recognizes that Constantinople in the hands of any 
strong power would sooner or later threaten her possession 
of Egypt and the Suez Canal, her position on the Persian 
Gulf, and her larger imperial aspirations for domination over 
the whole Near East south of Asia Minor and Armenia. 

A Suggestion Regarding a Solution of the 
Constantinople Problem 

Owing to the fact that there is a marked desire to get the 
Turk out of Europe, the fact that the actual possession of 
Constantinople by a power whose center of political and 
military gravity is at a distance is a liability as well as an 
asset, and owing to the fact that each of the great powers will 
be averse to having any of the others possess the city and the 
Straits, it is likely that some attempt at international control 
will be made. 



258 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

As pointed out in other instances in this volume, the method 
of international control may be either that of administration 
by an international commission dealing with the Constan- 
tinople problem alone, or that of administration by a league 
of nations, which shall be a central organ of administration 
for all such international concerns. Such a solution might 
see to it that Constantinople should turn its strategic position 
to common account rather than for the benefit of one nation 
alone, and at the same time reduce, if not eliminate, the age- 
old contention about Constantinople. 

Here again international control will succeed in the degree 
that it avoids becoming a rigid preserver of the status quo 
in the face of shifting needs and inevitable growth. It re- 
mains to be seen whether the political creativeness of the 
world can evolve a system of international regulation and 
control that will mete out a justice flexible enough to do away 
with the heretofore inevitable readjustments through war. 

BIBLIOGEAPHY 

Dascovici, N. La Question du Bospbore et des Dardanelles. Paris, 

1915. 
Dwight, H. G. Constantinople, Old and New. London, 1915. 
Erdmann, G. A. Die Dardanellen Leipzig, 1915. 
Esperet, J. B. La Condition Internationale des Detroits. Toulouse, 

1907. 
Essad, D. Constantinople de Byzance a Stambul. Paris, 1910. 
Goriainov, S. M. Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles. Paris, 1910. 
Hutton, W. H. Constantinople; the Story of the Old Capital of the 

Empire. London, 1900, 
Kumrow, C. Der Bosporus und die Dardanellen: Eine volker- 

rechtliche Studie. Biebrich a/R., 1913. 
Kuntze, H. Die Dardanellenfrage. Rostock, 1909. 
Limpricbt, M. Die Strasse der Dardanellen. Breslau, 1892. 
Mischev, P. H. La Mer Noire et les Detroits. Paris, 1899. 



THE NEAR EAST 
ASIA MINOR 



See Map of the Near East on page 252 



CHAPTER XVn 
ASIA MINOR 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 

Asia Minor is a peninsula jutting out from the continental 
mass of Asia toward Europe, from which it is separated only 
by the narrow straits of the Bosporus and Dardanelles. As 
might be expected from its geographical conformation, it has 
been a meeting-place where Asiatic and European influences 
have struggled for supremacy. The lines of this struggle 
have been predetermined by the country's internal structure. 
Asia Minor is a high plateau, ringed about by mountains 
which slope sharply down into the Mediterranean, ^gean, and 
Black seas, which wash its sides, leaving generally narrow 
coast strips between mountain-slopes and seashore. Only on 
the western, or -/^gean, coasts are there a few more gradual 
descents, where rivers from the interior have carved out con- 
siderable valleys. 

As a result of these physical characteristics, the interior 
plateau has always been the somewhat sheltered home of 
Asiatic stocks, while the coast strips and adjacent islands, 
being more readily accessible, have been occupied by peoples 
of European blood. At times the Asiatics have conquered 
the Europeans, at other periods the Europeans have subdued 
the Asiatics; but however wide the shifts of languages, cul- 
tures, and creeds, the race lines have changed but little. 

At the beginning of the historic period about 1000 b. c. 
the coasts and islands of Asia Minor were occupied by Greeks. 
These were presently conquered by the Persians after the 
latter had subdued the Asiatics of the interior. Then, when 
Alexander the Great destroyed the Persian Empire, Greek 

261 



262 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

influence spread throughout the entire region. Asia Minor 
remained a land of Hellenic culture down to the Turkish in- 
vasions of the eleventh century a. d., more than a thousand 
years later. 

The Turks reversed the process, stripping off the European 
veneer which Hellenism had laid upon the Asiatics of the 
hinterland and transforming them into the modern Ottoman 
Turks, a stock in which the conquering Turki strain from 
Central Asia has been greatly diluted by the blood of the 
primitive Asia Minor breeds. The Greeks of the coasts and 
islands, however, resisted Ottomanization, and to-day remain 
restive under Turkish rule, just as their remote ancestors 
chafed under the Persian yoke more than two thousand years 
ago. This is the basis of the Greek claim to the ^gean coasts 
of Asia Minor, the region where the Hellenic population is 
most densely disposed. 

The decay of Ottoman power and the possibility of a total 
break-up of the Turkish Empire has brought other peoples 
than the Greeks into the problem as claimants for Asia Minor 
spoils, Russia, Germany, Italy, and France all have inter- 
ests of varying character and extent in the country. Against 
these foreign claimants the Turks maintain their rights as 
political masters of the land and actual possessors of the 
soil. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Endres, F. C. Die Turkei. Munich, 1916. 

Ferriman, Z. D. Turkey and the Turks. London, 1911. 

Garnett, L. M. Turkey of the Ottomans. London, 1912. 

Jorga, N. Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches. 5 vols. Gotha, 

1908-13. 
Pears, Sir E. Turkey and Its People. London, 1912. 
• Philipsohn, A. Das tiirkische Reich. Weimar, 1916. 
Ramsay, W. M. Historical Geography of Asia Minor. London, 1890. 
Sykes, M. The Caliph's Last Heritage: A Short History of the 

Turkish Empire. London, 1915. 
Waehter, A. H. Der Verfall des Griechentums in Kleinasien im 14. 

Jahrhundert. Leipzig, 1903. 



ASIA MINOR 263 

ECONOMIC SURVEY 

As might be expected from its great size and topographical 
differences, an economic survey of Asia Minor presents a wide 
variety of conditions, with some sharp contrasts. Two rough 
divisions can, of course, be made — the interior plateau and the 
coastal regions ; but Avithin each of these two grand divisions 
there are wide variations of climate and soil. 

The central plateau, shut off from the rain-bearing sea 
winds by the ring of enclosing mountains, inclines to aridity, 
and its heart, the great plain of Axylon, the bed of a vanished 
sea, is an alkali desert broken by occasional salt lakes and 
marshes. Here the soil is valueless save for an evanescent 
spring vegetation which nourishes the Yuruk nomads' flocks 
of sheep and goats till the burning summer heats drive them 
to the hills. But about this arid center, where the land 
rises from its central depression toward the mountain rim, 
the soil is better. This intermediate zone needs only irriga- 
tion to become a great cereal-growing region, and even as it is, 
with ages of neglect and bad government to handicap it, cer- 
tain naturally favored sections like the Sivas region contain 
as productive wheat-fields as exist in the world. 

The coastal zone falls into three subdivisions: the Black 
Sea, -^gean Sea, and Mediterranean coastal regions respect- 
ively. The Black Sea coast region, exposed to the north 
winds from the Russian steppes, has a cold climate, with heavy 
rainfall and deep winter snows. Its soil is fertile and well 
watered, producing northern cereals and fruits. In the ex- 
treme east, the Trebizond district, under the lee of the neigh- 
boring Caucasus mountain-wall to the north, has a milder 
climate and produces more southerly products. The ^gean 
coast, with a fine, equitable climate and ample but well-dis- 
tributed rainfall, is like western Europe in its soil and prod- 
ucts. All kinds of temperate grains and fruits thrive there. 
The Mediterranean coast region, sheltered from the northern 



264 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

winds by the overhanging coastal ranges, bathed by the warm 
Southern sea, and flooded with the rays of the Southern sun, 
is a typical Mediterranean land. Some of the alluvial plains 
formed by the silt of the chief rivers, notably the plain of 
Adana near the Syrian border, are natural hothouses in which 
grow a wealth of subtropical products, such as cotton, sugar, 
and rice. The foot-hills are belted with citrus fruit orchards, 
fig-trees and olive-groves. A very fine cigarette tobacco is 
also grown, while a number of valuable gums and licorice- 
root complete the long list of vegetable products. 

The central plateau is almost a treeless land, but the moun- 
tain rim is clothed with fine forests except where ages of reck- 
less cutting have stripped the steeper slopes hopelessly bare. 
In the north the forests are particularly fine, fir, pine, cedar, 
and oak predominating. In several localities valuable walnut- 
groves abound. 

Asia Minor also contains a variety of domestic animals. 
The central plateau is a great grazing country. Everywhere 
are flocks of sheep and Angora goats, producing the valuable 
mohair of commerce. In the salt desert of Axylon camels find 
a congenial home. The plateau also nourishes a breed of 
small, but hardy, horses. In the agricultural regions horned 
cattle and buffaloes are extensively bred, especially for draft 
purposes. 

The mineral wealth of Asia Minor is very great. Its moun- 
tain rim is richly stocked with a variety of minerals and 
metals, though much of this wealth is as yet unexplored and 
but little is actually worked, owing to bad government, lack 
of capital, and the meager number of roads and railways. 
Apparently the most valuable mineral resources are copper, 
iron, manganese, gold, silver, chrome, and lead, with rich 
coal-fields at Karasu on the Black Sea. But alum, antimony, 
arsenic, asbestos, borax, kaoline, lithographic stone, meer- 
schaum, mercury, nickel, rock-salt, and sulphur are known 



ASIA MINOR 265 

to exist in paying quantities, and some of these are even to-day 
worked to a profit. 

The backwardness of civilization and of general economic 
development naturally keeps Asia Minor's industrial life at 
an abnormally low level. In the immediate vicinity of Con- 
stantinople and Smyrna a few small textile, glass, and soap 
factories have been started, but elsewhere industry in the 
modern sense does not exist. Certain valuable Oriental spe- 
cialties, notably carpets, rugs, silk stuffs, leather, and mohair, 
are, to be sure, produced in considerable quantities, but their 
production is carried on at the house-industry stage and under 
most primitive conditions. 

Asia Minor is therefore a land of potentially great re- 
sources. Under modem advantages of adequate financing 
and effective administration it might become a prosperous eco- 
nomic area. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Carles, G. La Turquie economique. Paris, 1906. 

Cuinet, V. La Turquie d'Asie. G^ographie administrative, etc. (4 

vols.) Paris, 1891-98. 
Fitzner, R. Anatolien. Wirtschaftsgeographie. Berlin, 1902. 
Geister, P. Die Turkei im Rahmen der Weltwirtschaft. Greifswald, 

1907. 
Rohrbach, P. Die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung Westaaiens. Halle, 1902. 
Saint- Yves, G. Les Chemins de fer frangais dans la Turquie d'Asie. 

Paris, 1914. 
Schmidt, H. Das Eisenbahnwesen in der asiatischen Turkei. Berlin, 

1914. 

THE FACTS ABOUT ASIA MINOR 

Where Asia Minor Is Located 

Asia Minor is the peninsula jutting out from the Asiatic 
continent toward Europe between the Mediterranean and 
Black seas. It has an area of 200,000 square miles, or about 



266 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

the size of "Wyoming and Colorado combined. Its population 
is about 11,000,000. 

Different Races in Asia Minor 

The Ottoman Turks number about 8,000,000, or about 
seventy-two per cent, of the population. They are found 
throughout the region except in certain coast districts and 
outlying islands. They constitute the vast majority of the 
population of Asia Minor. They are racially very mixed, 
but with certain general cultural standards which, with their 
Mohammedan faith, have fused them into a rough national 
unity. They are of all social grades except the commercial 
classes, the Turk having shown no business ability. The 
Turkish peasantry, though hardworking and steady, are much 
depressed by taxation and conscription. 

The Greeks number about 2,000,000, or about eighteen per 
cent, of the population. They are scattered all along Asia 
Minor's narrow coast between the coast ranges and the sea. 
They are also found in the towns of western Asia Minor. 
Some of them are peasants, and many are fishermen and 
sailors, especially in the islands off the ^gean coast of Asia 
Minor, which are solidly Greek. The Greeks also have a 
strong aptitude for business. Therefore the trading classes 
in the towns of western Asia Minor are mainly Greek. They 
are economically prosperous, although they have been sub- 
ject to Turkish persecution since 1913. 

The Armenians are found mostly in eastern Asia Minor, 
although scattered through many interior towns. On account 
of the persecution and massacres, reliable statistics concern- 
ing the Armenians are unavailable. They are peasants in 
the northeast and southeast, also workmen and artisans in 
the eastern towns. They are traders over a still wider area. 
They have a strong aptitude for commerce and industry. 
They have been depressed and decimated by the persecutions 
of the last twentj years. They are apparently well on the 



ASIA MINOR 267 

road to extermination through the terrible deportations and 
massacres since 1914. 

The Yuruks number about 250,000, or a little over two per 
cent, of the population, and are found in the desert interior 
basin. They are herdsmen and shepherds, primitive nomads, 
mostly of Turkoman blood and Mohammedan faith. 

The Levantines are only a sprinkling of the population. 
They are found in the coast towns, especially on the ^gean 
coast strip. They are a mongrel population of all Mediter- 
ranean stocks. Keen and shrewd, with considerable business 
ability, they are lacking in moral fiber. They have certain 
political affiliations with the . Italians. 

Who Controlled Asia Minor Before the War 
Turkey. 

Who Has Controlled or Occupied Asia Minor Since the 

War Began 

Turkey, with German oversight. 

Turkey's Interests in Asia Minor 

Turkish interests in Asia Minor are so obvious and all- 
embracing that they need no topical analysis. Asia Minor 
is the homeland of the Ottoman Turks. In the Balkans and 
even in Constantinople the Turk is an intruder despite cen- 
turies of political domination. . East of the Taurus Moun- 
tains, which mark off Asia Minor from Syria and Mesopo- 
tamia, he is an alien conqueror, hated and despised by the 
Arabic inhabitants despite the bond of Islam. But the great 
Asia Minor plateau beyond the coast ranges which ring it in 
on every sea-front is a solidly Turkish land, and here the 
Turk must maintain his political independence unless he is 
to become a man without a country. 



268 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Germany's Interests in Asia Minor 

Political. Germany does not desire to annex Asia Minor; 
she prefers to let it remain politically united under the 
Turks. Bu(t she does aspire to economic preference or mo- 
nopoly, thus reserving Asia Minor as a special sphere for 
German economic penetration and exploitation. Asia Minor 
is the necessary base for German schemes of domination over 
the East. 

Economic. Asia Minor could easily support several times 
its present population. The opportunities for German capi- 
tal, goods, business men, and skilled technicians are thus al- 
most incalculable. 

Strategic. Asia Minor under German control would be an 
invaluable base for Germany's projected ascendancy in the 
Near and Middle Bast. From this vantageground Germany 
could block Russia's southward advance to the Mediterranean, 
menace England in Egypt, and prepare schemes of aggres- 
sion in both Asia and Africa. 

Eacial. None. 

Cultural. None. 

Religious. None. 

Russia's Interests in Asia Minor* 

Political. Russian imperialists desire to annex virtually 
all Asia Minor in order to realize two of their favorite plans ; 
first, to secure control of Constantinople and the Straits ; and, 
second, to obtain an alternative route to the Mediterranean at 
the Gulf of Alexandretta, where Asia Minor joins Syria. 
This, together with its necessary prerequisite, annexation of 
the Armenian highlands to the north, would make Russia pre- 
dominant in both the Near and Middle East. 

Economic. The high economic value of Asia Minor makes 
it a very desirable field for Russian exploitation. 

Strategic. A Russian Asia Minor would enable Russia to 

1 See foot-note on page 55. 



ASIA MINOR ' 269 

threaten England in Egypt and the Persian Gulf. From this 
base Russian armies could be poured freely all over the Near 
East. 

Racial. None. 

Cultural. None. 

Religious. The Greek inhabitants of Asia Minor, like the 
Russians, are Orthodox Christians, but racial antipathy has 
in this case long nullified this apparent bond of sympathy be- 
tween the two peoples. 

Greece's Interests in Asia Minor 

Political. All Greeks regard the racially Greek regions of 
Asia Minor, especially the ^gean coast-line and adjacent 
islands, as irredentist ground. The extreme school of Greek 
imperialism claims the whole of Asia Minor as part of the 
Greek "Great Idea" of a restored Byzantine Empire, domi- 
nating the whole near East. 

Economic. The Greeks are the most successful and aggres- 
sive economic element in Asia Minor, especially since the ruin 
of the Armenians. They control much of the commercial life 
of Asia Minor. 

Strategic. Greek possession of the ^gean shore of Asia 
Minor and the adjacent islands would convert the ^gean 
into a Greek sea. Possession of this region is also necessary 
as the first step for Greek imperial dreams of expansion over 
the whole of Asia Minor. 

Racial, The Greek element of the native population in- 
vokes the interest of Greece. 

Cultural. The Greek element of the population is of 
course of Greek culture. 

Religious. The Greek element of the population is Ortho- 
dox Christian. 

Italy's Interests in Asia Minor 
Political. Italy aspires to control or annex southwest Asia 
Minor. She has already taken the first steps to this end by 



270 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

her occupation of the islands of Rhodes and the Dodekanese 
in 1911. 

Economic. The rich resources of this region would furnish 
a good outlet for Italian capital and trade. 

Strategic. Italian possession of southwest Asia Minor 
would give Italy a fine base in the Near East. 

Racial. Although few Italians are at present found in this 
region, Italy designs southwest Asia Minor as a field for 
Italian immigration. Its present under-population renders 
this feasible. 

Cultural. Virtually none. 

Religious. Virtually none. 

England's and France's Interests in Asia Minor 

Neither seriously contemplates the annexation of the whole 
or any part of Asia Minor. Their main object is to prevent 
any other European power from annexing it, and to keep an 
opening for their trade and capital. 

Solutions that Have Been Proposed and What They 

Mean 

1. Status Quo Ante Bellum. 

This would of course mean Turkish possession of Asia 
Minor. This would satisfy the vast majority of the inhabi- 
tants who are Turks, and the only native objectors would be 
the Greek and Armenian Christian minorities. As to Euro- 
pean powers, this would please Germany and Austria-Hun- 
gary so long as Turkey is their ally. It would conversely 
displease the other European great powers, although they 
would all probably prefer to see Asia Minor a Turkish state 
rather than see it pass into the hands of any European power 
other than their own, or the hands of their close friends. The 
great objector would of course be Greece, who would not be 
satisfied with anything short of Greek annexation of the 
Mgean coast-line and the adjacent islands. 



ASIA MINOR 271 

2. Division of Asia Minor along Racial Lines. 

This would probably mean a Turkish state in the interior, 
Greek possession of the ^gean coast-line and the adjacent 
islands, with certain eastern districts given to an Armenian 
state. 

While this appeals as the logical racial solution, certain 
practical difficulties are clear: 

A Turkish state in the interior would always seek to 
recover lost districts, and since it would be more powerful 
militarily than either of its neighbors, the temptation to Turk- 
ish aggression on other parts would be strong. 

The Greek part would have very indefensible fron- 
tiers, and, besides being a provocation to the Turkish state 
by cutting it off from its natural seaports, there would be a 
temptation to Greek imperialism to expand at the expense 
of the Turkish state, since, as the Italians say, ''The appetite 
grows with eating." 

An Armenian state, as discussed in the chapter on Armenia, 
would probably have difficulty in meeting the many apparently 
inevitable obstacles. 

3. Division of Asia Minor among Various European Claim- 

ants. 

This would probably mean that the ^gean region would 
go to Greece, southwest Asia Minor to Italy, and the rest of 
Asia Minor to Russia. 

This would lay the foundation for possible serious future 
conflict. It would leave the Turkish majority sullen, em- 
bittered, and hungry for revenge. 

It would probably mean quarrels among the dividers them- 
selves, since spheres claimed by various imperialists in these 
countries noticeably overlap, especially Greek and Italian 
spheres. An imperialistic Russia would so outweigh Greece 
and Italy in strength and extent of territorial possessions in 
Asia Minor that Russia would be constantly tempted to expel 



272 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

both Greece and Italy from their coastal footholds and take 
the whole to herself. Since this political division would also 
probably connote the erection of tariff walls and the estab- 
lishment of economic privileges to the possessing parties, this 
would arouse the resentment of the excluded powers, notably 
Germany and Austria-Hungary, and also England and 
France, who, while they might assent to such division for po- 
litical reasons, would dislike it for economical reasons. 

BIBLIOGEAPHY 

Abbott, G. F. Turkey, Greece and the Great Powers. New York, 1917. 
Berard, V. La Turquie et TH^llenisme contemporain. Paris, 1904. 
Bernard, M. Autour de la Mediterranee. Les Cotes orientales: Tur- 
quie d'Europe et d'Asie. Paris, 1899. 
Cobb, S. The Real Turk. Boston, 1914. 
DeBunsen, V. The Soul of a Turk. London, 1910. 
Deschamps, G. Sur les Routes d'Asie. Paris, 1894. 
Diest, W. von. Neue Forschungen im nordwestlichen Kleinasien. 

Gotha, 1895. 
Fitzner, R. Aus Kleinasien und Syrien. Rostock, 1904. 
Gallois, E. Asie-Mineure et Syrie. Paris, 1909. 

Garnett, L. M. J. Turkish Life in Town and Country. London, 1904. 
Garnett, L. M. J. The Turkish People. London, 1909. 
Grothe, H. Geographische Characterbilder aus der Asiatischen Turkei. 

Leipzig, 1909. 
Halil, Halid. The Diary of a Turk. London, 1903. 
Janke, A. Auf Alexanders des Grossen Pfaden: Eine Reise durch 

Kleinasien. Berlin, 1904. 
Karger, K. Kleinasien: Ein Deutsches IColonisationsfeld. Berlin, 

1892. 
Launay, L. de Chez les Grecs de Turquie, autour de la Mer fig6e. 

Paris, 1897. 
Leonhard, R. Paphlagonia: Reisen und Forschungen im nordlichen 

Kleinasien. Berlin, 1915. 
Oberhummer, R. Durch Syrien und Kleinasien. Leipzig, 1898. 
Nicolaides, N. Les Grecs de la Turquie. Brussels, 1910. 
Pickthall, M. With the Turks in War-time. London, 1914. 
Philippson, A. Reisen und Forschungen im westlichen Kleinasien. (5 

vols.) Gotha, 1910-15. 



ASIA MINOR 273 

Ramsay, W. M. Impressions of Turkey During Twelve Years' Wander- 
ings. London, 1897. 

Tozer, H. F. Turkish Armenia and Eastern Asia Minor. London, 
1881. 

Yahya, Siddik. Le Reveil des Peuples islamiques au XIV Sifecle de 
I'Hggire. Cairo, 1907. 



THE NEAR EAST 
ARMENIA 



See Map of the Near East on page 252 



CHAPTER XVIII 
ARMENIA 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 

The homeland of the Armenians is a lofty plateau inter- 
sected by still loftier mountain-ranges, culminating in the 
historic Mount Ararat, crowned with eternal snow. This land 
of short, hot summers and long, cold winters was occupied in 
very ancient times by a short, dark non-Aryan people which 
forms the substratum of the modern Armenian stock. Later 
this folk was conquered by an Aryan people, which impressed 
its language upon the country and its blood upon the upper 
classes, although the Armenian peasantry is still predomi- 
nantly of the primitive type. 

The outstanding characteristic of the Armenians is their 
extreme tenacity. The days of their national greatness were 
over before the beginning of the Christian era, the ancient 
Armenian kingdom having been destroyed by the Romans in 
the first century b, c. and ever since then they have been sub- 
jected to various foreign masters. But despite every variety 
of misfortune the Armenians have clung doggedly to their 
language, religion, and customs, and have thus preserved their 
race identity. In fact, taught adaptability by misfortune, 
the Armenians have learned to make the most of very slender 
opportunities, and whenever conditions have become at all 
bearable, they have enjoyed relative prosperity. 

Such was their condition during the first half of the nine- 
teenth century. The decay of Turkish power enabled the 
Armenians to purchase many privileges from the corrupt local 

277 



278 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

authorities, while the peasants of the mountainous districts 
enjoyed a quasi-independence. 

The Berl|a Congress of 1878 marked the beginning of their 
recent acute misfortunes. Russia then tried to make politi- 
cal capital out of the Armenians by claiming a protectorate 
over this Christian population. But England, alarmed at 
the prospect of Russia's gaining control of the strategically 
dominant Armenian plateau, blocked Russia's move by her- 
self espousing the Armenians' cause. European powers had 
thus interested themselves in the welfare of Turkey's Ar- 
menian subjects, and thereby raised among the Armenians 
hopes of European intervention and liberation from the Turk- 
ish yoke, as the Balkan Christians had recently been liberated. 
But this alarmed the Turkish government and aroused the 
fanaticism of the local Moslem populations, fearful of falling 
under Christian domination. As time passed, the more im- 
patient among the Armenians tried to bring about European 
intervention by initiating a revolutionary agitation marked 
by acts of terrorism. This, however, gave the Turkish sultan, 
Abdul-Hamid, the opportunity for which he had been waiting. 
Cleverly judging that the European powers were too dis- 
united among themselves to intervene in Turkish affairs, he 
determined to crush the Armenians. The fanatical Moslem 
population was accordingly let loose, and in 1896 a series 
of terrible massacres decimated the Armenians. Thereafter 
massacres never wholly ceased, while the accompanying de- 
struction of property reduced the Armenians to a state of 
extreme misery. The last blow fell at the beginning of the 
present war, when the Turkish government began a policy of 
wholesale deportations and massacres which has almost an- 
nihilated the Armenian population of Asiatic Turkey. The 
main body of the race is to-day found, not in Turkey, but in 
the adjoining portion of the Armenian plateau, under Rus- 
sian jurisdiction. 



ARMENIA 279 

ECONOMIC SURVEY 

Armenia is predominantly a country of bleaK mountains 
and treeless, grass-covered hills, with occasional stretches of 
arable land in the wider river valleys or about the great lakes 
of Urmia and Van. The agricultural value of Armenia is, 
however, greater than appears from its drab and unpromising 
appearance. The wide plain of Van in particular is covered 
with a rich, brown loam, which produces excellent cereal crops. 
Scattered among the mountains are many deep valleys which, 
sheltered from the bleak winds of the plateau, are natural 
hothouses, producing a variety of sub-tropical products such 
as cotton, rice, fruits, tobacco, etc. The grass-covered hills 
are excellent grazing-grounds, whereon the Kurds drive their 
flocks of sheep and goats. 

The mineral wealth of the Armenian highlands is very 
great, though little worked and imperfectly surveyed. The 
richest-known deposits are copper, which is found in many 
localities. Near Diarbekr is one of the richest copper- 
mines in the world, and other notable deposits are found near 
Trebizond on the Black Sea and in the Taurus region of 
Lesser Armenia. Iron, gold, and silver are also known to 
occur in paying quantities. 

Industry in the modem sense does not exist. The Ar- 
menians are skilful handicraftsmen, and certain local house 
industries, such as carpet-weaving, are carried on. But all 
this is on a small scale, and the political disturbances of the 
last twenty years have depressed what little industrial life 
did exist. 

THE FACTS AB0CJT ARMENIA 

Where Armenia is Located 

Armenia proper is the mountainous plateau bounded by 
Transcaucasia on the north, Asia Minor on the west, Meso- 



280 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

potamia on the south, and Persia on the east. It lies mostly 
in Turkey, but portions are under Russian and Persian juris- 
diction. 

Another district of Armenian population (Lesser Armenia) 
is the mountainous nucleus of the Taurus Mountains lying 
north of the Gulf of Adana, near the Mediterranean coast of 
Asia Minor. 

Territorial Units Involved 

Turkish Armenia, which includes the vilayets of Erzerum, 
Mamuret-ul-Aziz, Diarbekr, Bitlis, Van, and the Kozan Dis- 
trict of the vilayet of Adana, which is knov/n as Lesser Ar- 
menia. 

Russian Armenia, which is the southern part of Transcau- 
casia, near the Turkish frontier. 

Persian Armenia, which includes some districts in north- 
west Persia near the Turkish frontier. 

The combined area of these regions of Armenian popula- 
tion is about 80,000 square miles, or the size of Kansas. 

Different Races in Armenia 

The Armenians are found in the Armenian plateau and in 
Lesser Armenia. They are also scattered in colonies in Asia 
Minor and in Transcaucasia. On the Armenian plateau and 
in Lesser Armenia they formed, until the late deportations 
and massacres, the largest single element of the population, 
although, save in a few restricted districts, they nowhere con- 
stituted a clear majority. In Armenia proper and Lesser 
Armenia they are mostly peasants, workmen and artisans. 
In the town colonies, outside their home district, they are 
mostly artisans and traders. They are industrious, intelli- 
gent, and with strong commercial aptitude. They are some- 
what lacking in moral stamina, but with stubborn endurance. 
To-day they are apparently greatly reduced in numbers and 
economically almost ruined. The number of Armenians is 



ARMENIA 281 

very difficult to determine. Their numbers liave been greatly 
reduced in Turkish territory by the series of massacres and 
deportations which began about twenty years ago and culmi- 
nated in the wholesale evictions and slaughter since 1914. 
On the other hand, the Armenian population in Russian 
Transcaucasia has grown through immigration from Turkey. 
In 1914 the Armenian population of the Caucasus region was 
1,200,000. The Armenians of Persia number 50,000. The 
Armenians of Turkey must be reduced to well below 1,000,000, 

The Kurds are found in the Armenian plateau, northeast 
Asia Minor, and the hill country of northern Mesopotamia. 
They are wild, lawless highlanders, shepherds and semi- 
nomads. Robbery is their ancestral trade. They are fierce, 
but cowardly — a worthless breed. They are Mohammedans. 

The Turks are found throughout. They constitute a 
sprinkling of peasants and townsfolk everywhere, including 
populations such as the Lazi, back of Trebizond, the littoral 
of the Black Sea, which, although possessing little Turkish 
blood, are Moslems and have been more or less Ottomanized. 
Also the gentry and official classes are Turks. 

Who Controlled Armenia Before the War 

Turkish Armenia was under Turkish rule. 
Russian Armenia was under Russian rule. 
Persian Armenia was de jure under Persian rule, but de 
facto under Russian rule. 

Who Have Controlled or Occupied Armenia Since the 

War Began 

Turkish Armenia. Russian armies occupied most of it 
from the beginning of 1916 until the beginning of 1918 when 
the increasing disorganization of the Russian armies rendered 
increasingly probable the loss of Russian control. 

Russian Armenia. Russian, except for a few temporary 
Turkish raids in the autumn of 1914, 



282 THE N^xTIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Persian Armenia. Russian, except for temporary Turkish 
raids. 

Turkey's Interests in Armenia 

Political. Retention of its Armenian vilayets is vital to 
Turkey if it is to retain its present Asiatic provinces. 

Economic. The lofty Armenian plateau has such a cold 
climate that the country is of relatively slight agricultural 
value, although some sheltered districts produce good crops. 
There are good pasturage areas, supporting many sheep. The 
Armenian mountains contain considerable mineral wealth, 
especially copper, but it is little worked and imperfectly 
known. 

Strategic. The strategic value of Armenia is very great. 
The Armenian plateau is the keystone of the arch of Turkish 
Asiatic dominion. A hostile power intrenched in this natural 
fortress would dominate the rest of Asiatic Turkey in every 
direction, and could throw armies freely westward into Asia 
Minor or southward toward Syria and Mesopotamia. 

Racial. There is a large Turkish element in the population 
of these provinces. 

Cultural. Such culture as the Mohammedan elements of 
the population possess is mainly Turkish. 

Religious. All of the Mohammedan elements of the popu- 
lation are bound to Turkey by religious ties. 

Russia 's Interests in Armenia ^ 
Political. Possession of Turkish and Persian Armenia 
would place the whole of the Armenian plateau in Russian 
hands, thus enabling Russia to dominate the whole of Asiatic 
Turkey and northern Persia. 

Economic. As previously stated, the economic value of the 
Armenian plateau is considerable, and, under strong govern- 
ment, its latent economic possibilities could be greatly de- 
veloped. 

1 See foot-note on page 55. 



ARMENIA 283 

Strategic. Were the Armenian plateau "wholly in Russian 
hands, Russian armies could pour freely all over Asiatic Tur- 
key, and could break a path to the Mediterranean, giving 
Russia a valuable warm-water naval base at the port of 
Alexandretta. 

Bacial. None. 

Cultural. None. 

Religious. The religious interest is slight. The Arme- 
nians, although Christians, belong to a special branch of 
Christianity. Thus they do not come within Russia's pro- 
tectorate of the Orthodox Christians of the Ottoman Empire. 

Germany's Interests in Armenia 

Turkish retention of Armenia is necessary to the German 
scheme of a German-controlled Ottoman Empire. 

England's Interests in Armenia 

England would not care to see Turkish Armenia in Russian 
hands, since this would enable an imperialistic Russia to con- 
quer Mesopotamia and Syria, thus threatening both the Per- 
sian Gulf and the Suez Canal. The same dangers to England 
would be involved in an Armenia forming part of a German- 
controlled Turkish Empire. 

Solutions that Have Been Proposed and What They 

Mean 

1. Status Quo Ante Bellum. 

This would imply the continued division of the Armenian 
race between Turkey, Russia, and Persia. In this case the 
Armenians could in no way achieve a real national identity. 
If Turkey, Russia, and Persia are reactionary after the war, 
the Armenians would remain persecuted parts of these three 
political dominions. If these three countries should be in 
reality liberal after the war and should be disposed to grant 
local autonomy to national minorities, the Armenians would 



284 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

still be unable to take advantage of the grant. Russian and 
Persian Armenia are such narrow frontier bands of territory 
that they would be difficult to administer as units. In Turk- 
ish Armenia the Armenian population is too scattered and 
interspersed with other racial elements. 

2. United Armenia. 

A union of the territories of Turkish, Russian, and Per- 
sian Armenia would result in enough area to constitute an 
independent state, but in no considerable section of this area 
would the Armenians form a clear majority of the population. 
To be sure, the Armenians would be the most intelligent and 
progressive element ; but their numbers and their vitality has 
been so greatly reduced by the long series of persecutions and 
massacres, and there has been such extensive destruction of 
property in these territories, that their potential force has 
been so reduced as to form a serious bar to their gaining the 
ascendancy over the more numerous racial elements in the 
territory. 

3. Limited Armenian State Constituted of the Turkish 

Part. 
This would be even less viable than a united Armenia. It 
is in the Turkish part that the massacres, persecutions, de- 
struction of property, and reduction of vitality have been 
greatest. 

4. Annexation of Armenia to Russia. 

The annexation of all Armenian territory to an imperial 
Russia would mean attempted denationalization and Russifi- 
eation of the Armenians, as has occurred in the past in Rus- 
sian Armenia. Annexation to a liberal Russia would mean 
an eventual chance for the Armenians to realize, to some de- 
gree at least, their national aspirations. Russian protection 
could contribute an adequate policing that would restrain the 



ARMENIA 285 

lawless elements which in an independent Armenia would 
probably prevent the Armenians, relatively unwarlike, from 
developing and maintaining political control. In such a con- 
trolled situation the Armenians could develop their economic 
and cultural superiority and would become the dominant ele- 
ment, thus gaining ultimately something of national solidarity. 

5. Autonomous Armenia under Russia. 

This would be feasible probably after a period of develop- 
ment under the kind of protection a liberalized Russia could 
give the Armenians as discussed above. 

6. Autonomous Armenia under Turkey. 

This is probably not feasible because it is hardly probable 
that even a liberalized Turkey would consent to allow its racial 
and religious kinsmen inhabiting these regions to pass under 
Christian Armenian rule. 

7. German-controlled Armenia as Part of a Germanrcon- 

trolled Turkish Empire. 
This would mean strong government and economic develop- 
ment. With their economic superiority, the Armenians could 
take more advantage of such a period of economic develop- 
ment than could the other elements. It probably would not 
give the Armenians a chance to develop political strength as 
a start toward an Armenian nationalism, because the Germans 
would be oblig'ed to take into account the sentiments of the 
Mohammedan majority of the Turkish Empire, which would 
oppose any national aspirations on the part of the Armenians. 

8. Internationalization of Armenia. 

In this instance, as in all others, the question of interna- 
tional regulation or control depends upon the large outcome 
of the peace conference. Nobody yet knows whether or not 
the conference will create really workable organs of inter- 
national control. If a general league of nations is created. 



286 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

these "areas of friction" may well become administrative 
wards of the league. In the absence of a general league, or 
in the event that a league is formed for the sole purpose of 
police duty, then there may be created here and there in the 
weak spots of international life certain local centers of inter- 
national administration. At best these will represent experi- 
ments in constructive statesmanship. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Basmadian, K. L. Historie moderne des Armeniens. Paris, 1917. 

Berard, V. La Politique du Sultan. Paris, 1897. 

Bryce, J. Transcaucasia and Ararat. London, 1896. 

Buxton, N. Travels and Politics in Armenia. London, 1914. 

Cholet. Armenie, Kurdistan et Mesopotamie. Paris, 1892. 

Contenson, L.de Les Reformes en Turquie d'Asie. Paris, 1913. 

DeCoursous. La Rebellion armenienne. Paris, 1895. 

Gladstone, W. E. The Armenian Question. London, 1905. 

Gregor, N. T. History of Armenia. London, 1897. 

Hepworth, G. H. Through Armenia on Horseback. London, 1898. 

Hoffmeister, E. von Durch Armenien. Berlin, 1911. 

Leart, M. La Question armenienne a la Lumiere des Documents. 
Paris, 1913. 

Lehmann-Haupt, C. F. Armenien einst und jetzt. Berlin, 1910. 

Lepsius. Armenia and Europe. London, 1897. 

Lynch, H. F. B. Armenia: Travels and Studies. (2 vols.) Lon- 
don, 1901. 

Percy, Earl. The Highlands of Asiatic Turkey. London, 1901. 

Pinon, R. La Suppression des Armeniens. Paris, 1916. 

Rohrbach, P. In Turan und Armenien auf dem Pfaden russischer 
Weltpolitik. Berlin, 1898. 

Rohrbach, P. Vom Kaucasus zum Mittelmeer; eine Reise durch 
Armenien. Berlin, 1903. 

Toynbee, A. J. Armenian Atrocities, the Murder of a Nation. Lon- 
don, 1915. 

Tozer, H. F. Turkish Armenia and Eastern Asia Minor. London, 
1881. 

Vandal, A. Les Armeniens et la Reforme de la Turquie. Paris, 1897. 

Wigram, W. A. The Cradle of Mankind: Life in Eastern Kurdistan. 
London, 1914. 

Wiliams, W. L. Armenia: Past and Present London, 1916. 



THE NEAE EAST 
SYRIA 



See Map of the Near East on page 252 



CHAPTER XIX 
SYRIA 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 

Syria is a long strip of relatively habitable land between 
the vast expanse of the Arabian desert and the Mediterranean 
Sea. Its chief historical significance has been due to its 
being the main line of communication between Asia and 
Africa. For this reason Syria has been a meeting-place and 
battle-ground of nations and peoples, so that to-day its popu- 
lation is racially one of the most mixed on earth. For this 
same reason it has never been a seat of enduring political 
power, its ancient states, such as the kingdom of the Jews and 
the city polities of the Phoenicians, having been ground up 
long before the Christian era under the shock of rival empires 
battling for the Syrian spoils. 

Syria's latest master, Turkey, has been in control since the 
sixteenth century; but the Turk has always remained a 
stranger in the land, disliked by all the elements of the poly- 
glot population. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Briinnow, R. E., and Domaschewski, A. von. Die Provincia Arabia. (3 
vols.) Strasaburg, 1904-09. 

Cooke, A. W. Palestine in Geography and History. (2 vols.) Lon- 
don, 1901. 

Cuinet, V. Syrie, Liban et Palestine. Paris, 1901. 

Huntington, H. Palestine and its Transformation London, 1911. 

Lortet, L. La Syrie d'aujourd'hui. Paris. 1884 

Musil, A. Arabia Petraea. Moab. Vienna, 1907. 

Smith, G. A. Historical Geography of the Holy Land. London, 1897- 

Smith, G. A. Jerusalem. (2 vols.) London, 1908. 

289 



290 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 



ECONOMIC SURVEY 

Taken as a whole, Syria is a poor country. In ancient 
times it was more favored, but ages of neglect have destroyed 
its forests and thus decreased its rainfall, while over-cultiva- 
tion has impoverished the soil. There are still some fertile 
districts, especially on the Mediterranean coast and in Pales- 
tine, while the large oasis of Damascus enjoys a historic rep- 
utation. Elsewhere, however, crops are thin, and agriculture 
is handicapped by insufficient rainfall. Irrigation would re- 
store many districts. 

Syria is poor in minerals and in water-power. Industrial 
life is at a very low ebb. The native textile and silk indus- 
tries have been almost destroyed by cheap European machine- 
made products. 

BIBLIOGEAPHY 

Mygind, E. Syrien und die Mekkapilgerbahn. Halle, 1906. 

Warburg, O. Syrien als Wirtschafts- und Kolonizationsgebeit. Ber- 
lin, 1907. 

Zwiedeneck-Sudenhorst, H. von. Syrien und seine Bedeutung fiir den 
Welthandel. Berlin, 1873. 



THE FACTS ABOUT SYRIA 

Where Syria is Located 

Syria is the long strip of territory lying between the Medi- 
terranean Sea and the Arabian desert. Syria has an area of 
114,530 square miles, or about the size of Arizona. Its popu- 
lation is 3,675,000. 

Different Races in Syria 

The Arabs number 3,000,000 and are found throughout, 
except in a few mountainous districts. The population of 
Syria is extremely mixed. But the numerous Arab migra- 



SYRIA 291 

tions which have overrun Syria, especially since the Moham- 
medan conquest (seventh century a. d.), together with the 
unifying influence of Islam, have so Arabized these mongrel 
populations, who to-day speak mostly Arabic, that they feel 
themselves to be Arabs and may be counted as such. Only 
the sects of religious dissidents occupying the remote moun- 
tainous districts have maintained the older religious and cul- 
tural ideas, and thus stand racially apart. 

The Turks are found throughout the region. They are 
mostly officials and garrison troops. They are few in num- 
ber, but politically dominant. 

The Maronites number 350,000 and are found in the Leba- 
non region of northern Syria. They are the only one of the 
dissident sects of more than local importance. Christians, 
reconciled with Rome, they have for centuries been under the 
protectorate of France and have thus absorbed much French 
culture. They are the basis of French claims to Syria. In 
their mountain fastnesses of Lebanon they have led a semi- 
autonomous political existence. 

The Druses number 200,000 and are found in the Lebanon 
and Damascus regions. They are an heretical Moslem sect, 
fierce and predatory, long the scourge of their Christian 
Maronite neighbors. 

The Jews are found mostly in Palestine. They are about 
equally divided between Oriental Jews of Sephardin stock 
and recent Zionist immigrants from Russia and Rumania, 
mostly of Ashkenazim blood. 

Minor Christian and heretical Moslem sects are found in 
various regions. They are obscure peasants and hillmen. 

Who Controlled Syria Before the War 
Turkey. 



292 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Who Has Controlled or Occupied Syrli Since the 
War Began 

Turkey, until the British invasion from Egypt, which began 
early in 1917 and has now progressed to a point north of 
Jerusalem. 

Turkey's Interests in Syria 

Turkey's interest in the retention of this important part 
of its dominions is too evident to require topical analysis. 
Besides its intrinsic value, the loss of Syria would jeopardize 
Turkey's communications with Mesopotamia and would en- 
tirely cut off contact with Arabia. 

England's Interests in Syria 

Political. Syria is the natural land gateway to Egypt and 
the Suez Canal. Were Syria in British hands, Egypt would 
be unassailable, and England's desired control of Arabia and 
Mesopotamia would be greatly furthered. 

Economic. While the economic value of Syria is not par- 
ticularly high, a considerable portion of Syria's trade is in 
English hands. 

Strategic. As the present war has demonstrated, Syria is 
the obvious base for attacks on Egypt and the Suez Canal. 

Racial. None. 

Cultural. None. 

Religious. Virtually none. 

France's Interests in Syria 

Political. French interests in Syria are very old, dating 
from the crusades. French imperialists have long regarded 
Syria as a possible sphere of French control. 

Economic. Much French capital is invested in Syria, and 
several valuable railway and other concessions are in French 
hands. 



SYRIA 293 

Strategic. France 's acquisition of Syria would solidify her 
position in the Near East by giving her a territorial foothold, 
which she does not now possess. 

Racial. None. 

Cultural. The French protectorate exercised for gener- 
ations over the Roman Catholics of Syria has drawn the latter 
to French culture. The Maronites of Lebanon in particular 
are largely educated in French church schools, and have ab- 
sorbed many French ideas. 

Religious. The French protectorate over the Roman Cath- 
olics of Syria forms the base of religious interests. 

Germany's Interests in Syria 

Syria as part of a German-controlled Turkey is vital to the 
German imperialist dream of German domination over both 
the Near East and Africa. 

Russia's Interests in Stria 

Russia, as the protector of the Orthodox Christians in Asi- 
atic Turkey, has religious interests in Syria analogous to 
those of France. Some Russian imperialists hope to use 
these religious interests for political ends. 

Solutions that Have Been Proposed and What They 

Mean 

1. Status Quo Ante Bellum. 

This would mean Syria as a part of the Turkish Empire, 
with continued discontent among nearly all parts of the popu- 
lation under Turkish rule. Turkey would be satisfied with 
this solution, and so long as Turkey was friendly to the Cen- 
tral powers, it would satisfy Germany and Austria-Hungary. 
It would greatly displease England and France and in a lesser 
degree Russia. 



294 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

2. German Controlled Syria as Part of a German Con- 

trolled Turkey. 
This would be an important step toward German imperialist 
dreams of domination of the Near East and possibly Africa. 
It would be bitterly opposed by England and France and to 
a lesser degree by Russia. 

3. Annexation of Syria to France. 

This would be welcomed by most of the Christian minority, 
especially the Maronites of Lebanon, with their traditional 
dependence upon France. It would probably be resented at 
first by the Mohammedan majority, although France has been 
so successful in handling kindred peoples in northern Africa 
that she might reconcile them to French rule. It would be 
opposed by Turkey and the Central powers. While England 
might not formally object to it, English imperialists would 
probably regret that it was not under English rule. 

4. Annexation of Syria to England. 

This is desired by British imperialists as part of their 
Cape-Cairo-Calcutta dream. It would be the last link save 
Mesopotamia in the chain of India, Baluchistan, southern Per- 
sia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Egypt. It would also give 
England control of the whole Arabian peninsula by isolating 
it from all foreign influence, and by inclosing it within British 
controlled territory and British controlled seas. This would 
imply a veiled protectorate of the holy places, Mecca and 
Medina, and thus a strong British hold over the entire Mos- 
lem world. 

5. Annexation of Syria to Egypt. 

This would be in many ways the carrying out of a tendency 
that has existed for ages. On numerous occasions (the Pha- 
raohs, the Mamelukes, and Mehemet Ali) Syria has fallen 
under Egyptian control, and Syria is in fact the first logical 
possession for an expanding and aspiring Egypt. Such an 



SYRIA 295 

Egyptian control of Syria would at first connote English over- 
control, but would also contain the germ of an Egypto-Arab 
Empire to which the khedival dynasty of Egypt has been 
long secretly aspiring. 

6. Syria as Part of a Pan-Arahia. 

This is the dream of most of the Mohammedan Arab or 
Arabized population of Syria, as well as Pan-Arabians every- 
where. Their ultimate goal is a great empire uniting all the 
peoples of Arab blood and culture from Morocco to Persia 
and from Mesopotamia to Central Africa. Such a Pan- 
Arabian empire would probably be opposed by all European 
states. (Present references by statesmen to a free and inde- 
pendent Arabia mean merely the Arabian peninsula, with 
possibly Syria and Egypt added and even these under Euro- 
pean veiled control as guarantees.) 

A genuine Pan-Arabian empire would menace all Euro- 
pean possessions in Asia and Africa and would risk conjuring 
up the specter of a militant Pan-Islamism against European 
Christendom. 

7. Palestine Erected Into a Jewish State. 

This could come about only through control of Syria by 
some European power or powers or by an international con- 
cert. 

The number of Jews in Palestine is to-day so small and 
their position so artificial a product of Zionist stimulation 
that further immigration of Jews could come only through 
large capitalization by wealthy Jews throughout the world. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Alonzo, A. La Russie en Palestine. Paris, 190L 

Azoury, N. Le Reveil de la Nation arabe dans I'Asie turque. Paris, 

1905. 
Baldensperger, P. J. The Immovable East: Studies of the People and 

Customs of Palestine. London, 1913. 



296 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Bambus, W. Paliistina, Land und Leute. Leipzig, 1898. 

Bassim, C. G. La Question du Liban. Paris, 1915. 

Bell, G. L. The Desert and the Sown. London, 1907. 

Bliss, F, J. The Religions of Modern Syria and Palestine. New York, 

1912. 
Contenson, L. de. Lea Reformes en Turquie d'Asie: La Question 

arm#nienne, La Question syrienne. Paris, 1913. 
Cressaty, Comte. La Syrie frangaise. Paris, 1916. 
Gallois, E. Asie-Mineure et Syrie. Paris, 1909. 
Goodrich-Freer, A. In a Syrian Saddle. London, 1905. 
Hill, G. With Bedouins: A Narrative of Journeys in unfrequented 

Parts of Syria. London, 1891. 
Humann, 0. Reisen in Nord-Syrien. Berlin, 1890. 
Leach, C. The Romance of the Holy Land. London, 1911. 
Leary, L. G. Syria, the Land of Lebanon. New York, 1913. 
Lees, G. R. Village Life in Palestine. London, 1905. 
Libbey, W. The Jordan Valley and Petra. New York, 1906. 
Moutran, N. La Syrie de demain. Paris, 1916. 

Nawratski, C. Die Jiidische Kolonization Palastinas. Munich, 1914. 
Oberhummer, R. Dureh Syrien und Kleinasien. Leipzig, 1898. 
Oppenheim, M. von. Vom Mittelmeer zum persischen Golfe durch den 

Hauran. (2 vols.) Berlin, 1899-1900. 
Richard, H. La Syrie et la Guerre. Paris, 1916. 
Roederer, C. La Syrie et la France. Paris, 1917. 
Treves, Sir F. The Land that is Desolate. An Account of a Tour in 

Palestine. London, 1912. 
Verney, N. Lea Puissances gtrangeres dans le Levant, en Syrie et en 

Palestine. Paris, 1900. 
Yahya Siddyk. Le Reveil des Peuples islamiques au XIV Sifecle de 

I'Hggire. Cairo, 1907. 



THE NEAR EAST 
MESOPOTAMIA 



See Map of the Near East on page 252 



CHAPTER XX 
MESOPOTAMIA 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 

As Egypt is the gift of the Nile, so Mesopotamia is the cre- 
ation of the Tigris and the Euphrates. The great twin rivers, 
bursting out of the snow-clad Armenian highlands to the 
north, have deposited their abundant silt in the course of 
their southward flow, and during unnumbered ages have 
transformed what was originally a long arm of the sea into 
a vast alluvial plain stretching from the Armenian highlands 
to the Persian Gulf and filling in the whole wide depression 
between the Persian mountains on the east and the sterile 
Arabian plateau on the west. The Persian Gulf, into which 
the Tigris and the Euphrates finally discharge themselves', is 
merely the diminished remnant of the ancient sea which once 
stretched to the very foot-hills of the Armenian mountains. 

The Mesopotamian plain, being one vast alluvial deposit, 
holds possibilities of marvelous fertility. A rational distri- 
bution of the river waters can easily make its rich soil bear 
diverse crops of incredible yield. Accordingly, whenever a 
strong and intelligent government has controlled it, Meso- 
potamia has become one of the garden-spots of the world, 
studded with magnificent cities and supporting a dense popu- 
lation. Such it was in the ancient days of Nineveh and Baby- 
lon; such again in the early Middle Ages under Haroun-al- 
Raschid, the mighty Calif of Bagdad. 

Its present miserable condition dates from the terrible 
Mongol invasion of the thirteenth century, which desolated the 
whole country and slew its industrious population. Since 

299 



300 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

then no strong, intelligent government has arisen to repair 
the irrigation canals; so the land has gone to waste, parched 
during the dry months of low water, soaked to fever-stricken 
marsh in the season of river-floods. Its present inhabitants 
are a mere handful of Arabized mongrels, who cling to a 
sprinkling of wretched villages, cowed by swarms of nomad 
Bedouin Arabs crowding in from the great desert to the west 
and pasturing their flocks and camels on the sites of ancient 
fields. 

Turkish authority is confined mostly to the towns, for, al- 
though Mesopotamia has formed part of the Ottoman Empire 
since the seventeenth century, the Turks have never acquired 
more than a superficial hold upon the land. Outside the 
towns political power is exercised by local Arab sheiks and 
by the heads of the great Bedouin tribes, 

ECONOMIC SURVEY 

Mesopotamia is a land of immense economic possibilities 
ruined by centuries of misgovernment and neglect. As might 
be expected from a region built up mainly by alluvial de- 
posits, Mesopotamia is devoid of mineral wealth save for some 
bitumen and petroleum deposits on the middle Tigris. It is 
also a treeless country, with the exception of some sparse 
growth along the river-banks and the palm-groves of the ex- 
treme south, near the Persian Gulf. 

Mesopotamia is thus predestined to be an agricultural coun- 
try. Nevertheless, nature must be supplemented by man. 
Mesopotamia's rainfall is not sufficient for regular agricul- 
ture. The winter rains clothe the land with rich herbage, 
but by midsummer this is burned up, and the country takes on 
the appearance of a desert. The key to Mesopotamia's agri- 
cultural wealth is the water of the great rivers, the Tigris and 
the Euphrates. This water, however, needs the artificial dis- 
tribution that an elaborate irrigation system would provide. 



MESOPOTAMIA 301 

With such a system installed, there would be almost no 
limit to the productivity of the soil. Every kind of cereal 
can be grown, especially in the north, while the southern por- 
tion of Mesopotamia would offer ideal conditions for sub- 
tropical staples, notably cotton and rice. At present the only 
important product of Mesopotamia is dates. 

In default of agriculture, Mesopotamia is to-day mainly a 
pastoral region. Here the Arab tribes find excellent spring 
pasturage for their sheep and goats, while camels also abound. 

As to industrial life, it is virtually non-existent. 

THE FACTS ABOUT MESOPOTAMIA 

Where Mesopotamia is Located 

Mesopotamia is the region of the alluvial plains of the 
Tigris and the Euphrates rivers lying between the Persian 
plateau and the Arabian desert, and stretching from the Ar- 
menian highlands to the Persian Gulf. 

Territorial. Units Involved 

Mesopotamia, which includes the vilayets of Mosul, Bagdad, 
and Basra, has an area of 143,250 square miles, or about the 
size of Montana. Its population is about 2,000,000. 

Different Races in Mesopotamia 

The Arais are found throughout, except in the extreme 
north and northeast of the region. Racially the population 
of Mesopotamia is very mixed, but centuries of Arab inva- 
sions and immigrations, together with Islam and the general 
use of the Arab language, have pretty thoroughly Arabized 
the mass of the population. Owing to the general decay of 
agriculture, a large part of the population are nomads or 
semi-nomads with Arab tribal organizations. 

The Kurds are found in the north and northeast of the 
region. Flowing down from the Armenian highlands, they 



302 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

occupy the foot-hills, in some places extending out into the 
Mesopotamian plain itself. They are nomadic, lawless, and 
primitive. 

The Turks are found throughout the region. They are 
almost exclusively officials and soldiers. They are politically 
dominant in the cities and settled districts, though the local 
Arab sheikhs have much authority, while the nomad tribes 
are virtually independent. 

The Persians are found in central Mesopotamia, especially 
about Bagdad. Mesopotamia was for centuries under Per- 
sian rule. Also, some of the Shiite sacred places are in this 
region, and are visited by hosts of Persian pilgrims. Thus a 
considerable Persian population, especially religious officials, 
merchants, and artisans, has accumulated. Persian influence 
is evident throughout the vilayet of Bagdad. 

The Assyrian Christians are found in a few scattered locali- 
ties. They are the only self-conscious remnant of the older 
populations. They have been kept from complete Arabization 
through their Christian faith. They are few in numbers, 
depressed, and persecuted. They exert no distinct influence 
on the general life of the country. 

Who Controlled Mesopotamia Before the War 
Turkey. 

Who Has Controlled or Occupied Mesopotaml*. Since 
THE War Began 

Southern Mesopotamia has been under British military 
control from the Persian Gulf to a point some distance above 
Bagdad. Northern Mesopotamia is still Turkish. 

England's Interests in Mesopotamia 

Political. English control of Mesopotamia would make her 
clearly predominant in the Middle East. Already possessing 



MESOPOTAMIA 303 

Egypt and India and controlling southern Persia, British pos- 
session of Mesopotamia would virtually insure the linking up 
of all these regions overland by a trans-Asian railroad from 
Cairo to Calcutta. And this, in turn, would isolate Arabia 
from direct contact with any other foreign power, thereby 
insuring British hegemony throughout the peninsula and a 
more or less veiled control of Islam's holy places, Mecca and 
Medina. That would give England, already the greatest 
Moslem power, the virtual hegemony of the Moslem world. 
British control of Mesopotamia would also do much to allay 
Indian unrest by opening a field for India's congested popu- 
lation in a Mesopotamia regenerated by irrigation and good 
government. Such a Mesopotamia could support many times 
its present very sparse nomadic population. 

Economic. In English hands Mesopotamia might become 
one of the granaries of the empire and one of its chief cotton- 
growing areas. It might also serve as an outlet for India's 
congested population. 

Strategic. As stated under England's political interest, 
British control of Mesopotamia would supply the missing 
link in England's chain of Eastern empire from Cairo to Cal- 
cutta. It would also buttress her sea-power by absolutely 
precluding any land threat to the Persian Gulf, a very vul- 
nerable spot in Britain's naval armor. 

Racial. England has no direct racial interest in Meso- 
potamiia. 

Cultural. None. 

Religious. England is already the greatest Mohammedan 
power in the world. Mesopotamia, by assuring British con- 
trol of Arabia and the holy places, Mecca and Medina, would 
greatly enhance English prestige throughout the Mohamme- 
dan world. Furthermore, possession of the Shiite holy places 
in Mesopotamia, Kerbela, for instance, would increase British 
prestige and strengthen her hold over the Shiite Persians. 



304 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Germany's Interests in Mesopotamia 

Political. Germany desires to obtain indirect possession of 
Mesopotamia through a German-controlled Turkey. This 
would mean a firm base of German power driven down be- 
tween Egypt and Persia to the Persian Gulf. That would 
involve a general threat to English predominance in the Mid- 
dle East. It would also mean for Germany the possibility of 
controlling Arabia and the holy cities, Mecca and Medina, 
thus gaining great prestige for Germany throughout the 
Mohammedan world. 

Economic. The enormous possibilities of Mesopotamia as 
a wheat-raising and cotton-growing country make its control 
especially desirable for a central Europe such as Germany 
dreams of heading. This would satisfy two of Germany's 
chief desires, for which she has previously been obliged to look 
overseas, thus making her relatively immune to the economic 
strangulation of British sea-power. Possession of Mesopo- 
tamia would also give Germany a base for the economic pene- 
tration of Persia. 

Strategic. Control of Mesopotamia would give Germany a 
good military base for operation against Persia and, through 
Persia, against India. It would also enable her to threaten 
British sea-power in the East by giving Germany a good naval 
base on the Persian Gulf. 

Cultural. None. 

Religious. Germany has no direct religious interest in 
Mesopotamia, but, indirectly, control of Mesopotamia would 
give Germany much influence in the Mohammedan world. 

Turkey's Interests in Mesopotamia 

The great value of Mesopotamia in every respect makes 
Turkey's interest in retaining this important part of its do- 
minion self-evident. 



MESOPOTAMIA 305 

Eussia's Interests in Mesopotamia 

Some Russian imperialists dream of annexing Mesopotamia 
and driving down to the Persian Gulf, after having annexed 
Armenia and Persia, thus insuring Russian domination of 
the Middle East. 

Solutions that Have Been Proposed and What Thet 

Mean 

1. Status Quo Ante Bellum. 

This would mean Mesopotamia's being part of a German- 
controlled Turkey. This would satisfy Turkey and Germany, 
but would be bitterly opposed by England, and would prob- 
ably run counter to the present desires of the native popu- 
lation which, so far as it has any self-consciousness, is Arab 
and anti-Turkish. 

2. Annexation of Mesopotamia to the British Empire. 
This would mean a real asset to English power politically, 

economically, and strategically. Probably the native popu- 
lation would not at first take kindly to British rule, as they 
are in reality opposed to the rule of any foreign power and 
wedded to their anarchic independence. This would not, 
however, be a serious factor, since the native population is 
small, semi-savage, and racially inarticulate. 

3. Mesopotamia as Part of a Pan-Arah Empire. 

This solution is the one the native population would prob- 
ably prefer, but it would be bitterly opposed by all the Euro- 
pean powers and Turkey, since such an empire would threaten 
both Europeans and Turks throughout the Near and Middle 
East. 



306 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Fraser, D. The Short Cut to India; the Record of a Journey Along 
the Route of the Badgad Railway. Edinburg, 1909. 

Menant, J. Les Yezidis. Paris, 1892. 

Oppenheim, M. von. Vom Mittelmeer zum persischen Golfe. (2 
vols.) Berlin, 1899-1900. 

Sachau, E. Am Euphrat und Tigris. Berlin, 1900. 

Soane, E. B. To Mesopotamia and Kurdistan in Disguise. London, 
1912. 

Strange, G. le. The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate. London, 1905. 

Winckler, H. Die Euphratlander. Leipzig, 1905. 



THE NEAR EAST 
ARABIA 



See Map of tlie Near East on page 252 



CHAPTER XXI 
ARABIA 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 

Arabia is a vast plateau, bounded by the Persian Gulf on 
the east, the Indian Ocean on the south, and the Red Sea on 
the west. Its northern or land frontier is rather indeter- 
minate, the sterile wastes of northern Arabia melting im- 
perceptibly into the Mesopotamian region to the northeast 
and the Syrian region to the northwest. 

Taken as a whole, Arabia is a desert land, though there are 
some regions that are comparatively well favored by nature. 
The best parts of Arabia lie in the south. In the extreme 
southeast and southwest the lofty mountains of Oman and 
Yemen, respectively, rise high enough to catch the monsoon 
rains, so that these regions enjoy a fairly abundant water- 
supply, which makes possible regular cultivation and supports 
a settled agricultural population. Between these two favored 
coast regions stretches a vast, sandy desert almost devoid of 
life. 

Central Arabia, though possessing no large fertile areas 
like Oman and Yemen, contains many oases that support a 
settled population, while much of its territory has sufficient 
rainfall to give pasturage to sheep and camels during certain 
seasons of the year. This is the homeland of the pastoral 
Bedouins who roam over its wide stretches. 

Northern Arabia is less favored. It is not so inhospitable 
as the great southern desert, but it has a lighter rainfall than 
the central belt and contains fewer oases. 

Arabia is probably the original home of the Semitic branch, 

309 



310 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

of the human species, and the Bedouin Arabs of the interior 
are to-day the purest representatives of the Semitic race. 
The Arabs possess many high qualities. Their physical 
make-up is remarkably fine and their intellectual powers are 
great. Their chief weakness is a general instability and in- 
capacity for political association, which has kept them divided 
and weak during the greater part of their history. Only once 
have they played a major part in world affairs. This was 
when their great genius Mohammed succeeded in fusing them 
into a temporary political and spiritual unity, which carried 
Arab arms and Arab civilization from France to China. 

This mighty Arab outpouring of the seventh century a. d. 
was not enduring. But the Arabs set their mark on every 
portion of the Mohammedan world, and the memories of this 
time are enshrined in every Arab heart. Prom that day to 
this the Arabs have regarded themselves as a chosen people, 
and a series of politico-religious movements have swept the 
peninsula looking to the reestablishment of Arab power in the 
world. 

The most recent of these movements had its roots in the 
Wahabite propaganda of the eighteenth century. This was 
primarily a religious revival aiming at the purification of 
Islam from various abuses into which Mohammedanism had 
fallen, but it soon acquired a political and even nationalistic 
complexion. The Wahabites found both coasts of Arabia un- 
der the power of the Turks, who were always regarded by the 
Arabs as a barbarous and inferior people. The aim of the 
Wahabites was to free Arabia, rescue the holy cities, Mecca 
axid Medina, from Turkish pollution, and reforge the Arab 
race into a conquering theocracy for the triumph of Islam 
throughout the world. For a while they were successful. By 
the end of the eighteenth century the Turks were virtually 
driven from Arabia. However, the Turkish sultan now called 
upon Mehemet Ali, the new ruler of Egypt, and Mehemet 
All's European-drilled troops defeated the Wahabites aaid 



ARABIA 311 

established Egyptian control over a great part of the penin- 
sula. The permanent retention of Arabia, however, proved 
too great a task. The Egyptian garrisons were withdrawn, 
and the Turkish Empire, then reviving under European re- 
forms, regained its former grip on the coast provinces both 
to the east and the west. 

The interior, however, remained independent, and con- 
tinued a seat of Wahabite religious teaching, and the Waha- 
bite leaven continually stirred the coastal populations to re- 
volt against Turkish rule. 

During the nineteenth century another foreign influence, 
England, became increasingly potent in southern Arabia. 
During that period England established herself at Aden, the 
extreme southwestern tip of Arabia, and brought under Eng- 
lish control the opposite region of Oman, at the entrance to 
4he Persian Gulf. From these two foci British influence radi- 
ated over a wide zone, particularly in the east, the Persian 
Gulf region becoming virtually a British sphere of influence 
throughout. 

The present war immediately produced a test of strength 
between the Turks and the British to determine their respec- 
tive positions in Arabia. The Turks attempted to drive the 
British from Aden, while the British clinched their mastery 
of the Persian Gulf region by landing an army at the head 
of the gulf and undertaking the conquest of Mesopotamia. 
As time passed, the British gradually got the upper hand, and 
in the summer of 1916 Turkish power in Arabia was dealt a 
crushing blow by the revolt of the Grand Shereef of Mecca, 
a religious potentate who led his people to the expulsion of 
the hated Turks. At the close of 1916, the Shereef, with 
British backing, declared himself Sultan of Arabia, and to-day 
Turkish power throughout the peninsula is virtually at an 
end. 

As things now stand, British influence is paramount 
throughout Arabia. But in the long run British as well as 



312 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Turkish influence is menaced by the growth of Arab nation- 
alistic sentiment, which, founded on the puritan zealotry of 
the Wahabites, has taken on an increasing political complexion 
since the beginning of the twentieth century. This movement 
is known as Pan-Arabism. Its adherents are found not only 
in Arabia proper, but among the Arabized populations of 
Syria, Mesopotamia, Egypt, and wide stretches of northern 
Africa. Its thinkers dream of a great Arab empire, which 
will expel all foreigners and revive the glories of an Arab- 
controlled Islam. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Avril, A. d'. L'Arabie contemporaine. Paris, 1900. 

Briinnow, R. E., and Domaszewski, A. von. Die Provincia Arabia. (3 

vols.) Strassburg, 1904-1909. 
Hell, J. Die Kultur der Araber. Leipzig, 1909. 
LeBon, G. La Civilisation des Arabes. Paris, 1884. 
Zwemer, S. M. Arabia, the Cradle of Islam. Edinburgh, 1900. 

ECONOMIC SURVEY 

In proportion to its vast extent, the economic value of 
Arabia is slight, great stretches of country being absolute 
lesert, while other large regions are sterile plateau sparsely 
tufted with scrub and wiry grasses which give pasture to 
sheep and goats at certain seasons. 

The only two regions of real fertility are Yemen and Oman. 
Endowed with good soil and a sufficient rainfall, these dis- 
tricts produce valuable agricultural crops. The coffee of 
Yemen is noted throughout the world. In both Yemen and 
Oman cereals, especially wheat, barley, and millet, are ex- 
tensively cultivated. Outside of a few districts in Yemen 
there are no forests ; but the date-palm grows readily through- 
out the peninsula, wherever there is any water, and is one of 
the great food staples of the country. The aromatic gums 
for which Arabia was famous in antiquity are to-day but little 
grown. 



ARABIA 313 

As befits a pastoral eoimtry, Arabia supports numberless 
flocks of sheep and goats, which, with the camel, form the 
chief wealth of the Bedouin tribes. Contrary to general be- 
lief, the horse is not so abundant as the camel, its dependence 
upon comparatively rich pasturage mailing its extensive breed- 
ing impracticable. In the agricultural areas, especially 
Yemen, horned cattle are found. 

The mineral wealth of Arabia is not great, and what little 
there is has been very imperfectly explored. 

Industrial life, save for a few local house-industries, does 
not exist. 

THE FACTS ABOUT ARABIA 
Where Arabia is Located 

Arabia is the peninsula bounded by Syria and Mesopotamia 
on the north, the Persian Gulf on the east, the Indian Ocean 
on the south, and the Red Sea on the west. 

Territorial Units Involved 

Turkish Arabia, which includes the vilayets of Hejaz 
and Yemen, has an area of 170,300 square miles and a popu- 
lation of 1,050,000. Since the summer of 1916 these provinces 
have been in revolt, and Turkish rule over them has virtually 
ceased. The leader of the rebellion, the Grand Shereef of 
Mecca, has proclaimed his independence and declared these 
provinces to constitute the Sultanate of Arabia. The vilayet 
of Nejd comprises the vast interior of middle Arabia, includ- 
ing a district on the Persian Gulf coast. It is a mere name, 
since Turkey exercises no authority in the region, all power 
being in the hands of local chieftains. The whole matter is 
the result of a political bargain struck in 1914 between the 
Turkish Government and the most powerful native chieftain, 
Abdul-Aziz Bin Saud, who theoretically recognized Turkish 
authority, and was thereupon appointed Vali. 



314 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

British Arabia, which includes the Aden protectorate, with 
an area of 9000 square miles and a population of 46,000, and 
the Oman protectorate, with an area of 82,000 square miles 
and a population of 500,000. 

Independent Arabia, which includes the whole vast in- 
terior, as well as part of the Persian Gulf coast. It includes 
the so-called Vilayet of Nejd, The most powerful ruler is 
Bin Saud, referred to above. Its area is 1,000,000 square 
miles. Its population is estimated at 3,500,000. 

Arabia has therefore a total area of about 1,200,000 square 
miles, or about one third the total area of the United States, 
and a population estimated at about 5,000,000. 

Different Eaces in Arabia 

The Arabs may be put down as constituting the essential 
population of the whole peninsula except for a small Jewish 
element that has been settled in Arabia since very ancient 
times. In southern Arabia, however, the Semitic type is much 
mixed with Hamitic and negroid elements from Africa. 

Who Controlled Arabia Before the War 

Turkish Arabia was under the control of Turkey. 

British Arabia was under the control of England. 

Independent Arabia was under the control of local chief- 
tains, the central region of Nejd being mostly united under 
the authority of Bin Saud. 

Who Has Controlled or Occupied Arabia Since the War 

Began 

At the end of 1914, Turkish troops overran most of the 
Aden protectorate, but this Turkish occupation ended with 
the collapse of Turkish authority upon the successful revolt 
of the Shereef of Mecca in the summer of 1916. The west 
coast (vilayets of Hejaz and Yemen), including the holy cities 
of Mecca and Medina, now constitute the Sultanate of Arabia. 



ARABIA 315 

This new Arab state has been recognized and is supported by 
England, but is, of course, not recognized by Turkey. Inde- 
pendent Arabia has not changed its status. Bin Saud, ruler 
of Nejd, has apparently maintained an attitude of neutrality. 

Turkey's Interests in Arabia 

Political. In the ordinary sense Turkey's interests politi* 
cally are not great. 

The possession of her portion of Arabia has been more of 
a burden than a benefit. It is through her possession of the 
holy places, Mecca and Medina, that she is able to exert influ- 
ences upon pilgrims from all parts of the Mohammedan world, 
and these influences are a political, as well as a religious, 
asset. 

Economic. Virtually none. Economic benefits are more 
than offset by the expense of maintaining Turkish authority. 

Strategic. In a defensive sense Turkish Arabia is a lia- 
bility rather than an asset ; but to Ottoman imperialists Turk- 
ish Arabia offers necessary territorial bases for assaults upon 
Egypt and the Persian Gulf region and for the possible Turk- 
ish conquest of the entire Arabian peninsula. 

Racial. None. 

Cultural. In the strict sense, none. While Arab culture 
has profoundly influenced Turkish culture, it has not been 
influenced by Turkish culture. 

Religious. This is the great interest Turkey has in Arabia. 
Possession of Mecca and Medina is of incalculable importance 
to the Mohammedan Turks. 

England's Interests in Arabia 

Political. England regards her possession of Aden as a 
necessary pendant to her control of Egypt and the Suez Canal 
and as an indispensable way-station on her route to the Far 
East. She regards her protectorate over Oman and the east 
coast of the Arabian Peninsula as necessary to her dominance 



316 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

of the Persian Gulf. Lastly, British imperialists desire to 
control the entire Arabian Peninsula as a link in the projected 
chain of empire from Cairo to Calcutta, and as a means of 
strengthening the hold on England's Mohammedan subjects 
through a veiled control of the holy cities. 

Economic. Under strong government such as England 
could give, Yemen, and to a lesser degree, other parts of the 
peninsula would admit of a greater economic development 
than now prevails. 

Strategic. The possession of the Arabian peninsula would 
insure English predominance throughout the Middle East, 
would almost certainly involve England's possession of Meso- 
potamia and Syria, and would make possible a trans-Asian 
railroad from Cairo to Calcutta, which would solidly knit 
England's Asian and African dominions into a firm band of 
empire. 

Racial. None. 

Cultural. None. 

Religious. Since England to-day rules over more Moham- 
medans than any other power, control of the holy places would 
heighten her influence over her Moslem subjects and the en- 
tire Moslem world. 

Germany's Interests in Arabia 

Germany does not aspire to direct control of Arabia, but 
does desire veiled control of Arabia as part of a rejuvenated 
and German-directed and exploited Turkish Empire, with all 
that this implies of dominance in the Near East, influence 
throughout the Moslem world, and threats to England's East- 
ern empire. 

Solutions that Have Been Proposed and What They 

Mean 

1. Status Quo Ante Bellum. 

As to the Turkish part of Arabia, this would mean a con- 



ARABIA 317 

tinuous condition of unrest under a rule which the inhabitants 
dislike. 

As to the British part of Arabia, it would mean that the 
unsettled condition of the rest of the peninsula would be a 
temptation to British imperialism. 

As to the independent part of Arabia, this would mean the 
continuance of a favorable center for Pan-Arabia and Pan- 
Islam agitation. 

It would mean the continuance of an unstable condition 
throughout. 

2. British Controlled Arabia. 

This would mean a strengthening of the British Empire 
throughout the East and the bringing of Arabia within the 
pale of Western civilization under strong government and 
rational economic exploitation. But it would probably meet 
with the bitter hostility of the native population, and might 
provoke Pan-Islamic and Pan-Arabic activity, which might 
react unfavorably far beyond the bounds of the peninsula 
itself. 

3. Turkish Controlled Arabia. 

It is difficult to believe that an Ottoman Empire left to its 
own resources, could retain permanent control of the entire 
peninsula. In the face of the hostility of the native popula- 
tion to Turkish rule, the strain would probably prove too 
great. 

4. Arabia Under Veiled German Control. 

A German-controlled Ottoman Empire would have the 
power to conquer and maintain control over Arabia and give 
it economic development. The fact that the nominal owner 
of Arabia would be Turkey would probably prevent native 
discontent from assuming a Pan-Islamic complexion. But 
the discontent would be none the less bitter, and it could rely 



318 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

upon the support of England, who could be counted upon to 
oppose a German control of Arabia. 

5. Independent Arabia. 

A truly independent state, confined to the limits of the 
Arabian Peninsula, is probably not feasible. The present 
poverty of the country and the traditional political instability 
of the Arabs themselves would probably prevent the establish- 
ment of such a polity. 

6. Arabia as Part of a Pan-Arah Empire. 

This would imply the union of the Arabian peninsula, 
Syria, Mesopotamia, and very probably northern Africa into 
a state, the fundamental bases of which would be the unity 
of the Arab race and culture inspired by Islam. This reli- 
gious sanction would probably be the only moral basis upon 
which such an empire could be effectuated. The presence of 
such comparatively rich and civilized areas as Syria and 
Egypt would give the state a nucleating center of stable eco- 
nomic, political, and intellectual life, not possessed by the 
limited Arabian state projected above. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Azoury, N. Le Reveil de la Nation arabe dans I'Asie Turque. Paris, 
1905. 

Bent, J. T. Southern Arabia. London, 1900. 

Blunt, Lady A. A Pilgrimage to Nejd, the Cradle of the Arab Eace. 
London, 1881. 

Bury, G. W. Arabia Infelix, or the Turks in Yemen. London, 1915. 

Cart, L. Au Sinai et dans I'Arabie Petree. Neufchatel, 1915. 

Doughty, C. M. Wanderings in Arabia. London, 1908. 

Euting, J. Tagebuch einer Eeise in Inner-Arabien. Leyden, 1914. 

Gazanfer Ali Khan. With the Pilgrims to Mecca: The Great Pilgrim- 
age of A. H. 1319 (A. D. 1902). London, 1905. 

Griessbauer, L. Die Internationalen Verkehrs- und Maehtfragen an den 
Kiisten Arabiens. Berlin, 1907. 

Hadji Khan. With the Pilgrims to Mecca. London, 1905. 



ARABIA 319 

Hirseh, L. Reisen in Siid-Arabien und Hadramut. Leyden, 1897. 
Hogarth, D. G. The Penetration of Arabia. London, 1904. 
Huber, C. Journal d'un Voyage en Arabia. Paris, 1891. 
Hurgronje, S. The Revolt in Arabia. New York, 1917. 
Jung, E. Les Puissances devant la Revolte arabe. Paris, 1906. 
Musil, A. Arabia Petraea. Vienna, 1907. 
Mygind, E. Syrien und die Mekkapilgerbahn. Halle, 1906. 
Oppenheim, M. von. Vom Mittelmeer zum persischen Golfe durch den 

Hauran. (2 vols.) Berlin, 1899-1900. 
Schmidt, W. Das siidwestliche Arabien. Frankfort, 1914. 
Wavell, A. J. B. A Modern Pilgrimage to Mecca. London, 1912. 
Yahya Siddyk. Le Reveil des Peuples islamiques au XIV Sifecle de 

I'Hegire. Cairo, 1907. 



THE NEAR EAST 
EGYPT 



See Map of the Near East on page 252 



CHAPTER XXII 
EGYPT 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 

Egypt is the gift of the Nile. Without this current of life- 
giving water pouring down from the distant Abyssinian high- 
lands and traversing hundreds of leagues of waterless coun- 
try until it finally empties into the Mediterranean there would 
be nothing to distinguish the Nile Valley from the vast deserts 
which stretch away on either hand to east and west. 

Along the banks of the Nile and in the broad Delta which 
the river has gradually built out into the Mediterranean an 
industrious agricultural population has been established since 
prehistoric times. Isolated for ages from the rest of the 
world, the Egyptians developed a strongly marked racial 
identity which has persisted almost unchanged to the present 
day. The Persian Conquest (521 b. c.) ended the period of 
native rule, and ever since the Egyptians have been ruled by 
a long series of foreign masters. But beneath all these shift- 
ing foreign administrations, Persian, Macedonian, Roman, 
Arab, JMameluke, and Turk, has lain the great mass of Egyp- 
tian peasantry, the fellaheen, unchanged and unchanging; 
and finally the alien intruders have been absorbed into the 
Egyptian type. The physical and mental make-up of the 
modern fellah is to all appearances precisely that of his re- 
mote ancestor who sweated under the task-masters of Pharaoh. 

The modern history of Egypt really dates from the French 
invasion under Napoleon in 1796. Though the French were 
expelled in 1801, they had impressed the Egyptian upper 

323 



324 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

classes with the power and superiority of European methods, 
and when during the troubled years which followed the 
French evacuation the able Albanian adventurer Mehemet Ali 
made himself mas.ter of the country, he strenuously endeav- 
ored to turn Egypt into a regular modern state. During his 
long reign (1805-1848) he forced the Sultan of Turkey to 
abandon all direct interference with Egyptian affairs and to 
recognize him and his successors as hereditary rulers of Egypt 
under a merely nominal Turkish suzerainty, Egypt thus be- 
coming virtually an independent state. 

Mehemet Ali's successors shared his ambitions, but lacked 
his sense of proportion. Khedive Ismail in particular 
strained Egypt's resources by his attempts to build up a great 
Sudanese empire and plunged his country into debt to Euro- 
pean financiers. In 1879, Egypt went bankrupt. Accord- 
ingly England and France intervened in the interest of the 
European creditors, deposed Ismail, and established a "dual 
control" of the country. The situation was soon complicated 
by a native rebellion headed by Arabi Pasha, the rebels seek- 
ing to expel the Europeans and raising the cry of "Egypt 
for the Egyptians!" Faced by this critical situation, France 
hesitated, but England took decisive measures. A British 
army crushed Arabi Pasha at the battle of Tel-el-Kebir in 
1882 and established that British protectorate which has per- 
sisted to the present day. 

This protectorate was at first carefully veiled. Khedives 
of the Mehemet Ali dynasty nominally governed the country, 
British authority being exercised by an English "financial 
adviser" — whose advice was always taken. From 1883 to 1907 
this adviser was Lord Cromer, an extremely able man, who 
raised Egypt from bankruptcy to prosperity. 

Despite the material successes of British rule, however, 
Egypt has been growing increasingly restive under British 
control. The cry of "Egypt for the Egyptians!" first raised 
by Arabi Pasha has never ceased, and a strong nationalist 



EGYPT 325 

movement seeking Egyptian independence has persisted de- 
spite all British attempts to stamp it out. 

The outbreak of the present war brought matters to a head. 
When Turkey, by joining the Teutonic powers in November, 
1914, became the enemy of England, the reigning Khedive 
Abbas Hilmi, long restive under English control, threw in his 
lot with the Turks, and a Turkish army prepared to drive the 
English from the country. But England was determined on 
no account to lose her hold on Egypt. She had come to 
regard Egypt, with the Suez Canal, as the vital middle link 
in her world empire, and she accordingly took decisive meas- 
ures to regularize her position in Egypt, hitherto rather 
anomalous from the strict legal point of view. Accordingly, 
on December 10, 1914, England issued a proclamation depos- 
ing Abbas Hilmi, appointing his cousin Hussein Kamel as 
sultan, and declaring Egypt a British protectorate. Egypt 
was thus formally incorporated within the British Empire. 

This British protectorate has been assented to by Britain's 
allies, but has not been accepted by Turkey or the Central 
Powers. Egypt's status is thus still in dispute, and will be 
determined by the outcome of the present war. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Balls, W. L. Egypt of the Egyptians. London, 1915. 

Blunt, W. S. The Secret History of the British Occupation of Egypt. 

Breasted, J. H. A History of Egypt (to the Persian Conquest). 
London, 1906. 

Brehier, L. L'Egypte de 1789 a 1900. Paris, 1901. 

Butcher, E. T. The Story of the Church of Egypt. (2 vols.) London, 
1897. 

Colvin, Sir A. The Making of Modern Egypt. London, 1906. 

Cressaty, A. L'Egypte d'aujourd'hui. Paris, 1912. 

Cromer, Earl of. Modern Egypt. (2 vols.) London, 1908. 

Cromer, Earl of. Abbas II. London, 1915. 

Cunningham, A. Today in Egypt : Its Administration, People and Pol- 
itics. London, 1912. 

Dicey, E. The Story of the Khedivate. London, 1902. 



326 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Dicey, E. The Egypt of the Future. London, 1906. 

Freycinet, C. de. La Question d'Egypte. Paris, 1905. 

Milner, A. England in Egypt. London, 1904. 

Weigall, A. E. P. A History of Egypt from 1764 to 1914. London, 

1915. 
White, A. S. The Expansion of Egypt. London, 1899. 

ECONOMIC SURVEY 

Egypt's economic life, like all its other forms of activity, 
is virtually restricted to the Delta and the narrow ribbon of 
alluvial soil on the banks of the Nile. The vast desert tracts 
to the east and west, which make up the balance of Egypt's 
political area, contribute nothing economically except dates 
from a few oases, some sheep and horses raised by the Arab 
Bedouins, and the produce of certain stone quarries and mines 
of gold and precious stones, none of these latter being of 
notable value. 

Egypt is thus overwhelmingly an agricultural country. 
The Nile silt is proverbial for its richness and the fields of 
Egypt have for ages borne heavy crops — in many regions three 
a year. The character of the crops varies greatly with the 
season. The crop which is of greatest importance to the world 
at large is cotton. Egypt is an ideal cotton-raising country 
from every point of view, and Egyptian cotton is unsurpassed 
for quality. The only thing which prevents this staple from 
acquiring still greater importance is the limited amount of 
land available for its cultivation. Egypt is also a great 
cereal-growing country, the chief cereal crops being wheat, 
corn, millet, barley, and rice. Quantities of vegetables and 
fruits of high quality are raised, much of it for export, while 
flower culture for perfumes is an occupation of some im- 
portance. 

The yield of principal crops for 1913, estimated in tons, 
stood as follows : Cotton, 379,560 ; wheat, 1,029,200 ; corn and 
millet, 1,640,000 ; barley, 245^500 ; rice, 191,000. 



EGYPT 327 

Of late years a certain industrial life in the modern sense 
has developed, chiefly at Alexandria and Cairo. Of course 
Egypt has for centuries possessed some Oriental specialties, 
silk-weaving, pottery, gem-setting, fine inlaying, and kindred 
branches. None of these have been conducted in modem fac- 
tories, however, methods of production being primitive and 
backward. During the latter part of the nineteenth century 
flour and cotton-ginning mills sprang up at many points. 
Only very recently, however, have modern factories appeared. 
These are mostly textile factories. Another industry of in- 
creasing importance is the manufacture of cigarettes. These 
are made of tobacco imported from Turkey and Greece. They 
are mainly of high quality. 

Although passing through Egyptian territory, the Suez 
Canal has comparatively little influence upon Egypt's eco- 
nomic life. Indeed, in some respects it is a detriment rather 
than a benefit, for most of the trade between Turkey and 
the Far East, which formerly broke bulk and passed across 
Egypt in transit between the Mediterranean and Red seas, 
now passes through the Suez Canal without any benefit accru- 
ing to the Egyptian people. The year before the war 5085 
vessels passed through the canal, with a tonnage of 20,033,884 
and carrying 282,235 passengers. The canal toll receipts 
were £5,140,000. 

BIBLIOGEAPHY 

Annuaire Statistique de I'Egypte. Cairo. Annual. 

Le Commerce ext^rieure de I'Egypte. Alexandria. Annual. 

Stateman's Year Book. London, Annual. 

Suez Canal : Returns of Shipping and Tonnage. London. Annual. 

Arminjou, P. La Situation gconomique et financiere de I'Egypte. 

Paris, 1911. 
Barrois, J. Les Irrigations en Egypte. 

Eid, A. La Dette hypothecaire de I'Egypte. Brussels, 1906. 
Mardon, H. W. Geography of Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Soudan. 

London, 1902. 
Roux, J. C. L'Isthme et le Canal de Suez. (2 vols.) Paris, 1901. 



328 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Roux, J. C. Le Coton en Egypte. Paris, 1908. 

Strakosch, S, Erwachende Agrarlander. Nationallandwirtschaft in 

Agypten imd im Sudan unter englisschen Einfluss. Berlin, 1910. 
Ungard, A. Der Suezkanal, seine Geschiclite, etc. Vienna, 1905. 
Willcocks, Sir W. Egyptian Irrigation. London, 1913. 

THE FACTS ABOUT EGYPT 
"Where Egypt Is Located 

In the broad sense Egypt comprises the whole territory 
between the Eed Sea and the Sahara Desert, stretching from 
the Mediterranean south to the Nubian border, and including 
the Sinai Peninsula. The area of this entire region is 350,000 
square miles, or about the combined areas of Texas and 
Arizona. Of this vast region, however, only about 12,226 
square miles in the Nile Valley and the Delta is settled area. 
Virtually all the rest is desert. The settled area, therefore, 
is about equal to the combined areas of Massachusetts and 
Connecticut. Total population, 11,189,000. 

Different Races in Egypt 

The Arahs, who constitute 971/2 per cent, of the population, 
are divided roughly into three classes or types as follows : 

The Fellaheen, who constitutes 86 per cent, of the popula- 
tion, there being a total of 8,786,000, are of the settled or 
sedentary type. They are found throughout the settled area. 
This ancient Egyptian stock has been singularly tenacious of 
its racial identity, so absorbing all its successive conquerors 
that the modern Egyptian peasant differs little in physical 
type from the peasant of the Pharaohs. But culturally he 
has been Arabized, and religiously he is a fanatical Moslem. 
He is intensely industrious, patient, and tenacious, but with 
little initiative and ultra-conservative. 

The Bedouins, who constitute 5 per cent, of the population, 
there being a total of 538,000, are of the nomad type. They 



EGYPT 329 

are found on the outskirts of the settled area and in the desert. 
They are fairly pure-blooded Arabs, who maintain the life 
and customs of their remote ancestors in Arabia. Many are 
lawless nomads. 

The Copts, who constitute Gi/o per cent, of the population, 
there being a total of 706,000, are that part of the old popu- 
lation which has partly resisted Arabizatioii through their re- 
tention of the Christian faith. They are found throughout 
the settled area, especially in the towns. They are, in the 
main, traders, usurers, and artisans. 

The Europeans, who constitute IV2 per cent, of the popu- 
lation, there being only 158,000 of them, are mostly British, 
Italian, Greek, etc. 

Who Controlled Egypt Before the "War 

England, although a fictitious Turkish suzerainty was per- 
mitted to remain. 

Who Has Controlled or Occupied Egypt Since the 
War Began 

England, except for Turkish raids on the eastern, and 
Senussi raids on the western, frontier. 

England's Interests in Egypt 

Political. England considers possession of Egypt and the 
Suez Canal as absolutely vital to the existence of the British 
Empire. 

Economic. The large foreign trade of Egypt is falling in- 
creasingly into British hands, and immense sums of British 
capital have been invested in the country. Furthermore, the 
shares of the Suez Canal Company, control of which is in 
British hands, are a very lucrative investment. 

Strategic. Egypt and the Suez Canal together form the 
keystone of Britain's arch of empire, controlling, as they do, 



330 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

the communication between East and West, and protecting, 
as Egypt does, the immense British holdings in the Soudan 
and eastern Africa. 

Racial. None. 

Cultural. None. 

Religious. None. 

France's Interests in Egypt 

Political. Since the Anglo-French agreement of 1903, 
France has abandoned her century-old ambitions toward 
Egypt in favor of England. 

Economic. Great amounts of French capital are invested 
in Egyptian bonds, Suez Canal ComiDany shares, and other 
phases of Egyptian economic life. 

Strategic. None. 

Racial. None. 

Cultural. Such European cultural influence as has been 
exerted upon the native Egyptian population has been almost 
exclusively French in character. Despite a generation of 
British political occupation, modern Egypt still has a French 
veneer. 

Religious. None. 

Turkey's Interests in Egypt 

Political. Until the British government's declaration of a 
formal protectorate . over Egypt in December, 1914, Turkey 
was legally the suzerain of Egypt. This suzerainty Turkey 
and her allies still claim. 

Turkey hopes, indeed, in ease of the victory of the Central 
Powers, to expel the English from Egypt and assume that 
direct political control which she exercised prior to the nine- 
teenth century. 

Economic. Slight. 

Strategic. Egypt and the Suez Canal in British hands, as 



EGYPT 331 

recent events have demonstrated, threaten Turkish possession 
of both Arabia and Syria. On the other hand, Turkish pos- 
session of Egypt would safeguard these possessions and would 
open the way to that reassertion of Turkish claims over 
Tripoli and other portions of northern Africa to which Turkish 
imperialists aspire. 

Racial. With the exception of a certain element in the 
Egyptian upper class, which is of Turkish blood, Turkey has 
no racial interests in Egypt. 

Cultural. None. 

Religious. Both Turks and Egyptians are Orthodox Mo- 
hammedans. 

Germany's Interests in Egypt 

Germany's ambitions regarding Egypt would be realized 
through a possible control of Turkey in possession of Egypt. 
Such a control of Egypt through Turkey would not only 
buttress Germany's position in Asia, but would also open the 
way for German imperialist ambitions to control Africa. 

Solutions that Have Been Proposed and What Thet 

Mean 

1. Status Quo. 

This means a British protectorate over Egypt, or, in other 
words, Egypt as a part of the British Empire. However the 
problem may work out, the old status, which obtained until 
December, 1914, — that is, Egypt under nominal Turkish 
suzerainty, but effective British control, — is gone beyond re- 
call. Egypt as a British protectorate would satisfy British 
desires, as well as those of Great Britain's allies. It would, 
however, leave unsatisfied the ambitions of Turkey and Ger- 
many, and would face the discontent of the nationalist ele- 
ment of the nation's population, which desires Egyptian inde- 
pendence and an end of British rule. 



332 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

2. Turkish Controlled Egypt. 

This would of necessity imply a German-controlled Otto- 
man Empire, as Turkey alone has neither the power to expel 
the British from Egypt nor the power to maintain control 
were the British expelled. 

Such a Turko-German-controUed Egypt would perhaps be 
economically as efficiently developed as under British control ; 
but German rule in Egypt would encounter the lasting oppo- 
sition of England, Prance, and probably Italy, while it would 
also face keen native discontent, for it is difficult to believe 
that the Germans would succeed better than the British in 
reconciling the native population to European tutelage. And 
native discontent has long been a serious problem for Egypt's 
British rulers. 

3. Independent Egypt. 

This would, of course, satisfy the desires of the nationalists 
and the bulk of the population, but it would be opposed by all 
European interests in Egypt, as well as by most of the Copts, 
fearful of unrestrained Mohammedan rule. It is difficult to 
believe that the Egyptians at present possess the political effi- 
ciency required to maintain Egypt's independence, 

4. Egypt as Part of a Pan-Aral) Empire. 

This would come about only as the result of a mighty out- 
burst of Islamic religious zeal, coupled with racial and cul- 
tural self-consciousness among the Arab or Arabized popula- 
tions of Arabia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Egypt, and probably 
other portions of northern Africa. It could be effected only 
in the teeth of the European world, whose colonial interests 
in both Asia and Africa would thereby be put in jeopardy. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Adams, F. The New Egypt: A Social Sketch. London, 1893. 
Crossland, C. Desert and Water Gardens of the Red Sea. London, 
1913. 



EGYPT 333 

Dunning, H. W. Today on the Nile. New York, 1905. 

Fuller, F. W. Egypt and the Hinterland. London, 1901. 

Fyffe, H. The New Spirit in Egypt. London, 1911. 

Gayet, A. Coines d'Egypte ignores. Paris, 1905. 

Guerville, A. B. de. New Egypt. London, 1905. 

Hennig, R. Der Kampf um den Suezkanal. Berlin, 1915. 

Leaage, C. L'Achat des Actions de Suez. Paris, 1906. 

Loti, P. Aegypten. Reisebilder. Berlin, 1010. 

Low, S. Egypt in Transition. London, 1914. 

Marden, P. S. Egyptian Days. London, 1914. 

Maspero, G. Ruines et Paysages d'Egypte. Paris, 1910. 

Metin, A, La Transformation de I'Egypte. Paris, 1903. 

Mieville, Sir W. Under Queen and Khedive. London, 1899. 

Reynolds-Balls, E. Cairo of Today. London, 1913. 

Rothstein, T. Egypt's Ruin. London, 1910. 

Schanz, M. Agypten. Halle, 1904. 

Scott, J. H. The Law Affecting Foreigners in Egypt. Edinburgh, 

1907. 
Servier, A. Le Nationalisme musulmane en Egypte, en Tunisie, en 

Alg^rie. Constantine, 1913. 
Todd, J. A. The Banks of the Nile. London, 1913. 
Travers-Symons, M. The Riddle of Egypt. London, 1914. 
Weigall, A. E. P. Travels in the Upper Egyptian Deserts. London, 

1909. 
Worsfold, W. B. The Redemption of Egypt. London, 1900. 
Yahya Siddyk. Le Reveil des Peuples islamiques au XIV Sifecle de 

I'Hggire. Cairo, 1907. 



THE NEAR EAST 
PERSIA 



See Map of tlie Near East on page 252 



CHAPTER XXIII 
PERSIA 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 

Persia consists essentially of a vast elevated tableland, the 
Iranian plateau, ringed about by lofty mountains. These 
mountains shut away the rain-bearing winds from the Indian 
Ocean and the Caspian Sea, so that the Iranian plateau suf- 
fers greatly from drought. Most of its interior is desert. 
The bulk of the population of Persia is concentrated in the 
vicinity of the mountains or in the oases which here and there 
break the monotony of Persia's arid plains. 

In very ancient times Persia was occupied by the Iranians, 
a branch of the Aryan race. Persia's history has ever since 
been the story of the struggle of these Iranians against the 
invasions of foreign peoples, mostly Turanian nomad hordes 
from the north. Several times the Iranians have been sub- 
dued, but as invariably they have roused themselves from 
their servitude and overcome the invaders. The Iranians 
possess a race consciousness unusually strong for an Asiatic 
people. They have ancient cultural traditions, and are to- 
day the true Persians, the nomad or semi-nomad Turanian 
Turkoman tribes which occupy the deserts and mountains hav- 
ing contributed nothing to Persian civilization. 

During the nineteenth century Persia fell into decrepitude. 
A line of effete monarchs had plunged the country into 
anarchy, while the shadow of European domination was 
slowly creeping over the land. Russia and England were both 
seeking to gain control of Persia. But with the beginning of 
the twentieth century there appeared signs of a national re- 
vival, which culminated in the revolution of 1906, at which 

337 



338 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

time the despotism of the ruling shah was overthrown, and 
Persia was endowed with the forms of a constitutional monar- 
chy. Unfortunately, the Persians displayed little aptitude 
for self-government. There followed a period of acute politi- 
cal disorder, which was complicated by Russian and British 
intrigues. Finally, in 1909, Russia and England composed 
their differences and agreed upon what amounted to a veiled 
partition of Persia, Russia taking northern Persia as her 
"sphere of influence," England the south, with a neutral 
zone between. The Russo-British agreement terrified and 
infuriated the Persian patriots, but they were helpless. The 
outbreak of the European war led many of them to turn to 
Germany and Turkey for aid against the Anglo-Russian peril. 
Since 1914 Persia has been a battle-ground of rival factions. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Alamg, I. Persia by a Persian. London, 1906. 

Aubin, E. La Perse d'aujourd'hui. Paris, 1908. 

Bassett, J. Persia, the Land of the Imams. London, 1886. 

Benjamin, S. G. W. Persia and the Persians. London, 1887. 

Browne, E. G. The Revolution in Persia. London, 1910. 

Chirol, V. The Middle Eastern Question. London, 1904. 

Cresson, W. P. Persia. London, 1906. 

Curzon, Lord. Persia and the Persian Question. (2 vols.) London, 

1892. 
Demorgny, G. La Question persane. Paris, 1916. 
Hamilton, A. Problems of the Middle East. London, 1909. 
Jackson, A. V. W. Persia, Past and Present. London, 1906. 
Shuster, W. M. The Strangling of Persia. New York, 1912. 
Stuart, D. The Struggle for Persia. London, 1902. 
Sykes, E. C. Persia and Its People. London, 1910. 
Sykes, P. M. A History of Persia. (2 vols.) London, 1915. 
Whigham, H. J. The Persian Problem. New York, 1903. 

ECONOMIC SURVEY 

The high mountain walls which surround the Iranian 
plateau on every side intercept the rain-bearing winds and 



PERSIA 339 

rob them of their moisture. For this reason the mountainous 
rim of Persia has a very heavy rain and snowfall, while the 
interior plateau suffers from drought, the central depressions 
being absolute desert. The only part of Persia possessing 
ample rainfall is the narrow coast-strip between the Caspian 
Sea and the Elburz Mountains. This region has an almost 
excessive rainfall. Its climate is hot and humid, its vegetation 
of almost tropical luxuriance. 

Persian agriculture is therefore dependent mainly upon 
the rivers which flow down from the mountains till they 
finally lose themselves in the desert. The soil of Persia is 
generally rich, and wherever water exists, all sorts of agri- 
cultural products thrive. With a rational system of reser- 
voirs and irrigation, the abundant precipitation upon the 
mountains might be made to fructify great areas of country, 
and Persia might become a flourishing agricultural region, 
with the exception of certain sand deserts and salt marshes in 
the central lowlands. Unfortunately, ages of neglect and 
bad government have rendered impossible the effective use of 
this water-supply, so that only the most naturally favored 
regions are to-day under cultivation. 

Even as it is, however, Persia produces heavy cereal crops, 
notably wheat, barley, and rice. All sorts of fruits and vege- 
tables of very high quality grow readily. Tobacco of a rather 
inferior kind is largely grown for home consumption, while 
opium is also raised both for local use and for export. An- 
other of Persia's exports is cotton. Certain local specialties 
such as aromatic gums and vegetable dyes complete the list of 
Persia 's agricultural products. 

Persia is also an important grazing-country. Great num- 
bers of sheep are raised, and Persian wool is of excellent qual- 
ity, some of it being exported. Horses, mules, and asses, 
formerly bred on an extensive scale, have to-day greatly de- 
clined in numbers mainly on account of the high cost of 
fodder. 



340 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Persia is a land of enormous mineral wealth. The moun- 
tain-ranges are stored with almost every kind of mineral and 
metal. Rich deposits of copper and lead are found in nearly 
every part of the country, and huge deposits of iron ore exist 
in several localities. Coal is found near Teheran, and valu- 
able seams outcrop in the southeastern provinces. One of the 
richest oil-fields in the world is found in southeast Persia, 
and a subsidiary field exists in the north. Besides these prin- 
cipal mineral resources, antimony, borax, cobalt, manganese, 
nickel, rock-salt, and tin are known to exist in paying quan- 
tities, while gold-bearing gravels have been prospected in 
certain localities. Unfortunately, the total lack of roads and 
railways, lack of capital, and general political insecurity pre- 
vent any rational exploitation of this abundant mineral wealth, 
which remains virtually unused. 

These same factors keep Persia's industrial life at a low 
minimum. Of recent years some attempts to establish modern 
factories have been made, but with little success. Such indus- 
try as exists concerns itself with certain Oriental specialties, 
notably carpet- and rug-weaving, silk-weaving, and leather- 
working. Some of these Persian products are of high artistic 
quality, but the methods are antiquated, and the output is 
small. 

Persia is a land of important economic possibilities as yet 
untapped. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Statesman's Year Book. London, Annual. 

Grotlie, H Znr Natur und Wirtschaft von Vorderasien. I. Persien. 

Frankfort, 19 IL 
Jung, K. Die Wirtschaftlichen Verhaltnisse Persiens. Berlin, 1910. 



PERSIA 341 

THE FACTS ABOUT PERSIA 
Where Persia Is Located 

Persia is the great Iran plateau, bounded on the north by 
Russian Transcaucasia, the Caspian Sea, and Russian Tur- 
kestan; on the east by Afghanistan and Baluchistan; on the 
south by the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf ; and on the west 
by the Turkish provinces of Armenia and Mesopotamia. Per- 
sia has an area of 628,000 square miles, or a little larger than 
the Pacific coast States of Washington, Oregon, and Califor- 
nia. Its population is about 9,500,000. 

Different Races in Persia 

The Persians (Iranians) are found in the fertile regions and 
in the cities of the plateau. They form the bulk of the popu- 
lation. They are peasants and townsfolk. The intellectual 
and cultural elite of the country are exclusively Iranian. 

The Turkomans constitute most of the population of north- 
west Persia and the desert regions generally. They are pri- 
marily nomads, although some are settled agriculturists, espe- 
cially in the northwest. The Turkomans possess much politi- 
cal power by virtue of their superior fighting ability. 

The Armenians are found in the northwest. They are peas- 
ants, traders, and artisans in the towns. They are Christians 
and under severe persecution. 

The Arahs are found in the southwest coast districts along 
the Persian Gulf. Some are agriculturists, some nomads and 
fisherfolk. 

The Baluchis, Lurs, etc., are scattered along the Afghan 
and Baluchi borders in the extreme east. They are primitive 
agriculturists and herdsmen, wild and lawless. 



342 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Who Controlled Persia Before the War 
Persia in theory, although Russia and England controlled 
Persia in fact. 

Who Has Controlled or Occupied Persia Since the 
War Began 

Persia is in a very confused situation. The Persian Gov- 
ernment has entirely broken down. Turkish troops entered 
Persia in the autumn of 1914, and Turco-German emissaries 
roused many sections of the country. Against this, Russian 
and British troops entered Persia, and desultory fighting has 
since been in progress. 

Russia 's Interests in Persia ^ 

Political. Possession of Persia would give Russia an outlet 
to the warm waters of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, 
and would go far toward giving Russia the mastery of the 
entire Middle East. 

Economic. Were Persia under Russian control and placed 
behind the Russian tariff wall, most of the profit of Persia's 
economic exploitation would accrue to Russia. Already Rus- 
sia conducts a considerable trade with Persia, while many 
valuable mining and railroad concessions have been acquired 
by Russian interests. 

Strategic. Persia's strategic value to Russia is very great. 
The Iran plateau is a natural fortress, dominating Mesopo- 
tamia on the west, menacing India to the east, and giving 
access to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. Were Rus- 
sia possessed of Persia, she could throw her armies freely east 
or west, while England's sea communications with India and 
the Far East would be gravely compromised by Russian naval 
bases on the Persian coasts. 

Racial. None. 

Cultural. None. 

Religious. None. 

1 See foot-note on page 55. 



PERSIA 343 

England's Interests in Persia 

Political. England has never wished to annex Persia, but 
until recent years she has been determined that Russia should 
not obtain any part of the country. Her 1909 agreement with 
Russia, dividing Persia into zones, of which Russia should 
control the northern, and England the southern, with a neu- 
tral strip between, was an unwilling compromise necessitated 
by England's need of Russian aid against Germany. Eng- 
land regards her control over southern Persia and the Persian 
Gulf as vital to her position in India and the Far East. 

Economic. Until recently most of Persia's foreign trade 
was in British hands. Persia was a good customer for British 
goods, no others being able to compete in the Persian market. 
Of late years, however, this British trade monopoly has been 
impaired by German and Russian competition. Much English 
capital is invested in Persia, and British interests control 
many valuable concessions, notably the great oil-fields of 
southern Persia. 

Strategic. England has always regarded Persia as the 
buffer state protecting India on the west, and she is resolved 
never to allow any European power to establish itself on the 
Persian Gulf. 

Racial. None. / 

Cultural. None 

Religious. None. 

Germany's Interests in Persia 

Political. Ever since Germany began to gain a privileged 
position in Turkey (about twenty years ago) German im- 
perialists have looked to Persia as a supplementary field for 
German enterprise which, once Turkey were under German 
control, could be used for pressure against England in India 
and against British sea-power. 

Economic. It is only since the beginning of the twentieth 



344 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

century that German economic interests in Persia have been 
noticeable. In those few years, however, German enterprise 
has made considerable headway. German goods have cut per- 
ceptibly into England's former monopoly, and some German 
capital has entered the country. 

Strategic. The strategic value of Persia to Germany as a 
supplement to a German-controlled Turkey would be high. 
Germany could then threaten England in India, Russia in 
central Asia, and British sea-power from bases on the Persian 
Gulf. 

Racial. None. 

Cultural. None. 

Religious. None. 

Solutions that Have Been Pkoposed and What They 

Mean 

1. Status Quo Ante Bellum. 

That is, a veiled Anglo-Russian condominium, with Eng- 
lish, Russian and neutral spheres. This arrangement has in 
it a few elements of permanence. 

Geographically the Iran plateau is so much a unit that 
natural internal frontiers are not feasible. The fact of the 
neutral zone is good proof that England and Russia realized 
this fact. The present agreement has never fully satisfied 
either England or Russia. 

The present English sphere has no natural frontier, pro- 
tecting from Russian aggression either the Persian Gulf or the 
road to India, the great British political consideration in these 
regions; while the Russian sphere does not give Russia that 
access to the Indian Ocean or the Persian Gulf which is her 
ultimate objective in Persia. 

Lastly, this arrangement is abhorrent to the strongly self- 
conscious Persian people, and leaves them sullen, revengeful, 
and ready for trouble. 



PERSIA 345 

2. Formal Partition of Persia Between England and Rus- 

sia. 
This solution is open to the same objections as the status quo 
solution, plus the fact that this would accentuate Persian dis- 
content, since it would spell the death-warrant of their hopes 
of freedom and national independence. 

3. Annexation of All Persia to Russia. 

This would fulfil the Russian imperialists' dreams, and 
would give Russia her long-coveted access to the open ocean 
on the south. It would, however, be irreconcilably opposed 
by England, and would beget the irreconcilable opposition of 
the Persians, who dread Russian rule more than any other. 

4. German-Controlled Persia. 

This would occur only as a pendant to a German-controlled 
Turkey. It would be bitterly contested by both England and 
Russia as well as by the Persian people. 

5. Independent Persian State. 

This would be an ideal solution if the Persian people were 
capable of evolving a modem state sufficiently strong to main- 
tain itself amid the clash of rival and covetous European 
imperialisms. 

Persia's recent history shows that while a small elite, pos- 
sessed of intelligence, patriotism, and ability to assimilate 
modern civilization, does exist, the mass of even the true 
Persians (Iranians) still lack developed political capacity, 
while the Turkoman elements, lawless and uncivilized, are so 
superior in fighting ability to the softer and less virile Per- 
sians (Iranians) that any attempt of the latter to bring the 
Turkomans under the restraints of modem governmental au- 
thority would be likely to provoke a Turkoman rising, which 
would plunge the country into anarchy. 



346 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE 

Furthermore, this presupposes that the European great 
powers would grant such a Persian Government a fair field, 
whereas, the recent history of Persia shows this assumption 
to be unwarrantably optimistic. 

6. Internationalization of Persia. 

Persia offers another opportunity for an experiment in in- 
ternational control, the outlook and possible methods of which 
are discussed in the chapter on Constantinople and still more 
fiilly in the Appendix, which deals with the colonial problem. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Bert, F. B. Through Persia from the Gulf to the Caspian. London, 

1909. 
Browne, E. G. A Year Amongst the Persians. London, 1893. 
Feuvrier, M. Trois Ans a la Cour de Perse. Paris, 1899. 
Fl-aser. D. Persia and Turkey in Revolt. London, 1910. 
Gordon, Sir T. E. Persia Revisited. London, 1896. 
Grothe, H. Wanderungen in Persien. Berlin, 1910. 
Hedin, S. Overland to India. (2 vols.) London, 1910. 
Krahmer, G. Die Beziehungen Russlands zu Persien. Leipzig, 1903. 
Landor, H. S. Across Coveted Lands. (2 vols.) London, 1902. 
Layard, Sir H. A. Early Adventures in Persia. (2 vols.) London, 

1894. 
Malcolm, N. Five Years in a Persian Town. London, 1905. 
Moore, A. The Orient Express. London, 1914. 
Stillman, C. H. The Subjects of the Shah. London, 1902. 
SykesJ P. M. Ten Thousand Miles in Persia. London, 1902. 
Warzee, D. de. Peeps into Persia. London, 1913. 
i' Williams, E. C. Across Persia. London, 1907 

Yate, C. E. Khurasan and Sistan. London, 1900. 



APPENDIX 
THE COLONIAL PROBLEM 




AFRICA 

AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 
SHOMINC THE EXPANSION or 
KAILROADS * STEAMSHIP LINES 
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 



RAILROADS IN OPERATION 

• ♦ " UNDER CONSTRUCTION 
PROJECTED RAILROADS 
STEAMSHIP LINES 



APPENDIX 

THE COLONIES 

The colonial questions which will arise for settlement at the 
close of the present war differ radically from the class of prob- 
lems which have been treated in the body of this book. In 
those problems, while the material basis has been territory, the 
spiritual factors have been race and nationality. Those areas 
are all inhabited by self-conscious populations, mostly civil- 
ized, whose political aspirations form a vital part of any set- 
tlement proposed. This is not the case with the colonial areas 
which can reasonably be expected to come before the peace 
conference. With the partial exception of German South- 
west Africa, none of these colonial areas contain a settled 
white population, while in all save Kiao-Chau the natives are 
savages or semi-savages, incapable of self-government and 
devoid of national consciousness. 

In fact, with the exception of Kiao-Chau and the German 
possessions in the Pacific, the colonial problems which seem 
destined to come up for settlement are confined to central 
Africa. The main body of this chapter will therefore be 
devoted to the central African situation, with brief mention 
of the Kiao-Chau and German Pacific matters. 

I. CENTRAL AFRICA 

Central Africa is an enormous region extending roughly 
from the Zambezi River in the south to Guinea and the 
Sudan in the north, and bounded by the Indian Ocean on the 
east and the South Atlantic Ocean and the Guinea region on 

349 



350 APPENDIX 

the west. Its area is about 3,500,000 square miles, approxi- 
mately the size of continental United States plus Alaska. 

This vast region has a tropical climate and, with some 
small exceptions, is entirely unsuited for white settlement. 
Its value to its present European possessors is therefore not 
as a possible outlet for European emigration, but as a source 
of tropical products. Save for a few points along the coast 
it has been effectively occupied by Europeans only within the 
last forty years. For this reason its development is still only 
beginning, while colonial boundary-lines have not yet acquired 
the fixity which comes from long tenure and extensive vested 
interests. 

The following is a survey of the various European holdings 
in Central Africa. 

A. Germany's Holdings 

(For the sake of simplicity the German colonies of South- 
west Africa and Togo will be here considered, although geo- 
graphically neither falls within the central African region; 
German Southwest Africa belonging to the South African 
and Togo to the Guinea area.) 

1, German East Africa. 

This is the largest and by far the most valuable of the Ger- 
man colonies. It is bounded on the north by British East 
Africa and the British Uganda protectorate, on the west by 
the Belgian Congo and Lake Tanganyika, on the south by the 
British colonies of Northern Rhodesia and the Nyassaland 
protectorate and by Portuguese East Africa, and on the east 
by the Indian Ocean. Its area is 384,180 square miles, or 
about the size of Texas and New Mexico, and in 1913 its popu- 
lation was estimated to be 7,659,000. The total white popu- 
lation was 5336, of whom 4107 were Germans. 

The land is generally fertile, much of it being covered by 
valuable forests. All tropical products grow well, and a 



APPENDIX 351 

good start has been made in the cultivation of such products, 
especially rubber and coffee. German East Africa is also a 
good grazing-country. In 1912 the colony contained over 
10,000,000 head of cattle, sheep, and goats. Its mineral 
wealth, though but little exploited, is considerable. Coal, 
iron, lead, copper, mica, and salt are known to exist. 

Germany acquired the colony in 1890. The Government 
has been very active in opening up the country. An unusually 
fine system of roads exists, together with a thousand miles 
of railway, one line running clear across the colony from 
Dar-es-Salaam, the capital, on the seaboard, to Lake Tan- 
ganyika. 

At the beginning of the present war the colony was at- 
tacked by British forces from the north and south and by 
Belgian forces from the west. Later, Portuguese troops joined 
in the assault. After a notable defense, the Germans were 
driven from the colony in December, 1917. 

2. Kamerun. 

Kamerun is a triangular block of territory, the northern 
apex resting on Lake Chad. Before 1911 the colony was 
bounded by French Congo to east and south, and by the 
Atlantic Ocean and British Nigeria on the west. Its area was 
then 191,130 square miles. In 1911, as part of the settlement 
of the Franco-German dispute over Morocco, France ceded 
to Germany a wide strip of territory on the eastern border 
of Kamerun, totaling 107,270 square miles, while Germany 
ceded to France portions of Kamerun territory aggregating 
6450 square miles. The new area of Kamerun since 1911 
has thus stood at 291,950 square miles, or about the size of 
Texas and Louisiana. 

Kamerun is much less valuable than German East Africa. 
The climate is bad, and much of the country is swamp and im- 
penetrable jungle, while the absence of navigable rivers makes 
the penetration of the hinterland a slow and costly under- 



352 APPENDIX 

taking. The soil of the coast region is rich, and of late years 
considerable progress has been made in the cultivation of 
tropical staples, especially rubber and cocoa. The forests are 
rich in tropical hardwoods, particularly ebony. Gold and 
iron have been found. 

At the beginning of the present war Kamerun was attacked 
by French and English troops, who finally conquered the 
colony in February, 1916. 

^. Togo. 

This relatively smaU colony on the Guinea coast is little 
more than a narrow enclave wedged in between the British 
colony of Gold Coast on the west and the French colony of 
Dahomey on the east. Its water-frontage on the Gulf of 
Guinea is insignificant. Togo's area is 33,700 square miles, 
or not quite so large as Indiana, with a population of 1,032,000, 
only 368 of whom were whites, mostly Germans. 

Togo's small area, narrow shape, and extremely restricted 
seaboard, devoid of a good harbor, place natural barriers to 
its future possibilities. In addition, the climate is bad, while 
much of the interior is brush. Still, considerable fertile land 
exists, and the comparative ease of penetration encouraged the 
German government to devote much energy to its develop- 
ment. In 1914, plantations of palms, coffee, cocoa, and kola 
were being successfully operated, while a busy trade in palm- 
oil, palm kernels, and gum was being carried on. 

At the beginning of the present war Togo was overrun by 
French and British troops after a rather perfunctory resist- 
ance by the small German constabulary. All resistance ended 
on August 7, 1914. 

4. German Southwest Africa. 

This large colony, geographically part of South rather than 
of Central Africa, is bounded on the south and east by British 
territory— Union of South Africa, Bechuanaland protectorate 



APPENDIX 353 

and Rhodesia ; on the north by Portugese Angola ; and on the 
west by the Atlantic Ocean. Midway down this seaboard is 
the British enclave of Walfisch Bay, a tiny territory of only 
430 square miles, yet possessing considerable importance owing 
to the fact that the bay is the only good harbor on the entire 
coast. The area of German Southwest Africa is 322,450 
square miles, the size of Texas and Oklahoma, with a popula- 
tion in 1913 of 95,000, of whom 14,816 were whites, 12,292 
being Germans. 

Southwest Africa occupies in several respects a unique posi- 
tion among German}^ 's overseas possessions. To begin with, 
it is the only German colony which can in any sense be termed 
a "white man's country." The climate, though hot, is not 
tropical, this being due to the colony's distance from the 
equator and its slight rainfall, which makes the country dry 
and healthful. Another factor rendering Southwest Africa 
an area of white settlement is the smallness of the native 
population. These number only 80,000 Hottentots and Bush- 
men, nomads of a very low type. In the second place. South- 
west Africa is the first German colony, having been occupied 
in 1883. This fact, together with the considerable German 
resident population and the large amounts of money and 
energy devoted to its development, give the land a high senti- 
mental value in German eyes. 

Despite its large size, Southwest Africa can never become 
a colony of first-rank importance. Its insufficient rainfall 
condemns most of its surface to desert or arid pasture-land. 
Even with the most careful irrigation, its cultivable area must 
remain small, thus setting narrow bounds to the growth of its 
population. Its lack of good harbors is also a grave handi- 
cap. Southwest Africa may in time become an important 
stock-raising country. The German government has done 
much to encourage pastoral pursuits, and in 1913 Southwest 
Africa possessed 205,643 horned cattle, 472,585 sheep, 31,503 
Angora goats, 485,401 other goats, 15,916 horses, and 13,618 



354 APPENDIX 

mules and asses, besides some swine and camels. The colony 
also contains some mineral wealth. Valuable copper-mines 
are in operation, exporting 27,500 tons of copper, and dia- 
monds were discovered a few years ago, the stones taken in 
1913 being valued at $5,000,000. Gold, asbestos, graphite, 
and marble are also known to exist. 

The German government has spent large sums in roads, 
railways, and harbor improvements. In 1913 there were 1304 
miles of railway open, with more under construction. The 
road system is excellent. 

At the beginning of the present war German Southwest 
Africa was invaded by a mixed army of British imperial troops 
and South African Union forces, and the Germans, after a 
spirited resistance, capitulated on July 15, 1915. 

B. England's Holdings 

1. British East Africa. 

Including the administrative subdivision known as the 
Uganda protectorate, British East Africa is a large, irregu- 
larly shaped block of territory lying immediately to the north 
of German East Africa, and stretching northward to Abys- 
sinia and the Egyptian Sudan. Including Uganda, its area 
is 335,941 square miles, with a population of about 7,000,000, 
including 30,000 Asiatics, mainly Hindus, and about 6000 
Europeans, mostly British. 

On the whole, British East Africa is much like German 
East Africa in soil and climate, though it does not appear 
to possess the latter 's mineral resources. One peculiarity of 
the colony is the presence of an elevated district, the Nairobi 
highlands, which, though situated on the equator, lies so high 
that its climate renders it suitable for white settlement. 

Much capital and energy have been invested in British East 
Africa of late years, and the colony is making rapid strides 
in stock-raising and agriculture. In 1914 the colony possessed 
626 miles of railway. 



APPENDIX 355 

2. Zanzibar protectorate. 

The island of Zanzibar, together with the adjacent island 
of Pemba, lies off the coast of German East Africa. Their 
combined area is 1020 square miles. Their great source of 
natural wealth is the clove industry, these islands yielding 
the bulk of the world 's supply. The estimated acreage of the 
clove plantations is 60,000. Cocoanut-growing ranks next in 
importance. Besides this, Zanzibar City is the natural com- 
mercial center for all the tropical east coast of Africa and 
conducts a brisk trade in spices, rubber, gum, ivory, and other 
products. In 1913 the exports were valued at over $5,000,000. 

3. Nyassaland protectorate. 

Nyassaland is a narrow and rather irregular ribbon of ter- 
ritory wedged between Lake Nyassa on the east and the 
British colony of Rhodesia on the west. It stretches from 
German East Africa to the north down into Portuguese East 
Africa (Mozambique) in the south, almost reaching the Indian 
Ocean, and thus nearly severing Mozambique in two. Its 
area is 39,315 square miles, being thus about the size of the 
German colony of Togo ; but the inconveniences of its peculiar 
shape are obviated by the fact that it abuts on British terri- 
tory to the west, thus assuring easy communication with the 
rest of the Empire. Its population is about 1,000,000, of 
whom 831 are Europeans, mostly British. 

The soil of Nyassaland is rich, the principal crops being 
coffee and tobacco, with excellent prospects for cotton-grow- 
ing. Lying on the southern edge of the tropics and fairly 
high, the climate is rather subtropical than tropical. Indeed, 
one district, the Blantyre highlands, is "white man's coun- 
try," and here a rapidly increasing nucleus of whites is 
settled. 

4. Northern Rhodesia. 

Although administratively connected with the older terri- 
tory known as Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, lying 



356 APPENDIX 

as it does north of the Zambezi River, belongs geographically 
to the Central African rather than the South African zone. 

Northern Rhodesia is bounded on the south by the Zambezi 
River and Portuguese East Africa, on the east by Nyassaland, 
on the north by German East Africa and the Belgian Congo, 
and on the west by the Portuguese colony of Angola (Portu- 
guese West Africa). Its area is 290,000 square miles, or 
slightly larger than Texas, and its population in 1913 was 
about 870,000, of whom nearly 3000 were Europeans, mostly 
British. 

The most important thing about Northern Rhodesia is its 
ability to support a large white population. Elsewhere in 
Central Africa, with the exception of the Nairobi highlands 
of British East Africa and the Blantyre highlands of Nyassa- 
land, whites cannot thrive and breed. But Northern Rho- 
desia, consisting mostly of high plateau country, with an ade- 
quate rainfall and much good arable land, offers distinct 
opportunities for white immigration. This is proved by the 
fact that of the 2250 farmers and stock-raisers already on the 
land, over 500 are children. European cereals grow well, 
besides cotton and tobacco. There is plenty of timber of 
various kinds. Gold, copper, zinc, and lead are already 
worked, and coal has been discovered. Altogether Northern 
Rhodesia's prospects are excellent. 

C. Belgium's Holdings 

1. Belgian Congo. 

Belgian Congo (formerly the Congo Free State) occupies 
the heart of Central Africa. Starting from the narrowest of 
sea-fronts, where the mighty Congo River empties into the 
Atlantic Ocean, Belgium's unique colonial possession spreads 
prodigiously landward till it covers almost the whole vast 
watershed drained by the Congo and its numberless affluents. 
Belgian Congo is thus surrounded by a ring of territories, 
French, British, Portuguese, and German. Its area is esti- 



APPENDIX 357 

mated at 909,654 square miles, or nearly one third the size of 
continental United States, with a population conjectured to 
number some 15,000,000, though some estimates place it as 
low as 9,000,000. It has probably decreased during the last 
generation, owing to the policy of the European concession- 
aires, who have so harshly exploited the natives. In 1912 the 
European population numbered 5465, of whom 3307 were 
Belgians. 

Belgian Congo is a thoroughly tropical country, with a rich 
soil, superabundant rainfall, and hot, moist climate. All 
tropical products grow luxuriantly, but little regular cultiva- 
tion has as yet been attempted. In the days of the conces- 
sionaires the most obvious natural resources, especially wild 
rubber and ivory, were recklessly exploited. Since the 
Congo's annexation to Belgium in 1907 the Belgian Govern- 
ment has instituted a more rational and far-sighted system 
of development. Cattle-raising is impossible owing to the 
tse-tse fly. Belgian Congo contains considerable mineral 
wealth. Rich gold- and copper-mines are already being 
worked, while coal, iron, tin, and manganese are also known 
to exist. 

D. France's Holdings 

1. French Congo. 

French Congo, otherwise known as French Equatorial 
Africa, is a vast, irregularly shaped band of territory lying 
immediately to the north of the Belgian Congo, the boundary 
being the Congo and Ubanghi rivers. Its western frontier 
is the German colony of Kamerun. To the northeast it abuts 
upon the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, while through the French 
Sudan to the north it connects with the main body of France 's 
great North African empire. Before 1911 its area was 669,- 
000 square miles, with a population estimated at 9,000,000, 
decreasing steadily owing to the ravages of sleeping sickness 
propagated by the deadly tse-tse fly. In 1911, as previously 



358 APPENDIX 

stated, France ceded about one sixth of her Congo colony to 
Germany. French Congo in soil and climate closely resem- 
bles Kamerun and Belgian Congo. The colony has been very 
slightly developed. There are only 1275 Frenchmen in the 
country. 

E. Portugal's Holdings 

1. Portuguese East Africa. (Mozambique.) 
Portuguese East Africa is a long and most irregularly 

shaped band of territory stretching along the east coast of 
Africa from the colony of German East Africa on the north 
to the British colony of Natal on the south. Its western 
boundary is entirely inclosed by British territory. Its area 
is 476,712 square miles, with a population roughly estimated 
at about 3,000,000. The white population stands around 
7000, the majority of whom are concentrated at the capital, 
Lourengo Marques. 

Portuguese East Africa contains a great variety of natural 
resources, but the inefficient Portuguese government has done 
little to open up the country. Its chief importance at pres- 
ent arises from its chief port-town, LourenQO Marques, situ- 
ated at the extreme south of the colony. This town is the 
natural outlet for the Transvaal and is connected with the 
interior by a railway. The transit trade from the Transvaal 
is the colony's main source of wealth. 

Strictly speaking Lourengo Marques and all that portion 
of the colony lying south of the Zambezi River, which cuts 
Portuguese East Africa into two fairly equal halves, lies out- 
side the Central African area and belongs to the South Afri- 
can zone. 

2. Portuguese West Africa. (Angola.) 

Portuguese West Africa, or Angola, is an immense, almost 
square block of territory on the west coast of Central Africa, 
lying opposite the other Portuguese colony of Mozambique, 
on the east coast. The two colonies are sundered by the 



APPENDIX 359 

British colony of Rhodesia. Angola's other boundaries are 
the Belgian Congo on the north and German Southwest Africa 
on the south. Its area, 484,000 square miles, is almost exactly 
that of Mozambique. Its population is roughly estimated at 
4,000,000, of whom a few thousand are Portuguese whites and 
near-whites. 

Angola has great economic possibilities. Much of the soil 
is rich, and its mineral wealth is considerable ; copper, iron, 
gold, malachite, petroleum, and salt being known to exist in 
paying quantities. An inefficient government has, however, 
done little to open up the country. 

3. Sao Thome and Principe. 

Sao Thome and Principe are two volcanic islands lying off 
the coast of French Congo. Their combined area is 360 square 
miles, with a population in 1900 of 42,000, of whom 1185 were 
whites. 

The chief economic importance of the islands is the culti- 
vation of cocoa, which is produced in large quantities, being 
raised by indentured labor from Angola. It was in regard 
to the labor conditions on these cocoa plantations that the 
noted scandals of a few years ago arose. 

F. Spain's Holdings 

1. Fernando Po. 

Fernando Po is an island lying in the bight of the Gulf of 
Guinea, off the coast of the German colony of Kamerun. Its 
area is 1185 square miles. Its population is believed to be 
about 17,000, of whom some 300 are white (Spaniards). 

Fernando Po has an exceedingly rich soil, but is little de- 
veloped. Its geographical position in the bight of the Gulf 
of Guinea, thereby commanding both bends of the adjacent 
mainland coasts gives it some strategic importance. 

2. Rio Muni. (Spanish Guinea.) 

Rio Muni is a small enclave on the mainland, not far from 



360 APPENDIX 

Fernando Po, wedged in between German Kamerun and 
French Congo. Its area is 9264 square miles. The popula- 
tion is roughly estimated at 90,000, of whom 130 are whites, 

Rio Muni has a fertile soil and valuable forests, but its 
climate is very bad, and it is almost entirely undeveloped. 

II. GERMAN COLONIES IN THE PACIFIC 

The German colonial possessions in the Pacific are not of 
great importance. The only one with considerable possibili- 
ties is German New Guinea. The others are scattered groups 
of small islands. Considered in detail they are : 

1. German New Guinea, or Kaiser Wilhelm's Land. 

The German colony of Kaiser Wilhelm's Land occupies the 
northeastern corner of the large island of New Guinea, the 
rest of the island being occupied by the English and Dutch. 
Together with the adjacent island groups of the Bismarck 
Archipelago and the Solomon Islands, German New Guinea 
forms the territorial and administrative nucleus of Ger- 
many 's holdings in the Pacific. It was the first of Germany 's 
Pacific possessions, being occupied in 1884. 

German New Guinea has an area of about 70,000 square 
miles, or the size of North Dakota, with a population esti- 
mated at 531,000, of these 200 being whites, mostly Germans. 
The country is of little present value. The climate is intensely 
hot and unhealthful, the natives savage, and economic ex- 
ploitation has hardly begun. German New Guinea has, how- 
ever, considerable possibilities as a grower of tropical prod- 
ucts, especially rubber. Valuable forests of tropical woods 
exist, and gold has been discovered in the interior. 

2. Bismarck Archipelago and Solomon Islands. 

These two island groups, which really form a single chain 
beginning off the north coast of German New Guinea and ex- 



APPENDIX 361 

tending eastward toward the central Pacific, have a combined 
area of 24,200 square miles, with a population estimated at 
70,000, about 900 of whom are whites, mostly Germans. The 
climate is similar to that of New Guinea, though not so un- 
healthful. This, together with greater ease of penetration, 
has rendered possible a slightly higher stage of economic de- 
velopment. The chief products of the Bismarck Archipelago 
are copra, cotton, coffee, and rubber. Those of the Solomon 
Islands are sandalwood and tortoise-shell. 

3. The Caroline, Pelew, Marianne, and Marshall Islands. 

These groups of small islands lie considerably to the north- 
ward of New Guinea. They cover a wide area, stretching 
from a point near the Philippine Island of Mindanao east- 
ward into the central Pacific. They possess a certain geo- 
graphical unity, the only non-German possession in this wide 
area being the American Island of Guam, the largest of the 
Marianne Group. The Marshall Islands have belonged to 
Germany since 1885. The other three groups were purchased 
from Spain in 1899. 

These islands have a combined area of 1060 square miles, 
with a population of 70,000, of whom 400 are whites, mostly 
Germans. Of coral or volcanic formation, the soil is rich; 
but they are too small to possess any considerable economic 
possibilities. 

4. German Samoa. 

In 1899 the Anglo-American-German condominium over 
Samoa was dissolved, England renouncing her rights in favor 
of Germany and the United States, who divided the Samoan 
Islands between them. Germany got the larger part, in- 
cluding the two largest islands, Upolu and Savaii. The chief 
American island, Tutuila, however, contains the best harbor, 
Pago-Pago. 

German Samoa has a combined area of 1060 square miles, 



362 APPENDIX 

and a population of 35,000, of whom 600 are whites and 2000 
Chinese. Considering its small size, the colony is highly 
valuable, the islands being exceptionally fertile. The natives 
are fairly civilized, and good roads and other improvements 
exist. Thriving cocoa and rubber plantations have been es- 
tablished, and these products, together with copra, form the 
colony's chief exports, which in 1912 amounted to over $1,- 
250,000. 

Immediately after the beginning of the European "War, 
Germany's Pacific colonies were captured by the British and 
Japanese after a perfunctory resistance. German New 
Guinea and the adjacent archipelagoes were occupied by Aus- 
tralian troops, German Samoa was captured by a New Zea- 
land force, while Japan seized the Caroline, Pelew, Marianne, 
and Marshall Islands. At the present writing the German 
Pacific possessions are still held by their respective conquerors. 

III. KIAO-CHAU 

The broad, land-locked bay of Kiao-chau is situated at the 
southeastern base of the mountainous peninsula of Shan-tung, 
which juts out of the continental mass of China between the 
waters of the Yellow Sea and the Gulf of Pe-Chi-Li. 

In November, 1897, a German naval squadron entered the 
bay of Kiao-chau and occupied its port, the city of Tsing-Tao, 
as a punitive measure for the murder of some German mis- 
sionaries. In March, 1896, China leased the town of Tsing- 
Tao, the bay of Kiao-chau, and the shores thereof to Germany 
for a period of ninety-nine years, and in April the district 
was declared a protectorate of the German Empire. 

The waters of the bay of Kiao-chau cover an area of about 
200 square miles. The shores of the bay and the city of Tsing- 
Tao — in other words, the land area leased to Germany — com- 
prise another 200 square miles. Furthermore, the actual 



APPENDIX 363 

leased area was surrounded by a so-called ''neutral zone" 
thirty miles wide, in which Germany obtained special privi- 
leges. 

The land-area of the Kiao-chau concession contained, in 
1913, a population of about 192,000. The white population, 
including the garrison, was 4470, mostly Germans, 

At the time of its acquisition Germany had high hopes of 
Kiao-chau. That was the period when the partition of China 
among the great powers seemed inevitable, and since Kiao- 
chau was both a fine war-port and a good commercial harbor, 
Germany determined to make it the naval and commercial 
center of the empire in the far East. Immense sums were 
spent on its fortification and on the development of Tsing- 
Tao, which soon became a handsome European town. 

Although the more sanguine prophets were disappointed, 
Kiao-chau attained a considerable commercial importance. 
The German-built railway into the Shan-tung hinterland 
tapped the economic resources of the province, and most of its 
foreign trade passed through the port of Tsing-Tao. In 1913 
the export and import trade of the port of Tsing-Tao totaled 
nearly $19,500,000, while 923 vessels of 1,298,000 tons entered 
at Kiao-chau. The German-owned railway from Tsing-Tao 
to Tsinang near the Hoang-Ho had a length of 252 miles. 

A few days after the outbreak of the European War, Japan 
delivered an ultimatum to Germany, summoning her to de- 
liver up the leased territory of Kiao-chau and, upon Ger- 
many's refusal, Japan declared war. A strong Japanese army 
invested Tsing-Tao, while a Japanese fleet blockaded the port 
by sea. After a spirited resistance, Tsing-Tao surrendered 
on November 7, 1914. Since then the leased territory has been 
occupied by Japan, who has assumed all Germany's rights in 
the Shan-tung hinterland as well. 



364 APPENDIX 

Solutions that Have Been Proposed and What They 

Mean 

Among the numerous suggestions for a solution of the 
colonial problem, three types of solutions stand out as the most 
likely: (1) the old system of national control and agreed- 
upon spheres of influence; (2) the administration of the polit- 
ically weak and unorganized territories of the world by a 
league of nations, if such an international organization is 
effected by the peace conference; (3) the administration of 
specific colonies by local centers of international control. 

The larger implications of these three types of solutions 
may be set down as follows : 

1. National Control and Agreed-Upon Spheres of hifluence. 

The obvious difficulty in this system is that it contains an 
inevitable threat to the peace of the world. When the in- 
vestor class of a given nation runs into difficulty in one of the 
weak and unorganized territories, when the investing interests 
of one nation clash with the investing interests of another, 
the investor turns to his home government for help. And 
since the problem of guaranteeing investments is inextricably 
tangled with the problems of diplomatic prestige and national 
honor, it has been a very natural development that the foreign 
offices should become collection agencies and insurance com- 
panies for the foreign investor class. Colonial history teems 
with instances where the business conflict of rival nations in 
colonial territory has reacted upon the situation in Europe, 
now menacing, now upsetting, the peaceful relations of 
Europe. 

Another difficulty involved in this solution is the latent 
threat that resides in the potential military power of the 
native populations, when the territory is in the hands of any 
of the great powers. A clear ease of this is the extraordinary 
resistance displayed in this war by the native troops of Ger- 
man East Africa. 



APPENDIX 365 

This solution, applied to Central Africa, regardless of any 
reshuffling of the spheres of influence, will leave in certain 
contest two dominant imperialist ideals; that is, the German 
desire for a Central African empire and the British desire for 
an all-red route from Cape to Cairo. The appetites of these 
two rival imperialisms would be whetted by the presence in the 
Central African area of Portugal's extensive possessions, be- 
cause Portugal is a weak power, probably incapable of de- 
veloping them, and thereby creating a political vacuum which 
would inevitably draw in other powers. Such an arrange- 
ment could not but leave the Portuguese colonial area the 
scene of foreign pressure and conflicting interests. 

The Belgian C'^ngo presents another difficulty, since it is in 
the possession of a state which, small at best, may be so 
wasted at the close of the war as to be unable to develop and 
maintain efficient political control of this area, again creating 
a weak spot which will constitute a temptation to the powers 
with greater political and financial abilities. 

Since the Portuguese and Belgian possessions constitute 
roughly one half of the entire Central African area, it is 
clear that the old system of colonial administration will in- 
evitably leave a very large area, the weakness of whose pos- 
sessors will throw a constant temptation in the way of the 
stronger powers. 

Under this solution, a conflict of interests is inevitable in 
the German colonial possessions in Oceanica. There exists, as 
regards these territories, the strong desire of Australasia and 
New Zealand to retain the German colonies that have been 
taken by them during the war. Also the ambition of Japanese 
imperialists enters here. The island groups to the north of 
the equator which have been taken by the Japanese, while not 
large enough for colonies of settlement, have marked strategic 
importance, which will inevitably figure in Japanese dreams 
of Pacific domination. 

As regards Kiao-chau, while it may be a source of distinct 



366 APPENDIX 

difficulty between Japan and China, it has probably fallen 
to the rank of a minor question as regards the former colonial 
ambitions of Germany. It may be doubted whether Germany 
has any special desire to get it back, for the reason that Kiao- 
chau is a relic of a played-out phase of world politics. When 
Germany acquired Kiao-chau, it looked as though China 
would be partitioned among the great powers ; but since then 
China has become so self-conscious that the question of her 
partition is clearly adjourned, if not out of the question. 
And, in addition to this, the fact that Japan has become so 
much stronger, as a result of the weakening of the white 
world, makes it clear that an attempt at the partition of China 
would face the combined opposition of Chinese nationalism 
and Japanese imperialism. In the light of these facts, Ger- 
many's attempt to regain Kiao-chau would be a game not 
worth the candle. 

2. The Administration of Weak and Unorganized Areas of 
the World hy a League of Nations. 

This solution would doubtless apply only to the colonies of 
exploitation, not to colonies of settlement with marked white 
populations. It would probably apply only to colonies climat- 
ically incapable of supporting a permanent white population ; 
that is to say, the colonial areas where the chief interests of 
the great powers are in the opportunities they offer for the in- 
vestment of capital, access to raw materials, or in the strategic 
importance of the areas. It would not apply to colonies which 
present a distinct racial problem either in the sense of the 
mother country's having a considerable population therein or 
in the sense of a real national consciousness among the natives. 
This solution, as proposed, is a promising method for giving 
stability to a league of nations if organized. The exponents of 
this solution invariably support their contention by reference 
to the way in which the ceding of the Western lands of the 
United States to the Government ©f the Confederation, and 



APPENDIX 367 

the erection of these lands into a large public domain to be 
held and developed as a common property for the common 
welfare, bound the leagued States together by the tie of a 
common economic interest. 

The success of such a proposal will depend very largely 
upon the outcome of the war, the extent to which interna- 
tional interests dominate national interests at the peace 
conference, and the degree to which the principles of freedom 
to trade and equality of economic opportunities in these terri- 
tories are worked out. 

3. The Administration of Specific Colonies by Local Centers 
of International Control. 

This proposal has been advanced mainly by the type of po- 
litical thinker who does not yet regard the proposal for an all- 
inclusive league of nations as in the field of practical possi- 
bilities. The proposal is that there should be created per- 
manent international commissions to administer those areas 
where world crises are most liable to develop. The exponents 
of this proposal point out that such policies and arrangements 
as the Monroe Doctrine, Pan-American action, the Conference 
of Algeciras, and the London Conference after the Balkan 
Wars, have been called into existence by the fact that there 
did not exist any instrument of international control to deal 
with areas that held the threat of trouble ; that these arrange- 
ments have been attempts to fill the vacuum caused by the 
fact that no international organization existed that had perma- 
nent executive as well as legislative or suggestive powers. 
The proposal is regarded by its best exponents as the begin- 
ning of a solution, the practically possible step on the road 
toward real international government. It is an attempt to 
elaborate and give permanence to such arrangements as the 
various European conferences that have from time to time 
dealt with such problems as Morocco. The weakness of these 
conferences in the past has been that they legislated inter- 



368 APPENDIX 

nationally, but left the execution of their decrees to national 
governments. 

This solution suggests the putting of the executive power 
into the hands of a series of permanent international commis- 
sions on the several problems involved in areas of exploitation. 

This solution, granted a satisfactory conclusion of the war, 
may figure not only as a substitute for a general league of 
nations, but it might be an important supplement to a general 
league of nations; that is to say, the general league of na- 
tions, if created, may be restricted in its functions mainly to 
the negative matter of police duty, while the positive matters 
of removing the causes of war and administering the threaten- 
ing areas may perhaps go into the hands of local centers of 
international control. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

CENTRAL AFRICA 

(xeneral. 

Banning, E Le Partage politique de I'Afrique. Brussels, 1888. 
Bonnefon, E. L. L'Afrique politique en 1900. Paris, 1900. 
Brown, R. The Story of Africa and its Explorers. (4 vols.) 

London, 1896-98. 
Chatelain, C. A. L'Afrique et I'Expansion coloniale. Paris, 1901. 
Darcy, J. L'Equilibre africain au XXe Siecle. Paris, 1900. 
Darmstadter, P. Geschichte der Aufteilung und Kolonization 

Afrikas. Berlin, 1914. 
Deherain, H. Etudes sur I'Afrique. Paris, 1904. 
Deville, E. Le Partage de I'Afrique. Paris, 1898. 
Fallex, M., and Mairey, A. L'Afrique au debut du XXe Siecle. 

Paris, 1906. 
Gibbons, H. A. The New Map of Africa. New York, 1916. 
Hahn, F., and Sievers, W. Afrika. Leipzig, 1901. 
Heawood, E. The Geography of Africa. London, 1896. 
Hertslet, Sir E. The Map of Africa by Treaty, (3 vols.) London, 

1909. 
Johnston, Sir H. H. The Colonization of Africa. Cambridge, 

1905. 
Johnston, Sir H. H. The Opening Up of Africa. London, 1911. 



APPENDIX 369 

Keltie, J. S. The Partition of Africa. London, 1895. 

Kidd, B. The Control of the Tropics. New York, 1898. 

Launay, L. de. Les Richesses Minerales de I'Afrique, Paris, 1903. 

Lorin, H. L'Afrique a I'entree dii XXe Siecle. Paris, 1901. 

Meyer, H. Die Eisenbahnen im tropischen Afrika. Leipzig, 1902. 

Ortroy, F. van. Conventions internationales definissant les limites 
actuelles des possessions en Afrique. Brussels, 1898. 

Powell, A. The Last Frontier; the White Man's War for Civiliza- 
tion in Africa. London, 1913. 

Renty, E. de. Les Chemins de fer coloniaux in Afrique. (3 vols.) 
Paris, 1905. 

White, A. S. The Development of Africa. London, 1892. 

GERMAN COLONIES. 
General. 

Billow, H. von. Deutschlands Kolonien und Kolonialkriege. 
Dresden, 1900. 

Calvert, A. F. The German African Empire. London, 1916. 

Cheradame, A. La Colonisation et les Colonies allemandes. 
Paris, 1905. 

Das Uberseeische Deutschland; die Deutsche Kolonien in Wort und 
Bild. Berlin, 1903. 

Decharme, P. Compagnies et Societes Coloniales allemandes. 
Paris, 1903. 

Hassert, K. Deutschlands Kolonien. Leipzig, 1910. 

Koschitzky, M. V. Deutsche Colonialgeschiohte. Berlin, 1888. 

Lewin, E. The Germans and Africa. London, 1915. 

Zimmerman, A. Geschichte der deutschen Kolonialpolitik. Ber- 
lin, 1914. 

(1) German East Africa. 

Fonck, H. Deutsch-Ostafrika. Berlin, 1909. 

Jager, F. Das Hochland. der Eiesenkrater und die umliegenden 

Hochlander, Deutsch-Ostafrikas. Berlin, 1911. 
Kollman, P. The Victoria Nyanza. (Translation.) London, 

1900. 
Kurtze, B. Deutsch Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft. Jena, 1913. 
Leue, A. Dar-es-Salaam. Berlin, 1903. 
Meyer, H. Der Kilimandjaro. Berlin, 1900. 
Monte Santa Maria, G. B. del. L'Africa orientale tedesca. (3 

vols.) Citta di Castello, 1913. 



370 APPENDIX 

Peters, K. Das deutsch-ostafrikanische Schutzgebeit. Munich, 

1895. 
Peters, K. Wie Deutseh-Ostafrika enstand. Leipzig, 1914. 
Plumon, E. La Colonie allemande de I'Afrique Orientale. Rennea, 

1905. 
Stuhlmann, F. Wissenschaftliche Forschungsresultate uber Land 

und Leute unseres ostafrikanischen Schutzgebiets und der 

angranzenden Lander. Berlin, 1909. 
White, S. E. The Re-discovered Country. London, 1915. 

(2) Eamerun. 

Calvert, A. F. The Cameroons. London, 1917. 

Dominik, T. Kamerun: Sechs Kreigs- imd Friedensjahre in 

deutschen Tropen. Berlin, 1901. 
Haase, L. Durcha unbekannte Kamerun. Berlin, 19l5. 
Hutter, F. Wanderungen und Forschungen im Nord-Hinterland 

von Kamerun. Braunschweig, 1902. 
Puttkamer, I. von. Gouverneursjahre. Berlin, 1912. 
Sembritzki, E. Neu-Kamerun. Berlin, 1913. 
Zintgraf, E. Nord-Kamerun. Berlin, 1895. 

(S) Togo. 

Gehrts, M. A. A Camera Actress in the Wilds of Togoland. Lon- 
don, 1914. 
Klose, H. Togo unter deutscher Flagge. Berlin, 1899. 
Passarge, S. Togo. Berlin, 1910. 
Seidel, N. Die Kiiste und das Vorland der Togocolonie, Berlin, 

1897. 
Trierenberg, G. Togo. Berlin, 1914. 

'(^) German Southwest Africa. 

Billow, F. J. von. Deutsch Siidwest-Afrika. Berlin, 1899. 

Calvert, A. F. Southwest Africa during the German Occupation. 
London, 1915. 

Dinter, K. Deutsch Sudwestafrika. Leipzig, 1909. 

Dove, E. Deutsch Siidwestafrika. Berlin, 1903. 

Eveleigh, W. South-West Africa. London, 1915. 

Francois, C. von. Deutsch Sudwestafrika Berlin, 1899. 

Irle, I. Die Herrero. Gutersloh. 1906. 

Kiietz, H. H Deutsch Sudwestafrika. Berlin, 1909. 

Leiner, F. Bergtouren und Steppenfahrten im Herenoland. Ber- 
lin, 1904. 



APPENDIX 371 

Leutwein, F. Elf Jahre Gouverneur. Berlin, 1910. 

Opitz, W. In Siidwestafrika. Leipzig, 1909. 

Rehbock, T. Deutsch Siidwestafrika. Berlin, 1898. 

Rohrbaeh, P. Siidwestafrika. Berlin, 1907. 

Sehulze, L. Siidwestafrika. Berlin, 1910. 

Schwabe. K. Im deutschen Diamantenlande. Berlin, 1909. 

BRITISH COLONIES. 
General. 

Johnston, Sir H. H. History and Description of the British Em- 
pire in Africa. London, 1910. 

Sanderson, E. Great Britain in Modern Africa. London, 1907. 

(1) British East Africa, and Uganda Protectorate. 

Ansorge, W. J. Under the African Sun. London, 1899. 

Ashe, R. P. Two Kings of Uganda. London, 1897. 

Austin, H. H. Among Swamps and Giants in Equatorial Africa. 

London, 1902. 
Churchill, Rt. Hon. W. S. My African Journey. London, 1908. 
Colville, Sir H. The Land of the Nile Springs. London, 1895. 
Cranworth, Lord. A Colony in the Making. London, 1912. 
Crawford, E. M. The Equator's Snowy Peak. London, 1913. 
Cunningham, J. F. Uganda and Its People. London, 1905. 
Eliot, Sir C. N. The East Africa Protectorate. London, 1905. 
Fitz-Gerald, W. W. A. Travels in the Coastlands of British 

East Africa. London, 1898. 
Gregory, J. W. The Foundation of British East Africa. London, 

1901. 
Hinde, S. L. and H. The Last of the Masai. London, 1901. 
Hindlip, Lord. British East Africa. London, 1905. 
Jack, E. M. On the Congo Frontier. London, 1914. 
Johnston, Sir H. H. The Uganda Protectorate. 2 vols. London, 

1902. 
Kearton, C, and Barnes, J. Through Central Africa from East 

to West. London, 1Q15. 
Klingspor, P. Britisch-Ost-Afrika. Bonn, 1909. 
Kmunke, R. Quer durch Uganda. Berlin, 1913. 
Kollmann, P. The Victoria Nyanza. London, 1900. 
Lloyd, A. B. Uganda to Khartoum. London, 1906. 
Lugard, F. D. The Rise of our East African Empire. 2 vols. 

London, 1893 
Lugard, S. D. The Story of Uganda. London, 1900. 



372 APPENDIX 

McDermott, P. L. British East Africa. London, 1895. 

Mullins, J. W. The Wonderful Story of Uganda. London, 1904. 

Playne, S. East Africa. London, 1910. 

Purvis, J. B. British East Africa and Uganda. London, 1909. 

Rolin, M. Le Droit de I'Uganda. Brussels, 1910. 

Stigand, C. H. The Land of Zinj. London, 1913. 

(2J Zanziha/r Protectorate. 

Craster, J. E. E. Pemba. The Spice Land of Zanzibar. London, 
1913. 

FitzGerald, W. W. A. Travels in the Coastlands of British East 
Africa. London, 1898. 

Lyne, R. N. Zanzibar in Contemporary Times. London, 1905. 

Newman, H. S. Banani: The Transition from Slavery to Free- 
dom in Zanzibar and Pemba. London, 1898. 

(3) Nyassalmid Protectorate. 

Caddick, H. A White Woman in Central Africa. London, 1900. 

Duff, H. L. Nyassaland under the Foreign Ofl&ce. London, 1906. 

Foa, E. Du Cap au Lac Nyasse. Paris, 1897. 

Johnston, Sir H. H. British Central Africa. London, 1897. 

Moore, J. E. S. The Tanganyika Problem. London, 1903. 

Rankin, D. J. The Zambezi Basin and Nyassaland. London, 1893. 

Sharpe, Sir A. The Geography and Economic Development of 
British Central Africa. London, 1912. 

Simpson, S. Report on the Cotton-growing industry in the Brit- 
ish Central Africa Protectorate. London, 1906. 

Vyvyan, C. B. Precis of Information Concerning the British 
Central Africa Protectorate. London, 1901. 

{^) Northern Rhodesia. 

Coillard, F. Sur le Haut Zambeze. Paris, 1897. 

Foa, E. Du Cap au Lac Nyasse. Paris, 1897. 

Guide to Rhodesia: For the Use of Tourists and Settlers. Bulu- 

wayo, 1914. 
Gouldsbury, C, and Sheane, M. The Great Plateau of Northern 

Rhodesia. London, 1911. 
Hensman, H. History of Rhodesia. London, 1900. 
Melland, F. H. and Cholmeley E. H. Through the Heart of Africa. 

London, 1912, 
Rolin, H. Les Lois et I'Administration de la Rhodfesie. Brussels, 

1913. 
Worsfold, W. B. The Union of South Africa. London, 1913. 



APPENDIX 373 

FRENCH COLONIES. 
(1) French Congo. 

Chevalier, A. L'Afrique centrale frangaise. Paris, 1907. 

Cureau, A. L. Savage Men in Central Africa. A Study of Primi- 
tive Races in the French Congo. London, 1915. 

De Chavannes. La Mission de Brazza. Paris, 1886. 

Foa, E. La Travers^e de I'Afrique du Zambeze au Congo fran- 
gais. Paris, 1900. 

Foureau, F. De I'Algerie au Congo par le Tchad. Paris, 1902. 

Gentil, E. La Chute de I'Empire de Rabah. Paris, 1902. 

Mezieres, A. B. de. Rapport de Mission sur le Haut Oubangui, 
le M'Bomou et le Bahr el-Ghazal. Paris, 1903. 

Morel, E. D. The British Case in French Congo. London, 1903. 

Oppenheim, M. F. von. Rabeh und das Tschadsee Gebiet. Ber- 
lin, 1902. 

Rhins, D. de. Le Congo. Paris, 1885. 

Riemer, 0. Das franzosische Kongogebiet. Bonn, 1909. 

Rouget, F. L'Expansion coloniale au Congo frangais. Paris, 1906. 

BELGIAN COLONIES. 
(1) Belgian Congo. 

Alexis, M. G. F. Notre Colonic en 1910. Brussels, 1911. 
Anton, G. R., and Barnhaupt, C. Kongostaat und Kongo Reform. 

Munich, 1911 
Baccari, Capitano. II Congo. Rome, 1898. 
Bertrand, J. Le Congo beige. Brussels, 1909. 
Blanchard, G. Formation et Constitution politique de I'Etat In- 

dependant du Congo. Paris, 1899. 
Boulger, D. C. The Congo State. London, 1898. 
Bourguignon, M. et als. Congo, climat, constitution du sol, 

hygiene. Brussels, 1898. 
Bourne, H. R. F. Civilization in Congoland. London, 1903. 
Biichler, M. Der Kongostaat Leopolds II. 2 vols. Zurich, 

1913. 
Burdo, A. Les Beiges dans I'Afrique centrale. 6 vols. Brussels, 

1891. 
Casati, G. Ten Years in Equator ia. London, 1891. 
Castelein, A. L'Etat du Congo, ses origines, ses droits, ses de- 
voirs, le requisition de ses accusateurs. Brussels, 1907. 
Cattier, F. Etude sur la Situation de I'Etat Ind^pendant du 

Congo. Brussels, 1906. 



374 APPENDIX 

Cattier, F. Droit et Administration de I'Etat Independant du 

Congo. Brussels, 1898. 
Cliapaux, A. Le Congo. Brussels, 1894. 
D^scamps, Baron E. L'Afrique Nouvelle. Brussels, 1903. 
Dubreucq, R. A travers le Congo beige. Brussels, 1909. 
Goffart, F., and Morrissen, G. Le Congo: Geographic physique, 

politique et #conomique. Brussels, 1908. 
Gohr, A. De I'Organisation judiciare et de la competence en 

matifere civile et commerciale au Congo. Liege, 1910. 
Goffin, A. Les Pecheries et les Poissons du Congo. Brussels, 

1909. 
Halewyek, M. La Charte coloniale. Brussels, 1910. 
Harris, J. H. Dawn in Darkest Africa. London, 1912. 
Huterau, A. Documents ethnographiques congolais. Brussels, 

1910. 
Jack, E. M. On the Congo Frontier. London, 1914. 
Johnston, Sir H. H. The River Congo. London, 1895. 
Johnston, Sir H. H. George Grenfell and the Congo. 2 vols. 

London, 1908. 
Michaux, C. Pourquoi et comment nous devons Coloniser- Brus- 
sels, 1910. 
Morel, E. D. Affairs of West Africa. London, 1902. 
Morel, E. D. King Leopold's Rule in Africa. London, 1904. 
Morel, E. D. Red Rubber. London, 1906. 

Morel, E. D. Great Britain and the Congo. London, 1909. 
Paque, E. A. J. Notre Colonic. Etude pratique sur le Congo 

beige. Naniur, 1910. 
Pierantoni, R. Le Congres de Berlin et I'Etat Independant du 

Congo. Brussels, 1^01. 
Roby, M. My adventures in the Congo. London, 1911. 
Stanley, Sir H. M. The Congo and the Foimding of its Free 

State. 2 vols. London, 1885. 
Van der Linden, Fr. Le Congo, les noirs et nous. Brussels, 1890. 
Vermeersch, A. La Question congolaise. Brussels, 1906. 
Wauters, A. J. L'Etat Independant du Congo. Brussels, 1899. 
Wauters, A. J. Histoire politique du Congo beige. Brussels, 1912. 
Weeks, J. Among the Primitive Bakongo. London, 1914. 
Wildeman, E. de. Les Plantes tropicales de Grande Culture. 

Brussels, 1902. 



APPENDIX 375 

PORTUGUESE COLONIES. 

General 

Marvaud, A. Le Portugal et ses Colonies. Paris, 1912. 
Negreiros, A. Les Colonies portuguaises. Paris, 1907. 
Vasconcelloa, E. J. do. Colonies portuguaises. Communications 
maritimes et fluviales en 1900. 

(1) MozamMque. (Portuguese East Africa.) 

Lyne, R. N. Mozambique: Its Agricultural Development. Lon- 
don, 1913. 

Maugham, R. C. F. The History, Scenery, and Great Game of 
Manica and Sofala. London, 1906. 

Maugham, R. C. F. Portuguese East Africa. London, 1906. 

Maugham, R. C. F. Zambesia. London, 1909 

Negreiros, A. Angola. Paris, 1901. 

Worsfold, W. B. Portuguese Nyassaland. London, 1899. 

(2) Angola. 

Cadbury, W. A. Labor in Portuguese West Mrica. London, 

1910. 
Monteiro, J. J. Angola and the River Congo. 2 vols. London, 

1875. 
Neigreiros, A. Angola. Paris, 1901. 
Nevinson, H. W. A Modern Slavery. London, 1906. 
Weeks, J. H. Among the Primitive Bakongo. London, 1914. 

(3) 8do Thom4 and Principe. 

Cadbury, W. A. Labor in Portuguese West Africa. London, 1910. 
Negreiros, A. L'fle de San Thome. Paris, 1901. 
NeAdnson, H. W. A Modern Slavery. London, 1906. 

SPANISH COLONIES. 

(1) Fernando Pa. 

Baumann, O. Eine afrikanisehe Tropeninsel: Fernando Po und 

die Bube. Vienna, 1888. 
Hutchinson, T. J. Impressions of Western Africa. London. 
Johnston, Sir H. H. George Grenfell and the Congo. London, 

1908. 

(2) Rio Muni. (Spanish Guinea J 

Roche, J, B. Au Pays des Pahouins. Paris, 1904. 



376 APPENDIX 

GEEMAN COLONIES IN THE PACIFIC 

Blum, K. Neuguinea und der Bismarck Archipel. Berlin. 

Christian, F. W. The Caroline Islands. London, 1899. 

Das liberseeische Deutschland; die deutsche Kolonien in Wort 
und Bild. Berlin, 1903. 

D^eharme, P. Compagnies et Socigtes coloniales allemandes. 
Paris, 1903. 

Ehlers, O. E. Samoa, die Perle der Sudsee. Berlin, 1900. 

Finsch, O. Karolinen und Marianen. Hamburg, 1900. 

Hassert, K. Deutschlands Kolonien. Leipzig, 1910. 

Hesse-Wartegg, E. von. Samoa, Bismarckarchipel und Neu Guinea. 
Leipzig, 1902. 

Kramer, A. Die Samoa Inseln. Stuttgart, 1902. 

Krieger, M. Neu-Guinea. Berlin, 1899. 

Kurze, G. Samoa, das Land, die Leute, und die Mission. Ber- 
lin, 1899. 

Naehrichten uber Kaiser Wilhelmsland und den Bismarck-Arehi- 
pel. Herausgegeben von der Neu-Guinea Kompagnie. Berlin. 

Parkinson, R. Dreissig Jahre im der Siidsee. Land und Leute, 
Sitten und Gebrauehe auf dem Bismarck- Archipel. Stuttgart, 
1909. 

Pfeil, J. Graf Studien und Beobachtungen aus der Sudsee. 
Braunschweig, 1899. 

Eeinecke, F. Samoa. Berlin, 1901. 

Schnee, H. Bilder aus der Sudsee. (Bismarck- Archipel.) Ber- 
lin, 1904. 

Semon, R. Naehrichten iiber Kaiser Wilhelmsland. Berlin, 1899. 

Stair, J. R. Old Samoa. London, 1897. 

Stephan, E., and Grabner, F. Die Kiiste von Umuddu bis Kap 
Sankt Georg. (Neu-Mecklenburg.) Berlin, 1907. 

Tappenbeck, E. Deutsch Neu-Guinea. Berlin, 1901. 

Wegener, G. Deutschland in der Sudsee. Bielefeld, 1903. 

KIAO-CHAU 

Franzius, G. Kiautschou, Deutschlands Erwerbung in Ostasien. 

Berlin, 1898. 
Hesse Wartegg, E. von. Schantung und Deutsch-China. Leipzig, 

1898. 
Hirth, F. Schantung und Kiau-tschou. Munich, 1898. 



APPENDIX 377 

Janson, A. von. Tsingtau: Erwerb, Blute und Verlust. Berlin, 

1915. 
Jones, J. The Fall of Tsing-Tau. Boston, 1915. 
Riclitliofen, F. von. Schantung und seine Eingangspforte Kiaut- 

schou. Berlin, 1898. 



THE END 








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